JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - The Petitioners are Plaintiffs in T.S No. 226 of 1956 in the Court of the Second Munsif, Cuttack. On 12-4-60, some witnesses were examined for the Plaintiffs in presence of both, parties, and the next day being a holiday, further hearing was adjourned to 14-4.60. On 14-4-60, at the commencement of the hearing, neither the Defendants nor their lawyer appeared on call. In their absence, one of the Plaintiffs witnesses was examined and discharged, and arguments for the Plaintiffs were head, and the case was fixed for judgment to 1-5-60. Sometimes thereafter, on that very day, a petition was filed on behalf of the Defendants to reopen the case, alleging that there was some delay in heir coming back to the court with their witnesses from their village where they had gone as the previous day was a holiday, and that the day in, their appearing in court on 14-4-60 was not a deliberate one. Holding that the absence of the Defendants was not wilful, the trial court allowed the petition on condition of payment of cost to the Plaintiffs, observing that the ground was sufficient for the relief under Order 18, Rule 2 (Orissa amendment) and Rule 17 Code of Civil Procedure. It is against this order that the Plaintiffs have come in revision. 2. Order 18, Rule 2, CPC provides that on the day fixed for the hearing of the suit or on any other day to which the hearing is adjourned, the party having the right to begin shall state his case and produce his evidence in support of the reissues which he is bound to prove. The other party shall then state his case and produce his evidence (if any) and may then address the Court generally on the whole case. The party beginning may then reply generally on the whole case. The Orissa: Amendment to this rule is by way of adding an explanation which says, "Nothing in this rule shall affect the jurisdiction of the Court to direct any party to examine any witness at any stage for reasons to be recorded in writing. Obviously this explantation has its bearing on the question of the sequence laid down in the main rule and has nothing to connect itself with the question of non-appearance of a party at a particular stage. Obviously this explantation has its bearing on the question of the sequence laid down in the main rule and has nothing to connect itself with the question of non-appearance of a party at a particular stage. Order 18, Rule 17 lays down that the Court may at any stage of a sit recall any witness who has been examined and may put such questions to him as the Court thinks fit. The trial court thought that this rule applied in case of the particular Plaintiffs witness who was examined and discharged without being cross-examined on 14-4-60. The intention of this rule is to give opportunity to a party to put some questions to a witness who has already been examined when inadvertently such questions were left out in the earlier examination; this rule again has no bearing on the question of non-appearance of a party at a particular stage. 3. It has been urged before me that the procedure adopted by the court is justified by Section 1'1 Code of Civil Procedure, though the court itself has been of opinion that the said section does not apply. Order 9, Rule 7 CPC provides for remedy to a Defendant where the hearing of the suit exparte has been adjourned and the Defendant appears at or before such a hearing. Order 9, Rule 13 CPC provides for remedy to Defendant who is absent at the hearing stage and against whom a decree is passed exparte. Order 17, Rule 2 CPC provides for the course to be adopted when the Defendant is present at the earlier stage of the hearing, but is absent on the date of the adjourned hearing. Order 17, Rule 3 CPC provides for the course to be adopted when the Defendant, after taking time, fails to produce his evidence or to cause attendance of his witnesses or to perform any other act necessary for the further progress of the suit. In a case where Order 17, Rule 2 applies, the remedy for the Defendant is one by way of appeal-or review or for setting aside exparte decree under Order 9, Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure, whereas if Order 17, Rule 2 applies, the remedy is by way of appeal or review. In a case where Order 17, Rule 2 applies, the remedy for the Defendant is one by way of appeal-or review or for setting aside exparte decree under Order 9, Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure, whereas if Order 17, Rule 2 applies, the remedy is by way of appeal or review. I need not discuss here whether Order 17, Rule 2, or Order 17, Rule 3 CPC applies to the present case when the Defendants remained absent to call on the adjourned date of hearing whichever of them might apply, they have got specific remedy in law their-against. The inherent power which has been preserved u/s 151 CPC is to enable the court to deal with matters and situations which are not covered by any specific provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the absence of some special circumstances, which amount to the abuse of the process of the court, it cannot grant a relief in exercise of its inherent power when the ends of justice can be served by another remedy provided in the Code. In the present case, as I have said, the hearing of the suit was concluded by the court in the absence (If the Defendants, either following Order 17, Rule 2 or Order 17, Rule 3 Code of Civil Procedure, and so the Defendants have remedy against the course so taken