Rameshwar Prasad v. Collector, Bharatpur — 1961 DIGILAW 18 (RAJ)

CHHANGANI, J.—This is an application under Art. 226 of the Indian Constitution by one Shri Rameshwar Prasad Modi praying for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to remove the resolution dated 27.8.1960 declaring the motion of no-confidence as carried out against the petitioner Chairman; and "writ in the nature of prohibition or any other appropriate writ or order restraining the respondent No.1 the Collector Bharatpur from enforcing the effect of the impugned resolution. Further prayers for restraining a fresh election of Chairman and interference with petitioner discharging duties as Chairman by the petitioner have also been made. 2. The material facts are these: The petitioner was elected a member of the Municipal Board on 6.1.1958, and later on, on 18.6.1958 he was elected Chairman of the Board. The Board originally consisted of 18 members. One Shri Umraosingh, a member elected from Ward No. 16 died in the year 1959 and his seat remained vacant and it is not in dispute that the "whole number" or "total number of members" holding office at all material and relevant times was 17. On 24th July, 1960, a written notice of intention to make a motion of no confidence in the Chairman, the petitioner before us, signed by six members Sarv Sri Anant Prasad, Raghubir Singh, Kishan Gopal, Hari Shanker, Shamshuddin and Girraj Singh, respondents No. 13, 4, 16, 6, 9 and 5 respectively, marked Ex. P-5, was sent together with a copy of the motion marked Ex. P.6 to the Collector Bharatpur, respondent No. 1, who is the prescribed authority for the purposes of provisions of sec. 72 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (Act No. 38 of 1959 hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1959). Respondent No. 1, the prescribed authority, decided to convene a meeting to be held on 27th August, 1960 at 1 P.M. in the office of the Municipal Board. A notice dated 17th August, 1960 of the meeting was sent to the petitioner at first by express delivery and then by registered post, which is marked Ex. P-2. 3. Respondent No. 1, the prescribed authority, decided to convene a meeting to be held on 27th August, 1960 at 1 P.M. in the office of the Municipal Board. A notice dated 17th August, 1960 of the meeting was sent to the petitioner at first by express delivery and then by registered post, which is marked Ex. P-2. 3. A day prior to the date of the meeting, the petitioner sent letters under postal certificates to respondents Sarv Sri Girraj Singh, Hari Shanker, Ajai Singh, Shamshuddin and Krishna Gopal, respondents No. 5, 6, 7, 9 and 16 respectively stating that they were in arrears of taxes or dues and have had incurred disqualifications under clause (xiv) of sec. 26 of the Act of 1959. The petitioner also submitted a written objection petition to the respondent No. 1 stating that the above named five respondents having incurred disqualifications under sec. 26 sub-sec. (xiv) of the Act of 1959, could not be permitted to take part in the meeting for the consideration of the no-confidence motion. There is some controversy between the parties as to the precise time at which the objection petition was presented. The petitioner states to have filed it at 12-30 p.m., whereas, according to Ex. P-4, a copy of the proceedings of the meeting, it appears to have been received by the respondent No. 1 at 1-15 p.m. However, the controversy is immaterial for the purposes of the present writ application inasmuch as it came up for consideration before the discussions on the no-confidence motion. The respondent No. 1 found vide his decision Ex. P-3 that Sri Girraj Singh, respondent No. 5, was in arrears of dues from September, 1956 and hence, was disqualified under sec. 26 (xiv) of the Act of 1959, and, therefore, upheld the objection of the petitioner to the effect that he was not entitled to vote. As regards the other respondents, he found against the petitioner and overruled the objection. The motion was eventually put to vote at 5 p.m. In all, nine members respondents No. 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16 and 17 voted for the motion. The petitioner also states that when respondent No. 15 Ashfaq Ali Khan raised his hand for the motion, he had objected to his participation on the ground that he had incurred a disqualification under sec. 26 (xii) of the Act of 1959. The petitioner also states that when respondent No. 15 Ashfaq Ali Khan raised his hand for the motion, he had objected to his participation on the ground that he had incurred a disqualification under sec. 26 (xii) of the Act of 1959. He further states that he had also challenged the constitutionality of the very notice of motion and the motion under sec. 72 of the Act of 1959. There is, however, no reference to these objections in Ex. P-4, the copy of the proceedings and the contesting respondents deny them. The respondent No. 1 finding that the total number of members was 17 and that nine members constituting majority of the total number of members, having voted for the motion, declared the motion carried out. It may also be mentioned that Hari Shanker respondent No. 6, Ajai Singh respondent No. 7 and Shamshuddin respondent No. 9 in spite of findings in their favour tendered the amounts claimed as due from them under protest to avoid unnecessary complications. 4. The petitioner is challenging the validity of the no confidence motion by means of this writ application on the following grounds: — (1) The notice of motion of no confidence having been signed by disqualified members, namely, Girraj Singh, Shamshuddin, Krishan Gopal and Hari Shanker, could not have been taken note of and the meeting held was not a proper one, and all the proceedings taken and the declaration of no confidence as passed, are null and void. In particular, it has been emphasised that at any rate Sri Girraj Singh having been found disqualified by respondent No. 1 and having been disallowed to take part in the meeting his signatures on the written notice Ex. P-5 were of no avail, or legal effect and the notice having been validly signed by only five members, who did not constitute one-third of the total members, was not valid in law and did not provide a proper and valid foundation for the convening of a meeting for a consideration of the no-confidence meeting. (2) Secondly, it is urged that the five members, Shamshuddin, Krishna Gopal, Hari Shanker, Ajai Singh and Ashfaq Ali Khan having incurred disqualification under sec. 26 clauses (xiv and xii) had no right to vote and that the respondent manifestly erred in overruling the petitioners objections to their voting. (2) Secondly, it is urged that the five members, Shamshuddin, Krishna Gopal, Hari Shanker, Ajai Singh and Ashfaq Ali Khan having incurred disqualification under sec. 26 clauses (xiv and xii) had no right to vote and that the respondent manifestly erred in overruling the petitioners objections to their voting. According to him, the votes of these five persons should have been ignored and in consequence the motion having been supported only by four persons should have been declared as not carried out. 5. The respondents have submitted varying replies. The respondents No. 4, 6, 11, 13 15 and 16, represented by Mr. Tyagi, have strongly opposed the writ application inter alia on the following grounds :— (1) That the notices issued by the petitioner on 29.8.1960 to the five members claiming that they were in arrears of taxes were without foundation, and that the motive behind the issue of such notices was only to save his chair by trying to avoid the meeting. (2) That the Collector, the prescribed authority, had no jurisdiction to decide the controversy relating to the disqualifications of the members raised by the petitioner, and that he was, therefore, wrong even in restraining Sri Girrajsingh, from exercising his right to Vote. They traversed the allegations of facts relating to the disqualifications of members and contended that the various members had the right of vote, and that the motion was properly carried out. 6. The respondent no. 5 Shri Girrajsingh, represented by Mr. Sarolia, submitted a reply admitting the allegations of the petit oner in the writ application. It is significant to observe that the reply was not supported by any affidavit initially. It was only on 19.1.1961, subsequently to the commencement of the arguments that an affidavit has been filed. 