JUDGMENT V.R. Newaskar, J. This second appeal preferred by the defendant raises the question regarding bar of limitation for the maintainability of the present suit for recovery of Rs. 1,000 as damages on account of wrongful attachment of plaintiff's property. The attachment had been effected in a proceeding for attachment before judgment in an earlier suit filed by the defendant against the plaintiff for recovery of money. This earlier suit was Civil Suit No. 388 of Samvat Year 2000. The present suit for recovery of damages was filed on 4-5-1951. According to the plaintiff in the earlier suit referred to above the defendant applied for attachment before judgment on certain grounds. This application was allowed and the Court by its order dated 16-9-1944 ordered the property of the plaintiff to be attached. In pursuance of this order actual seizure of the plaintiff's property took place on 19-9-1944 and the property thus seized was entrusted to a Supratdar. To this attachment the plaintiff objected on the grounds that the order for attachment bad been applied for on insufficient grounds. Plaintiff further states that he bad also claimed Rs. 1,000 as damages but the defendant failed to prosecute his application for attachment before judgment contested by the plaintiff and got the proceedings for attachment before judgment dismissed for default on 6-5-1946. The result was that the order of attachment before judgment was vacated. In the order dismissing the proceedings regarding wrongful attachment the Court ordered that the question of damages and costs for wrongful attachment would depend upon the decision of the earlier suit upon merits. However, it is said, the Court, while disposing of the defendant's suit against the plaintiff on 16-8-1050, gave no direction regarding the damages which had been claimed. The plaintiff, therefore, brings the present suit for recovery of damages and contends that the attachment had been applied for by the defendant maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause and on insufficient grounds. In giving the details as to damages claimed the plaintiff alleged that his shop which was near the Gopal Mandir square in Ujjain remained closed for 1 1/2 months. Rs. 500 are claimed as compensation in respect of this closure. Rs. 500 are further claimed for loss of reputation and credit due to the attachment effected by the defendant. In giving the details as to damages claimed the plaintiff alleged that his shop which was near the Gopal Mandir square in Ujjain remained closed for 1 1/2 months. Rs. 500 are claimed as compensation in respect of this closure. Rs. 500 are further claimed for loss of reputation and credit due to the attachment effected by the defendant. The cause of action was stated to have arisen on 16-9-1944 when the attachment was actually effected as also on 16-8-1950 when that Court failed to give any damages. The defendant contested the suit inter alia on the ground that the claim was barred by limitation. The defendant did not dispute the fact that the proceedings regarding inquiry as to the propriety of attachment were dismissed for default on 6-5-1946, He further did not accept the fact that any cause of action arose in plaintiff's favour on 16-8-1950, The trial Court framed issues bearing on the question of limitation which were issues Nos. 5, 7 and 8 and treated them as preliminary in pursuance of its power under Order 14, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. After hearing arguments addressed to it by the parties on those issues the trial Court held the claim of the plaintiff to be barred by time. According to it the starting point for limitation was 16-9-1944 and since the suit had been filed on 4-5-1951 it was barred by limitation under Article 13 of the Kanun Miyad Samaat Riyasat Gwalior which applied to the suit in question. The suit was accordingly dismissed. On appeal the appellate Court reversed the decision and held the suit to be within time. The suit was accordingly remanded for trial on other issues left undecided. The present appeal is directed against this order of remand. Mr. Chhajed for the appellant contended that the cause of action ought to be taken to have arisen on 16-9-1944 when the attachment of the plaintiff's property actually took place. The suit was accordingly remanded for trial on other issues left undecided. The present appeal is directed against this order of remand. Mr. Chhajed for the appellant contended that the cause of action ought to be taken to have arisen on 16-9-1944 when the attachment of the plaintiff's property actually took place. He contended that there was no Article corresponding to Article 29 of the Indian Limitation Act in Kanun Miyad Samaat Riyasat Gwalior but it is urged that even if we apply Article 13 of the Gwalior Act which corresponds to Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act still it cannot be disputed that the plaintiff's right to sue which means to make a claim for damages arose immediately on making the wrongful attachment and this cause of action then cannot be taken to have remained in suspension thereafter. The fact that the