B. K. Gupta v. Chancellor, Lucknow University — 1961 DIGILAW 184 (ALL)

JUDGMENT A. P. Srivastava, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The material facts leading up to it are that in the University of Lucknow two persons, one designated as Professor of Law and the other as Professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law, were to be appointed. The appointment was to be made by the Executive Council of the University on the recommendation of a Selection Committee. There were four candidates for the two posts including the petitioner and the respondent No. 3. The Selection Committee appointed for choosing the candidates and recommending them to the Executive Council met on the 13th of December 1958 and after interviewing all the four candidates recommended to the Executive Council the petitioner for the post of Professor of Law and one Dr. V.N. Shukla for the other post. While the recommendation of the Selection Committee was being considered by the Executive Council on the 20th of December 1958 an objection was raised that the Selection Committee which had made the recommendation was not duly constituted. The point was overruled by the Vice-Chancellor who was presiding at the meeting of the Executive Council. The recommendation of the Selection Committee was accordingly accepted and the Executive Council decided to appoint the petitioner as the Professor of Law. A formal letter of appointment was thereupon issued on the 22nd of December 1958 appointing the petitioner as Professor of Law on probation for two years. The respondent No. 3 then submitted a petition dated the 22nd December 1958 to the Chancellor of the Lucknow University through the Vice-Chancellor of the University raising the question whether the Selection Committee had been duly constituted and whether the acceptance of its recommendations by the Executive Council and the resulting appointment of the petitioner as Professor of Law was valid. The question was submitted to the Chancellor for decision under Section 39 of the Lucknow University Act. After hearing the respondent No. 3 and the Vice-Chancellor of the Lucknow University the Chancellor, now the respondent No. 1, gave his decision on the 23rd of May 1959. He held that the Selection Committee was illegally constituted, that the decision of the Executive Council accepting the recommendations of the Selection Committee and the appointments made as a consequence thereof were null and void. He directed that a new Selection Committee should be constituted. He held that the Selection Committee was illegally constituted, that the decision of the Executive Council accepting the recommendations of the Selection Committee and the appointments made as a consequence thereof were null and void. He directed that a new Selection Committee should be constituted. The Vice-Chancellor, the respondent No. 2, was directed to implement the decision by taking immediate action. In pursuance of this decision the Registrar of the University informed the petitioner by letter dated the 3rd of June 1959 that his appointment as Professor of Law stood rescinded and that necessary action would be taken in due course to make an appointment in compliance with the decision of the Chancellor. On the 28th of July 1959 the petitioner filed the present writ petition praying: - (1) That a writ, direction or order in the nature of certiorari may be issued quashing the order of the opposite party No. 1 (Chancellor) dated 23-5-1959. (2) That a writ, direction or order in the nature of mandamus may be issued to opposite party No. 2, (Vice-Chancellor), commanding him to give effect to the resolution of the Executive Council dated 20-12-1958 appointing the petitioner as Professor of Law. (3) That a writ, direction or order in the nature of mandamus be issued restraining the opposite party No. 2 (Vice-Chancellor) from giving effect to the decision of the opposite party No. 1 (Chancellor) dated 23-5-1959. (4) That such other suitable writ, direction or order may be issued as may be deemed fit by this Hon'ble Court. 2. Several grounds have been put forward in support of the petition. Some of them relate to the merit of the decision of the Chancellor and try to make out that the Selection Committee in question had in fact been properly constituted. It is also urged that the decision of the Chancellor stands vitiated as he has contravened an important principle of natural justice by deciding the matter without hearing the petitioner who was directly interested in the matter. It is further contended that the Chancellor had exceeded his jurisdiction and that no valid reference having been made to him he was never legally seized of the question for the purposes of deciding it under Section 39 of the Lucknow University Act. 3. It is further contended that the Chancellor had exceeded his jurisdiction and that no valid reference having been made to him he was never legally seized of the question for the purposes of deciding it under Section 39 of the Lucknow University Act. 3. The petition is opposed by all the three respondents, Counter-affidavits have been filed by the Vice-Chancellor himself, by the Registrar of the University and by the respondent No. 3. 