DAVE, J.—This is an appeal by accused Ramla, against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Jalore, dated the 27th March, 1961, whereby he has been convicted under sec. 307, I.P.C., and sentenced to five years R.I. 2. The case relates to an incident, which took place at village Sanghana on the night between the 1st and 2nd June, 1960. The first information report about the occurrence was lodged on the next day by P.W. Khubla at police station, Bhawatra. 3. The prosecution story in this case was that the appellant had illicit intimacy with Mst.Chunki, widow of Fatta, who was uncle of P.W.Kastura. P.W.Kastura resented appellants illicit connection with Mst.Chunki and therefore he used to reprimand him from time to time. The story goes that three days before the occurrence, Kastura again reprimanded the appellant and asked him to stop his visits to Mst. Chunki and, thereupon, the appellant told him that he should not meddle in the affair, otherwise he would be killed. The prosecution story further is that on the night between 1st and 2nd June, 1960, P.W. Kastura was sleeping on a cot outside his Jhumpa. His brother P.W. Khubla was also sleeping on a separate cot by his side. When both of them were asleep, the appellant came armed with a spear and caused injuries on the neck of P.W. Kastura with the intention of murdering him. On receiving the spear blow, Kastura was aroused from his sleep and he raised a cry, on account of which his brother Khubla also woke up. According to the prosecution, both of them saw the appellant when he was running away. 4. The first information report about this occurrence was written by P.W. Bhur Singh, Sarpanch of village Sangahana at the dictation of Kastura himself. That report was presented by his brother Khubla at police station, Bhawatra. Kastura was also taken by his brother in a cart to the police station and therefore the Station House Office recorded the statement of Kastura on the back of his written report. Thereafter, he sent Kastura for his medical examination to the Medical Officer Incharge, General Hospital, Jalore. The Sub Inspector also recovered one dagger (Chhuri) from the house of Ramla appellant. It may be noted here that the said recovery is of no avail, because according to Kastura, it was not the weapon with which he was struck. Thereafter, he sent Kastura for his medical examination to the Medical Officer Incharge, General Hospital, Jalore. The Sub Inspector also recovered one dagger (Chhuri) from the house of Ramla appellant. It may be noted here that the said recovery is of no avail, because according to Kastura, it was not the weapon with which he was struck. Moreover that weapon was not sent to the chemical examiner for the presence of blood. After investigation, the police challaned the appellant in the court of the Magistrate First Class, Jalore, for offences under secs.307 and 326, Indian Penal Code. The accused pleaded not guilty in the committing magistrates court, but on preliminary inquiry the Magistrate came to the conclusion that a prima facie case was made out against the accused and so he was committed to the court of the Addl. Sessions Judge, Jalore, for his trial in respect of the said offences. In the trial court also, the accused pleaded innocence. He did not take up any specific plea in his statement which was recorded under sec. 342, Criminal Procedure Code. He, however, examined Mst. Chunki in his defence. 5. Mst. Chunkis version was that on the night of occurrence she had gone to Kasturas house in order to grind corn, since her own grinding-mill (Ghatti) was out of order. She had sought Kasturas permission on the preceding day and he had told her that she could come to his house and use his mill (Ghatti). She, therefore, went to Kasturas house. She found that the door of his house was closed from inside. She, therefore, called out Kastura to open the door. Kastura opened the door and she then went in. When she was about to grind the corn, Kastura approached him and made an attempt to have sexual intercourse with her. She, therefore, ran away from his house, but he pursued her and at that time he dashed against the door of his house and got the injuries, on account of some sharp nails which were piercing out of the shutters. 6. The prosecution examined 8 witnesses to prove the case against the accused. The learned Additional Sessions Judge did not believe the version put forward by Mst. Chunki and relying upon the prosecution evidence, he convicted and sentenced the accused as mentioned above. 7. 6. The prosecution examined 8 witnesses to prove the case against the accused. The learned Additional Sessions Judge did not believe the version put forward by Mst. Chunki and relying upon the prosecution evidence, he convicted and sentenced the accused as mentioned above. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that his client was innocent and that the trial court has committed an error in convicting him of the offence under sec. 307, Indian Penal Code. Learned counsel has raised two-fold contentions. It is urged by him that, in the first instance, it is not proved by the prosecution beyond doubt if the injuries received by Kastura were caused to him by the appellant. It is contended that the occurrence took place in the night and neither Kastura nor his brother Khubla could be certain about the identity of the assailant. His next argument is that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that Kastura was injured at the hands of the appellant, the appellants act did not come within the ambit of sec. 307, Indian Penal Code, that the injuries received by Kastura were of simple nature and therefore the appellant could, at the most, be held guilty of an offence under sec. 324, I.P.C. 8. Learned Assistant Government Advocate has, on the other hand, tried to support the judgment of the trial court. 