7. Similarly, the respondents Nos. 3, 8, 9, 12, 14, 10, 18 and 7, represented by Mr. J. S. Rastogi, by means of two replies, one on behalf of Ajaisingh and the other on behalf of the rest, admitted the petitioners case. The replies were not supported by affidavits and it was only, on 17.1.1961, that one Sri Ajaisingh has filed an affidavit. 8. Before taking up the respective contentions of the parties, it will be desirable to to refer to sec. The replies were not supported by affidavits and it was only, on 17.1.1961, that one Sri Ajaisingh has filed an affidavit. 8. Before taking up the respective contentions of the parties, it will be desirable to to refer to sec. 26 of the Act of 1959 dealing with disqualifications of the members as the controversy between the parties has mainly centred over the alleged disqualifications :— 9. It begins with a sentence— A person, notwithstanding that he is otherwise qualified, shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being a member of a board." Thereafter, follow fourteen clauses specifying the qualifications. Then there is a proviso declaring how the various kinds of disqualifications shall cease to operate. 10. The opening sentence is ofcourse wide and disables persons suffering from disqualifications from standing as candidates for election, and further prevents them from continuing as members. The section, however, does not say anything as to how the disqualifications can be noticed and given effect to. It will be convenient to point out at this stage that sec. 12(2) of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951 (Act No. XXIII of 1951-hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1951) provided that "if any person elected or nominated as a member is subject to any of the disqualifications specified in sub-sec. (1), his seat shall be deemed to be vacant". Sub-sec. (5) of that Act further provided: — "If any question or dispute arises whether a vacancy has occurred under this section, the orders of the Government shall be final for the purpose of deciding such question or dispute." There are, however, no similar provisions in sec. 26 of the Act of 1959. There are ofcourse, in the Act of 1959 various provisions under which disqualifications can be relied upon for appropriate action. Firstly, under sec. 34(a) the election of a person as a member may be questioned by election petition on the ground that he was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under the Act on the ground of disqualifications mentioned in sec. 26. Firstly, under sec. 34(a) the election of a person as a member may be questioned by election petition on the ground that he was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under the Act on the ground of disqualifications mentioned in sec. 26. Secondly, under Rule 6(2)(a) of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Election of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, President and Vice-President) Rules, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Election Rules, 1959) a Returning Officer appointed for the purpose of holding and conducting an election of Chairman may reject nomination of a candidate on the ground that he suffers from any of the general disqualifications mentioned in sec. 26 of the Act of 1959. Similarly, under R. 3(a) of the Rajasthan Municipal Boards Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen and Municipal Councils Presidents and Vice-Presidents (Election Petition) Rule, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Election Petition Rules, 1959), the election may be questioned on the ground of disqualifications mentioned in sec. 26. And, lastly, under sec. 63, disqualifications may be relied upon for enabling the State Government to remove a member but only after an inquiry and findings by a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge and only in conformity with his findings. On the basis of these provisions the case for the contesting respondents in opposition to the writ application may be appropriately stated as follows: — The Act has made specific provisions for noticing and giving effect to disqualifications for several purposes, and that these various provisions contemplate Inquiries into the controversy and fair opportunity to all. Considering these provisions and the language of sec. 26, it does not contemplate that either the Chairman of the Board or a prescribed authority presiding over a meeting under sec. 72 of the Act of 1959 should be competent to notice and give effect to disqualifications and prevent members from exercising their rights, in a summary manner on what may very often be imperfect information and without inquiry and fair opportunity to the member concerned and that a member must be deemed to continue in office capable of exercising all rights untill removal or suspension under sec. 63. A provision in sec. 63. A provision in sec. 63 for the suspension of a member until the conclusion of the inquiry and the passing of a final order implicitly recognises the right of a member to continue until the valid declaration to the effect that he is disqualified. 11. On behalf of the petitioner, various arguments have been advanced for a contrary contention. In the first instance, a great stress was laid on the opening sentence of sec. 26 disabling persons subject to disqualifications from both being chosen and continuing and it was contended that the incurring of the disqualifications was intended to imply an automatic termination of the members and that a fact of a member having become subject to this disqualification can be noticed and given effect to by a Chairman of the Board or by the prescribed authority under sec. 72 on proper materials coming to their notice. Any other interpretation will mean allowing a disqualified member to function and will result in making sec. 26 meaningless and nugatory. It was also pointed out that there are some disqualifications for which there can not be any serious controversy and they can be easily ascertained without an elaborate inquiry. It was further indicated that in case of a no-confidence motion against a Chairman and Vice Chairman, when the success or failure of motion depends on a very narrow margin the alleged disqualifications of members assume a great importance and in all fairness to the Vice Chairman the prescribed authority should be competent to prevent a disqualified member from contributing towards the removal of a Chairman or Vice-Chairman. Reference was also made to the possibilities of a strong Chairman taking steps against defaulting members and incurring their displeasure and of all conceivable and undesirable motions of no-confidence in consequence thereof, and also to the likely indifference of the Government in taking appropriate action under sec. 63 of the Act of 1959. These considerations have been pleaded for a liberal interpretation of sec. 26. 12. Examining the language of sec. 26 in a literal and grammatical sense, I feel quite unable to accept the contention on behalf of the petitioner. Sec. 26 merely enumerates the disqualifications which disable a person from continuing as a member. 63 of the Act of 1959. These considerations have been pleaded for a liberal interpretation of sec. 26. 12. Examining the language of sec. 26 in a literal and grammatical sense, I feel quite unable to accept the contention on behalf of the petitioner. Sec. 26 merely enumerates the disqualifications which disable a person from continuing as a member. It is not possible to find in the language of the opening sentence to imply that the disqualification can be noticed and found and given effect to without a proper determination of a controversy by a competent authority after inquiry. A controversy on a question whether a member has incurred disqualification is bound to arise in many cases, and the law does take note of such controversies and has provided for a determination of that controversy under Sec. 63. A reading of Sec. 26 with Sec. 63 and other provisions, already referred to earlier, is sufficient to negative a suggest on that the disqualification can be noticed otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1959. 