Judgment :- 1. His Second Appeal is by the plaintiff in a suit for recovery of property with rent, past and future. The properties are said to have been leased orally in Thulam 1121 by Avaran Haji, the plaintiff's assignor, to the 1st defendant. Plaintiff has taken an assignment of the landlord's rights as per Ext. A4 dated 22-12-1947. 2. 2nd defendant was impleaded in this suit as one in joint cultivation of the property with the 1st defendant. The 2nd defendant disclaimed the lease, and set up an independent title in himself. He denied the title of Avaran Haji to any portion of the suit property and added that even if he had any title at any time that was extinguished by limitation and adverse possession of himself and his predecessors-in¬interest The learned Munsiff found the title of the suit property with the plaintiff, and the oral lease mentioned by the plaintiff to be true and decreed the suit. The learned Subordinate Judge, however, found, on a very detailed discussion of the evidence in the case, that the oral lease could not be true and that the plaintiff had no title to the property and dismissed the suit. Hence this Second Appeal. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant laid great stress on certain admissions made by the defence witnesses in the box, particularly to a statement in the cross-examination of Dw. 2, who is the son of Ummayyakutty Umma under whom the plaintiff traces his title, where, after referring to Exts. A2 and A3 he concluded saying: "Thus, plaintiff became entitled to the suit property". This statement coming from a defence witness would have gone a great way in proof of the plaintiff's title to the property but for the fact that other portions of the same deposition betrays that the witness was in utter confusion with regard to the identity of the property that he was adverting to. For, in another portion of the same deposition, he has sworn that the suit property is not included in the property assigned by his father (the reference is admittedly to Ext. A2 the conveyance by his mother). 4. For, in another portion of the same deposition, he has sworn that the suit property is not included in the property assigned by his father (the reference is admittedly to Ext. A2 the conveyance by his mother). 4. As the questions involved in this Second Appeal, namely, the genuineness of the oral lease and the plaintiff's title to the property, are pure questions of fact, and definite findings thereon have been entered by the first appellate court, they do not came within the purview of a second appeal. As has been categorically laid down by Supreme Court in Pattabhiramaswamy v. Hanymayya (AIR. 1959 SC. 57) it is not in the jurisdiction of a judge hearing a second appeal to canvass the correctness of findings of facts entered by the first appellate court. In the jurisdiction in which the suit arose the law at the time of the decision by the first appellate court was as laid down in the Indian Code of Civil Procedure (without the modification incorporated thereon by the Kerala Amendment Act, 1957). Under that Code the decisions on questions of fact by the first appellate court were final; when such a decision is given the finality thereof becomes a vested right of the party in whose favour the decision is; and his vested right cannot, without express provision in a statute, be affected by a subsequent amendment of the Civil Procedure Code. Hence the facts that the Second Appeal has been later on transferred to this Court with the reorganisation of the States and that before this appeal was heard the law came to be amended by the Kerala Act XIII of 1957 bringing divergent findings on questions of fact within the scope of a second appeal cannot avail in this case. I hold therefore that the merits of the findings of fact entered into by the first appellate court cannot be canvassed in this Second Appeal. It is after a detailed discussion of the evidence on record, that the appellate court has drawn its conclusions on the questions in dispute. Even if in the appreciation of the evidence, the first appellate court has erred, the ruling of the Supreme Court cited above is to the effect that the judge sitting in Second Appeal will not be competent to enter into the merits thereof. Even if in the appreciation of the evidence, the first appellate court has erred, the ruling of the Supreme Court cited above is to the effect that the judge sitting in Second Appeal will not be competent to enter into the merits thereof. See the judgment in S.A. No. 78 of 1955-M. No question of law arises in this case. The Second Appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.