The circumstances that give rise to this appeal may briefly be stated thus:— A suit was brought by the appellants against the respondents on 19.2.50 in respect of the land in dispute with the allegation that the tenancy rights in the land were acquired by two brothers Sewa and Baga. These two men had a third brother Lala who had separated from Sewa and Baga before these two brothers acquired the tenancy rights in the land. The appellants therefore went on to say that Sewa and Baga were tenants in common of these two khatas which were entered in their name in the Settlement of Smt. 1982 in equal shares. Baga died without any male descendant in Smr.1988. The plaint was silent as to what happened between 1988, i.e. 1931 and 1948 A.D. But it appears from the case put forward by the appellants that after the death of Baga his half share in the two khatas was mutated half and half in the name of Lalas sons Adu and Norang respondents and Sewa. It was further alleged in the plaint that in 1948 Adu and Norang applied for division of the holding. On this Sewas sons who are the appellants before us objected that Adu and Norang had no right in the land. In consequence the Assistant Collector Rajgarh ordered on 6th October 1941 that the parties should get their rights determined in the civil court. Thereupon the present suit which has given rise to the second appeal was filed in the Munsifs court by the appellants. Their claim was that they were entitled to the entire khata by survivorship as Baga and Sewa were joint. They also claimed by adverse possession. The Munsifs court dismissed the suit in February 1951. There was an appeal to the Senior Civil Judge and he held that the suit should have been transferred to the revenue courts after the enforcement of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Procedure and Jurisdiction Act. The judgment and decree of the Munsif were accordingly set aside and the case was sent to the Revenue Court for decision. The Assistant Collector decided against the appellants and dismissed the suit. In appeal the Commissioner Bikaner confirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this second appeal to the Board. The judgment and decree of the Munsif were accordingly set aside and the case was sent to the Revenue Court for decision. The Assistant Collector decided against the appellants and dismissed the suit. In appeal the Commissioner Bikaner confirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this second appeal to the Board. This appeal was heard and decided by the Board on 12-13-55 by a decision to which one of us was a party. The decrees and judgments of the lower courts were set aside and a decree was granted in favour of the appellants declaring them to be the sole tenants of the disputed land. This decision of the Board was challenged by a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan. The writ petition was allowed and the case was sent back to the Board for reconsideration on the lines pointed out by their Lordships of the High Court. This guidance may be summarised as below: — (a) The question of joint tenancy should not have been made the basis of decision as the appellants had put forward a case of tenancy in common only. In this connection their Lordships referred to the discussion on the point in Cheshires Modern Real Property pages 543 to 552 and were pleased to observe that as soon as the shares of two tenants in some land are definite the tenancy is a tenancy in common and not a joint tenancy. (b) The question as to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the land on the basis of adverse possession was not considered by the Board. (c) The question as to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the land on the ground that Sewa and Baga were members of a joint Hindu family and therefore Sewa had succeeded by survivorship to his brother Baga on his death in preference to the descendants of Lala who was a separated brother, needed consideration. (d) The law relating to the devolution of interest in occupancy tenancy in 1931 should also be determined. (e) The question as to whether in the face of Sewa being alive the sons of Lala can succeed or not as Lala was admittedly dead at the time of Begas death. We would take up the last point first. (d) The law relating to the devolution of interest in occupancy tenancy in 1931 should also be determined. (e) The question as to whether in the face of Sewa being alive the sons of Lala can succeed or not as Lala was admittedly dead at the time of Begas death. We would take up the last point first. To ascertain the law with regard to the devolution of tenancy rights we have examined the provisions contained in the Dasural Amal Adaltain Mal Riyasat Bikaner 1885. A.D. Sec. 123 lays down that the existing procedure was that if any person died without leaving any issues his movable and immovable property escheated to the State Government and real brothers and brothers sons were not recognised as heirs to it and this principle was carried to the extent that if a separated son died in the lifetime of his father then also the property escheated to the State. This was declared to be wrong and sec. 124, 125 and 126 were laid down for the purpose of determining succession. Sec. 124 laid down that if a person died after separating from his father without leaving any issues then the property of the deceased was to devolve on his father who would not be required to pay any court fees etc. Sec. 125 which is relevant for present purposes may be reproduced as below:— ^^nQk 125%& tks fdlh tk;nkn okys dh isV dh vkSykn ugha gks vkSj og cs vkSykn ej tk;s rks ,slh lwjr esa mlds nknk dh vkSykn esa ikl gksus ls ftldk gd gksxk og okfjl gksxkA jkt ls eqtkfgeu u gksxhA** Sec. 126 lays down that in the case of a failure of the descendants of the grand-f?ther the property was to be deemed to have escheated to the State Government. These provisions therefore made it abundantly clear that on the failure