JUDGMENT 1. These four Rules arise out of four suits for declarations that certain 'awards' under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, are illegal, void and without jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiffs or their predecessors were not bargadars under the present, petitioners under the aforesaid Act. In each of the above suits, there was also a prayer for an injunction, restraining execution of the particular award or 'awards' in question. The 'awards' in question were for delivery of paddy. They were made in proceedings which raised disputes between the parties', as contemplated under Sec. 18 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. The suits were contested by the defendants. 2. One of the questions, which arose for decision, was whether such suits were maintainable in the Civil Court and this defence was apparently based on Sec. 21 of the above Act, read, of course, with, inter alia, Secs. 18 and 19 of the same. The learned Munsif framed in each suit issue No. 1 on the above point and, within the said issue, which was framed comprehensively, in several parts, in the following form, namely-"1. Is the suit maintainable? has proper court fees been paid is the suit bad for mis-joinder of causes of action?" were included inter alia questions as to court fees, mis-joinder of parties and causes of action and also as to the validity of the claim of the heirs of the alleged original bargadar after the latter's death, which last question arose in some of the above suits. All these points appear to have been covered by the aforesaid Issue No. 1, framed by the learned Munsif,-at any rate, they were dealt with by him under that issue. If the defence succeeded on any of the above points, the particular suit or suits concerned would have been dismissed in limine, but the learned Munsif, having held in favour of the plaintiffs on all the above paints, answered the aforesaid issue Mo. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs and held inter alia that the suits were main tamable and could be dealt with by the Civil Court. It is against this order that the present Rules were obtained by the petitioners. 3. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs and held inter alia that the suits were main tamable and could be dealt with by the Civil Court. It is against this order that the present Rules were obtained by the petitioners. 3. The principal question, which has been argued before us, is whether suits of the present description, where so called 'awards' under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act for delivery of paddy are sought to be questioned, would be maintainable before the Civil Court. Reference has been made to Sec. 21 of the Act in support of the petitioners' contention that such suits would not be entertain able by the Civil Court. Reference has also been made to Sec. 18 (2) of the Act in support of the above submission and of the petitioners' further and more extreme submission that the question whether a person is a bargadar or not within the meaning of the above Act would be concluded by the decision of the tribunal under the said Act. in other words, it has been contended in the extreme form that, under Sec., 18 (2), that tribunal alone would have jurisdiction, that is, exclusive jurisdiction to decide that point. For our present purpose, we do not deem it necessary to consider this extreme or broader aspect of the matter and to decide the larger issue whether a decision on the question of relationship between the parties as bargadar and owner or jotedar, which, obviously, may touch a point of title,-the more so, where, as, in the instant cases, the plaintiffs claim to be bargadars not under the petitioners but under some of the opposite parties, under whom according to them, they cultivate the disputed lands as bargadars,-would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal under the above Act and would be conclusive and not liable to be re-opened before the Civil Courts. There is much to be said in favour of the Civil Court's jurisdiction, in the matter, even though the decision under the earlier Act (The West Bengal Bargadars Act, 1950) reported in (1) Darpa Hari Pakhira and Ors. There is much to be said in favour of the Civil Court's jurisdiction, in the matter, even though the decision under the earlier Act (The West Bengal Bargadars Act, 1950) reported in (1) Darpa Hari Pakhira and Ors. v. Samarendra Nath Sen and Anr., 57 C. W. N. 337 may well obviously be distinguishable and the earlier decision of this Court in (2) Surendra Nath Chakravarty v. Haran Chandra Chakravarty, 49 C. W. N 592, under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act may also well be distinguished and may not affect the above position. It may well be argued, also, on the language itself of the present statute, namely, Sec. 18 (2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, that, in the matter of determination of the above question of status or title, the ouster of the Civil Court's jurisdiction would be only to the extent necessary for purposes of Sec. 18 (1) and would not extend beyond the same and such determination under the above Act may very well thus be incidental in the sense of not being final for purposes other than those covered by Sec. 18 (1), which view would be quite consistent with Sec. 21 (1) of the aforesaid Act, as it would protect the orders and proceedings under Sec. 18, as contemplated under the said Sec 21 (1. Consistently with the above reservation, we must make it clear also that we are expressing no opinion on the aforesaid question of jurisdiction, so far as Sec. 17 of the Act is concerned. In our view, however, the instant suits, as they stand on the present plaints, would be liable to be dismissed in limine in view of section 21 of the above Act, as explained above, and the other considerations, which we shall presently mention. 4. The suits, as we have said above, are primarily for invalidating the awards under the above Act for delivery of paddy and for restraining execution of the same. It is true that the ground alleged is that the plaintiffs or their predecessors, as the case may be were not bargadars, or, more accurately, bargadars under the petitioners. 4. The suits, as we have said above, are primarily for invalidating the awards under the above Act for delivery of paddy and for restraining execution of the same. It is true that the ground alleged is that the plaintiffs or their predecessors, as the case may be were not bargadars, or, more accurately, bargadars under the petitioners. Whatever might be the position on this question, namely, whether the plaintiffs or their predecessors were bargadars or not as aforesaid and whether the decisions under the above Act on that question of status would be liable to be re-opened before the Civil Court or not, the relief, which has been prayed for in the aforesaid suits,-at least, the primary or the main relief,-would not be allowable in view of Sec. 21 of the above Act, as the granting of that relief would obviously affect the particular 'award' or 'awards' concerned, which, undeniably are orders (decisions) of the special tribunal under the aforesaid Act. This is not permissible in view of the express language of the statute and, to that extent, at least, the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to have been ousted. It has been argued, however, that, even then, the plaintiffs would be entitled to declaration of their barge rights under the several opposite parties, mentioned by him as against the petitioners, in respect of the disputed lands On this point, as said above, we have reserved consideration on the simple ground that it is unnecessary to decide it in the instant cases, as; here, apart from anything else, there is this difficulty in the plaintiffs' way that, in each of the instant suits, several persons, claiming to be bargadars in respect of different lands or different parts of the disputed lands, have joined as plaintiffs for declaration of their respective status as aforesaid. It is difficult to held that, with regard to this particular aspect of the matter any common question of law or fact would arise. In such circumstances even if the present suits are to be considered and dealt with and decided only on the question of relationship of bargadar and owner between the parties, they would be bad for multifarious ness or mis-joinder of parties and causes of action. In such circumstances even if the present suits are to be considered and dealt with and decided only on the question of relationship of bargadar and owner between the parties, they would be bad for multifarious ness or mis-joinder of parties and causes of action. In that view, all the instant suits are bad in law and none of the reliefs, prayed for in the said suits, can be granted to the plaintiffs and the suits must fail. That being so, no decision is called for on the other questions, dealt with and decided by the learned Munsif. We would, accordingly, make these Rules absolute, set aside the orders, complained against and direct that the plaintiffs' suits be dismissed on the reasons, which we have given above. As the plaintiffs' suits, so far as the claim for declaration of their barge rights in the lands in question are concerned,-not, of course, under the petitioners but under some of the opposite parties,-are being dismissed only on the technical ground of multifarious ness, it need hardly be said that they will be entitled to institute fresh suits for the said purpose, if the same be not otherwise barred. There will be no order as to costs in any of these Rules.