Sohan Lal v. State — 1961 DIGILAW 176 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Kailash Prasad, J. - These are three connected cases-two appeals and one revision-which arise from the judgment dated 8th October, 1960 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Mathura. Appeal No. 1943 of 1960 has been filed by Sohan Lal Sharma, a practising Lawyer of Mathura, who has been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge u/s 500 IPC and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 100 and in default of payment of fine to simple imprisonment for seven days. Appeal No. 62 of 1961 has been filed by Narendra Mitra, Editor, printer and publisher of a newspaper called 'Nai Lahar.' He has been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge u/s 501 and 502 IPC and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 50 under each count. In default of payment of fine he has been ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for seven days. The Cr.R. has been filed by the state of Uttar Pradesh with the prayer that the sentences passed on the accused be enhanced. 2. The case of the prosecution is that between 27-3-1955 and 28-4-1957, K.B. Saksena, Tahsildar was the consolidation officer of Baldeo Circle in Mathura district. In the issue of 28-4-1956 of the newspaper Nai Lahar there appeared an article containing defamatory matter. Sohan Lal Sharma contributed the article and Narendra Mitra printed and published it in the said newspaper. The article contained matters defamatory of K.B. Saksena. The original article is Exhibit (sic)a. 4 and it admittedly bears the signatures of Sohan Lal Sharma. The complaint was filed u/s 198B, CrPC. 3. Both the Appellants pleaded not guilty and denied the charges framed against them. Sohan Lal Sharma stated that the article was signed by him, but he denied that he sent it to Narendral Mitra for publication in Nai Lahar. He further stated that he could not say how it was published. He also stated that the matter contained in the article was not defamatory and the contents of the article were entirely true and he has been prosecuted only because he was opposed to corruption rampant in the department of Consolidation of Holdings. 4. Narendra Mitra did not deny the publication of the, article in his newspaper. He admitted that a short note above the article was his own. 4. Narendra Mitra did not deny the publication of the, article in his newspaper. He admitted that a short note above the article was his own. He also stated that Sohan Lal Sharma had given it to him for publication in the newspaper and the contents of the article were so far as he knew, true. 5. Seven witnesses were produced in support of the prosecution case and sixteen witnesses were called in defence. 6. The Additional Sessions Judge, after considering the evidence convicted and sentenced the Appellants as mentioned above. The Appellants have, therefore, filed these appeals against their conviction and sentences and the contention on behalf of the State is that the punishment awarded to the Appellants by the Additional Sessions Judge is too meagre and inadequate. The prayer, therefore, on behalf of the State is for enhancement of the sentences passed on the Appellants. 7. The contention of the Appellants that the allegations made in the article against K.B. Saksena are not defamatory, is not correct. The article details many, irregularities of the consolidation department and the harassment caused to the public by its officials. It ends with the allegation that the consolidation officer amassed a tidy amount by way of bribe. There can be no doubt that the imputation of bribe are calculated to harm the reputation of the consolidation officer and are, therefore, defamatory of him. 8. Another contention of the Appellants is that the complaint, on which the Additional Sessions Judge took cognizance of the offence, was bad in law in as much as the provisions of Section 198B, Code of Criminal Procedure were not complied with. It was pointed out in support of the contention that the complaint was signed by K.B. Saksena as complainant, while Section 198 B requires that the complaint should be in writing and should be made by the public prosecutor. The original complaint is on record. It is correct that K.B. Saksena had signed it purporting to be the complainant, but it also bears the signatures of the Public Prosecutor. An order dated 27-10-1956 made by the Sessions Judge on the back of the complaint shows that the complaint was filed by Mr. Haveli Ram, public prosecutor at the house of the Judge at 5-43 P.M. Mr. Haveli Ram also filed a telegram of Government sanctioning the prosecution of the accused. An order dated 27-10-1956 made by the Sessions Judge on the back of the complaint shows that the complaint was filed by Mr. Haveli Ram, public prosecutor at the house of the Judge at 5-43 P.M. Mr. Haveli Ram also filed a telegram of Government sanctioning the prosecution of the accused. The Judge directed that the complaint was to be put up on 29-10-1956 for orders. Mr. Haveli Ram seems to have appended his signature to this order in token of the receipt of its information. The fact is, there-fore, established that the complaint was filed by the public prosecutor. Section 198 B does not require that the complaint should be signed by the public prosecutor. What it requires is that the complaint should be in writing and it should be made by the public prosecutor. The expression 'made' evidently means 'made to the Court.' Here the complaint was in Writing and it was made to the court by the public prosecutor by presenting it to the Judge. The fact that the complaint was signed by K.B. Saksena consolidation officer, will not detract from its being made by the public prosecutor. 