of the direct descendents of the deceased the property was to devolve on the descendants of the grand-father of the deceased the nearer excluding the remoter ones. By an application of this principle Sewa was entitled to inherit the rights of the deceased Bega in preference to Adu and Norang sons of Lala, Lala having died prior to Bega. By an application of this principle Sewa was entitled to inherit the rights of the deceased Bega in preference to Adu and Norang sons of Lala, Lala having died prior to Bega. As regards the question of joint tenancy their Lordships of the Rajasthan High Court were pleased to quote with approval the discussion on the point in "Cheshire, On Modern Real Property" to the effect that as soon as the shares of two tenants in some land are defined the tenancy is a tenancy in common and not a joint tenancy. With profound respects to the learned Judge of the Rajasthan High Court we may refer to a Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court (AIR 1930 Lahore High Court 515 wherin it was observed that the rule of survivorship was equally applicable to a occupancy tenancy where there is a unity of tenancy with a plurality of parties possessing well defined shares. The question, however, now assumes a mere academic significance. As observed by their Lordships of the Rajasthan High Court the question of succession in the present case has to be determined with reference to the law prevailing at the time of Begas death i.e. when the succession opened. This question has alredy been dealt with above. The plea of adverse possession was no doubt raised in the case. Ordinarily the possession of a co-tenant is the possession of all the co-tenants unless a definite ouster is proved We have not been shown any thing definite on the point and hence our finding on the point is in the negative. Sewa and Baga were the members of a joint Hindu family and therefore Sewa succeeded by survivorship to his brother Bega. Lala had separated from Sewa and Bega and as such could have had no claim to succeed Bega. Bega died in 1885; and the Tehsildar decided [his succession on two mutations No. 1 and 2 relating to Khasra No. 44 and 5 respectively. We have referred to both these mutations and examined their entries in detail. In column No. 3 of mutation No. 1, the entries are as follows:— "Sewa wa Bega Pisran Mansa Jat Malikan Sakinan-i-deh Ba Hissa barabar" Lala or his sons name does not appear in this colum. The Tehsildar decided the succession of Bega according to his own order on the basis of kursi-i-nama i.e. the pedigree table. In column No. 3 of mutation No. 1, the entries are as follows:— "Sewa wa Bega Pisran Mansa Jat Malikan Sakinan-i-deh Ba Hissa barabar" Lala or his sons name does not appear in this colum. The Tehsildar decided the succession of Bega according to his own order on the basis of kursi-i-nama i.e. the pedigree table. It is clear from the Tehsildars order that the parties were not present when he took up the mutation in the Jalsa Aam proceedings. He has not only not recorded the presence of the parties but gone to say in his order that it was Hazreen Jalsa ( persons present) who verified the fact of Begas demise as issueless. Having ascertained the fact of Begas demise he proceeded to decide the mutation in accordance with the Kursinama which the patwari had recorded on the mutation. He appears to have taken no care to compare the Kursinama with the entries in column No. 3 and had he done so the fact that the name of Lala was no where in the record and that the Kursinama prepared by the patwari was not at all in accordance with the entries in the record of rights. The Tehsildar appears to have also failed to take any steps to inform the parties of his decision made in their absence. However it went unchallenged and was given effect to in the Revenue papers i.e. the Jamabandi of Sambat year 1887 and appears to have been retained and repeated in all subsequent revenue records prepared from time to time. The plaintiffs appellants challenged these entries only in the partion suit of the defendants for the first time, and filed their declaratory suit on the clear allegation that this mutation was wrongly sanctioned. It is obvious that both the trial court and the learned Commissioner have placed reliance on entries in the revenue records subsequent to these mutation orders which were made in pursuance to these mutations as pointed out already. The entries that have appeared in the Revenue Records subsequent to the passing of the above mutation orders are not at all pointed to prove that the succession of Bega has been correctly decided. The significant fact to be noted in this connection is that the appellants throughout continued in the exclusive possession of the disputed land. The entries that have appeared in the Revenue Records subsequent to the passing of the above mutation orders are not at all pointed to prove that the succession of Bega has been correctly decided. The significant fact to be noted in this connection is that the appellants throughout continued in the exclusive possession of the disputed land. As long as they were in peaceful enjoyment of the holding it was not necessary for them to challenge the entries. When a suit for division of the holding was brought against them on the basis of the entries they challenged the same and brought a suit for declaration of their exclusive rights. To conclude therefore we hold that Sewa became the sole tenant of the land in dispute after the death of Bega and as such the plaintiffs who are the sons of Sewa are entitled to be declared as the sole tenants of the disputed land after Sewas death. The decisions of the lower courts are therefore clearly wrong and untenable. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the decrees of the lower courts and grant a decree in favour of the appellants-plaintiffs declaring them to be the sole tenants of the disputed land - khasra Nos. 44 and 5 in village Bhakran Tehsil Rajgarh.