4. When the petition was argued before us, learned counsel for the petitioner did not consider it necessary to press all the grounds taken in the petition. The only ground he stressed was that the impugned decision was liable to be quashed because a fundamental principle of natural justice had been contravened and the petitioner had been deprived of his post without being heard. He urged that this ground alone was sufficient for the success of the petition. He pointed out that the proceedings before the Chancellor under Section 39 of the Lucknow University Act were quasi-judicial proceedings. The petitioner was vitally interested in the question that had been raised. Without giving him an opportunity to have his say, the Chancellor was not justified in passing an order which directly affected the petitioner and deprived him of his post. 5. Sec. 39 of the Lucknow University Act under which respondent No. 3 made his representation to the Chancellor reads as follows: - "If any question arises whether any person has been duly elected or appointed as, or is entitled to be a member of any authority or other body of the University or whether any decision of the University or any Authority thereof is in conformity with this Act, the Statutes or the Ordinances, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor whose decision thereon shall be final." 6. The Selection Committee and the Executive Council are authorities for the purposes of the Act under Cls. (2) and (5-A) of Sec. 15. The statutes framed under the Act provide that the authority entitled to appoint a Professor is the Executive Council but the appointment must be made on the recommendation of a selection committee. It is not disputed that the question raised by the respondent No. 3 in his representation to the Chancellor were covered by Sec. 39. The statutes framed under the Act provide that the authority entitled to appoint a Professor is the Executive Council but the appointment must be made on the recommendation of a selection committee. It is not disputed that the question raised by the respondent No. 3 in his representation to the Chancellor were covered by Sec. 39. Out of the two main questions raised one related to the decision of the Executive Council appointing the petitioner as Professor of Law and the other was whether the Selection Committee had been constituted in conformity with the provisions of the Act, statutes and the ordinances framed thereunder and was a properly constituted authority entitled to recommend the petitioner's appointment to the post. Both the question raised were, therefore, covered by Section 39 and could be raised under it. 7. The Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the Chancellor conceded, and in our opinion rightly, that the proceedings under Section 39 of the Lucknow University Act were quasi-judicial proceedings. The concession was however, not made by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 and it was urged by him that whatever the Chancellor did under this section was purely administrative. He pointed out that there was no lis before the Chancellor and there was nothing in the section itself which required him to act judicially or quasi-judicially. The section in the Allahabad University Act which corresponds to Section 39 of the Lucknow University Act is Sec. 42. It reads: "If any question arises whether any person has been duly elected or appointed as, or is entitled to be, a member of any authority or other body of the University, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor, whose decision thereon shall be final." 8. Sec. 39 of the Lucknow University Act was also originally couched in exactly the same terms. By a subsequent amendment, however, the scope of the section was widened and the Chancellor was empowered to decide questions relating to the decisions of the University or any authority thereof also and to find out whether they were in conformity with the provisions of the Act, statutes or ordinances. The addition did not, however, change the nature of the proceedings or of the powers which the Chancellor was to exercise under the section. In Dr. The addition did not, however, change the nature of the proceedings or of the powers which the Chancellor was to exercise under the section. In Dr. Ishwari Prasad v. Registrar, University of Allahabad, AIR 1955 Allahabad 131 a question arose with reference to Section 42 of the Allahabad University Act as to whether the proceedings under it were judicial or purely administrative and Mootham, J. (as he then was) held: - "The expressions `duly elected or appointed' and `entitled to be' clearly refer, in my opinion, to the legal rights of the person concerned under the Act and Statutes, and the Advocate General agreed that the Chancellor could not otherwise dispose of the question referred to him. In such circumstances I can entertain no doubt that the section imposes on the Chancellor the duty to act judicially in arriving at his decision." 9. The decision was confirmed in special appeal in Registrar, University of Allahabad v. Dr. Ishwari Prasad, AIR 1956 Allahabad 603. Dealing with the point Mehrotra, J. observed: - "The Chancellor has not only to exercise his discretion but he has to take a decision thereon which necessarily implies that, in determining the dispute referred to him, he had to act judicially." 10. The Division Bench decision is binding on us and if we may say so with respect we are in entire agreement with it. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 that the Chancellor acts only in his administrative capacity under Section 39 does not appear to be acceptable at all. He deals under the section with the questions raised and is expected to decide those questions. His decision is to be final. The decision is to be arrived at not for his own satisfaction but is intended to settle disputes relating to the rights and titles of persons who are members of any authority or other body of the University or are persons who are affected by the decisions of the University or any authority thereof. While arriving at his decisions on these disputed questions, therefore, the Chancellor is expected to act judicially or at least quasi-judicially. 