Judgment :- 1. The respondent in this petition who is the purchaser of the 1st defendant's share of the properties, in execution of the decree in O.S. 240 of 1103 of the Alleppey District Court filed a claim petition before the Munsiff's Court of Haripad alleging that he had already taken delivery of the properties, that the attachment effected by the petitioner in O.S. 442 of 122 is not subsisting and that he was not entitled to proceed against the properties. The learned Munsiff allowed the petition. 2. It is seen that the 1st execution petition filed by the petitioner was on 28-12-1124 and that was dismissed on 29-7-1950. The next petition was on 20-3-53 and that petition was also dismissed on 1-4-53. The 3rd application was on 29-8-53 and that was also dismissed on 17-6-54 for nonpayment of process fee. No order was passed either on 1-4-53 or 17-6-54 that the attachment would subsist. The contention of the respondent is that under 0.21, R.57 if the application is dismissed and if no steps were taken pursuant to the attachment within three months of such dismissal the attachment would cease. What is contended by the petitioners is that in the absence of a direction for the cessation of a subsisting attachment made by the court the attachment would continue. 3. O.21, R.57 which is the provision that falls to be considered runs as follows: " (1) Where any property has been attached in execution of a decree and the court hearing the execution application either dismisses it or adjourns the proceedings to a future date, it shall state whether the attachment continues or ceases Provided that when the court dismisses such an application by reason of the decree-holder's default, the order shall state that the attachment do cease" 4. The view was consistently taken by the Madras High Court that if default was committed by the decree-holder consequent upon which the execution petition was dismissed the attachment would terminate even in the absence of a specific order to that effect. In Venkata Rao v. Surya Rao (AIR 1950 Mad. 2) the matter has been elaborately considered by Satyanarayana Rao, J., who delivered the opinion of the court. He rejected the contention that the attachment would continue so long as the court had not given a specific direction that it would cease. In Venkata Rao v. Surya Rao (AIR 1950 Mad. 2) the matter has been elaborately considered by Satyanarayana Rao, J., who delivered the opinion of the court. He rejected the contention that the attachment would continue so long as the court had not given a specific direction that it would cease. Reference was made to the previous rulings on the subject. I am in respectful agreement with this view. 5. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that O. 21, R.57 CPC., is not attracted to a case of attachment before judgment and that the penalty contemplated by that rule is incurred only with regard to applications in which the attachment is made in execution of a decree. It was urged by the learned counsel that when attachment is effected before judgment, the decree-holder cannot be punished for lack of diligence in prosecuting the execution petition since the attachment was not made in the execution petition. 6. It is laid down in Meyappa Chettiar v. Chidambara Chettiar (AIR 1924 Mad. 494 at page 500) [F.B.] that attachment before judgment is also governed by 0. 21, R.57 CPC. since the property attached in execution within the ambit of 0.21, R.57 includes property attached before judgment where there has been a decree followed by execution petition for the purpose of bringing the attached property to sale. 7. Repelling a similar contention, Courts Trotter, J., (as he then was) observed: "In my opinion, when a decree-holder having obtained his decree takes out an execution petition he has, in effect, elected, to lake the benefit of Order XXXVIII, R.11 and asks the court to treat his attachment henceforth as an attachment in execution of the decree which he is seeking to execute. When he has made that election, it seems that his attachment thereupon becomes subject to those requirements of diligence laid down by 0.21, R.57. When he has made that election, it seems that his attachment thereupon becomes subject to those requirements of diligence laid down by 0.21, R.57. I cannot assent to the view that attachment before judgment and attachment in execution are two such wholly different things as to make any provision applicable in express terms to the one in no event applicable to the other because, in my view, as soon as a decree holder applies for execution on the strength of the attachment that he has obtained before judgment and which he seeks after judgment to use as validating the sale for which he is applying, he thereby by his own act asks the court to treat his attachment as being an attachment in execution. I would therefore answer the question propounded in the negative." 8. This decision was followed in a recent case in Kollu Kankayya Naidu v. Jayamangala Reddeya (AIR 1960 AP 634) 9. The same view had been taken in a Full Bench decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Thampi Muhammed Abdul Kadir v. Padmanabha Pillai Parameswaran Pillai (1952 KLT 262) where it was held that an attachment before judgment shall cease to be operative when the execution application seeking to execution the decree pursuant to such attachment is dismissed for reasons stated in 0.21, R.57 CPC. 10. This decision was followed in an unreported decision of this High Court in S.A. 399 of 1056. (E) where it was held that attachment before judgment will cease with the dismissal of an execution petition filed to execute the decree passed in the suit where the attachment took place. 11. Following the above rulings, I hold that the decision of the learned District Munsiff is correct. The revision petition is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.