JUDGMENT Mukerji, J. - This is a First Appeal From Order which was referred to a Bench of two Judges by our brother S.N. Sahai, J. 2. The short question that falls for determination in the appeal was whether the suit that had been filed in the Civil Court could appropriately be field there or whether on the facts and on the circumstances of the case the Civil Court had no jurisdiction and that the suit was triable by a Revenue Court. 3. The facts giving rise to this appeal may now be shortly stated. The Appellant, who was the Plaintiff, filed a suit for an injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with the Plaintiff's possession. It may here be stated that prior to this suit for injunction the Plaintiff had filed another suit for a declaration-the declaration having been sought under the provisions of Section 63 of the UP Tenancy Act-in the Revenue Court. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen viz, the injunction suit, had been filed on 31st May, 1951, while the declaration suit u/s 63 of the UP Tenancy Act had been filed earlier viz. on the 6th of April, 1951. The declaration suit had been stayed and it appears that because of that stay the Plaintiff was forced to file the suit for seeking a relief for injunction. 4. According to the plaint the Plaintiff only asserted his ownership of the plots, which were said to be his occupancy holdings. The plaint also showed that according to the Plaintiff the Defendants had by chicanery got their names wrongly entered in the village papers. The plaint also made a clear averment to the effect that a declaratory suit u/s 63 of the UP Tenaney Act had been filed and that the said suit was pending disposal. 5. The trial Court decreed the Plaintiff's suit even though there was before it a plea of jurisdiction. It held that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to try and give relief in the present suit. 5. The trial Court decreed the Plaintiff's suit even though there was before it a plea of jurisdiction. It held that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to try and give relief in the present suit. On appeal the lower appellate court came to the conclusion, relying on two decisions of this Court in D.N. Rage v. Kazi Mohammad Haider 1946 AWR (HC) 403 and Syed Mohammad Zahir Husan v. Dulare 1953 AWR (HC.) 414 that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try this suit and therefore it set aside the decision of the learned Munsif and directed the plaint to be returned to the Plaintiff for presentation to the proper court. The Plaintiff preferred an appeal to this Court and that appeal came up before a learned Single Judge, who, in view of the decision reported in Syed Mohd. Zahir Husan v. Dulare (Supra) referred this case to a Bench. The learned single Judge said that he found it difficult to agree with the views expressed in the aforementioned case. 6. Strictly speaking the decision in Syed Mohd. Zahir Husan's case did not apply, because that decision was distinguishable on the facts of the present case. As we noticed earlier, in the present case the Plaintiff had already raised an action for a declaration before the Revenue Court. The Revenue Court, it is conceded, was the proper forum for the declaration which the Plaintiff sought and which may have been necessary for the Plaintiff to obtain in view of some of the misdoings of the Defendants, particularly in view of the fact that the Defendants had, their names recorded in the village papers. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen, was, as we have pointed out earlier, a second suit and this suit was for injunction simpliciter and so could not possibly lie in any Revenue Court and where, as in this case, the Plaintiff had sought the two possible remedies available to him in two Courts which respectively could exercise appropriate jurisdiction in respect of the respective reliefs sought, then in such a case there could be no question of the rule of law laid down in Syed Mohd. Zahir Husan's case applying. Zahir Husan's case applying. Assuming, with respect, that the decision was right, though in the view that we have taken it has not been necessary for us to pronounce on the correctness or otherwise of this decision, and we may also point out that if it had become necessary to pronounce on the correctness or otherwise of the decision given in Syed Mohd. Zahir Husan's case then the only course open to us would have been to refer the matter to a Full Bench. 7. Mr. Moti Lal a spearing on behalf of the Respondent argued that it made no difference to the application of Section 242 of the UP Tenancy Act and for determining the jurisdiction of the court under the provisions of that section as to whether or not the Plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration, and that the said suit was pending in the Revenue Court. We are unable to agree with this contention for the obvious reason that one of the reliefs which could be asked for by the Plaintiff on his entire cause of action included a relief of declaration, which was cognizable by the Revenue Court had already been sought by the Plaintiff from a court that had jurisdiction to give that relief and therefore even on the view taken by the Bench in Syed Mohd. Zahir Husan's case this particular suit could not be said to have been cognizable by the Revenue Court on the ground that "any relief obtainable by the Plaintiff could be granted by the revenue Court." Mr. Moti Lal next relied upon the Full Bench decision in D.N. Rege's case. In our view that case too was not applicable. 8. Mr. Moti Lal next contended that where the Plaintiff had sought a declaration in the Revenue Court by a suit and that suit had been stayed then the Plaintiff's second suit, if there was any in a Civil Court for injunction could not succeed because before there was a declaration an injunction could not be granted Mr. Moti Lal may be right or may not be right in his contention but what he contends for in our opinion touches the merits of the matter and does not raise a question of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. Moti Lal may be right or may not be right in his contention but what he contends for in our opinion touches the merits of the matter and does not raise a question of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. Whether a court ultimately grants an injunction or not is not a question germane to the entertainment of the suit for injunction, but, as we have said, is a matter affecting the merits. 9. The last argument of Mr. Moti Lal was that by splitting up the cause of action the Plaintiff, had in a sense, played a fraud on the court viz, that he had deprived the Revenue Court of the jurisdiction over the entire subject matter. He had, Mr. Moti Lal contended, also in a sense, conferred jurisdiction on the Civil Court to grant the injunction where, in his view of the matter, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction at all. In our view this argument has no substance, for we know that is open to a Plaintiff to chcose his forum if the law permits such a choice. A Plaintiff is entitled to commit fraud on the court in order either to attract the jurisdiction of a particular court or to deprive a court of jurisdiction. But the circumstances on which this principle of law would be given effect to are entirely different from the circumstances on which Sri Moti Lal could rely in this case. 10. The question whether a court has jurisdiction to try a suit or not is primarily determinable on the allegations made in the plaint. The allegations made by the Defendant in the written statement are not germane to the determination of the question of initial jurisdiction. If the allegations of the Defendant make out, ultimately, that the court had no jurisdiction because the allegation in the plaint on which the court initially exercised jurisdiction were wrongly then the Court could dismiss the suit or make any other appropriate order which the court though fit; but then the allegations in the written statement were not, as we have said, relevant for the purposes of determining whether initially a court could exercise jurisdiction to entertain a particular suit or not. 11. In the view which we have taken above we are of opinion that the court below was wrong in holding that the suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court. 11. In the view which we have taken above we are of opinion that the court below was wrong in holding that the suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Court below and the order of remand by the Court and send the case back to the lower appellate Court for a decision of the appeal on the merits. Costs of this appeal will abide the result.