ORDER : Whether the learned Subordinate Judge was right in holding that it was not a term of the contract between the parties that a suit relating thereto should be instituted only in the Bombay courts, or whether he was wrong, is, I am afraid, not a question that can be agitated under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code having regard to the scope of that section as defined by the Privy Council in Venkattagiri v. H.R.E. Board, Madras (AIR. 1949 Privy Council 156) and Joy Chand v. Kamalaksha [AIR. 1949 Privy Council 239) and by the Supreme Court in Keshardeo v. Radha Kishen ( AIR 1953 SC 23 ) and Chaube Jagdish v. Ganga Prasad ( AIR 1959 SC 492 ). For, assuming he was wrong - I am not suggesting that he was wrong any more than I am suggesting that he was right - what follows? That he has jurisdiction to try the suit (using the word ‘jurisdiction’ in its true sense of inherent competence) which is what he proposes to do and, jurisdiction also to decide whether or not there is a contract between the parties in enforcement of which he should decline to try the suit - and he has decided that there is not - is unquestioned. And that the parties cannot, by their contract, deprive him of this jurisdiction is unquestionable. A wrong decision regarding the existence or the terms of a contract is like any other wrong decision and involves no question of jurisdiction; the fact that the result of the wrong decision might be that one court tries the suit rather than another, should not cloud the issue. 2. I am aware that the word, ‘jurisdiction’ in conjunction with the words ‘not vested in it by law’ is used in S. 115 (a) in a sense somewhat different from what I have called its true sense, a sense narrower in that it excludes not merely that which the court has no inherent capacity to do so that, if it did it, its proceedings would be altogether void, but also that which it is barred from doing under some provision of the law so that, if it did it, its proceedings would be wrong but effective until set aside. The example of the bar under S. 11, Civil Procedure Code and under S. 3 of the Limitation Act given in AIR. The example of the bar under S. 11, Civil Procedure Code and under S. 3 of the Limitation Act given in AIR. 1949 Privy Council 156 are illustrative of this narrower sense. But then the bar must be one imposed by some provision of law and not by a contract or by other act of parties. For, the wording of Clause (a) of the section is, “to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law.” If the learned Subordinate Judge is proceeding to try the suit it is not something which by reason of some provision of law he should not do; it is rather something which he should not do by reason of the contract between the parties which it is his duty to enforce. There is a clear distinction between something imposed by law and something imposed by contract between the parties even if that contract be enforceable in law. With great respect it seems to me that this distinction has not been borne in mind in the numerous cases where interference has been had in revision. 3. Cases where a court has wrongly returned a plaint on the ground that there is an enforceable contract between the parties that the suit should be filed elsewhere, stand on a different footing. For that would amount to failure to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law attracting Clause (b) of the section. 4. It is argued that, in the view I am taking, clause (b) would authorise interference in revision even in a case where a court rightly holding that there is an enforceable contract between the parties that the suit should be filed elsewhere, returns the plaint for the purpose. For, it would still have jurisdiction vested in it by law to try the suit and its return of the plaint would be an omission to exercise that jurisdiction. I am afraid that this argument does pay sufficient heed to the wording of the clause. “Failed to exercise a jurisdiction” are hardly the words to apply to a case where a court declines to try a suit in enforcement of a contract between the parties. What it really does in such a case is to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law to enforce the contract and, in enforcement thereof, return the plaint. 5. “Failed to exercise a jurisdiction” are hardly the words to apply to a case where a court declines to try a suit in enforcement of a contract between the parties. What it really does in such a case is to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law to enforce the contract and, in enforcement thereof, return the plaint. 5. A number of cases have been brought to my notice where High Courts have interfered under S. 115 Civil Procedure Code in cases where courts have wrongly decided to proceed with the trial of a suit notwithstanding an enforceable contract between the parties that a suit should be instituted elsewhere. Mehta & Co. v. Vijayam & Co. [AIR 1925 Madras 1145), National Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Meghraj ( AIR 1937 Nagpur 334 ), Musa Ji Lukman Ji v. Durga Das (AIR 1946 Lahore 57), Unique Motor & General Insurance Co. v. Rayma Isa (AIR 1950 Kutch 32) and R.K Das & Co. v. I.T. Commissioner [AIR 1956 Calcutta 161] are some of these cases. Excepting in the Nagpur case, the question whether revision lies or not does not appear to have been considered, and it seems to have been assumed that, because the result of the wrong decision of the court below was that it would try the suit whereas under a legally enforceable contract it was some other court that should try it, there was a question of jurisdiction involved. In the Nagpur case, the High Court held that, in the view it was taking the court below had no jurisdiction to try the case and that therefore, in proceeding to try it, that court acted without jurisdiction. With due respect I am unable to accept this view, for, as I have already said, the result of a contract between the parties, even if the contract be enforceable in law, cannot be to divest the court of jurisdiction so as to make the trial of the suit an exercise of jurisdiction not vested in it by law. Its effect is only that the court in enforcing the contract, if it be enforceable in law, declines to try the suit. 6. Its effect is only that the court in enforcing the contract, if it be enforceable in law, declines to try the suit. 6. I might add that clause (b) of S. 115 cannot possibly apply for what the learned Subordinate Judge has done is to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law both to determine whether there is a legally enforceable contract regarding the forum and to try the suit himself. And, as for clause (c), the scope of that clause has been explained in AIR. 1949 Privy Council 156 at page 158 as meaning when it says, “illegally”, in breach of some provision of law, and, when it says, ‘material irregulity’ some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. That being the true meaning, it can hardly be said that the court below has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. 7. I dismiss the petition with costs. Dismissed.