11. It is, however, urged that even if the Chancellor was expected to act judicially or quasi-judicially while deciding the question referred to him under Section 39, it should not be forgotten that he constituted only a domestic tribunal. While arriving at his decisions on these disputed questions, therefore, the Chancellor is expected to act judicially or at least quasi-judicially. 11. It is, however, urged that even if the Chancellor was expected to act judicially or quasi-judicially while deciding the question referred to him under Section 39, it should not be forgotten that he constituted only a domestic tribunal. Sec. 39 itself does not require that any particular procedure is to be followed by the Chancellor under its provisions. The only statute which had been framed with reference to the section is Statute No. 3, according to which the Chancellor in deciding the questions referred to him under Section 39 may call for such documents or papers from the University or authority concerned as he may deem necessary. There is nothing, it is contended, either in the section or the statute requiring the Chancellor to issue notice to any one or to hear any one. The Chancellor, it is pointed out, cannot be expected to follow, while deciding the disputes referred to him, the procedure laid down for a civil suit or for a criminal trial. In some cases it is said, it will obviously not be very easy for him to know who are the persons who are interested in or are likely to be affected by in the question referred to him. A very large number of persons may be interested in some particular question. He cannot, it is argued, be expected to give a hearing to all of them. The contention is that there are no rules of natural justice of universal application. The principles of natural justice which have to be followed by a particular domestic tribunal have to be determined keeping in view the nature of the tribunal, the statute under which it is formed and the circumstances in which it is expected to act. The only rule of natural justice which the Chancellor could be required to follow, therefore, was that he should act in good faith, do justice according to his lights and follow the provisions of the Act and the statutes. The decision of the Chancellor cannot it is urged, be questioned simply on the ground that no notice was issued to the petitioner and he was never given an opportunity to be heard. 12. The decision of the Chancellor cannot it is urged, be questioned simply on the ground that no notice was issued to the petitioner and he was never given an opportunity to be heard. 12. It is true that the Chancellor was a domestic tribunal while performing his functions under Section 39 of the Act. But a domestic tribunal is also bound to conform to the principles of natural justice. As was laid down in State Medical Faculty of West Bengal v. Kshiti Bhusan Dutt, AIR 1961 Calcutta 31 at page 34: - "The decision of such a domestic body or a tribunal or a board particularly of a professional body can only be interfered with by the Courts of law on three main principles, namely, (1) that such domestic authorities have acted under bias or in bad faith and mala fide, (2) that such authorities have violated the principles of natural justice in the proceedings and conclusions before it and (3) that such domestic authorities have exceeded their jurisdiction under the statutes, rules and regulations, regulating their duties and procedure." 13. These principles were deduced from the decisions in Thompson v. New South Wales Branch of the British Medical Association, 1924 AC 764 (778) and Secretary of State v. Mask and Co., 67 Ind. App. 222 (236). It cannot, therefore, be said that a domestic tribunal is at liberty not to follow the principles of natural justice and that its decisions cannot be questioned even if it does not follow such principles. 14.Of course, as laid down by the Supreme Court in The New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. v. The New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1957 SC 232 and again reiterated in Nagendra Nath Bohra v. Commissioner of Hills Division, A.I.R. 1958 SC 398. "The rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitutions of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function; and the question whether or not any rules of natural justice had been contravened, should be decided not under any preconceived notions, but in the light of the statutory rules and provisions." 15. The main grievance of the petitioner is that the Chancellor should not have decided the question referred to him without giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. The main grievance of the petitioner is that the Chancellor should not have decided the question referred to him without giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. It cannot be denied that the principle that no one should be condemned unheard and that no decision affecting any person should be arrived at behind his back without giving him a chance of having his say, is an elementary principle of natural justice. The maximum audi alteram partem is a well known maxim of law. The question is whether while acting under Section 39 of the Lucknow University Act the Chancellor was bound to conform to this rule. We find nothing in the section itself or in the statute framed thereunder on the basis of which it can be argued that the Chancellor could disregard this rule. The statute framed with reference to Section 39 contemplates there being parties to the questions which are to be decided by the Chancellor under the section. It empowers the Chancellor to call for documents from the parties if he finds necessary. If he can call documents from the parties, there is no reason why he should not hear the parties if they want to be heard. In the present