JUDGMENT.- The defendant in O.S. No. 77 of 1955 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Ramanathapuram at Madurai has filed this appeal challenging the correctness of the decree against him for recovery of the sum of Rs. 6,125-10-9 with interest thereon at 5 per cent. per annum from 16th August, 1955, the date of suit, till payment. The plaintiff, the respondent in this appeal, claimed to be the assignee of a promissory note alleged to have been executed by the defendant and his wife, Kothaiammal in favour of one Ramaswami Raja, the younger brother of the plaintiff, for a consideration of a sum of Rs. 5,500. Kothaiammal was dead and the defendant alone was impleaded as a party to the suit. He denied that either himself or his wife executed the suit promissory note which he characterised as a forged document. He however admitted that on 13th November, 1950 the date of the suit promissory note, he executed a promissory note in favour of Ramaswami Raja for a sum of Rs. 500 and that promissory note was discharged by his executing an othi document in favour of the plaintiff and his brother Chinnaswami Raja wherein the promissory note amount was adjusted and given credit to. The learned Subordinate Judge of Ramanathapuram at Madurai overruled the plea of the defendant and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff as prayed for. This appeal has therefore been preferred by the aggrieved defendant. The two simple points that arise for consideration in this appeal are: (1) whether the suit promissory note was not executed by the defendant and his wife, the late Kothaiammal and is therefore a forged document and (2) whether the suit promissory note, if true and genuine, is not supported by consideration, to the extent of Rs. 5,500 stated to have been borrowed by the executants of the note from Ramaswami Raja, the payee on the date of its execution. * * * * * [After dealing with the first point and finding the promissory note to be genuine His Lordship proceeded]. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the defendant admittedly maintained accounts and he having failed to produce the same in Court, an adverse inference against the truth of his contention should be drawn by the Court. * * * * * [After dealing with the first point and finding the promissory note to be genuine His Lordship proceeded]. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the defendant admittedly maintained accounts and he having failed to produce the same in Court, an adverse inference against the truth of his contention should be drawn by the Court. The evidence of D.W. 2 relating to accounts is as follows: “I maintain accounts for my dealings for every year. The accounts will show my borrowings and the paddy I got and my other realisations. From 1912 onwards I have been maintaining accounts. I have been maintaining accounts till today. I have mentioned the pro-note in my accounts. From my accounts I say it is 21 months. I have entered the receipt of Rs. 240 in my accounts. I am writing my accounts till today.” It is however admitted that the plaintiff did not call upon the defendant to produce the accounts into Court. The defendant did not produce them perhaps in the view that the entries therein will only be self-serving statements without any evidentiary value. Unless a party is called upon to produce into Court any documentary evidence in his custody and possession and he fails to produce such evidence deliberately without any adequate or justifying reason the Court should not draw any adverse inference from the mere non-production of such evidence. See Silas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh1 where Sir George Farwell observed: “The High Court Judges attach great significance to the non-production of the books showing the accounts of the general estate, and appear to draw an inference therefrom adverse to the plaintiff’s claim ; any such inference is, in their Lordships’ opinion, unwarranted. These books do not necessarily form any part of the plaintiff’s case; it is of course possible that some entries might have appeared therein relating to the bungalow. But it is open to a litigant to refrain from producing any documents that he considers irrelevant; if the other litigant is dissatisfied it is for him to apply for an affidavit of documents, and he can obtain inspection and production of all that appears to him in such affidavit to be relevant and proper. But it is open to a litigant to refrain from producing any documents that he considers irrelevant; if the other litigant is dissatisfied it is for him to apply for an affidavit of documents, and he can obtain inspection and production of all that appears to him in such affidavit to be relevant and proper. If he fails so to do, neither he nor the Court at his suggestion is entitled to draw any inference as to the contents of any such documents.....It is for the litigant who desires to rely on the contents of document to put them in evidence in the usual and proper way ; if he fails to do so no inference in his favour can be drawn as to the contents thereof.” Further the presumption of adverse inference, if any, cannot displace the contrary inference supported by adequate evidence. Damisetti Ramachandrudu v. Damisetti Janakiramanna1. Exhibit A-1 is a negotiable instrument and due regard must be had to the presumption of consideration as indicated in section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 118 is as follows: “Until the contrary is proved the following presumption shall be made - (a) that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred was accepted, negotiated or transferred for consideration............” Reference can also be made to section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act which is in these terms: “The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.” Illustration (c) is in these terms: “ That a bill of exchange, accepted or endorsed, was accepted or endorsed for good consideration.” There is marked constrast between section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. The statutory presumption under, section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is mandatory while the presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act is permissive depending upon the exercise of the discretion of the Court. The statutory presumption under, section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is mandatory while the presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act is permissive depending upon the exercise of the discretion of the Court. Bills of Exchange, promissory notes and cheques are categories of transactions in the commercial world and the Law Merchant raises a presumption of consideration in favour of these instruments partly because it is necessary and important to preserve their negotiability intact and partly because the existence of a valid consideration may reasonably be inferred from the solemnity of the instruments themselves and the deliberate mode in which they are executed. (See Taylor on Evidence, section 148.) This presumption is however only a rebuttable presumption as Byles in his Bills of Exchange states: “Consideration is presumed until the contrary appears or at least appears probable.” The presumption of consideration is only to this extent, namely, that the negotiable instrument is supported by some consideration adequate or inadequate and is not a nudem pactum. There is no presumption regarding the quantum of consideration and the amount or value mentioned in a negotiable instrument should not be presumed to have been given or taken under