9. Before proceeding to examine the arguments raised by learned counsel on either side, it may be observed that the correctness of the fact that Kastura received two injuries on his neck on the night between 1st and 2nd June, 1960, has not been challenged by learned counsel for the appellant. Dr. Kishan Singh (P.W. 2) has stated that he was medical officer incharge of the Central Hospital at Jalore and that he had conducted the medical examination of Kastura on the 3rd June, 1960. He has proved his report Ex. P. 2, which he had recorded after the said examination. He has further stated that he found two incised wounds on Kasturas neck. The first one was on the left side of his neck and it measured 2"x 1/4"x 1". The second injury was also an incised wound measuring 1-1/2" x 3/4" x 1" below and away from the first injury. He has further stated that he found two incised wounds on Kasturas neck. The first one was on the left side of his neck and it measured 2"x 1/4"x 1". The second injury was also an incised wound measuring 1-1/2" x 3/4" x 1" below and away from the first injury. In the opinion of the witness, these injuries were not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, nor were they likely to cause death. He was also of the opinion that these injuries appeared to have been caused by a sharp weapon like a Chhuri. According to the witness, both the injuries were grievous because they were caused on a vital part and they were so close to the carotid artery that if it were cut, the life of the injured would have been in danger. 10. It has already been pointed out above that learned counsel for the appellant has not challenged the correctness of the statement of this witness so far as he no:iced the injuries on the person of Kastura, but he has challenged the correctness of the opinion of the witness inasmuch as he says that the said injuries were of grievous nature. It is contended by learned counsel that both the injuries were not covered by the definition of grievous hurt given in sec. 320 of the Indian Penal Code. It has been very candidly conceded by the learned Assistant Government Advocate that the injuries described by P. W. 2 Dr. Kishan Singh are not covered by the first seven clauses of sec. 320, Indian Penal Code. It was suggested that the doctor had perhaps given his opinion about the nature of the injuries being grievous on account of the eighth clause in the said section. That clause runs as follows— 11. "Eightly-Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits." 12. I have carefully gone into the statement of P. W. 2 and find that he has not stated if the injuries received by Kastura had caused him to be in severe bodily pain during the space of twenty days or that he was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during that time. It appears that no such question was put to him. It appears that no such question was put to him. He seems to have given his opinion on the ground that if the injuries had damaged the carotid artery, they would have proved dangerous to the life of the injured. It may be pointed out that the perusal of the very definition given above shows that an injury may be called grievous only if it "endangers life." This means that the injury which is actually found should itself be such that it may put the life of the injured in danger. A simple injury cannot be called grievous simply because it happens to be caused on a vital part of the body unless the nature and dimensions of the injury or its effect are such that in the opinion of the doctor it actually endangers the life of the victim. I agree with, learned counsel for the appellant that the witness (P. W. 2) was not correct in stating that the injuries received by Kastura were grievous, because he did not depose that the injuries received by Kastura were as such dangerous to his life. If the carotid artery were cut it would, have been a different matter, but the witness does not say that the said artery was even touched. He himself observed in the earlier part of his statement that both the injuries were not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, nor were they likely to cause death and in the face of that observation, it was not proper for him to give an opinion that the said injuries were grievous. He ought to have given his opinion on the basis of the injuries as they were actually found by him and not on what the condition of the injuries would have been if they were caused with a little greater force or if they had damaged a particular vital part of the body. Both the injuries are held to be of simple nature. 13. The next two questions which arise for determination are— (1) whether the said injuries were caused by the appellant, and (2) whether the act of the appellant was covered by the provisions of sec. 307, Indian Penal Code. 14. Both the injuries are held to be of simple nature. 