up as provided by the Code. In the Full Bench case of Nityandnda Kanungo v. Pala Dei 1952 C.L.T. 1 their Lordships had to consider the application of Section 151 CPC in a case where after the confirmation of the sale; on the decree-holder-purchaser's application for delivery or possession, a warrant was issued under Order 21, Rule 95 CPC and before the execution of the warrant, the person in possession came up with an application u/s 151 CPC for recalling the writ of delivery of possession, alleging that he was in possession in his own right and not being a party be was not bound by it. Their Lordships observed: The Court could not anticipate the position contemplated by Order 21, Rule 97, and investigate the claim of the prospective resisters. Their Lordships observed: The Court could not anticipate the position contemplated by Order 21, Rule 97, and investigate the claim of the prospective resisters. The Court could not exercise any such anticipatory jurisdiction to inquire into the question of title of a third party prospective obstructor, in an application by him before he bad in fact been dispossessed, which an application was not maintainable u/s 151. In relation to a situation which has been specifically contemplated and provided for by the Code, the exercise of an inherent were by way of a supposed anticipatory jurisdiction to deal with that situation u/s 151, s not permissible, unless any such exercise of the inherent power is sanctioned by a course of settled practice of Courts relating to that class of situations. Exercise of inherent powers could not also be supported on the ground that it tended to prevent abuse of process or helped to shorten litigation. The insistence of a party before the Court, on the procedure permitted by the law, does not normally amount to abuse of process of Court, unless there are serious reasons to think that in the circumstances of a particular case, it amounts to harassing, vexation and oppression. It was held in Doma Choudhary and Others Vs. Ram Naresh Lal and Others, : The inherent power has been preserved in order to enable the Courts to deal with matters and situations which are not covered by any specific provision of the Code. It is therefore, neither practicable nor desirable to define the limits or to enumerate the circumstances in which this power can be exercised. As, however, the power is, of necessity, very wide, the courts have to be very cautious and vigilant in exercising it. It may also be safely laid down that the court has no inherent power to override express provisions of the Code. Further, in the absence of some special circumstances which amount to a use of the process of the Court, it cannot grant a relief in exercise of its inherent power when the ends of justice can be served by another remedy provided by the Code which is available to the party concerned. Further, in the absence of some special circumstances which amount to a use of the process of the Court, it cannot grant a relief in exercise of its inherent power when the ends of justice can be served by another remedy provided by the Code which is available to the party concerned. The mere fact that the procedure for following the order remedy is longer or more costly will not entitle the Court to disregard this rule, because its order will not be necessary either in the end of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. In the absence of special circumstances, a Court has no jurisdiction, in the exercise of its inherent power, to set aside the dismissal for default of an application under Order 9, Rule 9 and to restore it. The ends of justice would be served if the Applicant follows the remedy by way of appeal. 4. There is another angle from which the-matter can also be viewed. Supposing the application of the Defendants u/s 151 CPC would have been dismissed by the trial court, and thereafter the decree was passed by the trial court, the Defendants would have proceeded for their remedy either by way of appeal or review or under Order 9, Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure, could such a remedy be open to them, or could it be said that, because their application u/s 151 had already been rejected, they were deprived of their statutory remedies expressly provided by the Code? If such a statutory remedy was still open to them, then it could next be urged that the finding of the Court u/s 151 on the merit of the case was res judicata between the parties, and could not be registered in those subsequent proceedings. I Section 151 would be held to be applicable to such cases, then, even if no such application is filed, it could be equally urged in the subsequent proceedings by way of appeal or review or setting aside the exparte decree that since the Defendants have taken no steps u/s 151, they have submitted themselves to the finality of the court's and they cannot re-agitate the same in those subsequent proceedings. In all such cases, the statutory remedy provided by the Court would be meaningless. 5. In all such cases, the statutory remedy provided by the Court would be meaningless. 5. In the circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that Section 151 CPC has no application to the present case, and the court's order directing restoration of the suit is without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the order of restoration passed by the trial court is set aside, and the revision petition is allowed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 50/-. Final Result : Allowed