JUDGMENT Krishnan, J. The question before us at this stage is a preliminary one whether this appeal could have been filed in this Court, because the amount in dispute after the preparation of the final decree is more than Rs. 5,000, and not before the District Judge, because the valuation of the suit (which was provisional) was less than Rs. 5,000, being actually Rs. 100. The respondent's contention is the latter; if it is accepted the memorandum of appeal will have to be returned for being presented in the Court of the District Judge. That Court will, in time decide, whether this is a fit case for condoning delay u/s 14, Limitation Act; that question does not arise here at present. The problem is this; one of the members of a firm sues his partner (or partners) for dissolution and accounts. Unable to form any estimate of the money that might be found payable to him after taking accounts, he puts a provisional valuation. The Court entertains the suit on the valuation, not finding any mistake or gross undervaluation and directing that the valuation should be modified. Ultimately the Court awards the plaintiff a sum higher than the original valuation of the suit; and that party, on the plea that on the accounts now taken he is entitled even to a larger sum, goes up in appeal. The question is whether the appeal should be presented in a Court to which appeals on the original valuation of the suit would lie, or in the one, which is competent to entertain appeal on the valuation on the actual amount in controversy at that stage. These become crucial, where the amount in dispute at the time of the final decree is outside the pecuniary appellate jurisdiction of the Court, which is competent to hear appeals from a suit of the original valuation. In this state, the dividing line of the appellate jurisdictions of the District Court and the High Court is 5,000 rupees. The facts of this case are simple. The plaintiff who is also the appellant, sued the respondent before the Civil Judge Class I for dissolution of a partnership and for accounts, on a provisional valuation of Rs. 100, offering as usual in such cases, to pay the appropriate court-fee if the sum due to him is found higher. The facts of this case are simple. The plaintiff who is also the appellant, sued the respondent before the Civil Judge Class I for dissolution of a partnership and for accounts, on a provisional valuation of Rs. 100, offering as usual in such cases, to pay the appropriate court-fee if the sum due to him is found higher. When, after the preliminary decree, accounts were taken, the plaintiff claimed that a sum of Rs. 9,700 in round figures was payable to him; the Court actually allowed only about Rs. 1,900. For the disallowed part of the claim at this stage i. e. Rs. 7,800 in round figures, he filed an appeal in the High Court and not in the District Court. Section 23, Madhya Bharat Civil Courts Act, runs thus: ID all suits decided by a Civil Judge in exercise of his ordinary or special jurisdiction of which the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds Rs. 5,000, an appeal from his decision shall lie direct to the High Court. In all other cases, it shall lie to the District Court. Prima facie, the appeal should go to the District Judge in a case in which the subject-matter has been valued at less than Rs. 5,000. There may be cases in which the plaintiff is found to have undervalued his suit; but then the Civil Judge himself would take steps in exercise of his powers, which are quite ample in this regard, to compel a proper valuation. We are dealing with a case where the Civil Judge has accepted the valuation for jurisdiction; an appeal from a decision in that suit, lies to the District Court, if the original valuation is less than Rs. 5,000, even though, as it happens in account suits, the actual amount decreed is more than Rs. 5,000. The valuation for jurisdiction has to be distinguished from the valuation for the purposes of taxation. A Court is always competent, if the evidence leads to it, to pass a decree for an amount in excess of its pecuniary jurisdiction; that controls only the entertainment of the suit, and not to the value of the decree actually passed. Section 23 of the Madhya Bharat Civil Courts Act is clear enough, but the case law that has been cited, can be conveniently summarised. Section 23 of the Madhya Bharat Civil Courts Act is clear enough, but the case law that has been cited, can be conveniently summarised. All the High Courts are of this view, though a passage in a judgment of the old Lahore High Court in Ganga Ram v. Hakim Rai AIR 1934 Lah. 645 (2), suggests the contrary. The Madhya Pradesh view which is reported in Hukmichand v. Surajbai 1959 MPLJ 045 : 1959 MPC 688, is by a single