13. The next two questions which arise for determination are— (1) whether the said injuries were caused by the appellant, and (2) whether the act of the appellant was covered by the provisions of sec. 307, Indian Penal Code. 14. Now, to begin with the first point, it is urged by appellants learned counsel that Kasturas assailant must have run away from the scene as soon as he was aroused from his sleep and that the incident having taken place at the dead of night, he could not be identified even by Kastura much less by his brother Khubla. It is further pointed out that P. W. Bhur Singh, who wrote out the first information report, had stated in the trial court that Khubla had only expressed his suspicion about his brothers assailant being Ramla and that he was not quite certain about him. It has also been argued that Bhur Singh and Dine Khan went to the sice and Dine Khan tracker was purposely taken by Khubla in order to compare the foot-prints of the assailant with those of the appellant. It is contended that if Khubla and his brother Kastura were certain about the assailant, there was no need of taking the tracker to the site. It has also been argued that the tracker has not been produced by the prosecution and the fact that his testimony has been withheld, shows that if he were examined, his testimony would not have been helpful to the prosecution. 15. I have given earnest consideration to these arguments and carefully scrutinized the evidence of P. Ws. Kastura, Khubla, Bhur Singh and others. Kastura (P. W. 4) has stated that on the night of occurrence he was sleeping in the court-yard outside his Jhumpa on a cot. His brother Khubla was also sleeping on another cot by his side. He was aroused from his sleep when he received injuries on his neck and when he saw accused Ramla standing near his cot with a small spear in his hand, he raised a cry which woke-up his brother. He has also stated that the appellant had illicit intimacy with his aunt Mst. Chunki and, therefore, he had told him several times not to pay any visits to her. He has also stated that the appellant had illicit intimacy with his aunt Mst. Chunki and, therefore, he had told him several times not to pay any visits to her. Only three days before the occurrence he told the appellant, when he met him, to sever his connection with Mst. Chunki. Thereupon, the appellant told him that if he would come in their way, he would be killed. This witness has been cross-examined at length, but, in my opinion, he has remained unshaken. It was quite natural for him to be aroused from his sleep the moment he received injuries on his neck and it could not be difficult for him to identify the appellant who was standing near his cot. The witness and the appellant are residents of the same village and they are not only of the same community but also distantly related. The appellant was intimately known to the witness and he could not make any mistake about his identity. Khubla (P. W. 5) has corroborated the statement of Kastura. He also says that he was sleeping by the side of his brother on a separate cot and when his brothers cries aroused him from his sleep, he saw the appellant running away at a distance of about three Paondas. The appellant was as much known to this witness as to his brother and therefore he also could not make any mistake about his identity. It is significant that in the first information report which was made soon after the occurrence, the appellants name was specifically mentioned. It is true that P. W. Bhur Singh, who had written out the first information report, has stated that when Khubla went to him and informed him about this occurrence, he had told him that he suspected Ramla as Kasturas assailant, but this statement goes against the report Ex. P. 1, which was admittedly written out by him and, in my opinion, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was right in holding that the witness was tampered with and won over by the accused. If Khubla had only expressed his suspicion about Ramla, it was the duty of the witness, to write the report accordingly. His oral statement cannot be relied upon in so far as it goes against the report written by himself. If Khubla had only expressed his suspicion about Ramla, it was the duty of the witness, to write the report accordingly. His oral statement cannot be relied upon in so far as it goes against the report written by himself. It is further significant that the witness says that he did not put any question to Kastura when he met him. This is again not believable. The witness has tried to explain this by saying that Kastuta was lying unconscious when he reached him, but Kastura does not say if he ever became unconscious. It appears from Ex. P. 1 that Kastura was well within his consciousness even by the time he was taken to the police station and his statement was recorded by the Station House Officer. It is therefore, clear that P. W. Bhur Singh was won over by the accused and so he tried to oblige him. I do not further agree with the contention of the appellants learned counsel that simply because a tracker was also asked by Khubla to reach the site, it should be presumed that Khubla was in doubt about the assailant. It appears that a tracker was requested to reach the site with the purpose that he might also see the foot-prints of the assailant and he may be able to corroborate the statements of Khubla and his brother Kastura. It is