Association Of Planters Kerala v. Industrial Tribunal Trivandrum
1961-07-07
M.A.ANSARI, T.C.RAGHAVAN
body1961
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT M.A. Ansari, C.J. 1. The Association of Planters of Kerala in Muttambalam, Kottayam, is the appellant before us, and claims to have been formed with the main object of representing and promoting the interest of the plantation industry in the State. It appears that the appellant, in pursuance of the aforesaid object, had undertaken in 1942 the distribution of food grains to the estates, and later the distribution of rationed food grains among the entire estate population of the State. The situation having improved in 1954, the distribution scheme had to be discontinued, and the surplus staff to be retrenched. A special sub committee was appointed for the purpose, which suggested retrenchment of 34 persons, including one C. K. John. That employee had resigned his appointment with the appellant from June 1, 1949, and had taken employment elsewhere. Later on, he applied on September 13, 1949, and was reappointed from September 15, 1949. When so reappointing, the appellant's management had directed that the gap in John's service would be treated as leave without salary, and he would be deemed to have continued in service from the date of his first entrance, which therefore, would be binding only on the employer, because no other employee was a party to it. In any case, it would not adversely affect the rights of one V. K. George, who, though employed on May 18, 1946, which was later than John's first employment, had never left the employment, and never consented to the concession, and had, therefore, become senior in service to John, whose employment had become broken by resignation and fresh appointment. That was the position when the retrenchment was decided upon, and the Committee recommended only 8 persons being retained, of whom one should be the Head accountant Head Clerk, one accountant cum-clerk, one cashier cum clerk, one stenographer and recorder, one despatch clerk, two peons and one watcher. The appellant gave effect to the recommendations ; and, among those retrenched was C. K. John, who was then the Head Clerk. V. K. George, who was then assistant accountant, was retained. A dispute arose, and the Government by notification dated March 10, 1955, referred the following two questions to the Industrial Tribunal, Trivandrum: "(1) Is the retrenchment of Sri C. K. John, Head Clerk, Association of Planters, Travancore, Kottayam, justified?
V. K. George, who was then assistant accountant, was retained. A dispute arose, and the Government by notification dated March 10, 1955, referred the following two questions to the Industrial Tribunal, Trivandrum: "(1) Is the retrenchment of Sri C. K. John, Head Clerk, Association of Planters, Travancore, Kottayam, justified? (2) To what reliefs is he entitled : (a) if the retrenchment is not justified? (b) if the retrenchment is justified?" 2. The Tribunal's award was published on September 16, 1958, which has found that the appellant's action was in gross violation of the principles of 'last come, first go', and the departure from the rule had not been accounted for. The management was, therefore, directed to pay half the salary and allowances from the date of discharge till C. K. John be re-instated in service, which was also directed by the award. This was followed by a writ petition in this Court, to which both John and George were impleaded, and the learned Judge has declined to interfere, where against this appeal has been filed. 3. We do not propose to interfere with the findings of fact by the Industrial Tribunal about the recommendation of the committee not being proper, but that would not justify John's being re-instated unless the principle of the 'last come, first go' has been infringed. Therefore, the short question arising for decision in the appeal is whether C. K. John's retrenchment had been in violation of the statutory direction contained in Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, which reads as follows: "Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman," Assuming that both George and John had belonged to the same category of workmen in the establishment, one fails to understand how the latter, having regard to the break in employment, can be treated as the employee, who had entered the service earlier. The fact remains that his earlier engagement had terminated by the letter of resignation, a copy of which is Ext. P.3.
The fact remains that his earlier engagement had terminated by the letter of resignation, a copy of which is Ext. P.3. In that letter C. K. John clearly states that he resigns from the post of Head Clerk with effect from June 1, 1949, about which he had already given notice in his letter of May 2, 1949. The later appointment is on October 1, 1949, and the relevant extract of the order reads as follows : "With reference to your letter of 13th September, 1949, you are hereby reappointed in your previous post on the same salary and D. A. which you were receiving when you left the service on 31-5-1949 ........ The break in service will be considered as absence on leave without pay. The reappointment is with effect from 15th September 1949 i.e., the date on which the Chairman has confirmed his approval of your reappointment." The next question is, how far condoning the break binds those, who were not parties to it. Clearly the concession rests on the agreement between the employer and the employee, which would not bind strangers, as the rule is well settled that a contract binds only those, who are parties to the bargain. It is further clear that the benefit conferred on other employees by the aforesaid resignation of not being retrenched before the person, who had later entered the service, cannot be taken away without their consent. These propositions rest on the rules of natural justice, and had received recognition by the Labour Tribunals in Teddington Chemical Factory (Private) Ltd. v. Gulsher Khan Abdulla Khan (1957 (1) LLJ 205). In that case dates of employments of freshly engaged persons were antedated by the employer, and such acts were found not to adversely affect the rights of those, who were factually employed earlier when making retrenchment. The respondent's learned advocate has tried to distinguish the case on ground that its principle would not apply, where a discharged employee is again engaged. We are afraid the rule, on which the Tribunal had acted is that the benefit derived by a person from given circumstances, can be taken away only with the consent of the party getting the benefit, and taking away the benefit otherwise would not be justified, even where the person engaged be a former employee.
We are afraid the rule, on which the Tribunal had acted is that the benefit derived by a person from given circumstances, can be taken away only with the consent of the party getting the benefit, and taking away the benefit otherwise would not be justified, even where the person engaged be a former employee. It follows that treating the break in service as leave without pay, would not nullify the benefit, that had resulted to S. K. George through John's resignation, and such condoning would be inoperative against George. It further follows that John, in such circumstances, is not a person, who had entered the service earlier; and, thus there is in the case no violation of Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act so as to justify the Tribunal's award in favour of John. This is an error of law apparent on the face of the record, because the case, to which we have made reference, was relied before the Tribunal and was brushed aside as not relevant. The legal error vitiates the entire award, which is hereby set aside and this appeal allowed without costs.