the instrument. A recital in a negotiable instrument as to the passing of consideration is no doubt prima facie evidence of such consideration having passed and the parties to the instrument are bound by the recital till the contrary is proved. In Narasamma v Veerraju2, Varadachariar, J., dealing with the presumption under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act observed thus at page 773: “Neither the earlier case-law nor the language of the section justifies any presumption being made as to the quantum of consideration. The English Act merely states that any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract may constitute valuable consideration for a bill or a note......Any presumption as to quantum of consideration, as distinguished from the mere existence of consideration, has accordingly to be drawn, not by virtue of section 118, Negotiable Instruments Act or even under section 114, Evidence Act, but only from the recitals, if any, that the instrument may contain. As to such recitals, it has long been established that being prima facie evidence against the parties to the instrument, they may operate to shift on to the party pleading the contrary, the burden of rebutting the inference raised by them: See Zamindar S.G.R.V. Bomaya Nayik Veerappa Chetty3, But the weight due to recitals may vary according to circumstances and, in particular circumstances the burden of rebutting them may become very light, especially when the Court is not satisfied that the transaction was honest and bona fide.” This decision was followed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Narayana Rao v.Ramachandra Rao1. At page 373 Krishna Rao, J., observed thus: "The Court is bound to start with the presumption that a promissory note, the genuineness of which is admitted or proved, was made for consideration But it is a rebuttable presumption and the recitals in the instrument are only prima facie evidence against the parties thereto, the weight to be attached to it varying with the circumstances. The recitals may operate to shift on to the party pleading the contrary, the burden of rebutting the inference raised by them. But the question of burden is of subordinate importance after both the parties have adduced all their evidence, unless evidence is evenly balanced and conflicting. Even in suits on negotiable instruments, the debtor can press into service facts and circumstances-disclosed by the plaintiff’s evidence." That there is no presumption in respect of the quantum of the consideration has also been held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in another decision, Raghava Reddi v Sundaram Reddi2. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. Even in suits on negotiable instruments, the debtor can press into service facts and circumstances-disclosed by the plaintiff’s evidence." That there is no presumption in respect of the quantum of the consideration has also been held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in another decision, Raghava Reddi v Sundaram Reddi2. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 3, Third edition, the rule regarding presumption is stated thus at page 175: It has been already stated that bills of exchange and promissory notes, unlike other forms of simple contract, are presumed to stand upon the basis of a valuable consideration...............The effect of the presumption, therefore, is that it shifts the burden of proof from the shoulders of the plaintiff who relies upon the instrument to those of the defendant who impugns it." The initial presumption of the subsistence of consideration in respect of a negotiable instrument which is not necessarily a presumption of the passing of consideration in respect of the amount or value mentioned in the instrument is only a starting advantage in favour of the plaintiff in an action on the instrument and a corresponding handicap against the defendant sued. The course of trial however may bring in various factors and circumstances the cumulative effect of which may be sufficient to destroy the presumption and to place the plaintiff in a position where he cannot succeed without establishing affirmatively by cogent and positive evidence that the document sued upon is supported by consideration, and that he is entitled to recover the amount sued for. In order to counteract the prima facie rebuttable presumption in favour of the plaintiff regarding the consideration the defendant can rely upon the circumstances and probabilities of the case and can, of course, make capital out of the absurdity in the evidence on the side of the plaintiff himself. I have no hesitation to conclude that, giving the plaintiff the fullest benent of the statutory presumption of consideration in regard to Exhibit A-1, the evidence on record and the overwhelming probabilities and circumstances of the case disentitle the plaintiff to get any relief on foot of the promissory note Exhibit A-1. I am not unaware of the fact that my finding, namely, that though the suit promissory note is genuine it is supported by consideration only to the extent of Rs. 500 is not the case of either party. I am not unaware of the fact that my finding, namely, that though the suit promissory note is genuine it is supported by consideration only to the extent of Rs. 500 is not the case of either party. The parties took up extreme positions, the plaintiff pleading that he had advanced cash of Rs. 5,500 to the defendant and the defendant denying the very execution of the suit promissory note. The duty of the Court is to give effect to the inference to be drawn from the evidence on record. The Court is not prevented from recording a finding which may not be consistent with the pleadings of either party in a suit. In Nanda Kumar Das v. Emdad Ali3 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed thus at page 50: "The learned Judge is perfectly entitled as a Judge of fact to give due weight to the evidence adduced by the parties to draw his own inference which may be inconsistent with the case of either party for it is the duty of the Judge to sift the truth and not to be pinned to the evidence of a party to the case in order not to defeat the ends of justice." I respectfully agree with this observation. The contentions of the parties largely depend upon the exigencies of the respective cases put forward by them and they do not hesitate to distort facts and events to obtain a verdict from the Court in their favour. The pleadings constitutes the framework of the action and they of the Court on the issue arising in the case is one that emerges from the evidence on record and it may so happen that the finding may not be in strict accord with the case of either party. There is no law which can prevent the Court from recording -such a finding without being fettered or oppressed by the pleadings in the case. Indeed it is the duty of the Court to record only such findings which follow on a proper appreciation of and a legitimate inference from the evidence on record. On my finding it follows that the plaintiff has to be non-suited. The appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge in O.S. No. 77 of 1955 are set aside and the suit is hereby dismissed. On my finding it follows that the plaintiff has to be non-suited. The appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge in O.S. No. 77 of 1955 are set aside and the suit is hereby dismissed. Having regard to the conduct of the parties who have put forward false contentions, I direct that each party should bear their respective costs both here and in the Court below. V.S. ------------- Appeal allowed.