13. A reference to analogous provisions in the Indian Constitution and other laws also lends considerable support to the above conclusion. Art. 102 of the Constitution in terms similar to those of Sec. 26 of the Act of 1959 provides that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament if he suffers from disqualifications mentioned in the subsequent clauses. Art. 103 further provides that if any question arises as to whether a member of either House of Parliament has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1) of Art. 102, the quest on shall be referred for the decision of the President and his decision shall be final. Before giving any decision on any such question, the President shall obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to such opinion. Further, under Art. 100 sub-sec. (2) the proceedings in the Parliament shall be valid notwithstanding that it is discovered subsequently that some persons were not entitled to take part in it. 14. Before giving any decision on any such question, the President shall obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to such opinion. Further, under Art. 100 sub-sec. (2) the proceedings in the Parliament shall be valid notwithstanding that it is discovered subsequently that some persons were not entitled to take part in it. 14. A consideration of these provisions leads to irresistible conclusion that the alleged disqualifications cannot be noticed and given effect to except in accordance with Art. 103, and that a member cannot be disabled from functioning by reference to disqualifications Similarly, Art. 191 prescribes disqualifications disabling a person for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State. Art 190 sub-sec. (3) states that if a member of a House of the Legislature of a State becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1) of Art. 191, his seat shall thereupon become vacant. Art. 192 in terms similar to Art. 103 provides for the determination of the controversy by the Governor of the State. These articles came up for consideration in Elec-tion, Tribunal India Vs. Saak Venkate Rao (1). The Supreme Court took the view that Art. 190(3) and 192(1) deal with disqualifications incurred after election as a member and cannot govern a case of pre-existing disqualifications. An argument that there would be no way of unseating a member who becomes subject to disqualification after his nomination and before his election, for, such a disqualification is no ground for challenging the election petition under Art. 329 read with sec. 100 of the Representation of the People Act. Art. 101, was not considered sufficient to enable the Governor to notice and give effect to disqualifications under Art. 163. The following observations of the Supreme Court in this connection are very significant:— "If this is an anomaly, it arises out of a lacuna in the latter enactment which could easily have provided for such a contingency, and it cannot be pressed as an argument against the respondents construction of the constitutional provisions. The following observations of the Supreme Court in this connection are very significant:— "If this is an anomaly, it arises out of a lacuna in the latter enactment which could easily have provided for such a contingency, and it cannot be pressed as an argument against the respondents construction of the constitutional provisions. On the other hand, the Attorney Generals contention might if accepted, lead to conflicting decisions by the Governor dealing with a reference under Art.192 and by the Election Tribunal inquiring into an election petition under Sec. 100 of the Parliamentary statute-referred to above." It also follows from the observations in the above case that if a member of State legislature had been subject to disqualifications at the time of election petition, he continues to be a member and his case cannot even be referred to the Governor under Art. 193. If a member of the Legislature, or, even of a Parliament, can continue to hold office in spite of a disqualification, and he cannot be prevented from functioning on interpreting Art. 102 and 191 so as to imply an automatic termination of a membership, I do not see any adequate justification for interpreting Sec. 26 of the Act of 1959 differently. 15. 15. A reference to the Rajasthan Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1959 (Act No. 37 of 1959 hereinafter referred to as the Panchayat Act, 1959) passed in the same year in which the Act of 1959 was passed, deals with the question of disqualifications of members under Sec. 16 and 17, the latter section providing as follows :— "Whenever it is alleged that any member of a Panchayat Samiti is or has become disqualified and such member does not admit the allegation, or whenever any member is himself in doubt whether or not he is or has become disqualified for the office, such member or any other member may, and the Pradhan at the request of the Panchayat Samiti shall, apply to the judge for a decision on the allegation or doubt." The provisions off Sec.26 and 63 of the Act of 1959 and Sec.16 and 17 of the Panchayat Act of 1959 deal with disqualification and the determination of the controversies relating to them and can easily be considered to be in pari materia and it will be quite proper and safe to interpret the provisions of Sec. 63 including the portion "relating to suspension" as implicitly recognising the right of a member to continue till the determination of controversies under Sec. 63 just as Sec. 17 of the Panchayat Act, 1959 expressly recognises. 16. On a careful consideration of the language and on the guidance provided by similar provisions in other Acts, I have no hesitation in holding that Sec. 26 cannot be construed so as to enable the Chairman of the Board and the prescribed authority under Sec. 72 of the Act of 1959 to notice and give effect to the disqualifications of a member. I have no doubt that the controversy about disqualifications can be determined only in accordance with the specific provisions of the Act. 17. The Various considerations relied upon on behalf of the petitioner ate also, in my opinion, of no Weight for the following reasons:— In the first instance, if a meaning of a provision of law is sufficiently clear the considerations of hardship and inconvenience cannot be invoked to depart from the ordinary meaning. 18. Secondly, there are similar considerations pulling in the opposite direction. 18. Secondly, there are similar considerations pulling in the opposite direction. It may be that there might not be a serious controversy in respect of some disqualifications enumerated in Sec. 26 but the existence of a controversy in the generality of cases must be sufficiently assumed. Evidently, laws cannot be so worded as to include every conceivable case, and it is sufficient if they apply to cases which must frequently happen. In this view of the matter, the theoretical possibility of the absence of a serious controversy cannot be permitted to be emphasised to dispense with salutary principles contained in Sec. 63 requiring proper inquiry and findings before giving effect to disqualifications. The same observations must govern the considerations emphasised in connection with cases of no confidence depending upon narrow margin of votes. As against the possibility of a strong Chairman suffering, I might easily note the possibility of an unscrupulous Chairman attempting to continue in office by abusing powers in connection with giving effect to disqualifications. As for the last consideration, I need only observe that it is hardly proper to attempt to interpret laws on an assumption that the Government will not act fairly and justly in discharging their duties and obligations under the various provisions of the Act. I have no doubt that the interpretation of Sec. 26 should not be affected by the considerations discussed above. 