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1961 DIGILAW 181 (MP)

BABULAL v. STATE

1961-10-17

H.R.KRISHNAN, S.B.SEN

body1961
JUDGMENT Krisknan, J. The two appellants, both residents of a village near Sipra on the Bombay-Agra Road, were put on trial before the Court of Sessions, Dewas, along with a third accused Champalal son of Mangal, for the murder of Gangaram from the same locality, the first two hitting him innumerable times with lathis, in execution of the common intention of causing him such injuries as they knew to be sufficient in due course of nature to result in death; and the third for abetment of the same offence u/s 114, Indian Penal Code. The last being acquitted, these two were convicted u/s 302/34, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The murder was committed by broad day light soon after 10 A.M., on June 14, 1960, when Gangaram was cycling on Bombay-Agra Road from the direction of Maksi in the direction of Dewas and had come near the roadside village Kalma in the police station Tonk Khurd. Two persons were lying in wait in a depression by the roadside, felled the cyclist by throwing stones and then rushing on him and dragging him to the roadside literally showered blows on him. The main question is factual, whether the evidence is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants were those two assailants. The third, Champalal, beyond any doubt, appeared with a bicycle, immediately after the attack; he talked to the assailants, who went away in the direction of Maksi. Champalal himself was stopped by the only eye-witness Kashiram, and was taken to the village Kalma by another villager who came Boon after. The questions of law are ones relating to the assessment of one witness evidence; the need; if any, for corroboration; the effect of the apparent absence of precaution in the conduct of Identification Parades; that of the failure, if any, of the State, to give the accused the copy of a witness's statement u/s 162, Criminal Procedure Code; the evidentiary value as inference against the accused; of their falsehood about their presence and movements at or near the scene of the crime; and, finally the admissibility and effect of the expression of the dead body Man's fear that some particular persona were planning to kill him. The common ground in this case is that the two appellants were very actively on the side of Champalal, in his disputes about land with his widowed sister-in-law Sabodrabai; Gangaram, on the other hand, was on the side of the widow. The undisputed documents show that Champalal has lost in the civil suit, as well as in the proceedings before the Magistrate about possession, and by the commencement of that agricultural year, there were different incidents of serious obstruction by Champalal assisted by the two appellants of Sahodrabai's possession and enjoyment of the lands which was with the assistance of Gangaram. It is also common ground that, whether by accident or design, all persons concerned happened to be in the locality in which this murder was committed, about 20 or 25 miles from their normal residences and the location of the lands. At that time, Sohadrabai was staying with her brother Ranchhod at village Gorva. Gangaram had left Sipra on 12-6-60 on a bicycle and gone to Gorva to take this lady's instruction in connection with the possession and cultivation of the lands; he was actually returning from the village after passing village Piplia, when he was killed near Kalma, the next village near the road. Champalal has relations in this village within a few minutes walk from the place of the killing. He too had left Sipra on the 13th, the day after the departure of Gangaram. The appellants had been to the village Chidawad about four or five miles further up in the direction of Maksi. They assert that this was for a Panchayat to settle the compensation to Bhagirath by one Badri of that village who had taken away Bbagirath's wife in 'natra'. When arrested in the afternoon of the 14th June, one of them had Rs. 500 on him which, according to him, was the compensation paid by Badri. They were also returning on that morning or forenoon from Chidawad to Sipra; it is a point in controversy as to the manner and sequence in which they moved before boarding the bus at Chidawad at about midday between one or two hours after the killing about four or five miles away. In this connection, the timings of two of the several stage carriages on the road between Maksi and Sipra via Dewas are important. In this connection, the timings of two of the several stage carriages on the road between Maksi and Sipra via Dewas are important. The first is the one on the Tarana-Indore route via Maksi and Dewas; it passes Chidawad at about 9-46, and stops at the scheduled stop near Kalma at about 10 A.M. On that day, it was on time. It goes upto Indore about 30 miles away. It returns in the afternoon, and on that date, reported as usual at the Tonk Khurd beat house, at about 3 P.M. The conductor of that bus Chand Beg (P.W. 16) is a very important witness. The second stage carriage passes Chidawad at about midday, and then Kalma about ten or fifteen minutes later, and Dewas by 1 0 clock; it stops there for some time and then goes to Indore, Sipra lying in that section. The appellants. certainly