'Complaint,' as defined in Cl. (h) of Section 4 Code of Criminal Procedure means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code, that some person whether known or unknown has committed an offence. For prosecution for defamation against public servant in respect of their conduct in the discharge of public functions, a special provision is made in the Code of Criminal Procedure that the complaint is to be made to a court of Session and not to a Magistrate. With this difference the expression 'complaint' in Section 198 B means the same as defined in Cl. (h) of S. 4. The essential element of 'Complaint' is to make allegations to a court with a view to its taking action under the CrPC. As the allegations can be oral, it is clear that the making of a complaint does not imply its being signed by the complainant. In our view 'making' means "bringing to the notice of". 9. Section 198B however requires that the complaint should be in writing. As the allegations can be oral, it is clear that the making of a complaint does not imply its being signed by the complainant. In our view 'making' means "bringing to the notice of". 9. Section 198B however requires that the complaint should be in writing. The complaint in question is in writing and it was presented to a Sessions Judge by the public prosecutor of Mathura with a view that the Sessions Judge may take action thereon against the persons who were alleged in the complaint to have committed the offence of defaming the public servant. The complaint was, therefore, made by the public prosecutor and the provisions of Section 198 B were duly complied with. 10. It was next contended on behalf of the Appellants that the complaint was time barred as it was not filed within six months of the committing of the alleged offence of defamation. 11. Cl. (4) of Section 198 B Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that no court of session shall take cognizance of an offence under sub Section (1), unless the complaint is made within six months from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. The complaint in question was filed, as will appear from the Judge's order on its back, on 27-10-1956. The article containing defamatory matter was published in Nai Lahar on 28-4-1956. It was the Appellant Narendra Mitra who was the publisher of the newspaper. He, therefore committed the offence on 28-4-1956 and the complaint against him is certainly within time. 12. The contention of Sohan Lal Sharma is two fold. His first contention is that he never sent the article to Narendra Mitra for publication in Nai Lahar and secondly, if it be established that he sent the article for publication, it must have been sent before 28-4-1956, and so the offence, if any was committed by him before 28-4-1956 and the complaint against him would be time barred. 13. The essence of the offence of defamation is the intention to harm reputation, and that necessarily requires publicity to be given to the imputation. It may, be that Sohan Lal Sharma once gave publicity when he sent the article to the publisher of Nai Lahar. 13. The essence of the offence of defamation is the intention to harm reputation, and that necessarily requires publicity to be given to the imputation. It may, be that Sohan Lal Sharma once gave publicity when he sent the article to the publisher of Nai Lahar. He again committed the offence when the article was published in the newspaper at his instance and the publication in the paper gave wider publicity to the defamatory allegation. Sohan Lal Sharma, therefore, committed the offence on 28-4-1960 if the article was published at his instance. The question, therefore, arises if Sohan Lal Sharma sent this article for publication. * * * 14. In the absence of any explanation by Sohan Lal Sharma how Ex. Ka. 4 reached Narendra Mitra or any suggestion that Dr. Pathak was ill disposed towards him, we have no hesitation in finding that Ex Ka. 4 was delivered to Narendra Mitra by Sohan Lal Sharma for publishing it in Nai Lahar of which Narendra Mitra was the editor, printer and publisher. Sohan Lal Sharma cannot, therefore, escape the responsibility for the publication of the article on 28th April, 1956. As the publication was made at his instance, Sohan Lal Sharma again committed the offence on 28th April, 1956, the date of the issue of the news paper. The complaint was, therefore, filed within six months of the date of the commission of the offence and is not time barred. 