significant that even Bhur Singh, who was tried to oblige the appellant, has stated that when the tracker went to the site, he expressed his opinion that foot-prints looked like that of appellant Ramla. I may make it clear at this stage that I am not referring to the evidence of P. W. Bhoor Singh in order to utilize the opinion which is said to have been expressed by the tracker at that time, but I have referred it in order to repel the argument that an adverse inference should be drawn on account of the non-production of the tracker by the prosecution. This Court has held in more than one case that the evidence of a tracker is of little importance and, under these circumstances, no adverse inference can be drawn, simply because he was not examined by the prosecution. This Court has held in more than one case that the evidence of a tracker is of little importance and, under these circumstances, no adverse inference can be drawn, simply because he was not examined by the prosecution. It may be further observed that there could be no good reason for Kastura or his brother to leave out the real assailant if he was somebody other than the appellant and name him if they were in any doubt. By naming the appellant in the first information report, they were consciously excluding the chance of any other assailant being detected. Therefore, the fact that the assailants name was mentioned in the first information report lends very strong corroboration to the statements of P. Ws. Kastura and Khubla. The trial court, which had the additional advantage of judging their veracity by their demeanour, has found both these witnesses trustworthy and I do not find any good ground to differ with the opinion of the trial court. In my opinion, it is established beyond any manner of doubt that the injuries received by P. W. Kastura were caused by the appellant and nobody else. 16. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the weapon recovered by the police in this case was only a Chhuri and not a spear and this shows that the investigating officer did not proceed in the matter with clean hands. In this connection, it would suffice to say that if the police were able to recover the real weapon which was used by the appellant, it would have certainly given further strength to the prosecution case, but the mere absence of its recovery does not weaken the prosecution case or cast any doubt on the veracity of the statements of P. Ws. Kastura and Khubla. On the contrary, if may be pointed out that P. W. Kastura was honest enough to say that the weapon recovered by the police was not the one which he had seen in the hand of the appellant. 17. Kastura and Khubla. On the contrary, if may be pointed out that P. W. Kastura was honest enough to say that the weapon recovered by the police was not the one which he had seen in the hand of the appellant. 17. Now coming to the second point, it is contended by learned counsel that P. W. Kastura had received only two simple injuries on his neck and therefore the only inference, which the trial court ought to have drawn, should have been that the appellant intended to cause simple injuries with a sharp weapon and thus he should have been convicted only under sec. 324 and not under sec. 307, Indian Penal Code. According to learned counsel, if no injury is received by the victim, the Court may consider the question whether it is proved by the prosecution evidence that the assailant had the intention to commit murder or that he had the knowledge that his act was likely to kill the victim, but if an injury is caused, then the intention or knowledge should be inferred only from the injury and other evidence should be excluded. In support of his argument, he has referred to Jeetmal S/o Manchharam Vs. State(1). In that case one Sidhanath and his brother Jeetmal had a scuffle and Sidhanath received four simple injuries on his head and throat. It was observed that "to sustain a conviction under sec. 307, Penal Code, it is necessary that there must be an act done under such circumstances as death might be caused if the act took effect. The act must be capable of causing death in the natural and ordinary course of things; and if the act complained of is not of that description, the assailant cannot be convicted of an attempt to commit murder under sec. 307, Penal Code". It may be pointed out that in view of the fact that the injuries received by Sidhanath were simple, the learned Judges thought that the accused could not have the intention of causing the murder of his brother, nor had he knowledge that he was likely to cause death. In the case (1) the learned Judges did not go to the length of laying down that if simple injuries are received in a certain case, an intention to commit murder can never be inferred. The learned Judges themselves observed that "for the purpose of sec. In the case (1) the learned Judges did not go to the length of laying down that if simple injuries are received in a certain case, an intention to commit murder can never be inferred. The learned Judges themselves observed that "for the purpose of sec. 307, what is material is the intention or knowledge, not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention". It is thus obvious that Jeetmals case(1) does not support the argument which the appellants learned counsel has tried to develop in this Court. 