traveled in that bus from Chidawad upto Dewas where, near a petrol pump, they were arrested and taken out by the police. They had tickets upto Sipra and were earring two lathis, one of them being a bamboo bound with iron bands and copper wire, but broken [at one end with the broken surface trimmed. The controversy is as to whether they had traveled in the earlier (that is, Chand Beg's) bus upto Kalma where they had got down at about 10 A. M. and got back to Chidawad for the second bus at about midday. It was in the second bus that Ramkishan (P. W. 3) of Fiplia came to Kalma. His village is about midway between Chidawad and Kalma. He has met Gangaram on the road, about "one peher after sunrise", and saw him off, towards Kalma; when later on, at about mid day he heard, from a 'motorwala' from Kalma, that a man from Barlai had been murdered there, be feared that it may be Gangaram, and went to find out. He found the two appellants in the same bus, and at Katma, reported this fact to the police, thereby leading to their arrest on the same bus at Dewas. He has given reasons for his suspicion, which have to be examined. The most important and the only eye-witness to the murder, is Kashi-ram of Kalma, whose account is that he was grazing cattle by the roadside. He has given reasons for his suspicion, which have to be examined. The most important and the only eye-witness to the murder, is Kashi-ram of Kalma, whose account is that he was grazing cattle by the roadside. Some time after the passing of the first bus which, of course, one on which Chand Beg was a conductor, he remarked a cyclist coming from the direction of Maybe. This was shortly after 10 A. M. Suddenly two persons rose from a depression on the roadside where they had been concealing, and after bringing down the cyclist by throwing stones, rushed upon him and belabored him with lathis while dragging him to the roadside near a bush. This should have taken only a minute or two, and the witness's description of this is very valid. The victim was given up for dead by his assailants and was later found to have innumerable marks all over the body divisible into ten groups each containing anything between eight and eleven lathi marks. Just as the beating ended, a third man came on a bicycle from the village and talked to the two assailants; then the latter walking fast or ran in the direction of Maksi. Kashiram did not in any event catch or stop them but he managed to do it to the third, who was encumbered with a bicycle; and put him in charge of another man of Kalma, Bhera by name who took him into the village. While the beating was on the witness saw it from within fifty paces; after the retreat of the offenders, approached Gangaram who began by saying that he was a man from village Barlai, but could say no more. Kashiram certainly had a better sense of duty than is usual among our villagers; he went to Isne Took Khurd beat-house- (Chowki) on the road, a few miles towards Dewas and made a verbal report to the hawaldar who came there. Before leaving, he remarked, as he thought, that the injured man had still some sings of life which might be correct, and that a piece of bamboo was lying there near, obviously broken from one of the lathis used in the attack. He brought the hawaldar to this place and on his direction went to the police station Tonk Khurd., which is a few miles in another direction, off the road. He brought the hawaldar to this place and on his direction went to the police station Tonk Khurd., which is a few miles in another direction, off the road. There he gave a report which was then above reduced to writing; the hawaldar of the beat house not being empowered to record any such information. The two accused and Champalal as well, were arrested soon after. By the time Bamkishan of Piplia arrived at Kalma, the hawaldar of the beat-house seems already to have reached. When the former's fears were verified, and the murdered man was found to be no other than Gangaram; he spoke to the hawaldar on his seeing the appellants on the bus and accordingly he arranged to get them stopped and arrested at Dewas. Whatever Ramkishan states as evidence is admissible at all events as introductory to a course of conduct. In principle Qangaram's statement- I have quarrels with Bhagirath and Babu on account of land; they walk about with farsi for killing me- it certainly admissible as a dying declaration. Be that as it may, and it will be examined later, it was Bamkishan that named the appellants as the possible murderers and it was this clue or suspicion that led to their arrest on the bus at Dewas, We are only concerned with Champalal incidentally; but his identification was no problem as he was actually on a visit to a relation at Kalma itself. Though that road is a busy one, at that moment, there was nobody except Kashiram near the scene of the murder. Bhera came soon after, not in time to see the beating but to hear from Kashiram what had happened and to take Champalal back to the village. It is certain that Kashiram had every opportunity of noting the course of the events, and of retaining a full daylight impression of the two assailants who were strangers to him. Be had no axe to grind in this matter and had nothing whatsoever to do with the quarrels between these two