19. On behalf of the petitioner, a number of other provisions of the Act of 1959 were invoked as aids in support of the interpretation relied upon by the petitioner. It was pointed out that under Sec. 61 (2) a member failing to comply with the provision of sub Sec. (i) i.e. (failing to make and subscribe an oath or affirmation) within a period of three months from the date of the first meeting, shall be deemed to have vacated his seat. (2) That under Sec. 53 (i) (b), non compliance with the provisions of Sec. 61 has been mentioned as a ground for removal. 20. (2) That under Sec. 53 (i) (b), non compliance with the provisions of Sec. 61 has been mentioned as a ground for removal. 20. On the basis of these provisions, it was argued that the Act contemplates (i) automatic termination of membership under Sec. 61 and other provisions and (11) removal as two different things and, therefore, an order of removal by the Government need not always be a condition precedent for preventing a member from functioning as a member and that he can be prevented from functioning as a member on a mere finding that he has vacated the seat or has incurred some disqualification. I have not been impressed by this argument. Ordinarily, there should be no controversy over an allegation of non-compliance of the provisions under Sec. 61, and a member admitting non-compliance will cease to act as a member. There will be, in the circumstances, no necessity of an order of the Government removing a member under sec. 63. Sec. 63 takes notice of the possibilities of some controversy with regard to this matter also and, therefore, it was considered necessary to empower the Government to adjudicate controversies over the matter and to give decision and not to permit such controversies to assume various forms leading to unpleasant complications. It will be usefull in this connection to note that compliance with sub-sec. (2) and (3) of sec. 63 requiring an inquiry and finding of a District Judge has not been considered necessary for a removal on this ground. In my opinion, the removal of a person from membership under sec. 63 is only the legal mode of giving effect to disqualifications and to prevent members suffering from disqualifications from continuing. 21. Reference was also made to Rule 6 (2) (a) of the Election Rules, 1959 and Rule 3 of the Election Petition Rules, 1959. Under Rule 6 (2) of the Election Rules, 1959 a Returning Officer is empowered to reject a nomination paper of a candidate seeking election as Chairman or Vice Chairman on the ground that the candidate suffers from any of the general disqualifications mentioned in sec. 26 of the Act of 1959. Similarly, under Rule 3 of the Election Petition Rules, 1959 an election of a Chairman and Vice-Chairman can be questioned on the ground of these disqualifications. 26 of the Act of 1959. Similarly, under Rule 3 of the Election Petition Rules, 1959 an election of a Chairman and Vice-Chairman can be questioned on the ground of these disqualifications. It is argued that a Returning Officer or a Judge dealing with the election petition can determine disqualifications and act upon it. It is further argued that on such a finding a member loses one of his rights, namely, to contest election for a Chairman or a Vice Chairman. It was also suggested that he also loses his right to vote at an election for a Chairman or Vice Chairman. While, I agree that a member can be prevented from contesting elections for the office of Chairman or Vice Chairman on the ground of a disqualification, and further that his election can also be questioned on this ground without an order under sec. 63, it cannot follow as a consequence that a member should cease to function on a rejection of his nomination or on the presentation of an election petition. It will be certainly open to a member whose nomination paper for Chairman or Vice Chairman is rejected on the ground of disqualification to agitate the question by means of an election petition before District Judge and to claim a right of full inquiry and possibly further to agitate the question in appeal or revision. Similarly, in an election petition against him on the ground of disqualification, he has right to make and substantiate his case in a proper legal inquiry. As I see, these provisions are not primarily intended to effect the rights of ordinary members. They merely prescribe the qualifications and disqualifications for members contesting elections for Chairman or Vice Chairman and, further specify the ground on which such election can be questioned. Such qualifications and grounds have of necessity to be stated and the legislature instead of laying it down independently, laid them down in terms of sec. 26 of the Act of 1959. If a membership is terminated automatically and can be noticed and given effect to by the Chairman, I do not see any adequate justification for permitting detailed inquiries on such disqualifications at the time of scrutiny of nomination papers and in the election petitions. These provisions cannot, I think, lend any support to the petitioner in connection with the interpretation of sec.26. 22. I may now turn to sec. These provisions cannot, I think, lend any support to the petitioner in connection with the interpretation of sec.26. 22. I may now turn to sec. 79 of the Act of 1959 which has been relied upon by both the sides in support of their rival contentions. Sec. 79, so far as is relevant for the present case, reads as follows:— "(1) No disqualification.........of any person acting as member, or as the Chairman or Presiding authority, of a general meeting or a committee appointed under this Act shall be deemed to vitiate any act or proceeding of the board or such committee, as the case may be, in which such person has taken part. (iv) Until the contrary is proved.........all the members shall be deemed to have been duly qualified." The respondents contend that a disqualification of a member cannot vitiate an act or proceeding of the Board or Committee, and that by implication it contemplates participation of members who may eventually be found to be disqualified. The respondents consequently contend that sec. 79 also supports their contention that disqualification can not be given effect, except under an order under sec. 63. They also contend that it is not open to the petitioner to challenge the validity of the written notice Ex. P-5 on account of the signatures of Sri Girraj Singh even on an assumption that Girraj Singh was subsequently found disqualified. They also contend that the vaildity of the no-confidence motion cannot be agitated on account of any disqualification of which the members taking part in the meeting be found subject to. In answer, the learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that sec. 79 is provided to save the acts of Board in general meeting, and that it does not apply to special general meeting convened under sec. 72 read with sec. 65. It was pointed out that a presumption to be raised under sub section four that all members at the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly qualified, is a rebuttable one, and that sub sec. (4) permits it to be proved that the members present at the meeting were not duly qualified and were disqualified. 