case the Chancellor actually gave a hearing to the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. We also took into consideration not only the representation made by the respondent No. 3 but also the facts brought to his notice on behalf of the University by the respondent No. 2. If the hearing was being given to these two parties it was in fairness necessary that a hearing should have been given to the petitioner also who was as much interested in the matter as the respondent No. 3, if not more. In fact, he could claim to be interested in the question referred to the Chancellor to a greater extent because he had already been appointed to the post of Professor of Law and was holding it while the respondent No. 3 was only a candidate for the post who had not even been recommended for the post. 16. We are unable to appreciate the argument that the Chancellor had any amount of difficulty in finding out whether the petitioner was a party interested in the question. No copy of the representation made by the respondent No. 3 to the Chancellor has been produced before us. 16. We are unable to appreciate the argument that the Chancellor had any amount of difficulty in finding out whether the petitioner was a party interested in the question. No copy of the representation made by the respondent No. 3 to the Chancellor has been produced before us. But in the circumstances it can safely be presumed that it had been mentioned in that representation that the Selection Committee whose constitution was being challenged had recommended the petitioner and that accepting that recommendation the Executive Council had appointed the petitioner as Professor of Law. No person could in the circumstances have any difficulty in finding out that the petitioner was a person vitally interested in the question which the Chancellor had to decide and the decision of the Chancellor was going to affect the petitioner directly. For effectively dealing with the question referred to the Chancellor, therefore, in our opinion, it was not only fair but necessary that the petitioner should have been heard. In not giving the petitioner an opportunity to have his say and giving a decision which affected him so adversely that it deprived him of a post to which he had been appointed the Chancellor clearly violated one of the fundamental principles of natural justice. 17. It may be that in certain circumstances in connection with some of the questions which may be referred to the Chancellor for decision under Section 39 he may not find it easy to find out all the persons interested whom he should hear or the number of such persons may be large. The difficulties are, however, in no way insurmountable. Moreover, no amount of anticipated difficulties can, in our opinion, entitle a judicial or a quasi-judicial body to ignore any of those fundamental rules which form the foundation of its judicial character and get for it the respect and confidence of the persons whose affairs are dealt with by that body. Who are the persons interested in a particular question naturally depend on the question itself, the circumstances in which it arises and the extent of the effect of its decision. Before taking up the question referred to him the Chancellor is expected to realise its implications and to ascertain who are the persons whose rights and interests are likely to be affected by it. If the number of such persons is large that should not matter. Before taking up the question referred to him the Chancellor is expected to realise its implications and to ascertain who are the persons whose rights and interests are likely to be affected by it. If the number of such persons is large that should not matter. An opportunity should be given to every one to have his say and all persons who want to be heard should be given a hearing. Only then can the decision of the Chancellor be held to be fair and just. 18. We may refer in this connection to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Cherukuri Fitchaiah v. Andhra University, Waltair, 1961 Andhra Law Times Reports 371. In that case the election of a member of the Senate of the Andhra University was in question and a reference had been made to the Chancellor under Section 27 of the Andhra University Act which provided: - "Save as otherwise provided, if any question arises whether a person has been duly elected or nominated as or is entitled to be a member of any authority of the University, the question shall be referred to the Chancellor whose decision thereon shall be final." 19. The unsuccessful candidate at the election had referred the question to the Chancellor who had decided it without giving a chance of hearing to the successful candidate. The successful candidate, therefore, challenged the decision of the Chancellor by a writ petition and urged that the decision was liable to be quashed because it infringed a rule of natural justice. A writ of certiorari was issued and it was observed: - "It is of the essence of justice and equity that a person should not be deprived of his property or the right of its privilege without being given an opportunity to cause against it. The chancellor, though not a judge in the real sense of term but constituted only an administrative authority, exercise quasi-judicial function in deciding whether a person was duly elected or not. Therefore, he should observe the judicial process. Even an administrative authority, when he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, has to conform to the norms of judicial procedure. It is thus meet that in the name of substantial justice, a person to be effected by the decision should be enabled to know the case he has to meet and place his views. Even an administrative authority, when he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, has to conform to the norms of judicial procedure. It is thus meet that in the name of substantial justice, a person to be effected by the decision should be enabled to know the case he has to meet and place his views. The maxim audi alteram partem means that no person should be condemned without being heard. In other words, any person to be affected must be afforded an opportunity to know the case he has to meet and to put his view-point before the authority deciding the dispute." 