factions. Possibly, he had seen Champalal as a visitor to his village but absolutely nothing more. Undoubtedly impartial and intelligent by the village standards, he has also shown some public sense. Be had no axe to grind in this matter and had nothing whatsoever to do with the quarrels between these two factions. Possibly, he had seen Champalal as a visitor to his village but absolutely nothing more. Undoubtedly impartial and intelligent by the village standards, he has also shown some public sense. Against his power of observation, there again nothing can be said and the cross-examination as to whether he was facing in this direction or that or whether the bush had not screened he view, is altogether fatuous. Three special grounds have been raised against his evidence. Firstly, it is urged that the first information report at Tonk Khurd police station, cannot be used for corroboration, because it was not the earliest information u/s 154, Criminal Procedure Code and as such available for corroboration. Certainly, he had made a verbal report at the beat-bourse following which the hawaldar had taken steps. But the hawaldar of the beat-house was not an officer in charge of a police station nor was he otherwise empowered to record the information of a cognizable offence. Actually, also it is nobody's case or suggestion that written report was either made or banded in at the beat-house. Anyway, even without the corroboration from the first information report, the case stands: at all events, this is the earliest recorded examination by the police, and as it was available to the accused for cross-examination, no grievance can be made on this score. Secondly, it is argued that in course of the day, Kashiram was examined a second time by the investigating officer u/s 162, which is quite usual and perfectly true in the present instance; farther that this statement has been suppressed, and not given in copy to accused on his request, and instead, a very summary note by the officer has been placed in the diary to the effect-"The witness corroborated the first information report." The suggestion is that the examination of this witness u/s 162, made a few hours after recording his first information report, turned out to be very damaging to the prosecution case and accordingly has been suppressed by the police officer, and a forgery committed by him by writing up a new "statement". In principle (and without reference to the facts of this case) we are surely of the opinion that any refusal to give a copy of the statement to the accused, has very strongly to be disapproved, because it hampers the cross-examination, and thus keeps back from the Court, the picture of the occurrence as was given by the witness at the early stages of the investigation. This question came up before the Supreme Court in Purahottam Jethanand v. The State of Kutch AIR 1984 SC 700, where, following AIR 1947 P.C. 67 , it held: wholesale refusal to grant the same will be a serious irregularity which could vitiate the entire trial. Where the alleged refusal is not wholesale but of the statement of individual witnesses, this will still be an irregularity the degree of which will vary with the facts of each case. If, for example, the witness has been examined only once by the police and a copy of the only statement is withheld, obviously a very important check on his evidence is lost; when the Court assesses his evidence, it should give due regard to this fact. In the extreme case the evidence of a particular witness may become entirely unreliable because of this circumstance. On the other hand, if a witness has been examined more than once, and the alleged refusal is of a statement made on the second or the third occasion, while the accused has got a copy of the statement of the earlier occasion or occasions, then the prejudice, if any, is of a slight nature. This is because the means of checking up his statement in Court with what he stated to the police id already available, and if the accused has got the earliest statement, so much the better. Even according to the accused in this case, the earliest statement by Kashiram, that is, what has been placed as the first information report, has been used by them amply, whatever the effects, for the purpose of cross-examination. Thus the alleged withholding of the copy and the alleged suppression of the statement recorded a few hours later u/s 162 even if true practice consequence in this case. So much in regard to general principles. In this particular case, the evidence dose not at all support the allegation of suppression of forgery made against the investigating officer. Thus the alleged withholding of the copy and the alleged suppression of the statement recorded a few hours later u/s 162 even if true practice consequence in this case. So much in regard to general principles. In this particular case, the evidence dose not at all support the allegation of suppression of forgery made against the investigating officer. Certainly, Kashiram was examined twice by the police his signature being taken on the first occasion as it was treated (and rightly in our view) as the first information report. In course of the cross-examination and after bringing him to the context of the second statement, he was asked if he had not signed it and he