plaintiff made a claim in the earlier suit u/s 439 of the Gwalior CPC and failed to obtain redress cannot alter the situation as to the cause of action for the present suit. The Court below, therefore, was not right, according to the learned counsel, in treating the date of disposal of the former suit as the date when the plaintiff's right to file the present suit accrued to him. He, therefore, argued that even applying Article 13 of the Gwalior Act the present claim is clearly barred by limitation. The learned counsel in this connection referred to the decision reported in Pannaji Devi Chand and Co. v. Sanaji Kapur Chand (1) and Krishna v. Sitaram (2). It is not disputed that there is no provision corresponding to Article 29 of the Indian Limitation Act in Kanun Miyad Samaat Riyasat Gwalior and that the question of limitation will have to be determined with reference to Article 13 of the Gwalior Act which corresponds to Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act. That provision is as follows:- Suit for which no period of Six years. When the right to sue accrues limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. Main point, therefore, which arises for consideration is, when does the right to sue accrue to the plaintiff ? Does it accrue when the attachment of his property takes place or it accrues only after the decision of the earlier suit which failed to award him any damages which he had claimed ? Main point, therefore, which arises for consideration is, when does the right to sue accrue to the plaintiff ? Does it accrue when the attachment of his property takes place or it accrues only after the decision of the earlier suit which failed to award him any damages which he had claimed ? In the absence of an Article corresponding to Article 29 of the Indian Limitation Act it cannot be said that the starting point of limitation is the date of seizure. The view, taken in Pannaji Devi Chand and Co., v. Sanaji Kapur Chand AIR 1930 Mad. 636 and AIR 1931 47 (Nagpur) , that the time begins to run under Article 29 of the Limitation Act from the date of actual seizure and not from the date the seizure is declared wrongful by a competent Court, has no application. But it is contended on behalf of the appellant that even under Article 13 of the Gwalior Act the right to sue should be taken to have accrued in plaintiff's favour when his property was wrongfully attached. In order to consider this question it will be necessary to refer to some of the decisions relied upon on behalf of the respondent. In Bassu Kuar v. Dhum Singh 151 A 211, the facts were that Barumal and Dhumsingh, who were Bankers in Saharanpur, had dealings together and Dhumsingh came to owe to Barumal Rs. 33,359-3-6. It was agreed between them that Dhumsingh should convey to Barumal or to his wife, Bassu Kuar, certain villages for a sum of Rs. 65,000 and that his debt referred to above should be set off against the price. A deed was thereupon executed by Dhumsingh in favour of Barumal by which he acknowledged the receipt of the whole purchase money and conveyed to Barumal's wife Bassu Kuar certain villages and he endorsed on the deed a memorandum showing that the balance only of the price, after allowing for the debt, was paid in cash. No money, however, was actually paid. This deed of conveyance was taken away by Barumal and a letter was signed prepared by Dhumsingh whereby he agreed to register the deed and pay the balance of the price. The dispute at this stage arose, Barumal saying that the deed was not in accordance with the conditions which had been stipulated. Dhumsingh, however, asserted to the contrary. This deed of conveyance was taken away by Barumal and a letter was signed prepared by Dhumsingh whereby he agreed to register the deed and pay the balance of the price. The dispute at this stage arose, Barumal saying that the deed was not in accordance with the conditions which had been stipulated. Dhumsingh, however, asserted to the contrary. A suit was filed by Dhumsingh for specific performance of the contract which Barumal resisted on the ground that the deed did not incorporate the stipulated conditions and that he had a right to recede from the bargain. A decree for specific performance was passed by the Subordinate Judge on 24-2-1881 in favour of Dhumsingh. The decree was later reversed by the High Court in appeal and Dhumsingh's suit was dismissed. At that stage Barumal renewed his demand for payment of debts and later on filed a suit for recovery of the same on 10-9-1884. On these facts it was observed by Hobhouse J. as follows:- Up to the date of the Subordinate Judge's decree in 1881, Dhumsingh retained the amount of his debt as of right, and in accordance with the contract alleged by him. After the decree of 18S1 he still retained it as of right, and with a title which could not be disputed in any Court of justice, except by the one mode of appeal from the decree of 1881. Barumal might have sued for his debt, but the utmost benefit that could have come to him from such a suit would have been to have it suspended or retained in Court till after decision of the appeal in the specific