18. Learned counsel has next referred to Sukra Ram Vs. State(2). In that case, a learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Court had certainly observed that "causing injuries, though with the intention of causing death but which do not result in death, does not come, in my opinion, under sec. 307". With great respect, I find myself unable to agree with this view. Since the discussion in the present case turns upon the interpretation of section 307, Indian Penal Code it would be proper to reproduce it at this stage: — Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and, under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to transportation for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. When any person offending under this section is under sentence of transporation for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death. It would appear from the perusal of the said section that it may be divided into three parts. The first part says that whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if he had by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. It is clear that stress is laid on the intention or knowledge of the accused and secondly on the circumstances. It is clear that stress is laid on the intention or knowledge of the accused and secondly on the circumstances. This part of the section does not even contemplate that it must be necessary that the victim should receive even a simple hurt. All that is necessary is that the accused should have the intention to commit murder of the victim or he should have knowledge that he is likely to cause his death. If he commits a certain act with that intention or knowledge and there are circumstances to show, that, if he by that act caused the death of the victim, he would be guilty of murder, he may be punished under this section even though the victim may not be hurt at all. This would be further clear from the second part of the section which says that if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to transportation for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. It is obvious that if no hurt is caused a lighter punishment is provided in the first part, but if hurt is caused, then the second part of the section would come into play and the offender would be liable to enhanced punishment provided by that section. Then, the third part of the section provides that if the offender is already under sentence of transportation for life and if hurt is caused, he may be punished with death. The illustrations which are given under section 307 further make it clear that it is not necessary that the person whose murder is attempted must be hurt by the offender. Illustration (a) to the section says that if A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that if death ensued, A would be guilty of murder then A would be liable to punishment under this section. It is clear from the said illustration that it was not laid down that Z must have received some injuries at the hands of A in order to punish him for the offence provided under this section. In Vasudeo Balwant Gogte vs. Emperor(3) the accused had fired at the Acting Governor of Bombay two shots from a revolver which was later taken away from him and was found to be a powerful weapon of. 380 calibre. In Vasudeo Balwant Gogte vs. Emperor(3) the accused had fired at the Acting Governor of Bombay two shots from a revolver which was later taken away from him and was found to be a powerful weapon of. 380 calibre. Both the shots were fired at point blank range but inspite of that the Governor was not hurt and the two bullets were found in the lining of his coat. In those circumstances, it was argued before a Division Bench of the Court on the basis of the view taken in Reg vs. Cassidy((1867)4 B.H.C.R.17),osi which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the appellant as well, that a case under sec. 307, Indian Penal Code, was not made out. Repelling this contention, it was observed by Beaumont C.J. as follows:—"If the reasoning of the learned Judges in that case be right as to the construction of sec. 307, and if the act committed by the accused must be an act capable of causing death in the ordinary course, it seems to me that logically the section could never have any effect at all. If an act is done which in fact does not cause death, it is impossible to say that that precise act might have caused death............If however sec. 307 does not cover the case of a man who fires a gun at his enemy with intent to kill him but misses his aim, it is difficult to see how the section can ever have any operation............I think that what sec. 307 really means is that the accused must do an act with such a guilty intention and knowledge and in such circumstances that but for some intervening fact the act would have amounted to murder in the normal course of events." I respectfully agree with the said observation made by the learned Judge. In Bharat Dube vs. Emperor(4) it was observed as follows:—"In order that an act shall amount to an attempt to murder all that is necessary to prove is that if the act had caused death it would have amounted to murder provided that it was done with such intention or knowledge as would be necessary to be proved in the case of murder. The fact that an act results in minor injuries or even in no injuries at all is not relevant for the purpose of deciding whether it amounted to