Judgment :- 1. This is a petition to bring up the records and quash by certiorari the order of the second respondent, the Regional Transport Authority, Ernakulam, Ext P. 4 dated May 5,1959, granting stage carriage permits to respondents 3 to 9 and the order of the first respondent, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam, Ext. P5 dated February 24,1960, confirming Ext. P4 on appeal. The second respondent invited applications for two stage carriage permits, for a route Cheriakadavu to Vaduthala by Ext P1, dated September 5,1958. There were 33 applicants, including the petitioner and respondents 3 to 9. The second respondent considered these applications, at its meeting held on May 5, 1959, and decided by Ext. P. 4, to grant seven permits for the route, which were issued to respondents 3 to 9. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner and others preferred appeals to the first respondent, which by Ext. P. 5 confirmed the order of the second respondent. 2. Two contentions were advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, firstly, that the grant of more than two permits was in contravention of Ext. P. 3, a decision of the second respondent, dated December 9,1958, taken under S.47 [3] of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, limiting the number of stage carriage permits, and secondly, that even if the second respondent had jurisdiction to grant more than two permits, the procedure followed in doing so, was illegal. The material part of Ext. P. 3 states, that the second respondent bad resolved "under S.47 [3] of the Motor Vehicles Act, to limit the number of stage carriages in the existing routes in this region to the existing number of stage carriages plying in those routes and also such number of stage carriages for which applications for pucca permits have been invited". I am satisfied, on the terms of Ext. P. 3, that it could apply only to existing routes, meaning routes on which stage carriages were plying at that time. The route in respect of which applications were invited by the second respondent, and for which permits have been granted to respondents 3 to 9, was not an existing route in that sense of the term, but was a notified route, or a proposed route as it is called in S.47 of the Act itself. This contention, is therefore overruled. 3. This contention, is therefore overruled. 3. It follows from the above, that the only basis for the second contention is, that applications were invited only for two permits. As held by a Division Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in P.I. Scaria v. P.K. Krishnan Nair (AIR. 1957 TC. 254) jurisdiction cannot be denied to the second respondent, to issue more than the number of permits notified. This proposition was not challenged. The contention centred on a very narrow point, that is, that before deciding to grant more than the notified number of permits, the applicants like the petitioner and others, who were "providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route", should have been put on notice as to such decision, when they would have objected to such grant. If, as held, the notification as to the number of permits is in itself no hindrance to the grant of more permits, there being no provision in the Act limiting the number of permits, except what is dictated by public interest, it must follow, that it is implicit in the power of the authority to grant as many permits as may be deemed justified. Apart from this, the Rajasthan High Court in Automobile Transport Ltd. v. Nathuram (AIR. 1959 Rajasthan 121) has laid down the principle, based on the observations of the Supreme Court in Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P. [AIR. 1954 SC. 728] that the fundamental right of a citizen to ply stage carriages on public highways, is limited only by reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Art.19 [6] of the Constitution and therefore as many permits may be granted, as are justified in public interest and that an existing operator has no vested interest in curtailing the rights of others. From this, the Court deduced a further principle, that when applications for permits are invited, all those who are interested thereby get notice, that applications are bound to be allowed unless the Regional Transport Authority is satisfied, that the granting of any of them would be against public interests and that "that is the proper time when persons who are interested in the matter, should make a representation against the grant of the permit". In that case, applications for three permits were invited and actually five were granted, though by the appellate authority, which, in my opinion, does not make any difference in principle. A somewhat similar argument, as was advanced in this case, was also advanced before the Rajasthan High Court, that the opposite parties were not aggrieved by the grant of three, but were aggrieved by the grant of five permits. This was repelled by the reasoning, that they must be fixed with notice of the power of the Regional Transport Authority to grant as many permits as may be deemed necessary in public interests, notwithstanding the notification for a limited number of permits, and that therefore they were bound to object to the grant of more permits when making their representations under S.47. Lakshmi Chand v. Regional Transport Authority (AIR. 1959 Allahabad 782) on which the learned counsel for the petitioner placed some reliance, has only laid down, that a person in the position of the petitioner cannot insist on making a representation at the time of taking a decision under S.47 (3) limiting the number of permits which may be granted, because he would have an opportunity to object to the grant of more permits than was justified in public. Judged by the above principles, I come to the conclusion, that Exts. P. 4 and P. 5 cannot be considered to be bad for any illegality of procedure. The petition fails and is dismissed. Dismissed.