JUDGMENT 1. This appeal, at the instance of the plaintiff, is directed against an appellate decree, reversing title decree passed by a learned Munsif. It has been referred to a Division Bench by Bhattacharya, J. Under the plaintiff, Abdul Rahim (defendant No. 1) and Amiran Bibi were originally tenants in respect of a plot of land measuring 1 Cottah 8 Chittaks and bearing premises No. 6/l, Shibtolla Lane, Entally, Calcutta. Abdul Hamid (defendant No. 2) succeeded Amiran Bibi. The entire tenancy ultimately passed on to Abdul Gaffur, by right of purchase. The tenancy was determined by a notice to quit. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought a suit, on June 18, 1948, against the defendants claiming possession and mesne profits. 2. The suit was contested by defendant No. 3. There were different heads of defence raised by the defendant, including the plea of defect of parties and invalidity of the notice to quit. The defenses were negative by the trial court and the suit was decreed, on March 18, 1949. The decree was affirmed in appeal, on November 11, 1949. There was a second appeal taken to this Court, being S. A. No. 194 of 1950, which came up for hearing before P. N. Mookerjee, J. His Lordship remanded the appeal with the following observation:- "before the lower appellate court, however a question was raised that the above appellant was entitled to protection under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act of 1949. At that time the unamended Thika Tenancy Act was in force and the court of appeal below rightly held that the appellant was not a tenant within the meaning of that Act and that, accordingly, he was not entitled to any protection under the same. Thereafter, the present appeal was filed in this court and, during the pendency of this appeal, the Thika Tenancy Act was amended twice, once by the Ordinance of 1952 and later on, again, by Act VI of 1953. It is the Thika Tenancy Act, as amended by Act VI of 1953, which is now in force. " There can be no question, having regard to the language of the amending statute of 1953, that, if the Thika Tenancy Act applies to the present case, it is the amended Act after the amending Act of 1953 which will apply. It is the Thika Tenancy Act, as amended by Act VI of 1953, which is now in force. " There can be no question, having regard to the language of the amending statute of 1953, that, if the Thika Tenancy Act applies to the present case, it is the amended Act after the amending Act of 1953 which will apply. The question, however, is whether the Thika Tenancy Act will at all apply to this case and whether the defendant-appellant will be a Thika tenant under the new amended Act and if so, what will be his rights under the same. The question involves consideration of the effect of the amending Act including the proviso to sec. 1 (2) in the light of the facts of the present case. For that purpose, the matter will have to go back to the lower appellate Court and that Court will decide the case after considering the relevant aspects of the matter in accordance with law. 3. After the matter went back on remand to the lower appellate Court, that Court reversed the decree of the trial court with the following observations :- (a) "that the defendant appellant is a Thika tenant within the meaning of section 2 (5) of the 1949 Act as it stands now. " (b) "the learned Advocate for the respondent invited me to transfer the proceedings to the Controller and did refer in this connection to sections 28 and 29 of the Act and also to section 5 of the 1952 Ordinance. In course of discussion at the Bar he, however, was so good as to abandon his reference to these provisions. And he failed to point out any provision whatever under which I could transfer the proceeding to the Controller as desired by him. The position is clear enough. The 1949 Act as it stands now applying, (?) sections 3 and 4 thereof apply too. So the defendant appellant is liable to ejectment from his holding on one or more of the grounds as listed in section 3 and not otherwise. The expression not other wise has an importance all its own. The notice which was served on him before the inception of the original suit was an ordinary notice under the then law. Not any one of the grounds as enumerated in section 3 was called in aid or could be called in aid. The expression not other wise has an importance all its own. The notice which was served on him before the inception of the original suit was an ordinary notice under the then law. Not any one of the grounds as enumerated in section 3 was called in aid or could be called in aid. Thus, as the result of these proceedings the defendant appellant is not liable to be evicted at all. " that decree is now being disputed at the instance of the plaintiff. 