65. It was pointed out that a presumption to be raised under sub section four that all members at the meeting shall be deemed to have been duly qualified, is a rebuttable one, and that sub sec. (4) permits it to be proved that the members present at the meeting were not duly qualified and were disqualified. It follows, it was urged on behalf of the petitioner, that the right to prove that the members were disqualified carries with it by necessary implication the right to question the validity of the meeting and consequently also the proceedings of the meeting. After carefully considering the language of sec. 79, I feel inclined to agree with contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. Sec. 79 saves all acts and proceedings of the Board from being vitiated on the ground of disqualification of a member and it will be hardly proper to limit it to the general meetings. The words "acting as member, or as a Chairman or presiding authority, of a general meeting or committee, appointed under this Act, qualify the word "person" immediately preceding them and so understood the section clearly reads that no disqualification of a person (the words qualifying person are eliminated) shall be deemed to vitiate any act or the proceeding of the Board. The expression "proceeding of the Board" is evidently general and includes the proceeding at a general special meeting. I am clear that the legislature contemplated participation by person who may ultimately be found to be disqualified and made this provision for saving such proceedings from being vititated, and that this view of sec. 79 lends support to the contention urged on behalf of the respondent. I also think that it is not open to the petitioner to challenge the validity of no-confidence motion by raising an argument that some of the persons taking part in the meeting were disqualified and should Be declared so as to effect the validity of the motion. Sub-section (4) does not in any way affect the position resulting from sub-sec. (1). It merely provides for certain presumptions about the validity of the meeting and in general terms and also for permitting contrary proofs. Sub-sec. (4) does not state what the result will be if it is proved that at a particular meeting some members suffering from disqualifications took part. (1). It merely provides for certain presumptions about the validity of the meeting and in general terms and also for permitting contrary proofs. Sub-sec. (4) does not state what the result will be if it is proved that at a particular meeting some members suffering from disqualifications took part. That matter, in my opinion, is to be governed by sec. 79, subsection (1), which as shown above, provides for the condonation of participation by persons found to be disqualified and saves the proceedings from invalidity. In this view of the matter, sec. 79 read as a whole clearly supports the respondents and cannot be pressed in service by the petitioner. 23. Reliance was also placed upon sec. 85 under which a member knowingly "acquiring directly or indirectly any share or interest in any contract or employment with under, by or on behalf of a board of which he is a member, not being a share, or interest such as, under sec. 26, it is permissible for person to have, without being thereby disqualified for being a member", is made liable to conviction by a criminal court, and to a sentence of fine extending up to five hundred rupees. It was urged that if an act of a minor nature can make a member liable to conviction, the incurring of a disqualification of sec. 26 should be treated seriously and should by way of punishment result in automatic termination of the membership. The question, however, is not one of the seriousness of the consequences of one act or the other, but it is one of the proper mode of determining a controversy over the incurring of an alleged disqualification. Evidently, under sec. 85, a member will have a right to fair trial before being condemned. In the circumstances, it cannot be properly contended that for imposing penalty for the more serious act falling under sec. 26, there should be no proper inquiry and determination and the disqualification should be noticed and recognised in the manner suggested. 24. Lastly, our attention was invited to sec. 2 of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Transitory Provisions) Order, 1960 by which the Act of 1959 was modified by providing that in clause (viii) of sec. 26, there should be no proper inquiry and determination and the disqualification should be noticed and recognised in the manner suggested. 24. Lastly, our attention was invited to sec. 2 of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Transitory Provisions) Order, 1960 by which the Act of 1959 was modified by providing that in clause (viii) of sec. 26 of the Act of 1959, the word or part time shall be deemed to be omitted till the constitution of the first Municipal Board or Municipal Council, as the case may be, under the said Act. It was submitted in this connection that the Government contemplated automatic termination of membership under sec. 26 and, therefore, thought it necessary to issue the transitory order for suspending operation of a part of clause (viii) or sec. 26. Had the Government not contemplated automatic termination of membership and considered an order of renoval under sec. 63 necessary, there was hardly any occasion for issuing this order. The argument, in my opinion, cannot be accepted. In the first instance, it is hardly fair to import into the interpretation of sec. 26 by speculations about the Government policy and intention in issuing the transitory order." Secondly, it is hardly proper to accept that the Government should not implement a law by omitting to exercise its duties under sec. 63 of the Act. The argument is too far fetched to admit acceptance. 25. It was strongly contended on behalf of the petitioner that a Chairman of the Municipal Board and a prescribed authority presiding over a meeting, under sec. 72, having the responsibility for the proper conduct and regulation of the meeting, should have the inherent jurisdiction to decide points of order, and consequently, all objections relating to the disability of the members to participate in the meeting on the grounds of having incurred disqualifications, the Act contemplates serious controversies in connection with disqualifications of members and the Act has made specific provision for the determination of the controversy. The determination of controversy may require investigation of complicated facts and the adjudication of rival contentions. A matter like this, cannot be treated as one in the nature of point of order to be decided by the Chairman of a meeting. It may also be significantly observed that the prescribed authority is a creation of law and can exercise only such powers as are conferred upon it by the statute. A matter like this, cannot be treated as one in the nature of point of order to be decided by the Chairman of a meeting. It may also be significantly observed that the prescribed authority is a creation of law and can exercise only such powers as are conferred upon it by the statute. Sec. 72 has described in detail the manner in which the presiding officer has to act. Sub-sec. (6) provides that as soon as the quorum is present, the prescribed authority or his nominee shall read the motion for the consideration of which the meeting has been convened and declare it to be open for discussion. The use of the word "shall" is significant. After the quorum is complete he is bound to read the motion and to declare it open for discussion. Sub-sec. (7) fixes four hours as the period for the discussion of the motion, and further states that such discussion shall not be adjourned and shall automatically terminate at the expiry of four hours. Under sub-sec. (8), upon the conclusion of the debate or upon the expiry of the said period of four hours, as the case may be, the motion shall be put to the vote of the board and the prescribed authority or his nominee shall neither speak on the merits thereof nor vote thereon. In my opinion the legislature could not be intended to empower a prescribed authority (with powers so determined and limited) to take cognizance of controversy relating to disqualifications and to decide them at such meetings. It is a well recognised principle of interpretation that what the statute does not expressly or impliedly authorise has to be taken as prohibited. The argument invoking inherent powers of the prescribed authority is without force and is rejected, It will be partinent to observe that in the working of the local institutions at the present infantile stage of democracy controversies arose in the past not only over alleged incurring of disqualifications by the members but even very trivial matters like the alleged resignations by the members. The legislature in the present statute took note of these controversies and incorporated various