said "yes". Actually, the officer states that he heard him through, while examining witnesses u/s 162, but finding that he said exactly the same thing as he had said in the first information report, he did not record the statement in extenso, but just made a note "that he corroborated the first information report". Certainly, we do not approve of this manner of recording the Btatement u/s 162, because this is not statement but the officer's opinion. Had it been the statement of a person other than the first informant, the consequence would be serious. But when the earlier statement in extenso is with us, this though incorrect, is not of any Berious significance. The officer repudiates the suggestion that there was some other Btatement which he has suppressed; there was nothing either in the conduct of the investigation or in the diary which has been brought up before us to justify this serious allegation. Certainly, the accused can bring out any irregularities committed by the officers in charge of the investigation, but allegations should be made with some basis. The only basis put forward on behalf of the appellants is that Kabhiram has said that he signed the statement, but the course of the cross-examination shows that he was very likely thinking of a statement that he did sign, that is, the first information report. The result is that for one thing this alleged refusal to give copy has in any event caused no prejudice in the present case and for another the allegation of suppression of the second statement is groundless. The third ground urged against this witness's evidence calls for a full consideration. The result is that for one thing this alleged refusal to give copy has in any event caused no prejudice in the present case and for another the allegation of suppression of the second statement is groundless. The third ground urged against this witness's evidence calls for a full consideration. The assailants, as already noted, though seen by broad daylight, still were absolute strangers to Kashiram, the only eye-witness. So on the merits of recognition or identification later on in the dock to the Court, the position is quite different from that in a case of an offence committed at night time or in circumstances, rendering identification prima facie difficult. Still the fact remains that the accused were stranger and corroboration of dock identification was indicated. The most usual, though by no means the only corroboration, is by adducing results of what is called an identification parade. The appellants were arrested on the bus at Dewas, brought to the beat-house on the road, and, in course of the afternoon or evening, taken to the thana. Kashiram, the only identifying witness, was of course in village. The officer, very correctly in our opinion, wanted to have the identification parade conducted without any delay. This would have normally been done by a Magistrate at Dewas within the jail. As it turned out, the officer learnt that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was on tour and in his commendable anxiety got the identification parade held quickly enough by the panchas and the mantri or secretary of the Panchayat at the thana headquarters. To be sure they did the best according to their understanding, but not being conversant with the elaborate precautions Courts have prescribed for identification parades, did it rather informally. There were only two offenders of unknown identity and two suspicious; they put in Champalal also on parade, quite unnecessarily, because he was known at Kalma and had been in fact stopped by him. Then they got only five non-suspects and, at least in their evidence they are hazy about the dress. As for the mixing up of these non-suspects with the suspects (two or three as we choose to understand the position) they are again uncertain. Then they got only five non-suspects and, at least in their evidence they are hazy about the dress. As for the mixing up of these non-suspects with the suspects (two or three as we choose to understand the position) they are again uncertain. Kashiram no doubt picked out these two, (and of course Champalal) but the Sessions Court found that the number of non-suspects was insufficient and the precautions not satisfactory and convincing, and refused to accept the identification in the Identification Parade as corroboration of the witness's identification of these two. At the same time, he found that the Kashiram's identification in the dock was for one thing, in itself reliable, and for another, sufficiently corroborated by other evidence. Without going over the body of ease-law that has developed on the subject of identification parades of suspects who were previously unknown to the eye-witnesses, we may note the salient principles. Firstly, what the witness does or says joking the identification parade is not Bubstantive evidence at the trial; but the witness's pointing out the accused before him in the dock during the trial as the person who committed this or that act in his presence is the real evidence, But moat often, this identification will not be of any probative force unless the witness has pointed him out in an identification parade with precaution Has Ten against collusion, inadvertent mistake, and intentional or accidental prompting. The