JUDGMENT Desai, C.J. - This is a second appeal by the decree holder from an order passed by the executing court u/s 52 of the Provincial Insolvency Act delivering possession over a house, which had been attached by it in execution of a decree obtained by the Appellant against the Respondents, to an interim receiver appointed u/s 20 of the Act. The Appellant obtained a decree and in execution of it got the house in dispute attached on 1-9-1954. The Respondents applied on 21-5-1954 for adjudication as insolvents and an interim receiver was appointed u/s 20 of the Provincial Insolvency Act on 18-9-1954. The interim receiver applied to the executing court u/s 52 of the Insolvency act for being put in possession of the attached house, and the executing court order possession over it to be "vested" in him. What it seems to have meant was that the possession be delivered to him. It also stayed further execution proceedings. The Appellant filed an appeal from the order. The Civil Judge dismissed the appeal on a preliminary objection that the appeal did not lie u/s 47, CPC and the order under appeal delivering possession to him was not an order regarding execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree. The Appellant had maintained that the interim receiver was a representative of the judgment debtors and Section 47 applied, but the appellate court held that the interim receiver was not a representative of the judgment-debtors and dismissed the appeal on the preliminary objection. Hence this second appeal which has been referred by V.D. Bhargava, J. to a Bench because of the importance of the question whether an order passed u/s 52 delivering possession of an attached property to an interim receiver is appealable u/s 47, CPC or not. We have heard Sri Saran Behari Lal Srivastava, nobody appears on behalf of the Respondents judgment-debtors. We are satisfied that the view taken by the lower appellate court is correct. 2. Admittedly the only question before the lower appellate court was whether the order appealed from, passed by the executing court, was an order governed by S. 47, CPC or not. It would be so governed if it related to a question arising between the Appellant, as decree-holder and the judgment-debtors through the interim receiver as their representative and if the question was in respect of the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. 3. It would be so governed if it related to a question arising between the Appellant, as decree-holder and the judgment-debtors through the interim receiver as their representative and if the question was in respect of the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. 3. Coming first to the question whether the interim receiver could be held to be a representative of the judgment debtors, we find that the authorities of this Court are against the Appellant. In Kashi Prasad v. Miller ILR 7 All. 752 Oldfield and Tvrrell, JJ. held that an official assignee, in whom the property of a judgment debtor vested and who applied to the executing court for delivery of possession, could not be said to be a representative of the judgment debtor and that his position was that of a third party, even though the insolvent judgment debtor's property had vested in him. His object, according to this decision, was to have the attachment withdrawn and the property made over to him, not for the purpose of execution of the decree but for the purpose of dealing with it under the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act for the benefit of the general body of the creditors. He might have represented the general body of the creditors for whose benefit the judgment debtor's property vested in him in trust, but could not be said to be a representative of the judgment debtor. In Grew v. Hajari Lal 5 ALJR 555 an official assignee was held to be not a representative of the judgment debtor within the meaning of S. 47, CPC. 4. We respectfully agree with the view expressed in these decisions. It was contended before us that the interim receiver becomes a representative of the judgment debtors because their property vests in him. We find that neither does the property vest in him nor does he become a representative merely because of the vesting, if any. As regards vesting, it is by virtue of S. 56(5) of the insolvency Act only that the property is said to vest in him. In this case possession over the attached property was delivered by the executing court to the interim receiver u/s 52; Section 52 requires possession to be delivered to the interim receiver and does not lay down that the property vests in him. In this case possession over the attached property was delivered by the executing court to the interim receiver u/s 52; Section 52 requires possession to be delivered to the interim receiver and does not lay down that the property vests in him. A person may be in possession of a property without its vesting in him; so possession could be delivered u/s 52 to the interim receiver without the property vesting in him. u/s 56(1) a property vests in a receiver appointed by the court at the time of the order of adjudication or at anytime afterwards. Sub S. (5) of S. 56 provides that the provisions of this section shall apply, so far as may be to an interim receiver appointed u/s 20. This has, in our opinion, reference only to the provisions of sub/S. (2) and (4). They are the provisions that can be said to be applicable to receivers. The provisions contained in Sub-section (1) to the effect that when a receiver is appointed at the time of the order of adjudication, or subsequently, the property of the insolvent shall vest in him, can hardly be said to be a provision "applicable to a receiver," and we doubt if sub Section (5) has any reference to this provision. In any case, even if we were to read for the words "such receiver" the words "interim receiver," the property cannot vest in the interim receiver before the order of adjudication. We cannot ignore the words "at the time of the order of adjudication, or at any time afterwards" occurring in Sub-section (1). They are to be read as much with reference to an interim receiver as with reference to a receiver. If the property will not vest in a receiver prior to the order of adjudication we do not under stand how it can vest in an interim receiver prior to the order of adjudication. Admittedly no order of adjudication was passed against the Respondents before the order under appeal was passed by the executing court. We, therefore, hold that the attached house, though possession over it was delivered to the interim receiver, did not vest in him. The Appellant claims that the interim receiver became a representative of the Respondent judgment debtors because of the vesting of the property in him, since there was no vesting at all, he did not became their representative. We, therefore, hold that the attached house, though possession over it was delivered to the interim receiver, did not vest in him. The Appellant claims that the interim receiver became a representative of the Respondent judgment debtors because of the vesting of the property in him, since there was no vesting at all, he did not became their representative. In Pulgaon Cotton Mills v. Gulabai AIR 1953 Nag. 345 there is just a dictum, not supported by any authority other than Sastri's Provincial Insolvency Act, 1937 pages 162 and 348, to the effect that on the appointment of an interim receiver the insolvent's property vests in him. We respectfully disagree with the view that the property delivered to the interim receiver by the executing court u/s 52 of the Insolvency Act can be said to vest in him. 5. Coming to the next question, no authority has been cited before us and no reason has been given why mere vesting should make the interim receiver a representative of the insolvent judgment debtor. The two authorities of this Court noticed earlier show that he is not a representative of the judgment debtor & that if he is a representative at all, he is not of the judgment debtor but of his creditors. We were referred to Dinesh Chandra v. Jahan Ali AIR 1935 Cal. 523 which held that the receiver in whom the property vests after adjudication acts as representative of both the judgment debtor and his creditors, but this was a mere dictum not supported by any reasons. Even if he becomes a representative of the debtor and his creditors, it means that he becomes a representative of the judgment debtor and the decree holder both (because the decree holder is also one of the creditors) and an order passed on his application can hardly be said to be an order disposing of a question arising between the decree holder and the judgment debtor. R. Subramania Ayyar Vs. Dharapuram Janopakara Nidhi Ltd. and Others, AIR 1928 Mad 454 it was observed that though there is no statutory provision laying down that the property vests in an interim receiver, he has very much the same rights and liabilities as a receiver u/s 56(5). It may be so, but, for the reasons already given, the property delivered to him u/s 52 cannot be said to vest in him. It may be so, but, for the reasons already given, the property delivered to him u/s 52 cannot be said to vest in him. We are also of the view that the executing court by delivering possession over the attached house to the interim receiver did not decide any question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and this was not the subject matter of the appeal. 6. We hold that the learned Civil Judge was right in upholding the preliminary objection and dismissing the appeal as not competent. The appeal is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs because the Respondents are absent.