performance suit, Dhumsingh's defence would have been that the debt was paid by virtue of the contract, and that defence must have prevailed if the suit were heard while the decree of 1881 still stood unreversed. It would be an inconvenient state of the law if it were found necessary for a man to institute a perfectly vain litigation under peril of losing his property if he does not. It would be an inconvenient state of the law if it were found necessary for a man to institute a perfectly vain litigation under peril of losing his property if he does not. And it would be a lamentable state of the law if it were found that a debtor who for years has been insisting that his creditor shall take payment in a particular mode, can, when it is decided that he cannot enforce that mode, turn round and say that the lapse of time has relieved him from paying at all. Principle of this decision was applied in a case by the Lahore High Court reported in AIR 1939 6 (Lahore) . In that case certain property was sold by Mr. Coates to the Maharaja of Faridkot. Later the creditors of Mr. Coates sought execution of the decree obtained by them against him and attached the property sold to the Maharaja. An objection was put to this attachment by the Maharaja which however failed and a suit under Order 21, rule 63, CPC was filed for a declaration that the property belonged to him and was not liable for attachment and sale in execution of the decree against Mr. Coates. The suit was held to have abated on 13-3-1908. There was an appeal by the Maharaja which was dismissed, The Maharaja thereupon upon preferred appeal to the Privy Council. The appeal was allowed and the order regarding abatement was set aside on 19-7-1917. The declaratory suit was thereupon heard but was dismissed by the trial Court but on appeal to the High Court it was decreed on 15-10-1928. By this time the property had been acquired by the Government and the amount mentioned in the award was sent to the executing Court which had it distributed amongst the various creditors of Mr. Coates. After the decree for declaration was obtained by the Maharaja he filed a suit against those creditors and the question of limitation arose. The aforesaid decision of the Privy Council was applied by the Lahore High Court to this case and it was held that the suit which was filed on 14-10-1930 was not barred by limitation. Coates. After the decree for declaration was obtained by the Maharaja he filed a suit against those creditors and the question of limitation arose. The aforesaid decision of the Privy Council was applied by the Lahore High Court to this case and it was held that the suit which was filed on 14-10-1930 was not barred by limitation. It was observed that it was not obligatory upon the Maharaja to bring perfectly a vain litigation with the natural result that it would be met either by a perfect defence or that the suit would be held in suspense and await the decision of the appeal in another Butt. Should we apply the principle of these decisions to the circumstances of the present case ? Here the plaintiff had claimed damages u/s 439 of the Gwalior CPC in the earlier suit and the contest with respect to that was going on when the proceedings for attachment before judgment were dismissed for default on 6-5-1946. The Court held over the question with regard to award of compensation until the decision in the main case. In the main case itself, it failed to refer to this question. The result was that the plaintiff did not obtain any redress in respect of the claim for damages nor was there any determination as to his right to do so. In view of this position a suit for recovery of the amount of damages claimed by him was perfectly competent under the provision of section 439 of the Gwalior Civil Procedure Code. Should he, therefore, have filed the suit before the decision of the earlier suit or ought to have waived ? If it was necessary for him to wait then in that case his right to sue would accrue when he fails to obtain the necessary redress. It is clear to me that the plaintiff having already laid a claim for damages in the earlier suit a second suit for the same purpose would be a vain litigation. To borrow the expression used by their Lordships of the Privy Council had he brought the present suit before the disposal of the earlier suit it would have been either held to be incompetent in view of the fact that the identical claim was under consideration or at any rate it would have been held in suspense awaiting the decision of the other case. In this state of things the principle of the decision of the Privy Council as well as of the Lahore High Court referred to above ought to apply in this case. On the facts as they appear in the present case there was no occasion for the plaintiff to file the present suit until the earlier suit was decided without determining the question of damages in respect of wrongful attachment of his property. The Court below was, therefore, right in holding the claim to be within time. The order of remand is, therefore, proper. The appeal is consequently dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed