Judgment :- 1. Ten persons, who are proprietors of Cigar Factories, have filed a common writ petition, seeking to vacate the award by the Industrial Tribunal, Kozhikode, which came to be made in the following circumstances. The sales tax on cigars was four Naya Paise, and the Central Government had fixed the price of cheap cigars at Rs. 21.87 per hundred packet containing 2500 cigars. Thereafter, the Kerala Government, by the Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, No. XII of 1957, imposed 15 Naya Paise as the Sales Tax on cigars with effect from October 1, 1957. The cigar manufacturers found the tax burdensome and closed their factories on October 5,1957, and from October 18 to October 26,1957. They reopened them on October 26,1957, because the Kerala Government had conceded the demand of levying not more than four Naya Paise as the Sales Tax. The workers in the aforesaid factories claimed wages for October 5, as well as for the period the factories had been later closed, on the ground that such closures did not justify non-payment of wages, whereas the employers insisted on the aforesaid closing not to be a lock-out to justify paying the wages. Thereafter, the following two questions were referred to the Industrial Tribunal: 1. "Are the workers employed in the abovementioned cigar companies at Badagara entitled to wages for the lockout on 5th October 1957, and for the period from 18th to 26th October, 1957 (8 days)"? 2. "Are the workers in the above concerns entitled to wages for 15th August, 1957 (Independence Day)"? 2. The Tribunal, after considering all the aspects of the matter, awarded 41/2 days' wages to all the workers, those under the licences having been found not to be entitled to any wages. The Tribunal further held that employers 1, 2,3 and 4 would pay wages for the 15th August, 1957, to all their workers, and the rest were not liable to pay anything towards this holiday. The aforesaid award is dated February 21,1959, and the ten proprietors of the cigar factories filed a joint petition in this Court in July, 1959, wherein two issues arise for decision, which are: 1. Whether more than one person can jointly invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226? The aforesaid award is dated February 21,1959, and the ten proprietors of the cigar factories filed a joint petition in this Court in July, 1959, wherein two issues arise for decision, which are: 1. Whether more than one person can jointly invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226? and 2 Whether the workers had joined the employers in observing the hartal against the levy of enhanced sales tax on the aforesaid dates, there then being thus no lock-out to justify the claim for wages? 3. A learned judge of this court found the first issue to be of sufficient importance, and accordingly referred the petition as well as another case, where similar question had arisen, to a Division Bench. 4. It would be idle to deny the divergence of judicial pronouncements in this country on the first issue, and a number of High Courts have held in favour of more than one person invoking jointly the jurisdiction under Art.226. Such are: Nathmal v. Commissioner of Civil Supplies, AIR 1952 Rajasthan 74, Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR. 1954 Rajasthan 185, Qurabali v. Government of Rajasthan, AIR 1960 Rajasthan 152, Menindra Nath v. Baranagore Municipality, AIR. 1956 Calcutta 291, A. Adinarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR. 1958 Andhra Pradesh 16 and United Motors (India) Limited v. State of Bombay, 55 Born. L.R. 246. Such a view is supported by similar forensic practice in the United States, which, in American Jurisprudence Vol. 35, para 333, page 81, is stated in these words: "Generally-Persons having a common and joint interest in the subject-matter in controversy may be joined as relators in mandamus, and in a number of cases it has been held, apart from any express statutory authority, that several relators may properly join in an application for the writ, even though they have no strictly joint interest in the right sought to be enforced, where the right of each relator is the same as that of all the others" Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 55, para 250) corroborates in the following passage: "Persons having a joint or common interest in the issuance of a writ of mandamus may join in an application therefor" Also Ferris (Extra-ordinary Legal Remedies, para 233, page 275) states the rule to be: "The rule is that persons having a common and joint interest in the subject-matter in controversy may be joined as relators, while those having separate and distinct rights may not On the other hand, the Madras High Court has in Management of R.B.D Factory v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1959 Madras 137, adhered to its earlier decision, and has been consistently following the practice that only one person can invoke the writ jurisdiction. The Allahabad High Court in Uma Shankar v. Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway AIR 1960 All. 366 and in Kailash Chandra v. District Registrar, AIR. 1961 All. 61, holds that proceedings under Art.226 being special, the rules of the civil or the criminal procedures will not be applicable and, in such circumstances, only one person can claim the writs under the Article The English practice is in support of this view; for we find in Halsbury's Laws of England: (Simond's Edition, Vol. II, para 155, page 83): "Two persons cannot join in a single application for an order of mandamus to enforce separate claims. There must be separate applications for separate orders, and that although the several applicants are successors in the Office in respect of which the claims arise" 5. The proposition, however, has been well settled by T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa AIR 1954 Supreme Court 440 that, in exercise of powers under Art.226, the courts in this country need keep to the broad and fundamental principles, which regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting certiorari, & need not look back to the early history nor to the procedural technicalities of the writs in English law. Therefore, the English insistence on one person alone asking for a writ need not drive us to discard the rule, which forms part of our adjective law of persons joining their civil claims or being joined in criminal prosecutions. Therefore, the English insistence on one person alone asking for a writ need not drive us to discard the rule, which forms part of our adjective law of persons joining their civil claims or being joined in criminal prosecutions. The provisions directing joinder of causes of action or charges, do not of course apply to writ proceedings; but we do not see why the rule of practice, where there be no apprehension of any miscarriage of justice, should not be followed in proceedings, for which this court is authorised to frame its own rules. After all, there is no wisdom in the High Court insisting on two petitions, where the same petitioners could jointly institute a suit for a declaratory relief. It follows that, unless there be compelling grounds to exclude persons jointly invoking the jurisdiction under Art.226, the general practice should be adhered to. We, therefore, respectfully agree with the majority of the High Courts that permit such joinder in writ petitions. It further follows that several persons filing one petition should not be forbidden, and the court may direct separate petitions and order deposit of necessary court fee, if the Court, in the circumstances of the case, feels such order to be proper. Therefore, the objection to a number of persons filing a single writ petition, is overruled. 6. Coming to the merits of the case, the writ petitioner's learned advocate has urged that lock-out has its significant connotation under the Industrial Disputes Act, No. XIV of 1947, and the joint hartal by the employers and employees in this case is not covered by the definition of 'lock-out' under S.2 (1) of the Act to justify the workers being given wages when they had not worked The learned advocate has argued that the Industrial Tribunal has erred in the case, because there had not been any case of lock-out, and granting of 41/2 days' wages to the employees was, therefore, legally not justified. It would be recalled that the workers were claiming wages for October 5,1957 and for the period from October 18, to October 25, 1957, As regards the first date, letters on behalf of the employers had been sent to the Secretary of the Union, seeking employees' co-operation; and by Ext M-4 there is a clear threat of shutting the factories if the workers did not join. The aforesaid letter is dated October 3, 1957, and there is nothing to show the Union having offered to join after the letter had been received. In these circumstances, the Union's case of the closure on October 5, 1957, being lock-out, cannot be said to be without evidence. So far as the second period is concerned, there is also in the same letter, Ext. M4, the threat of closing, should the response be not favourable; and here also there is no evidence of the employees having agreed to co-operate. In these circumstances, we feel sufficient grounds have not been made out for interference with the Tribunal's conclusion of the later closure also being lock-out. This Court, as has been held in Kaushalya v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC. 1168 is not to be appellate Court in exercise of the powers under Art 226; and, as there is no error of law apparent on the face of the record, the award cannot be vacated by writ of certiorari. Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed, and the parties will bear their costs. C. M. P. 2913/59 is also dismissed.