elaborate rules on the conduct of identification parades are not merely" mechanical rituals, but are calculated to guarantee against the wrong men being pointed out. The impression that witness who has seen the offender at the time of the crime, and who apparently has no personal motive to make any intentional mistake should be implicitly believed when he points out the accused in the dock, \B unsafe. Lock identification by itself may be insufficient for one of two reasons. Where the occurrence has taken place in the dark or in other circumstances rendering the witness's mental impression hazy, then the identification parade, if properly conducted, can satisfy the Court that the witness's later recollection that the person in the dock is the offender, is not the result of the inevitable suggestion from the mere fact of the persons being in the dock. Where the original identification has been, as in the present ease, by broad day light or in other circumstances eliminating the chances of mistake, the identification parade is still a guarantee that the witness having such a motive, is not making an intentional substitution with an ulterior purpose. In this case, however, the witness is altogether unconnected and certainly without any interest in implicating these accused persons; so corroboration from the results of identification parade is not altogether indispensable as in these two types of cases. All the same, we hold that the identification parade has not yielded satisfactory results so that the dock identification by a Bingle witness does still call for independent corroboration. This takes us into the examination of corroboration by other evidence. The allegation is that the appellants traveled from Ghidawad by the first bus, and got down near the scene of the murder and after it, went book (most likely on foot) to Chidawad and boarded the second bus at about midday. They for that part denied this and asserted that they were all the time at Chidawad till the arrival of the second bus. The time interval between the two at Chidawad, is about two hours or two hours and a quarter. If on the strength of Chand Beg's evidence, which in any event is the only evidence possible on this point, we accept the finding of the Sessions Judge that the appellants traveled by the first bus, got down near Kalma and shortly after went back to Chidawad to board the second bus, that alone might be sufficient, in these circumstances to fasten the guilt on them. For one thing, it proves their presence at the scene of the murder, and for another, which is even more important, their falsehood in regard to be respondent at that time and place leads to an inference under sections 8 and" TT5T, 'Evidence Act, in the manner analogous to what is laid down by the Supreme Court in Parsadi Lal v. State AIR 1967 SC 211. Therefore, this calls for close study. Ohand Beg, who is obviously disinterested, says that three men boarded his bus at Ghidawad; out of them he had reason to definitely remember two, one in white shirt and white cap and the other in green shirt and white cap, both carrying lathis, who were no other than the present appellants. Therefore, this calls for close study. Ohand Beg, who is obviously disinterested, says that three men boarded his bus at Ghidawad; out of them he had reason to definitely remember two, one in white shirt and white cap and the other in green shirt and white cap, both carrying lathis, who were no other than the present appellants. They had taken tickets upto Dewas, but shortly after leaving Ghidawad, they wanted to get down. This itself got fixed in his memory, because passengers who have paid for fifteen miles do not usually get down after going four or five miles. Again, before getting down they had a small argument; the stop for Kalma, like all the scheduled stops, is a fixed place on the road, but the he two passengers wanted to |;et down a short distance before that and insisted the conductor pulling up before reaching the scheduled stop. There is no law against stopping at odd places on the road, but the persons in charge of a bus try to avoid it, a every such additional stop means a delay of a few minutes, by the stoppage itself and the slowing down and speeding up. Any way, the insistence of the two passengers led to small alternation. They were strangers all right, but it was day time and during these ten or fifteen minutes in the bus, and the altercation before stopping, Chand Beg had ample opportunity of noting their appearance. Moreover, while returning in the bus in the afternoon, he had to stop at the Tonk Khurd beat' house at about 3 P. M. to make the usual report. There he saw the police detaining these two passengers who had got in at Chidawad with tickets for Dewas and had got down near Kalma after going only four or five miles and did so after a small altercation. Now that he had seen them under arrest, an identification parade was of question. By the very nature of this case, it was not necessary either. Chand Beg says that he told the hawaldar of what had happened in the morning. As already, noted, the witness is disinterested and cannot possibly be intentionally implicating these men. It is suggested to him that he goes to the police officers now and then in connection with his duties on the stage