provisions. Under sec. 62, notice in writing by a member resigning his membership has been required to be attested by a Magistrate of first or second class. Similarly, sec. The legislature in the present statute took note of these controversies and incorporated various provisions. Under sec. 62, notice in writing by a member resigning his membership has been required to be attested by a Magistrate of first or second class. Similarly, sec. 63 has been incorporated for the determination of the controversies arising over the alleged incurring of disqualifications. As I look at the scheme of the Act, I feel quite convinced that the legislature does not contemplate any other mode of noticing and giving effect to the disqualifications. The recognition of other modes, as suggested on behalf of the petitioner, will go to make sec. 63 unnecessary to a large extent, if not redundant, and further will result in bringing about conflicting decisions as indicated in the Supreme Court case. 26. The conclusions deducible on our above examination of the relevant provisions of the Act and in the light of the foregoing discussions may now be stated as follows: — (1) That sec. 26 of the Act of 1959 is broadly speaking, declaratory. It mainly specifies the various disqualifications which may disable a member from being chosen or continuing as a member. The section does not deal with the mode of noticing and giving effect to disqualifications. (2) That the question whether a member has incurred a disqualification will, generally speaking, be controversial one and a proper determination thereof with a view to preventing a member from functioning as a member can be made only under sec. 63 of the Act. Under the Election Rules, 1959 and Election Petition Rules, 1959, the disqualification can be taken note of for limited purposes stated therein. These provisions are, however, irrelevant in determining the rights of a member to function as a member. The disqualifications cannot be noticed and given effect to otherwise than in accordance with the above specific provisions of the Act. (3) That the Chairman of the Municipal Board and the prescribed authority have no authority under the law or in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction to notice and give effect to the disqualifications and preventing members from functioning as such. (4) That sec. 79 need not be confined to general meeting but it saves all acts and proceedings of the Board from being vitiated on the ground of disqualification of any person taking part in the proceedings of the Board. 27. (4) That sec. 79 need not be confined to general meeting but it saves all acts and proceedings of the Board from being vitiated on the ground of disqualification of any person taking part in the proceedings of the Board. 27. Let me now consider the various cases relied on behalf of the petitioner to see whether a consideration of these cases justifies the reconsideration of the conclusions stated above. A great reliance was placed upon a single bench judgment of this Court in Shri Deo Dutt Sharma Vs. Collector, Ajmer and others(2). The facts of that case were that a no-confidence motion was carried out against the Chairman of the Municipal Board, Ajmer by a vote of 18 members who undisputably constituted the majority of the total members. At the time when the motion was put to vote the Chairman had raised an objection that five of the members present in the meeting suffered from disqualifications under clause (xiv) of sec. 26 and might not be allowed to vote. The contention was overruled by the prescribed authority on the ground that a member did not automatically cease to function on account of any disqualification under sec. 26 and that he could continue to function till his removal by the Government under sec.63. On a writ application by the Chairman, the learned Judge recorded the conclusions to the following effect:— (1) Even the contesting respondents have not averred if the said five persons have paid off the arrears from 27th November, 1959 and, therefore, even if the case of Shri Arjundas be left out of consideration, it is clear that atleast four of the members did suffer from disqualifications when they voted against the petitioner on 27th November, 1959. 28. On this factual basis that four members were actually disqualified, the single bench Judge laid down the law as follows: — "The incurring of a disqualification under sec. 26 (xiv) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, does not automatically amount to removal of a member from the municipal board or council because the removal can only be made by the Government under sec. 63." (2) That the provision of sec. 26 should not be so construed that disqualification of a member becomes meaningless so long as he is not actually removed. 63." (2) That the provision of sec. 26 should not be so construed that disqualification of a member becomes meaningless so long as he is not actually removed. (3) That the member who incurred disqualification loses certain rights, namely, the right to be elected as Chairman or Vice Chairman or to cast a valid vote in the election of a Chairman or a Vice Chairman to take part in a meeting convened for carrying out a no confidence motion. 29. The precise question in the present form and pointedness "whether a prescribed authority presiding at a special meeting to discuss a no confidence motion against the Chairman, is competent and bound to entertain and decide questions of the members having incurred disqualifications under sec. 26 and to prevent them from participating in the meeting after recording an adverse finding against them, does not appear to have been properly raised before him and has not been determined. Having examined the various provisions, I have reached the conclusions different from those recorded by our brother Dave J. and have already given my reasons for the same. I do not consider it necessary to repeat the grounds in a fresh attempt to show why I differ from the learned single Judge. Generally I may mention that I find particular difficulty in holding that a person should be treated as disqualified so as to lose some rights and to continue as a member. In my opinion, on the language of sec. 26 any legal recognition of a disqualification of a member must have the effect of preventing him from continuing as a member altogether. It must follow as a corollary that the legal recognition cannot be permitted to be given except as provided in sec. 63 in cases of the present nature, (excluding other specific effects of disqualifications in connection with election petitions and the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman). I am also inclined to think that sec. 79 should not be confined only to general meetings. With great respect for our brother Dave J., I am constrained to differ from him and do not feel persuaded to change the conclusions stated earlier on the line of reasoning adopted in the above case. 30. Rammayya Venkat Narsu Bura Vs. The State of Bombay and another (3), has no relevance in the facts of the present case. With great respect for our brother Dave J., I am constrained to differ from him and do not feel persuaded to change the conclusions stated earlier on the line of reasoning adopted in the above case. 30. Rammayya Venkat Narsu Bura Vs. The State of Bombay and another (3), has no relevance in the facts of the present case. In that case an application was made to she Collector to declare that the respondent became disqualified to remain as a council. The question of automatic termination of membership and the competence of the Chairman to notice and give effect to it did not arise at all. 31. In M.P. Mangala Goundar Vs. P. S. Ayyathorai Mudaliar (4) the facts were these. Sec. 51 of the Madras District Municipalities Act provided for the reference of the controversies relating to disqualifications of the members for the decision of the District Judge. Sub sec. (3) provided that pending such decision, the councillor shall be deemed to be qualified. An election of a member on the ground of disqualifications existing at the time of election was questioned by means of an election petition. The learned Judge held that if such disqualifications are overlooked at the time of scrutiny, the method of removing the councillor is provided in s. 51. According to the learned Judge, the meaning of cl.3, s.51, would exclude any other remedy, and no decision of any other tribunal in any other proceeding declaring the councillor to be disqualified whould have any force when the clause says he shall be deemed to be qualified unless and until the decision of the District Court is given against him. The learned counsel emphasises that it was only because of clause 3 of sec. 51 that the member could continue to be qualified. He stresses the absence of such a provision in see. 63 of the Act of 1959. In my opinion, sec. 63 of the Act of 1959 also contemplates implicitly continuance of the membership and makes a provision for suspension. No assistance can be derived by trie petitioner from this case. On the other hand, the decision supports the respondents in ore respect that the right of the other authorities to notice and give effect to disqualifications should not be recognised to avoid conflicting decisions. 