4. Mr. Prafulla Kumar Roy, learned Advocate for the appellant argued a very interesting point for our consideration. He drew our attention to the definition of "thika tenant" in the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act (West Bengal Act II of 1949), namely:-Sec. 2 (5) "thika tenant" means any person who under the system commonly known as 'thika', 'thika masik utbandi', 'thika masik', 'thika bastu' or any other like system holds, land under another person and is, or but for a special contract would be, liable to pay rent etc. " and submitted that the system referred to in the definition being unascertained, few 'thika tenants' fitted in the definition and the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, for all practical purposes, was stillborn piece of legislation. Therefore, the trial court was right, he contended, in not transferring the case to the Controller under the provisions of section 29 of the Act and in. deciding the case under the law as in the Transfer of Property Act, inspite of the coming into operation of the first mentioned Act. The same was the case with the court of appeal below, when it dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decree for eviction passed by the trial court. While the matter was pending in second appeal, Mr. Roy submitted, the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act underwent two amendments, once by the West Bengal Ordinance XV of 1952, which came into operation from October 21, 1952 and once again by the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1953, which came into operation from March 14, 1953. While the matter was pending in second appeal, Mr. Roy submitted, the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act underwent two amendments, once by the West Bengal Ordinance XV of 1952, which came into operation from October 21, 1952 and once again by the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1953, which came into operation from March 14, 1953. The defendants-appellants, who claimed to be 'thika tenants', made no attempt to take advantage of section 5 (2) of the Ordinance, so that the Court which passed the decree might decide again, on evidence, whether the defendants were Thika Tenants and, if found to be so, might remit the case to the Controller for being dealt with accord-rig to law-that is to say, the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. It was, therefore, necessary for this court to remand the case to the lower appellate court for rehearing on the points hereinbefore indicated. In the meantime the Ordinance toad expired and the Amendment Act of 1953 had omitted section 29 from the statute. With the omission of section 29 from the Act (and also because of the expiry of the Ordinance) there remained no procedure to take the case cut of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and so far as the Civil Court was concerned, Mr. Roy contended, it must decide the suit. The question, however, remained, Mr. Roy contended, as to how such a suit must be decided. Under section 1 (2) of the Amending Act of 1953, the provisions of the amended Act is to apply, subject to the provisions of section 9, to all suits, appeals and proceedings pending- (a) before any court, or (b) or (c) on the date of the commencement of the calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1952. Under section 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, the Controller alone has jurisdiction, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, to evict a thika tenant. The combined result of section 1 (2) of the amending Act read with section 5 of the original Act would lead to this anomaly that Civil Courts must find themselves helpless in granting relief to the plaintiff by evicting a Thika Tenant. With' the omission of section 29, Civil Courts were unable even to remit ejectment suits to the Controller, where reliefs by way of eviction of thika tenants were made available under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. Mr. With' the omission of section 29, Civil Courts were unable even to remit ejectment suits to the Controller, where reliefs by way of eviction of thika tenants were made available under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. Mr. Roy, therefore, contended that the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act as it now stood must be deemed not to apply to pre-Act suits, otherwise the anomalous position in which a court, which is to try the suit, must find itself helpless in granting the relief prayed for, will not be removed. In elaboration of his argument Mr. Roy contended that no law would affect a pending proceeding unless the law made express provisions therefore. The amended Thika Tenancy Act made no provision regarding pre-Act suits; therefore, those suits, Mr. Roy contended, must be heard and determined under the Transfer of Property Act. 5. Attractive though the argument of Mr. Roy may appear to be at first, we are unable to accept the argument. Section 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act took away the jurisdiction of civil courts in the matter of eviction of thika tenants. The only power vested in civil courts in respect of such suits, was to be found in sections 28 and 29 of the unamended Act, namely, power to rescind or vary decree in certain cases and power to transfer pending suits and proceedings to the Controller for being tried according to the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. As soon as section 29 was omitted, by the amendment, civil courts ceased to have such power. That view finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court in (1) A.I.R. (1960) S.C. 936 (Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of West Bengal. Deprived of the jurisdiction to evict thika tenants and also deprived of the power to remit ejectment suits to the Controller, civil courts are now powerless to pass any order or decree for eviction, in ejectment suits against thika tenants. Suits for eviction of thika tenants thus become in-fructuous before civil courts. We do not wholly agree with the line of reasoning of the lower appellate court-particularly the reasoning that for non-compliance of the provisions of section 4 of the Act, the suit must fail. But on a different line of reasoning we affirm the decree passed. This appeal is therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.