carriage, which is of course true. Chand Beg says that he told the hawaldar of what had happened in the morning. As already, noted, the witness is disinterested and cannot possibly be intentionally implicating these men. It is suggested to him that he goes to the police officers now and then in connection with his duties on the stage carriage, which is of course true. Like all stage carriage conductors, he has to report movements and time tables at the appropriate police stations and check posts. From this it is made out that this witness is "under the thumb of the police" and should not be believed. We do not agree. He is not obliged to the police authorities; nor is there the least indication in this case that the police were interested in somehow getting these two appellants punished. From the view point of the investigating authorities, this is just a routine type of case. The cross-examination of Chand Beg is further directed towards ascertaining whether, he can recollect the appearance of every passenger who gets down by roadside and similar matters. This is to lose sight of the true state of affairs. Had nothing unusual happened during the passengers' traveling in the bus, the conductor would certainly have had no occasion to remember their appearance. But there were three unusual incidents each of which was by itself sufficient to fix their picture in the mind of the conductor. We, therefore, agree with the learned Sessions Judge that the two appellants boarded Chand Beg's bus at about 9-45 at Chidawad, got down near Kalma about ten or fifteen minutes later and after the murder, which was shortly after ten, went back to Chidawad and boarded the second bus at about midday. They were certainly at the site of the murder exactly when it was being committed and are denying it. They were certainly at the site of the murder exactly when it was being committed and are denying it. In this connection, it has been urged on their behalf that the murder could not have been committed by them as it was necessarily a pre-mediated one, and they could not have known beforehand that Gangaram who be cycling that way at that hour; again, if the appellants could have committed the murder only as a result of a conspiracy with Champalal, Champalal himself could not have known that Gangaram would be passing that way, or as for that matter, the appellants themselves would have come; even if they did come by the first bus, there was no time for them to have contacted Champalal, and planned things out in time to attack Gangaram. All this is speculative and can be disposed of briefly. The question IB not whether the murder had been planned well in advance with reference to the place and time, or whether overtaking Gangaram on his cycle while traveling by Chand Beg's bus, the appellants suddenly came to a decision to execute what they had always been thinking of, and got down at the point after a stretch which the bus could cover in five or six minutes while the cyclist could have taken twelve or fifteen minutes. Either way, the man was murdered at that place and the two appellants, certainly his old enemies, were nearby and are trying falsely to deny their presence. Still it does appear that there was an element of planning. After all, it was not very difficult for any of the three to have known Gangaram's movements at a village within a few miles of the places where they were respectively putting up. While, it was possible to have way-laid Gangaram on any part of the road upto some distance, the murderer did choose a place near the village Raima, where Champalal was at that time staying. This may not have been a mere accident. Was is mortal the point, immediately after the murder, Champalal did come on the scene, and talk to the murderers, which may not have been a bare coincidence. As for contacting Chanmpalal in the village or on the road itself, the possibility of an earlier appointment was not excluded. This may not have been a mere accident. Was is mortal the point, immediately after the murder, Champalal did come on the scene, and talk to the murderers, which may not have been a bare coincidence. As for contacting Chanmpalal in the village or on the road itself, the possibility of an earlier appointment was not excluded. Even otherwise between the appellants' getting down from the bus and the expected arrival of their victim, there were at least ten minutes and it should not have been difficult for one of them to have contacted Champalal within a few minutes from the road. His approval of the attack at that place could have been obtained within a minute or so; after all for a considerable time, the three were closely associated in their trying to prevent Champalal's sister-in-law from enjoying the property with the assistance of Gangaram. Thus, while planning and previous arrangement with Champalal are quite likely, it is not essential to prove it for the purposes of this case. The central point is the arrival of the appellants at that place, when the murder was committed, their going back to Chidawad to board the next bus and their denial. As already noted, a broken piece of bamboo with an iron band and a loop of copper wire was found lying near the body. Since such pieces are not found scattered all over the places, there can be no doubt