an attempt to murder or not. The illustrations to the section are themselves quite clear that the section provides different punishment for cases where the act results in hurt being caused and where no such result follows", Similar view was taken in Parcho Kewalram and others vs. Emperor (5), Emperor vs. Mt. Gangoo(6) and Badshah Singh and others vs. The Stats(7). In view of these authorities, there is no force in the argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that an intention to commit murder on the part of the appellant should not be inferred simply because the injuries received by Kastura were of a simple nature. It is true that if there is no, other evidence direct or circumstantial against the accused to show his intention and if his intention is to be inferred only from the injuries, then he should ordinarily be deemed to have intended to cause only that kind of injury which has been actually caused by him. In other words, if the injury found on the person of the victim is simple, then it should be inferred that the accused intended to cause simple injury and if the injury caused is grievous, he should be credited with the intention of causing grievous injury. Even a grievous hurt of each and every type caused by the accused cannot give rise to an inference that he had made an attempt to cause murder of the injured. In order to determine the question whether the accused had committed an attempt to commit murder, the court will have to find out if he intended to commit murder or whether he knew that his act was likely to cause death of the person assaulted by him and if there are circumstances to show that in the event of the death of the victim, the accused would have been held guilty of murder, then he may be held guilty of an attempt to commit murder, because the victim happens to remain alive. It is the intention or knowledge of the accused and the circumstances in which he commits the offence which are material in a case under section 307 I.P.C. and if there is other evidence direct circumstantial to indicate his intention or knowledge, then the fact that the injury caused is simple or grievous or that no injury is caused does not matter. Now, in order to see whether the appellant had an intention to commit Kasturas murder, we will have to look to the circumstances in which Kastura was injured. 19. It is clear from the evidence of Kastura and Khubla that both of them were sleeping outside the Jhumpa on separate cots. It is also clear that Kastura was injured at night time when he was asleep. It is obvious that the appellant had taken advantage of the fact that the victim was sleeping and he could not offer resistance. He committed this act under the cover of night in order to avoid his detection. Then he went there armed with a sharp weapon. If the appellant had intended to cause only simple injuries to Kastura, he could as well cause them on his hand or feet and other parts of his body which were not vital. But, it is clear, that instead of injuring Kastura on non-vital parts, he aimed the blows on a very vital part of his body, namely the neck, and the doctor has stated that the injury was so close to the carotid artery that if that artery were cut, Kastura might have died. It is also proved from the statement of Kastura that the appellant had told him only three days earlier that he should not meddle in the affairs between him and Mst. Chunki, otherwise he would be killed. It is urged by learned counsel for the appellant that this statement of Kastura should not be relied upon, because he did not make any report to the police. It is true that Kastura did not make any such report after that event, but that may be, because he never took it seriously that the appellant would actually translate his words into practice and go to the length of committing his murder. It is certain that the relations between the appellant and Kastura were strained. It is true that Kastura did not make any such report after that event, but that may be, because he never took it seriously that the appellant would actually translate his words into practice and go to the length of committing his murder. It is certain that the relations between the appellant and Kastura were strained. Now if the blow given by the appellant on the neck of Kastura would have gone deeper or if his carotid artery were cut and if Kastura had died as a result of these injuries, then the accused would certainly have been found guilty of a coldblooded murder. The appellant on his part had given two blows with a sharp instrument on the neck of Kastura in order to kill him. If Kastura in escaped death, it was because the injuries did not go deep enough and because further injuries could not be inflicted since Kasturas brother Khubla was aroused from his sleep and the appellant had to run away, otherwise he would have been caught red-handed. In view of these circumstances, the learned Additional Sessions Judge in my opinion committed no mistake in holding the appellant guilty of an attempt to commit murder. His conviction under sec. 307, Indian Penal Code, is fully justified. 20. Lastly, it is urged by learned counsel that the sentence awarded to the appellant is excessive, but I think that the sentence is not harsh in view of the circumstances in which the offence was committed. 21. There is ho force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed.