JUDGMENT 1. These two appeals arise out of two suits for ejectment brought by the plaintiff respondent against the respective appellants who were the tenants in respect of the particular premises concerned. The disputed premises, in the first case, comprised room No. 19 on the ground floor of premises No. 1, Goenka Lane. Calcutta, of which the appellant Sadhan chandra Chatterjee was the tenant in occupation, originally, at the contractual rental of Rs. 85/- per month, standarised subsequently by the Rent Controller at Rs. 44/- per month, with effect from September 1, 1954. The contractual month of the tenancy was according to Hindi calendar, from Badi 1st to Sudi 15th of each Hindi calendar month but the Rent Controller, in standardising the rent, gave effect to the standard rent, from September 1, 1954. as we have said above, presumably having in mind the English calendar. In the other appeal, the disputed, premises comprised two rooms, Nos. 18 and 22, on the ground floor of the very same premises No. 1, Goenka Lane, Calcutta, which were occupied by the other appellant Sudhir Chandra Dey, at the original contractual rental of Rs. 135/- per month, subsequently standarised at the reduced figure of Rs. 66/- per month by the Rent Controller with effect from September 1, 1954, as in the other case, the contractual month of the tenancy being, in this case too as in the said other case, according to the Hindi calendar, as detailed hereinbefore. The present suits were brought against the aforesaid two tenants on April 3, 1958, after service of the requisite notices to quit, expiring with Sudi, 15th Falgun, Sambat year 2013, corresponding to March 16, 1957, the notice to quit in either case, being dated January 14, 1957, and served on the tenant concerned on or about January 16. 1957. 2. In the two plaints, the material allegation of the plaintiff was that the defendant in either case has been guilty of requisite defaults under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. which would disentitle them from the benefit or protection of the said Act. 1957. 2. In the two plaints, the material allegation of the plaintiff was that the defendant in either case has been guilty of requisite defaults under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. which would disentitle them from the benefit or protection of the said Act. There were various defenses raised to the two suits including the defence of maintainability of the same at the instance of the original plaintiff and the added plaintiffs, the original plaintiff being the Receiver and the added plaintiffs being the owners of the disputed premises, to whom possession was directed to be made over by the Receiver under an order of this Court on the Original Side. 3. The main contest, however, was on the question of the alleged defaults. The position in this respect, in either case, was very peculiar. The contractual month of the tenancy, as we have said above, was according to the Hindi calendar, but the Rent Controller, as is usual in these cases, gave effect to the standard rent in either case from September 1, 1954, presumably, having in mind, the English calendar. The point necessarily arose between the parties in either case, as to whether, after the above order of standardisation, the month of the particular tenancy would continue to be under the Hindi calendar or would be according to the English calendar. The defendant in cither case, contended that, by reason of the order of the Rent Controller, the months of his tenancy must be taken, with reference to the standard rent and from the time it took effect, to have been converted into months under the English calendar. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the contractual month according to the Hindi calendar, as aforesaid, remained unaffected by the order of the Rent Controller and the defendant's defaults have to be judged in terms of the said calendar. There is no dispute that, if the relevant month of the tenancy be according to the English calendar, there has been no default committed by the defendant in either case. But the position will require very close examination, if the relevant month of the tenancy be held to be according to the Hindi calendar. 4. There is no dispute that, if the relevant month of the tenancy be according to the English calendar, there has been no default committed by the defendant in either case. But the position will require very close examination, if the relevant month of the tenancy be held to be according to the Hindi calendar. 4. The learned trial Judge, in either case, rejected the defendant's contention, that, by reason of the Rent Controller's order, in the proceeding for standardisation of rent, giving effect to the standard rent from September 1, 1954, presumably, under the English calendar, the calendar or month of the defendant's tenancy would change from the Hindi calendar to the English calendar. In our opinion, this view of the court below should be affirmed on the law, as it stands. In the relevant Section (Sec. 10 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, under which the rent, in either of the two instant cases was standarised) the word 'month' refers to the month of the tenancy, that is, the contractual month, and no power has been given to the Rent Controller to alter or change the same. The power, which has been given to the Rent Controller, is only to fix the rent with reference to a particular date or time and, when he specifies the time or a particular date, from which the standard rent will take effect, that will have no effect beyond this that the standard rent would be effective from that particular date or time. The contractual months of the tenancy, if they be different from the English calendar, will not be converted into months of or according to the English calendar merely by reason of the Rent Controller's specifying the date or time according to the English calendar, from which or with reference whereto the standard rent will come into effect. We would, therefore, affirm this part of the decision of the court below. At the same time, however, on the question of default, the matter does not appear to have been fully investigated by the court below. Indeed, in one of the judgments under appeal, the learned trial Judge has expressly observed that, as the case has to be decided under the Act of 1956, defaults and, necessarily then, corresponding payments or deposits too, prior to that Act will not require very close examination. Indeed, in one of the judgments under appeal, the learned trial Judge has expressly observed that, as the case has to be decided under the Act of 1956, defaults and, necessarily then, corresponding payments or deposits too, prior to that Act will not require very close examination. If that be so, the first or the initial default relevant will be the first or the initial default under the 1956 Act and it may very well be contended then that any deposit, which was made after the coming into operation of the 1956 Act, would be available towards or against this first default. If that view be accepted, in either of the two instant cases, the first deposit after the new Act of 1956, namely, the deposit, made on April 25, 1956, would go to satisfy validly the rent for the month of Chait Sudi 15, Sambat year 2012, which was outstanding at the time of the said deposit and which would in the true context, obviously be the first default under the aforesaid new Act of 1956. If, however, this deposit be taken, as aforesaid, to have satisfied or wiped out the said liability, the result would be that the subsequent deposits would be valid as regards subsequent rents and there would be no default in respect of payment of any of the said subsequent rents either because of deposit with the Rent Controller or because of deposit in court. It may, no doubt, be argued that, on the present finding of the trial court, on the date when the above new Act came into force, there was an earlier default, which was still outstanding, namely, of Falgun Sudi 15, Sambat year 2012, and, if the above deposit, which was made on April 25, 1956, be taken to have been in respect of the said arrear for the month of Falgun aforesaid, the position may well be that the defendant, in either case, would be a defaulter within the meaning of the above Act so as to be deprived of the protection thereunder. It is for consideration, then, whether the first deposit made after the aforesaid new Act came into force, would go to satisfy the first or the initial default under the said Act or would be available to the landlord for the purpose of any earlier default. It is for consideration, then, whether the first deposit made after the aforesaid new Act came into force, would go to satisfy the first or the initial default under the said Act or would be available to the landlord for the purpose of any earlier default. The learned trial Judge, in either case, does not appear to have considered this aspect of the matter very closely. We find, further, that the view that the earlier payments or deposits, that is, payments or deposits, made prior to the Act of 1956, would not be very relevant and need not be closely scrutinized may not also be quite correct. It may very well be that, by reason of those earlier payments, or deposits, particularly, when rents appear to have been admittedly paid duly and regularly up to Bhadra Sudi 15, Sambat year 2011,-there may be some surplus available to the tenant, in view of the above standardisation of rent, which may or may not liquidate the arrear for the month of Falgun aforesaid, which was the arrear immediately prior to the 1956 Act. In such circumstances, those earlier payments or deposits also will require closer examination for the purpose of enabling the Court to find out whether the defendant, in either case, is or is not a defaulter for the requisite period for being deprived of the benefit or protection of the relevant Rent Control law. 5. In our opinion, therefore, for consideration of the above aspects of the matter, the instant cases have to go back to the learned trial Judge and, although we are affirming the decisions of the trial court on the question of interpretation of the word 'month' as stated hereinbefore, the above aspects, which we have sufficiently indicated and pointed out above would require further and closer examination. We would, accordingly, allow those appeals, set aside the judgments and decrees of the court below to the extent, indicated hereinbefore, and remand the two cases to the learned trial Judge for further hearing and disposal in accordance with law in the light of the observations, made in this judgment. Costs of either appeal will abide the final result of the corresponding suit.