that this piece fell from one of the bamboo-sticks with which Gangaram had been attacked. The injury-report shows that though the injuries were serious and were accompanied with fracture, none of them was such as to lead to spurting of the blood. No doubt, the blood had come out, as usual, from lacerated wounds but by the time the blood came out, the lathis would have been off from the body. Thus the absence of blood marks either on the broken piece or on the sticks which the appellants were carrying, when arrested on the bus was only natural. The broken bamboo piece, has an extremely irregular and ragged broken edge. The bamboo stick with the appellant Bhagirath is generally similar in appearance to this piece, has iron bands and copper wire loops tied round in the similar manner. The broken bamboo piece, has an extremely irregular and ragged broken edge. The bamboo stick with the appellant Bhagirath is generally similar in appearance to this piece, has iron bands and copper wire loops tied round in the similar manner. 1% is also broken at the thicker end, but the edge is not irregular, having been trimmed manually or with the help of a penknife. So it is not possible to fit the two pieces at the broken end, to ascertain conclusively, whether or not they were parts of the same stick. If the stick with Bhagirath had not been trimmed, this would have been possible but as it is, we can only say that they are similar and it is very highly probable though not absolutely certain that this stick was-used in hitting Gangaram and was broken. As corroboration, this is of some value, but by itself cannot carry us very far. Finally we come to the alleged motive, and in that regard, Gangaram's apprehension from these persons as evidenced by what he told to Ramkishan. The civil suit between Ghampalal and his sister-in-law ended in a decree for delivery of possession in her favour in March 1959. Mutation was made in revenue records in her favour in the place of her husband's. Physical possession was also given in April before that agricultural year. But things had become only worse because Champalal had already sold or given away by ostensible sale, a considerable portion of the land to appellant Babu. Even in regard to the rest, there was resistance and there were proceedings u/s 145, Criminal Procedure Code, instituted at the instance of Sohodrabai, against the appellants and Champalal. In this also Sohodrabai's possession was maintained by the order dated 6-2-1960. But this did not deter Champalal and the two others. On 8-5-1960, Gangaram gave a report to the police that he had gone to cultivate the land whereupon the appellants and others armed with lathis and dharias, threatened to attack him and drove him out of the field. A ease was started and was actually pending at the time of this murder. Motive cannot be a substitute for evidence but whenever it is ascertainable, it can help in understanding the evidence in proper perspective. Gangaram's impression was as he told Ramkishan, that the appellants were preparing to kill him. A ease was started and was actually pending at the time of this murder. Motive cannot be a substitute for evidence but whenever it is ascertainable, it can help in understanding the evidence in proper perspective. Gangaram's impression was as he told Ramkishan, that the appellants were preparing to kill him. Whether or not, this fear was well founded, this statement was given by a man since dead, with reference to the cause of circumstance of the transaction resulting in his death. The present one is a case in which the cause of Gangaram's death comes into question. This statement was made within fifteen minutes or half an hour of his death. The result is that the one witness identification by Kaahiram is good as far as it goes, as he had ample opportunity of making the observation and has no motive of speaking falsehood; but by itself cannot support the conviction because the test-identification has been held by the Sessions Judge to have been held without sufficient precautions. However, the fact that the two appellants who were on inimical terms with Gangaram, were actually at that place at the time of the murder, and are trying to conceal it, goes a long way to corroborate it. In fact, in view of the motive, this by itself might be sufficient, in the absence of any explanation by the appellants, to justify their conviction. There is further support, though not of a very strong nature, of the identity of the broken piece of bamboo. A single lathi blow even on a vital part of the body has some times been held to be punishable only u/s 304, Indian Penal Code. The reason is that a person giving a single blow may not be aware of the possibility of its resulting in death. But no such doubt can arise where two assailants simultaneously attack an unresisting victim, and both behavior him with dozens of lathi blows some of which caused fracture of bones. The sheer quantity indicates that the assailants must have had the common intention of inflicting such injuries as were certain to result in death in normal course of events. Therefore the convictions of the two appellants u/s 302, Indian Penal Code, and the sentences for life imprisonment are upheld and the appeal is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed