JUDGMENT 1. This is defendants' second appeal, arising out of a suit for ejectment. The suit was brought on June 25, 1955, on inter alia the following allegations: 2. That the disputed property was comprised within the raiyati holding of one Manik Mardana and it was recorded as such under Khata No. 24 in the Record of Rights. After Manik's death, his two sons, Chakar and Jagu, came into possession of the suit property as his heirs and, after the death of Jagu, his only son Anath became entitled to this property along with his co-sharer Chakar. While Chakar and Anath were in possession of the suit lands as raiyats as aforesaid, they sold the same to the plaintiffs (who claim to be occupancy raiyats of the village, where the suit lands are situate) by a registered Kobala, dated January 2, 1954, for Rs. 1,999/- and the plaintiffs became entitled to the same and the possession thereof. The defendants are the heirs of one Ram Nath Singh, who was the father of defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and the husband of defendant No. 4. It is the plaintiff's case that the suit lands were settled with Ram Nath Singh by Manik under a temporary Sankorari Korfa settlement and Ramnath was recorded as Korfadar in respect of the same in Korfa Khata No. 2 under the aforesaid raiyati Khata No. 24, that Ramnath died some years ago and, as, according to the plaintiffs, he (Ramnath) had no permanent or heritable right in the suit lands, Manik's heirs at that time, Chakar and Anath, wanted to take khas possession of the same but at the request of defendants Nos. 1 to 3, they were allowed to continue in possession as temporary sankorari korfadars as before. After their purchase, the plaintiffs wanted Khas possession of the suit property, and, accordingly, they requested the defendants orally on the 1st of Baisakh, 1361 B. S. to quit possession of the same and they also gave them a registered notice through their pleader to that effect on February 15, 1954. The defendants, however, refused to give up possession and. as a matter of fact, defendant No. 1, in his reply to the plaintiffs' above notice, intimated to them on March 15, 1954, that they (the defendants) were not willing to quit possession. The defendants, however, refused to give up possession and. as a matter of fact, defendant No. 1, in his reply to the plaintiffs' above notice, intimated to them on March 15, 1954, that they (the defendants) were not willing to quit possession. The plaintiffs contend that, in the circumstances aforesaid, the defendants are in possession of the same as trespassers and they are liable to be evicted. 3. The suit was resisted by the defendants who, in their written defence, claimed that their predecessor Ramnath was not a temporary Sankorari Korfadar, as alleged by the plaintiffs, but that Manik Mardana had a transferable tenure interest in the suit lands and he settled the same along with some other lands with Ramnath in permanent raiyati rights by a registered patta, dated January 23, 1909, at an annual rental of Rs. 7-8-0. It appears, however, from the written defence, that according to the defendants, Ramnath did not get possession of the entire property, covered by the aforesaid patta, and, accordingly, a lesser rent of Rs. 7/- per annum was paid and accepted by the parties concerned and Ramnath continued in possession of the suit lands and other lands, connected therewith, under the aforesaid settlement, paying an annual rental of Rs. 7/- for the same, and, after Ramnath's death, the defendants continued in such possession on similar payment. The defendants, accordingly, resisted the plaintiff's claim of Khas possession, setting up, in the first instance, a valid permanent raiyati right in the suit lands. In the second instance, they claimed that, even if Manik Mardana had merely a raiyati right and not a tenure in respect of the suit lands, the defendants and their predecessor Ramnath had acquired a valid permanent under-raiyati under the law, then in force, namely, Act X of 1959. In the third place, they contended that their Korfa was heritable by custom and it could not, accordingly, be terminated by the plaintiffs at their sweet will and, lastly, they set up a claim of permanent right in the suit lands, be it under-raiyati, or raiyati, by adverse possession or prescription. 4. In the third place, they contended that their Korfa was heritable by custom and it could not, accordingly, be terminated by the plaintiffs at their sweet will and, lastly, they set up a claim of permanent right in the suit lands, be it under-raiyati, or raiyati, by adverse possession or prescription. 4. Of the above defenses, the first and the third did not succeed before the trial court but the plaintiffs lost on the other two grounds, set up by the defendants, as aforesaid, and, as the learned Additional Subordinate Judge found in favour of the defendants in respect of their claim of a valid permanent under-raiyati under Act X of 1859 and, in any event, such right by or under the law of prescription, as applicable to the case, he dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. A point was raised before the learned Additional Subordinate Judge that the above patta of January 23, 1909, on which the defendants based their claim or assertion of rights in the suit lands, was invalid in view of Section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, which, although it came into operation in the District of Manbhum. where the suit lands are situate, on December 25, 1909, was given retrospective effect in respect of transfers between, inter alia, January 1, 1909, and the coming into force of the above act, invalidating such transfers by raiyats in cases, where the transfers were or purported to be in excess of a settlement for five years. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge was of the view that, as the above Act was not in operation at the time, the impugned patta was executed by and between the parties, and as at that time, Act X of 185. 9 was in fore? and governed the rights of the parties and as, under the said Act, there was no bar, restriction or objection to the creation of a permanent under-raiyati by a raiyat, the settlement in favour of Ramnath could not be held to be invalid under Section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. 5. 9 was in fore? and governed the rights of the parties and as, under the said Act, there was no bar, restriction or objection to the creation of a permanent under-raiyati by a raiyat, the settlement in favour of Ramnath could not be held to be invalid under Section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. 5. In the second place, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge expressed the view that, even if the said settlement was invalid under the law, there could be no question that the defendants and their predecessors had all along been possessing the suit lard since January 23, 1909, on assertion of the permanent right, purported to have been created under the aforesaid patta, and, as such, under the law of prescription, they had acquired a valid permanent right of the same description by prescription or adverse possession. 6. From this decision of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal, which was heard by the learned District Judge of Purulia. Before him, the plaintiffs succeeded, as the learned District Judge was of the view that Section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act was retrospective in operation so as to invalidate the above patta and as he was also of the view that the defendants or their predecessor Ramnath could not prescribe against the plaintiffs or their predecessor, as they were tenants or, to quote the learned District Judge, 'tenants at will' and no prescription was permissible at the instance of such persons for acquisition of a higher status. The learned District Judge was further of the opinion that the above 'tenancy at will', which arose by reason of payment and acceptance of rents by and between the parties, had been duly determined by the plaintiffs by their demand for possession, supplemented by the above notice to quit, which, though for a period roughly of two months, was sufficient to determine the said tenancy. In this view, the learned District Judge allowed the plaintiffs' appeal, decreed their suit and claim for recover of possession on declaration of title. From this decision of the learned District Judge, the contesting defendants have preferred the present Second Appeal. It was urged on the appellants' behalf by Mr. Roy that, in any view of the case, the defendants' claim of a permanent right in the suit lands by prescription cannot fail. From this decision of the learned District Judge, the contesting defendants have preferred the present Second Appeal. It was urged on the appellants' behalf by Mr. Roy that, in any view of the case, the defendants' claim of a permanent right in the suit lands by prescription cannot fail. On behalf of the plaintiffs respondents, Mr. Mookerjee, sought to meet this contention of Mr. Roy by relying upon the observations of the learned District Judge and contending that, in the circumstances of this case, the defendants could not claim to have acquired any status, higher than the status of 'tenant at will' and, if that was the position, the learned District Judge was entirely right in holding that the said tenancy had been duly determined in the instant case and the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree. 7. In the course of argument, a point arose whether, even if the patta of January 23, 1909, was invalid under section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act by reason of its retrospective operation, the defendants, or, their predecessor Ramnath, should not be held to have had acquired the status of, at least, a tenant or tenants from year to year. Mr. Mookerjee contended that this inference was not permissible here, although, apart from that Section, the defendants or their predecessor, when they entered into possession under the void lease of January 23, 1909, could have claimed the status of a tenant or tenants from year to year, that was not permissible by reason of the express provision of Section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, which invalidated all settlements by raiyats which exceeded or might, 'in any possible event', exceed five years. Stress was laid on the words 'in any possible event', which, according to Mr. Mookerjee, contemplated leases other than leases for (contractual) terms or periods exceeding five years. It is quite true that the words are very wide and, literally interpreted, they may also invalidate leases from year to year, as there are obvious possible events, in which such leases might exceed the period of five years. The possible events, contemplated in such cases, would be, e. g., where the lessor does not choose to exercise his option of terminating the tenancy by any appropriate mode in law in the course of five years, but the difficulty that would still remain in the way of Mr. The possible events, contemplated in such cases, would be, e. g., where the lessor does not choose to exercise his option of terminating the tenancy by any appropriate mode in law in the course of five years, but the difficulty that would still remain in the way of Mr. Mookerjee would be that, in that view, even a tenancy at will would not be permissible under Section 46, as there, also, in possible events, e. g., of non-exercise of the option of termination by the lessee and the lessor, the tenancy might well continue and thus exceed a period of five years. It is not, therefore, necessary for us to express any definite opinion, in the instant case, on the point as to whether leases from year to year are also excluded from the purview of a raiyat's power by reason of Section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, assuming that the same had retrospective operation and applied to the instant case. If such leases, that is, leases from year to year, would not be permissible, tenancy at will also would be excluded and, in that event, the defendants and their predecessor Ramnath must be held, in spite of payment of so-called rent, to have continued in possession merely as trespassers or persons without title. If that be so, they would be prescribing from the very inception of their possession, namely, since January 23, 1909, and they would, obviously, acquire a title, as asserted, namely, the tide under the invalid lease, that is, of a permanent nature in the suit land by prescription. 8. This view of ours will not be opposed to any of the decisions, relied on by the learned District Judge, or, the decisions, on which the said decisions themselves are based. In particular, we may mention the two decisions of the Judicial Committee reported in Nainapillai Marakkyar and others v. Ramanathan Chettiar and others (1) L. R. 51, I. A. 83, and Madhaprao Waman soundalgekar and others v. Raghunath Venkatah Deshpande and others (2) 50 I. A. 255, therein cited, upon which reliance has often been placed for the purpose of holding that a tenant cannot prescribe against his landlord. These decisions have been distinguished in certain cases on the ground that they would apply only to those cases, where the person or persons concerned took possession as tenant or tenants, but where at its inception, the possession was that of a trespasser, the above cases would have no application. We do not, however, in the instant case, in view of our finding aforesaid, need consider the correctness or otherwise of the said distinction or the implications thereof, nor do we deem it necessary, in the above view, to pronounce upon the correctness or otherwise of the decisions of the Patna High Court, reported in Maharaj Singh and another v. Budhu Chamar and others (3) A. I. R. 1952 Pat. 48, Jatu Das and. another v. Mt. Sulochana mundain and another (4) A. I. R. 1957 Pat. 37, or, to the apparently contrary set of decisions,-all plainly distinguishable,-cited by the learned District Judge and reported in Rabindra Chandra Ghosh and others v. Mahtha Gouri Singh and others (5) A. I. R. 1937 Pat. 554, Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narayan Singh v. Harkhu Singh (6) A. I. R. 1949 Pat. 265, Murlidhar Kulthia v. Sm. Tara Dye, (7) A. I. R. 1953 Cal. 349, Sahadu Mahtor, and others v. Hari Ram Kahto and others (8) A. I. R. 1952 Pat. 43. This will be enough for the purpose of holding that the defendants, in the instant case, have acquired a permanent right in the suit lands by or under the law of prescription and for dismissing the plaintiffs' claim of recovery of possession and their suit to that extent. Before we part with this case, we would make certain observations on two other questions, which also arose for discussion in the course of hearing. The first is, of course, the construction of Section 46 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. That Section, in its relevant part, stands as follows: "46. Restrictions on transfer of their rights by raiyats,- (1) No transfer by a raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof- (a) by mortgage of lease, for any period, expressed or implied, which exceeds or might in any possible event exceed five years,- (3) No transfer in contravention of sub-section (1) shall be registered or shall be in any way recognised as valid by any court, whether in exercise of civil, criminal or revenue jurisdiction. (5) Nothing in this section shall affect the validity of any transfer (not otherwise invalid) of a raiyat's right in his holding or any portion thereof made bona fide, before the first day of January, 1903, in the Chota Nagpur Division except the district of Manbhum, or before the first day of January, 1909, in the district of Manbhum. 9. The dispute is as to the retrospective operation of the above statutory provision so as to cover or affect transaction between January 1, 1909, and the relevant date of coming into operation of the above statute in December, 1909, namely, December 25, 1909. Prima facie, when the statute expressly exempts transactions prior to January, 1909,-and no others,-from the operation of the section, it may reasonably be argued that, save and except those specifically exempted transactions, all other transactions, if they would, otherwise, fall within the mischief of the section, would be affected, but, on principle, a contrary view appears to have been taken in the decision, reported in Mrs. Vesta Clifton Sebastain v. Kulada Proshad Deogharia and others (9) 15 C. W. N. 43, and the principle of that decision appears to have been approved, followed and applied in the later case of Braja Lal Dutta v. Kenaram Paul, (10) 4, Patna Law Journal 411. No authority or decision was cited before us which has taken a contrary view on the aforesaid construction of the predecessor of this statute, which, on principle, would also lead to a similar construction of the present statute, and, upon that construction, this statute would not apply to the instant case and the same will be governed by the Order, Act X of 1859, under which the impugned transfer and settlement would be perfectly valid. It is, however, not necessary for us, in the view, we have already expressed to pronounce any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the aforesaid decisions but, if we had been minded to take a different view on the above principle of construction, it would, probably have been necessary for us to refer the matter to a Full Bench as the decision in Mrs. Vesta' Clifton Sebastain v. Kuloda Proshad Deogharia and others (9) 15 C. W. N. 43 appears to be a Bench decision of this Court. That contingency, however, does not arise and we refrain from further discussion of this point. 10. Vesta' Clifton Sebastain v. Kuloda Proshad Deogharia and others (9) 15 C. W. N. 43 appears to be a Bench decision of this Court. That contingency, however, does not arise and we refrain from further discussion of this point. 10. We may also add that, if, on account of the void lease, the possession of the defendants would have amounted to possession of tenants from year to year, that tenancy would have required a notice to quit for a minimum period of six months for its due termination. Such notice has not admittedly been given in the instant case and, if that was the position in law, in that view also, apart from the question of prescription, the plaintiffs' instant suit, so far as recovery of possession is concerned, would have failed. For the foregoing reasons, we would allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the learned District Judge and refuse the plaintiffs' claim for Khas possession and mesne profits and to that extent, dismiss their suit. The plaintiffs, however, would be entitled to a declaration of their title to the suit land, which means title to the superior interest therein with the defendants as their tenants, as aforesaid. To that extent, the learned trial court also was in error and that error should be rectified. The appeal is allowed as above. There will be no order as to costs in this Court.