32. The respondents have placed reliance upon Bhagwandas Burnwal Vs. State of U.P. (5). No assistance can be derived by trie petitioner from this case. On the other hand, the decision supports the respondents in ore respect that the right of the other authorities to notice and give effect to disqualifications should not be recognised to avoid conflicting decisions. 32. The respondents have placed reliance upon Bhagwandas Burnwal Vs. State of U.P. (5). In this connection, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the judgment did not take note of the provisions of sec. 113 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. That section ofcourse saved the proceedings of the Board from being vitiated on account of disqualification, subject to the condition stated in the following words:— "If the majority of the persons present at the time of the act being done, or proceeding being taken, were qualified and duly elected (or nominated) members of the board of committee." A comparison of sec. 113 of the U. P. Municipalities Act and sec. 79 of the Act of 1959 shows that the later part of the sec. 113 is not contained in sec. 79. Therefore, the principle of Allahabad case cannot be doubted in its applicability to the facts of the present case on the language of Sec. 79. 33. I do not consider it necessary to notice other cases which have not much relevance. I must observe that the above review of the case law does not affect the conclusion reached above. Considering the facts of the present case in the light of the above conclusions, it is evident that the respondent No.1 Collector Bharatpur had no jurisdiction to entertain objections relating to the competence of the members present at the meeting to vote, and that all the members present at the meeting on that day including Shri Girraj Singh could not be prevented by reference to their having incurred disqualifications from voting. The decision of the prescribed authority debarring Shri Girraj Singh from voting was without jurisdiction. On the day of the meeting held on 27.8.1960 and at all times prior to the meeting all the members including Shri Girraj Singh had the right to function and act as members and could not have been prevented from functioning as members with reference to allegations of disqualifications against them. The written notice Ex. On the day of the meeting held on 27.8.1960 and at all times prior to the meeting all the members including Shri Girraj Singh had the right to function and act as members and could not have been prevented from functioning as members with reference to allegations of disqualifications against them. The written notice Ex. P-5, therefore, did not suffer from any defect or infirmity on account of the signature of Shri Girraj Singh, who was subsequently treated as disqualified by the Collector Bharatpur. I have also no doubt that the five respondents, Hari Shanker, Ajai Singh, Shamshuddin, Krishana Gopal and Ashfaq Alikhan could function as members and were justified in casting their votes and the motion of no confidence cannot be challenged on the ground of the invalidity of the votes of the five respondents. No case has been made out for interference by this Court. I would, therefore, dismiss the application, but in the circumstances, without costs. MODI J.—I agree. As the question raised in this case is of considerable importance I wish to add a few words of my own. 2. The narrow but interesting point which falls for determination in this case is whether the presiding authority at a special meeting of a Municipal Board held to consider a no-confidence motion against its Chairman has any authority to decide a disputed question as to eligibility of a member to vote at such a meeting on the footing that such member stands disqualified by reason of his having incurred a disqualification under sec. 26 of the Act (No. 38) of 1959 and, therefore, cannot vote at the meeting; and whether such an authority can debar the member from voting at such a meeting on the ground aforesaid. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would have us answer this question in the affirmative. The main-stay of his argument was that if this was not the correct view sec. 26 would become useless, and that delinquent members whom the Chairman in the proper and legitimate exercise of his duties might have displeased or piqued would be only too readily encouraged to form themselves into an unholy alliance and manoeuvre a noconfidence motion against the Chairman and push him out. Strong reliance was placed in support of this submission on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Shri Deo Dutt Sharma Vs. Collector, Ajmer(1). Strong reliance was placed in support of this submission on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Shri Deo Dutt Sharma Vs. Collector, Ajmer(1). I may, atonce, state that such a possibility cannot be ruled out; though in my opinion it should be rare, so long as the Chairman and the Government impartially exercise their respective functions assigned to them under the Act with the awareness and even-hand-edness which is expected of them. 4. Nevertheless, the question that arises is whether the view contended for on behalf of the petitioner should commend itself for acceptance on these or like considerations. I have given this matter my most careful and anxious consideration, and on a balance of all the arguments pro and con, have reached the conclusion time on the whole we should not be justified in interpreting sec. 26 so as to make sec. 63 of the Act nugatory. The latter section lays down an elaborate procedure for the removal of a member by the Government for various reasons including those contained in sec. 26. And what is important to remember is that it prescribes a proper judicial inquiry by an independent tribunal as an essential precondition before this can be done. This section also makes a provision for an interim order of suspension of a member by the Government where such an order may be warranted. In other words, the section lays down a comprehensive and self-contained procedure for the removal of a member, and, to my mind, it cannot but follow that, notwithstanding his alleged disqualification, a member must continue to be and function as such, unless he is suspended pending the enquiry against him. I should also like to point out here that it is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that where an enactment lays down a comprehensive procedure for the doing of a thing it must be done in that manner or not at all, that is, it cannot be done in any other manner by an indirect process. 