15. It was next contended on behalf of the Appellants that the complaint could not be entertained against them as the sanction given by the Government for the prosecution of the accused was defective. It was argued that the order sanctioning the prosecution did not contain the fact constituting the charge and so the sanction was bad in law. There is nothing in law which requires that the order sanctioning prosecution must contain a detail of the facts constituting the charge. What appears necessary is that the Government before making an order sanctioning the prosecution, should have before it the full facts on which prosecution is sought to be lodged. In the present case the D.M., when he moved the Government for sanction, sent to the Government a copy of the article in question along with his report. Government had thus before it all the necessary material to consider the question of granting sanction. In the present case the D.M., when he moved the Government for sanction, sent to the Government a copy of the article in question along with his report. Government had thus before it all the necessary material to consider the question of granting sanction. There is, therefore, no force in the Appellant's argument that the order of sanction is defective. 16. Another contention of the Appellants is that the case falls within the First and Ninth Exceptions to S. 499 IPC and as such they did not commit the offence of defamation. 17. The first Exception to S. 499 provides that it is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be made or published. The Ninth Exception runs to the following effect:- It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it or of any other person, or for the public good. 18. For a defence under the First Exception the imputation has to be true and the publication of it has to be for public good. As many as 11 witnesses were examined by the defence in support of the contention that the allegations in the article were true. * * * 19. Sohan Lal Sharma who appeared as defence witness No. 16, too, had no personal knowledge of any case of bribery. The Sessions Judge, therefore, rightly found that it was not established that the imputations contained in the article were true. The first Exception cannot, therefore, be of any avail to the Appellants. 20. The essential feature of the Ninth Exception is that the imputations should be made in good faith for the public good. Good faith implies due and reasonable care and caution. We have seen above that no specific instance of bribery has been proved. The witnesses who gave specific instances of bribery are thoroughly unreliable. The other witnesses did not know of any specific instance of bribe having been given to the consolidation officer. They at the most knew that there were complaints against the inferior staff of the consolidation department. 21. Appellant Narendra Mitra entered the witness box as D.W. 5. The witnesses who gave specific instances of bribery are thoroughly unreliable. The other witnesses did not know of any specific instance of bribe having been given to the consolidation officer. They at the most knew that there were complaints against the inferior staff of the consolidation department. 21. Appellant Narendra Mitra entered the witness box as D.W. 5. He stated that he had verified the contents of the article from Hukam Chand Tewari and Keshav Deo Sharma. We have seen the testimony of these witnesses. They had no such information that the consolidation officer had amassed a large amount in bribe. The Appellant Sohan Lal in his examination-in-chief stated that Radhey Shyam Sharma, Champadevi and Nandkishore had told him that the consolidation officer had earned thirty thousand rupees in bribe. In cross examination he enlarged the list of his informers. He stated that Radhey Shyam, Yad Ram, Hukam Singh, Dipa, Ram Het, Ghure, Bhajan Lal, Champadevi, Charan Singh, Nand Kishore, Dori Lal Chholi and others had told him that Sri Saksena had collected Rs. 30,000 in bribe. On this long list of his informers only Dori Lal was produced. We have seen above that his testimony is unreliable. None of the witnesses bears the name of Radhey Shyam Sharma. One Radhey Shyam Jotshi has been produced as DW 12. He stated that he received complaints of irregularities and bribes against the officials of Chakbandi. He further stated that the complaints were, against the officers also. The witness, no where mentioned the name of any officer. On the other hand, he stated that the names of the persons were not mentioned in the complaints received by him. He could not therefore, convey any information to Sohan Lal Sharma to the effect that the consolidation officer had collected Rs. 30,000 in bribe. It is, therefore, perfectly clear that the information in possession of the Appellants could not have fairly and reasonably led them to the inference that Sri Saksena had collected thousands of rupees in bribe. It cannot, therefore, be said that the imputations, were made in good faith. The appeals have no force and must fail. 22. We are of the view that the sentences awarded to the Appellants by the Sessions Judge will meet the ends of Justice and there is no necessity to enhance the sentence. 23. We accordingly dismiss the revision and the two appeals.