JUDGMENT : K.N. Wanchoo, J. 1. This appeal by special leave against the order of the First Labour Court, West Bengal, is limited to the question of quantum of compensation payable under Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947) to seven of the workmen of the appellant. The brief facts necessary for the purpose are these: There was an industrial dispute between the appellant and its workmen and an award was made by the Third Industrial Tribunal on October 12, 1955, in that behalf. One of the issues before that tribunal was with respect to confirmation and the tribunal observed in that connection as follows: "The company is prepared to have six months after appointment as the period for confirmation after which a workman will either be confirmed or discharged if found not up to the mark. I think this is fair and it is accordingly given effect to. Regarding the present probationers or unconfirmed staff, the company is to confirm or discharge them, if found unsuitable on completion of six months after appointment. This will be operative from the date the award becomes enforceable." 2. It appears that the workmen filed an appeal against this award on December 5, 1955, though the appellant filed no appeal. It further appears that between December 15 to 31, 1955, the appellant dispensed with the services of seven workmen who were considered by it to be probationers As, however, the workmen had filed an appeal from the award on December 5, applications were filed by the seven workmen, who had been discharged, before the Labour Appellate Tribunal on the ground that they had been illegally discharged as no sanction of the Appellate Tribunal had been taken under Section 23 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 48 of 1950. These seven applications were dealt with by one order by the Appellate Tribunal and on June 15, 1956, it directed the reinstatement of these seven workmen in the posts which they held at the date of discharge and further directed that the appellant should pay them all wages and amenities from the date of discharge till their reinstatement. It appears that the appellant made an application for special leave against the order of June 15, 1956, in this Court; but that application was dismissed by this Court on October 29, 1956. 3. It appears that the appellant made an application for special leave against the order of June 15, 1956, in this Court; but that application was dismissed by this Court on October 29, 1956. 3. In the meantime the main appeal of the workmen before the Labour Appellate Tribunal was decided on September 15, 1956, and the award of the tribunal was confirmed (except for minor modifications), and in particular the award relating to confirmation was affirmed. It seems that the appellant did not reinstate these seven workmen as ordered by the Appellate Tribunal. Consequently, seven applications were made by the seven workmen under Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act for computation of the money due to them in accordance with the order of reinstatement made by the Appellate Tribunal. The workmen claimed varying amounts which were composed of (1) salary from December 1, 1955, to November 30, 1957; (2) Leave pay up to December 1957; (3) compensation for forced unemployment from December 1955; and (4) costs awarded by the Appellate Tribunal. 4. Various contentions were raised by the appellant before the Labour court; but we are not concerned with them in view of the limited question involved in the present appeal. The Labour court granted various amounts to the seven workmen which were substantially more than what they had demanded, and the question raised before us is whether the Labour court was justified in granting the relief which it did. What the Labour court did was to grant the workmen their salaries up to August 14, 1958, plus one month's pay as notice pay, plus leave pay plus costs awarded by the Appellate Tribunal. It does not appear to have granted the amount claimed on account of forced unemployment. 5. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant on S. S. Shetty v. Bharat Nidhi Limited, (1958) SCR 442 and it is urged that the Labour court should have calculated compensation in accordance with the principles laid down therein. Before, however, we consider that case we may point out that there can be no justification for granting a claim for leave pay and compensation for forced unemployment over and above the salary claimed by the workmen in their applications for the entire period from December 1, 1955, to November 30, 1957. Before, however, we consider that case we may point out that there can be no justification for granting a claim for leave pay and compensation for forced unemployment over and above the salary claimed by the workmen in their applications for the entire period from December 1, 1955, to November 30, 1957. It is not disputed that there is no provision of encashment of leave in the appellant-company and, therefore, when full salary was taken into account in the seven applications there was no question of any leave pay being paid as encashed amount over and above the full salary. Similarly when full salary was being claimed there was no question of claiming another Rs. 500 as compensation for forced unemployment. Therefore, these items from those claimed by the workmen must be rejected. 6. The next question is about the period for which salary should be paid. In this connection it may be mentioned that it was on October 29, 1956, that this Court dismissed the special leave petition. Therefore, up to that date the appellant was contesting the order of the Appellate Tribunal and it was only on that date that the order of reinstatement became final. Therefore, the appellant must pay the full salary up to that date. There is no serious dispute between the parties on this part of the claim. The real dispute is as to what should be paid to the workmen after October 29, 1956. The tribunal has allowed them full salary up to August 14, 1958, and has added one month's pay in lieu of notice. So far as this pay in lieu of notice is concerned, no objection can be taken to it, and we have, therefore, only to see whether the tribunal was right in allowing full salary from October 29, 1956, to August 14, 1958. 7. This brings us to the consideration of Shetty case. In that case the workman was discharged on the ground that he had become surplus to the requirements of the employer. The Industrial Tribunal, however, thought that the employer had been guilty of unfair labour practice and victimisation and held that the order of discharge was illegal; it, therefore, ordered that the workman should be reinstated with arrears of salary and allowance from the date of discharge. The Industrial Tribunal, however, thought that the employer had been guilty of unfair labour practice and victimisation and held that the order of discharge was illegal; it, therefore, ordered that the workman should be reinstated with arrears of salary and allowance from the date of discharge. The award was not implemented and the question arose of the computation of the money value of the benefit of reinstatement. The workman there claimed the entire salary which would be due to him up to the age of superannuation as the money value of the benefit of reinstatement. The Industrial Tribunal assessed the value at Rs. 1000 in accordance with Section 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On appeal to this court, it was held that "the monetary value of the benefit of reinstatement is to be computed not on the basis of a breach of the contract of employment nor on the basis of a tort alleged to have been committed by the employer by reason of the non-implementation of the direction for reinstatement in the award. The computation has to be made by the Industrial Tribunal having regard to all the circumstances of the case, such as, the terms and conditions of employment, the tenure of service, the possibility of termination of the employment at the instance of either party, the possibility of retrenchment by the employer, or resignation or retirement by the employee and even of the employer himself ceasing to exist, or of the employee being awarded various benefits including reinstatement under the terms of future awards by Industrial Tribunals in the event of industrial disputes arising between the parties in the future." 8. Having regard to all these circumstances this court set aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal and granted a lump sum as money value of the benefit of reinstatement, which was, however, much less than that claimed by the workmen. It is on these principles which the Labour court seems to have ignored that we have to judge that amount should be awarded to the seven workmen before us as compensation, because of their non-reinstatement after October 29, 1956. In this connection it is well to remember that the Appellate Tribunal found that the workmen were not permanent. This makes their case for compensation weaker than the case of Shetty, who was a permanent workman. In this connection it is well to remember that the Appellate Tribunal found that the workmen were not permanent. This makes their case for compensation weaker than the case of Shetty, who was a permanent workman. Considering therefore all the circumstances which were considered in the case of Shetty and the further circumstance that the workmen in this case were not permanent we think that one year's salary would be roughly the correct measure of the monetary value of the benefit of reinstatement in this case. This means that the workmen would be entitled to salary up to the end of October, 1957, and one month's salary thereafter in lieu of notice i.e. in all salary up to November 30, 1957. The amount therefore due to each workman, based on his application, will be as follows: 1. Shri Sailendra Nath Banerjee Rs. 2450 2. Shri Kanai Lal Dutta Rs. 2150 3. Shri Deb Dulal Banerjee Rs. 2195 4. Shri Manidra Lal Roy Rs. 1490 5. Shri Nar Bahadur Rs. 2810 6. Shri Mohd. Ishaque Rs. 1738.50 n.p. 7. Shri Amarnath Das Rs. 2145 9. The appeal is, therefore, partly allowed and the amount of compensation reduced as above. In the circumstances, we order parties to bear their own costs.