5. Now, if that is true effect of sec. 5. Now, if that is true effect of sec. 63 as doubtless it seems to me, it would be going too far to hold that the Act of 1959 really contemplates or permits that the presiding authority at the meeting of a noconfidene motion, who is more or less a persona designata, has, or was intended to have, authority to embark upon the task of deciding a disputed question that a certain member has rendered himself disqualified to vote because of his having incurred a disqualification under sec. 26 as this may well turn out in certain cases to be a highly vexed question which a conscientious presiding officer may have no means or opportunity of properly investigating, or against which a member wrongly supposed or suspected to have incurred a disqualification, may have no fair or adequate opportunity of defending himself, within the time schedule of sec. 72 of the Act, which lays down the procedure to be followed at a noconfidence motion meeting. It is not difficult to sec, therefore, that the whole business at such a meeting may result in a dead-lock, a situation which the legislature could hardly have intended. 6. As I look at the whole matter, therefore, the correct course appears to me to be so to interpret secs. 26 and 63 that they harmonise with each other. And the only satisfactory way to do so would be, with profound respect, to hold that while sec. 26 broadly lays down the various factors which would go to disqualify a member from being elected to a Board or from acting as such after his election, sec. 61 lays down the procedure for making a proper enquiry into the matter of such an alleged disqualification and for giving effect to the result to which the establishment of such a disqualification must lead after a proper enquiry. So interpreted, I think, the two sections would become complimentary to each other, and all conflict between them would be avoided; nor would they lead to any other untoward consequences. 7. I should also like to make it clear in this connection that, in my respectful judgment, the circumstance that rule 6(2) of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Election of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, President and Vice-President) Rules, 1951, makes a provision whereby a disqualification under sec. 7. I should also like to make it clear in this connection that, in my respectful judgment, the circumstance that rule 6(2) of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Election of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, President and Vice-President) Rules, 1951, makes a provision whereby a disqualification under sec. 26 is designed to operate as a bar against a member standing up for election to the office of a Chairman, cannot be legitimately used to put a different interpretation on sec. 26. The simple reason is that for one thing, such a contingency is an entirely different matter having no relation to the continuance of a person as a member of the Board as such, and, for another, the Returning Officer in such a case is empowered and is indeed in duty bound to make an enquiry into the matter of the alleged disqualification, and if that officer arrives at a wrong or a biased decision, it can be tested further by an appeal and an election petition. What is important to note for our present purposes is that sec. 72 makes no provision for such an enquiry or for any redress against an erroneous decision at which a Chairman may arrive whether deliberately or accidentally. After all is said and done, every member of the Municipal Board stands elected to it by reason of the mandate of the majority of the voters in his constituency and, to my mind, unless the legislature clearly, or, by necessary implication, provides for the virtual removal of a member by an indirect process like the one we are pressed to accept, I find it extremely difficult to hold that he can be deprived of his right to participate in the affairs of the Board by an allegation of disqualification under sec. 28 to defend himself against which he may have slender, or, even, no opportunity at the crucial juncture. 8. Nor do I find it easy to accept the view that, although to remove a member the procedure under sec. 28 to defend himself against which he may have slender, or, even, no opportunity at the crucial juncture. 8. Nor do I find it easy to accept the view that, although to remove a member the procedure under sec. 63 must be followed; yet, a member may or can be deprived of his right of vote at a special meeting, on the specious albeit fallacious ground that this does not amount to his removal, as the result of an ad hoc decision by a protem authority; unless the legislature so ordains either by an express and clear provision to that effect or by, what may be called, the principle of necessary implication. According to my reading of the Act of 1959, it contains no such provisions. 9. It may be permissible in this connection to go further and point out that the acceptance of the view pressed before us on behalf of the petitioner would perhaps land us in a highly anomalous position, where, for example, a Chairman without having secured the removal or suspension of a member may debar him from exercising his right of vote at any general meeting where he may so think fit to do so. I regret I do not feel persuaded to accept such a position as sound, as inevitably it is bound to lead to unending conflicts between the Chairman and the members of a Board and place the latter in an unnecessarily disadvantageous position, apart from the fact that this may contribute to very considerable uncertainty as to the efficacy of the resolutions which may be passed by the Board at its various meetings from time to time. 10. I would, therefore, agree that, broadly speaking, before a member can be prevented from exercising his normal right of participation in the affairs of the Board, to which he is entitled by the very strength of his election he must be removed according to law or may be suspended in the meantime, but if he is not so removed or suspended by a competent authority he cannot be deprived of his right so to participate unless where the legislature unmistakably so provides. Such a case may conceivably occur, for example, where, a member has a personal or pecuniary interest in a particular matter, but obviously a disability like this would be limited to a particular occasion. 11. Such a case may conceivably occur, for example, where, a member has a personal or pecuniary interest in a particular matter, but obviously a disability like this would be limited to a particular occasion. 11. Again, in my judgment, the principle of automatic termination of membership can properly be given effect to only within well known limits, and where the legislature clearly provides, by what is usually put as a "deeming provision". See, for example, sec. 61 (2) of the Act of 1959 where a member has failed to take his oath of office within the period of three months from the date of the first meeting of the Board. I would not be prepared, however, to accept this theory where a clear provision to that effect is not found or cannot be necessarily read into the Act. 12. Lastly, what clinches the matter, in my judgment, is that the presiding officer at such a meeting, which we are called upon to consider, is not invested with any authority to decide such disputed questions by anything contained in the Act. In this connection I also desire to add that I have not felt persuaded to accept the rather sweeping proposition that such presiding authority, (or, for that matter, even a Chairman of the Board) has an inherent jurisdiction to decide such a question on the supposed principle that a presiding authority is bound to decide all points of order which maybe raised before him. Speaking for myself, I am not at all convinced that there is any warrant for accepting this submission, and in my opinion, to characterise a matter of this type as a point of order would be to confuse all boundary lines between a mere point of order and what is not, but is virtually a question of the very right of a member to be or continue to be a member of the Board and function as such. Relying as I do on these broad and crucial considerations, I feel bound to say, with all respect, that I have not been able to find any satisfactory answer to them and, therefore, find myself unable to agree with the view taken in Deo Dutt Sharma vs. Collector, Ajmer, supra, and concur in the order proposed to be delivered by my learned brother Chhangani J.