Judge; but there is no Divisional Bench ruling. For the purposes of determining the proper appellate Court in a Civil Suit, what has to be looked at is "the amount or the value of the subject-matter of the suit". Such amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit must be taken to be the value assigned by the plaintiff in his plaint and not the value as found by the Court, unless the plaintiff has accepted the adjudication of the Court as the value of his suit for purposes of jurisdiction or unless it appears that either purposely or through gross negligence the true value of the suit has been altogether misrepresented. It may be noted that in the latter event, the Court hearing the suit would itself insist upon the proper valuation being accepted by the plaintiff. The old Lahore view is reported in Ganga Ram v. Hakim Rai AIR 1934 Lah. 645 (2). But in the more recent decisions of the Punjab High Court reported in Mohinder Singh v. Jagjit Singh AIR I960 P&H. 431 and in Oajja Singh v. Gurdial Singh AIR I960 P&H. 407, there seems to be some mutual difference. At all events, the latter decision which is by a Full Bench is to the effect that the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction remains the same throughout the litigation which of course includes appeal. The other High Courts have been more explicit in laying down the principles identical with those given in Madhya Pradesh decision already noted. For example, Bidyadhar Bachar and Others Vs. Manindra Nath Das and Others, : Where a Judge has in the proper exercise of his jurisdiction passed a decree for possession and also a preliminary decree for mesne profits, he must be held to have jurisdiction to make a final decree in accordance with his decision. For example, Bidyadhar Bachar and Others Vs. Manindra Nath Das and Others, : Where a Judge has in the proper exercise of his jurisdiction passed a decree for possession and also a preliminary decree for mesne profits, he must be held to have jurisdiction to make a final decree in accordance with his decision. This jurisdiction is not limited, if, as a result of the inquiry directed by him, the mesne profits are found to exceed the amount of his pecuniary jurisdiction as regards the value of the suit. If a suit ia rightly entertained as within the jurisdiction of the Judge and a decree passed his power to grant the proper and adequate relief is not affected by any event which increases the value of the relief daring the pendency of the exit. On these principles, the appeal would certainly follow the valuation of the suit and not that of the relief was finally granted. Part of the confusion in this regard is the result of a failure to distinguish between the valuation of a suit or appeal for the purposes of jurisdiction, and the valuation for the purposes of court-fees. From time to time ib happens that the valuation of the relief ultimately granted exceeds the valuation at the beginning for the purpose of jurisdiction. Even in regard to suits for account, the combined effect of section 7(iv), Court-Fee Act and adoption of the Suits Valuation Act is that to begin with the valuation pub for court-fee and for jurisdiction mentioned in the plaint, should be the same; this may be a notional valuation but it is not as such, illegal. But when, in the Court of the litigation, as a more valuable relief is granted, the party concerned may be asked to pay additional court-fee. Faizullah Khan, v. Mauladad Khan (1) is the case to the point. There are more recent oases such as Sheokiaandas v. Daudas (2). But they relate only to the taxation and not jurisdiction. The result of the discussion is that the suit before the Civil judge Class 1 had been valued provisionally at Ra. 100, which valuation was accepted. Faizullah Khan, v. Mauladad Khan (1) is the case to the point. There are more recent oases such as Sheokiaandas v. Daudas (2). But they relate only to the taxation and not jurisdiction. The result of the discussion is that the suit before the Civil judge Class 1 had been valued provisionally at Ra. 100, which valuation was accepted. As a result of subsequent inquiry, the relief granted was higher and the relief claimed by the plaintiff was higher still; the plaintiff certainly became liable to taxation ad valorem when he filed appeal for the disallowed portion of his claim which he maintained, he was entitled to. His appeal lay all the same to the District Court, because the suit had been originally valued and the valuation accepted at a sum below five thousand rupees. It is, therefore, ordered that the memorandum of appeal should be returned to the appellant for being presented to the appropriate appellate Court. Costs of this appeal to follow the final result. Final Result : Allowed