20. It was next urged that when the point of the unconstitutionality of the Selection Committee was raised before the Executive Council at the time it was considering the recommendations of the Committee, the Vice-Chancellor was of opinion that the Selection Committee had been duly constituted. He, therefore, overruled the objection raised. That was the stand taken by the Vice-Chancellor on behalf of the University even in reply to the representation made by the respondent No. 3 to the Chancellor. At the time of the hearing of the representation the Vice-Chancellor Sri Iyer said all that could be said against the representation of the respondent No. 3. So even if the petitioner had been heard he could not have added anything substantial to what the Vice-Chancellor had already said. The petitioner cannot, it is urged, in the circumstances make a grievance of the fact that he was not given a hearing. The argument is wholly unimpressive. Neither the Lucknow University nor the Vice-Chancellor represented the petitioner or held any brief for him. As the petitioner was the person who was going to be principally affected by the decision of the Chancellor he was entitled in his own right to be given a hearing. The fact that the stand that was taken by the Lucknow University at that stage was similar to that of the petitioner appears to be entirely immaterial. If there are more defendants than one in a suit having similar defences any of them cannot be shut out and be put out of Court simply on the ground that the other defendant is raising the same pleas. Presumably, the University or the Vice-Chancellor were not interested either in the petitioner or the respondent No. 3. If there are more defendants than one in a suit having similar defences any of them cannot be shut out and be put out of Court simply on the ground that the other defendant is raising the same pleas. Presumably, the University or the Vice-Chancellor were not interested either in the petitioner or the respondent No. 3. For them it was immaterial whether the petitioner got the post or the respondent No. 3 was appointed to it. To the petitioner the question was of personal importance and involved his future life and career. Neither the University nor the Vice-Chancellor could, therefore, be expected to put the matter before the Chancellor with the vehemence and persuasion which the petitioner would have utilised. Moreover, there could be points relating to the question not put forward by the University or the Vice-Chancellor which the petitioner could urge if he was given a chance. 21. On behalf of the respondent No. 3 it was urged that in his petition the petitioner wants the decision of the Chancellor to be quashed by a writ of certiorari. The real question decided by the Chancellor was whether the Selection Committee was duly constituted. The petitioner was not directly interested in that question. He cannot, therefore, claim to be a person aggrieved by that decision and cannot on that account get it quashed by a writ of certiorari. It is pointed out that the petitioner can claim to be interested only in one of the consequences that followed from the decision of the Chancellor but that cannot give him a right to impugne the decision itself. 22. This raises an interesting question as to who can be considered to be an aggrieved person entitled to claim a writ of certiorari. James, L. J. in Ex. Parte, Sidebotham, In re, Sidebotham, 1880 (14) Ch. D. 458 attempted a definition of a "person aggrieved" by saying "But the words `person aggrieved' do not really mean a man who is dis-appointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something." 23. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something." 23. In Ex Parte Official Receiver, in re Reed Bowen and Co., 1887 (19) Q.B.D. 174 Lord Esher, M. R., accepted the definition but qualified the word `something' by saying that `it must be something for which he had a right to ask.' 24. In Ealing Corporation v. Jones, 1959 (2) WLR 194 Lord Parker expressed the view that the expression "a person aggrieved" connotes "Some legal grievance, for example, a deprivation of something, an adverse effect on the title to something and so on." and did not mean only "A person who is disappointed or annoyed at the decision." More recently in Attorney-General of the Gambia v. N'Jie, 1961 (2) All. E.R. 504 at p. 511 Lord Denning remarked with reference to the definition of James, L.J. "But the definition of James, L.J., is not to be regarded as exhaustive. Lord Esher, M. R., pointed that out in Re Reed Bowen & Co., Ex. P. Official Receiver, 1887 (19) QBD 174. The words "person aggrieved" are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busy body who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance be cause an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests." 25. What has, therefore, to be seen is whether the petitioner is a person whose interests are affected by the decision of the Chancellor. The answer, in our opinion, must be in the affirmative. The petitioner is not only affected by the decision but is very much affected by it. In his decision the Chancellor not only held the Selection Committee as illegally constituted but also declared "The recommendations made by this Selection Committee for appoint-ment of persons to the two posts of Professorships mentioned above, and the decision of the Executive Council of the University taken at its meeting held on December 20, 1958 accepting the recommendations of the above mentioned Selection Committee, and the appointments made as a consequence thereof are, therefore, declared null and void." 26. The Chancellor thus in so many words declared the appointment of the petitioner as Professor of Law null and void. This part of his decision affected the petitioner directly and vitally. It had the effect of depriving him of a post which the petitioner claimed to be entitled to hold. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that the petitioner was not an aggrieved person so as to be entitled to get the decision of the Chancellor quashed by a. writ of certiorari. 27. Two other contentions were raised on behalf of the respondent No. 3. One was that the petitioner had been appointed only on probation and had, therefore, no right to the post of Professor of law. At any time during the period of probation the University could terminate his services. As he had no right to continue in the post he could not maintain the petition. The other was that there were provisions in the Lucknow University Act and the statutes framed thereunder under which if an employee of the University had any grievance against it he could get it referred to arbitration. The proper remedy for the petitioner if he was dissatisfied with the termination of his appointment was to have the matter referred to arbitration. 28. These contentions too are quite untenable. The petitioner was certainly appointed on probation for two years. His services had, however, not been terminated on the ground that his work did not prove satisfactory or that the University did not consider it proper to retain him in service. His appointment has really been cancelled because it has been declared null and void by the Chancellor. When the validity of the appointment itself was being put in jeopardy the fact that the appointment was on probation for a period of two years and the period has not expired cannot be given any importance. 29. The grievance of the petitioner is not against the University. He is really aggrieved against the order of the Chancellor who has declared his appointment as null and void. There is, therefore, no question of his utilising the provisions in the University Act or the statutes relating to arbitration. 30. 29. The grievance of the petitioner is not against the University. He is really aggrieved against the order of the Chancellor who has declared his appointment as null and void. There is, therefore, no question of his utilising the provisions in the University Act or the statutes relating to arbitration. 30. There is, therefore, considerable force in the contention of the petitioner that the decision of the Chancellor dated the 23rd May 1959 so far as it relates to him and his appointment as a Professor of Law is vitiated by the fact that it violated a fundamental principle of natural justice inasmuch as though it directly affected the petitioner it was given without giving him an opportunity of being heard. The decision is, therefore, liable to be quashed and the petitioner is entitled to restrain the respondent No. 2 (Vice-Chancellor) from giving effect to it. 31. As a natural consequence of the decision dated the 23rd May 1959 being quashed the reference made to the Chancellor will become pending before him again and he will have to decide it in accordance with law, after giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. At the time of such fresh hearing it will be open to the petitioner to oppose the representation made by the respondent No. 3 on merits and also to urge that the reference to the Chancellor was not properly made. We have not heard the parties on these points and express no opinion on the same. 32. It was in the end urged by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the Chancellor that there is bound to be some time lag between the quashing of the decision of the Chancellor and the reference being disposed of again. He urged that for this intervening period either this Court should pass some order directing the status quo ante to continue or let the Chancellor pass such interim orders. We are unable to accede to this request. We do not know what the status quo ante is in this matter. We are not very sure whether the Chancellor has any powers under Section 39 to issue interim orders or directions. The question has not been debated before us to enable us to say anything on the point. We are unable to accede to this request. We do not know what the status quo ante is in this matter. We are not very sure whether the Chancellor has any powers under Section 39 to issue interim orders or directions. The question has not been debated before us to enable us to say anything on the point. We are ourselves not in a position to issue any directions as to how the affairs are to be managed during this interim period. The only thing we can do is to leave the matter to take its ordinary natural course. The legal consequence of the order quashing the decision of the Chancellor must naturally follow and cannot, in our opinion, be suspended or prevented. 33. The petition in the result succeeds to this extent that the decision of the Chancellor (respondent No. 1) dated the 23rd May 1959 is quashed by a writ of certiorari and the respondent No. 2 (Vice-Chancellor) is directed not to give effect to that decision. The respondent No. 1 must deal with the reference made to him in accordance with law. The petitioner will have his costs in respect of the petition from the respondents.