JUDGMENT Ramabhadran, J. - This appeal has been referred to us by our brother Nasir Ullah Beg, J. on the question, whether a Custodian taking an objection under Section 17 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act can be said to be acting as the representative of the evacuee judgment-debtor within the meaning of Section 47, Civil Procedure Code. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal as stated in the order of reference are that the present appellant obtained a decree for a sum of Rs. 1,800 against the evacuee and in execution of that decree put the house of the judgment-debtor to sale. At that stage of Custodian appeared and filed an objection under Section 17 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, claiming immunity from all proceedings in execution. The trial court dismissed the Custodian's objection and permitted the execution to proceed. On the appeal being taken the First Additional Civil Judge of Agra allowed the objection of Custodian and set aside the order of the executing court dismissing his objection, since it was not open to the Custodian to go up in appeal against the order of the executing court dismissing his objection, since it was not an order covered by Section 47 Civil Procedure Code. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, Sri H. N. Seth for the appellant, contended that a Custodian cannot be deemed to be a representative of the original judgment-debtor, within the meaning of Section 47, Civil Procedure Code so as to confer a right of appeal upon him. He pointed out that the Custodian derives his powers, not from the original judgment-debtor but from the Act. Indeed, as brother Beg has pointed out, there may be instance where the Custodian acts not in the interest of the original judgment-debtor but in conflict there-with. In this particular case, the objection taken by the Custodian was one under Section 17 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, i.e. to the effect that the property in question was immune from attachment and sale. Obviously that was not an objection which the original judgment-debtor could himself have taken. 4. Mr. D.D. Seth for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the expression "representation" is to be interpreted widely and it would include any kind of representative, whether appointed by the judgment-debtor or otherwise. Obviously that was not an objection which the original judgment-debtor could himself have taken. 4. Mr. D.D. Seth for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the expression "representation" is to be interpreted widely and it would include any kind of representative, whether appointed by the judgment-debtor or otherwise. Reliance was placed in this connection on the rulings reported in (Mian) Abdul Aziz v. Alliance Bank of Simla, Ltd., AIR 1933 Lahore 352, Bankey Behari Lal v. Mst. Brij Rani, A.I.R. 1944 Oudh 314, Mst. Sant Kaur v. Teja Singh, AIR 1946 Lahore 142 (F.B.), Balram Karmakar v. Subodh Chandra Bose, A.I.R. 1956 Assam 9 and Thondam Annamalai Mudali v. Tiruttani Ramasami Mudali, AIR 1941 Madras 161. In (Mian) Abdul Aziz v. Alliance Bank of Simla, Ltd., AIR 1933 Lahore 352 Bhide, J was dealing with a case of mortgagee. He indicated that the expression "representative" to be found in Section 47, Civil Procedure Code could be construed in a wider sense than the expression "legal representative" and two tests should be applied to determine whether a person was a representative within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code or not. These tests are:- (1) Whether any portion of the interest of the decree - holder or of the judgment-debtor has, by act of the parties or by the operation of law, vested in the person; and (2) If there has been any devolution of interest, whether, so far as such interest is concerned, the person is bound by the decree. This case in our opinion, is not applicable to the facts of the present case, because the position of a Custodian, under the Administration of Evidence Property Act is unique in the sense that the property of the evacuee is vested in him and he is to administer the same as provided in the Act. The position of a mortgagee, obviously, is quite different. In Thondam Annamalai Mudali v. Tiruttani Ramasami Mudali, AIR 1941 Madras 161. Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was, made the following observation: "Now, the term "representative" is not defined in the Code. It has been held that it is a term of wider import than "legal representative" as defined by Sec. 2(11) of the Code and means "a representative in interest": see Ishan Chander v. Beni Madhub, 24 Cal. 62. Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was, made the following observation: "Now, the term "representative" is not defined in the Code. It has been held that it is a term of wider import than "legal representative" as defined by Sec. 2(11) of the Code and means "a representative in interest": see Ishan Chander v. Beni Madhub, 24 Cal. 62. Does it, however, necessarily import, as a condition of its application, a transmission of interest in property, or does it merely cannot standing in the place of another for the purpose of deriving some right of advantage from him? The latter is, undoubtedly the ordinary meaning of the term and it is commonly used in a variety of contexts which do not involve the idea of any interest in property passing. In the absence of any indication in Section 47 that the term is used in a more restricted sense, there seems to my mind to be no reason why it should not be understood in its ordinary meaning referred to above. Indeed, there is authority for the view that even the expression "legal representative," notwithstanding the terms of its definition referring to the devolution of an estate, can appropriately be applied to cases where there is and can be no transmission of interest in property. Dealing with the claim of a remoter reversioner to be substituted in the place of the deceased presumptive reversioner who had brought a suit for a declaration that an adoption made by a widow was invalid, their Lordships observed in Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subhammal, 38 Mad. 406 at p. 413: 'The phraseology of sub-sec. (11) in their Lordships' Opinion, is fairly open to the contention that the suit was brought by the deceased plaintiff as representing, in his reversionary right, the estate of the last male owner, and that on his death such right devolved on the petitioner." 5. It is, of course, plain that the right, here referred is, is not an interest in property as a reversioner, presumptive or remote, has only a spec successions. It is, of course, plain that the right, here referred is, is not an interest in property as a reversioner, presumptive or remote, has only a spec successions. I am therefore of opinion that the terms `representative' in Section 47, Civil Procedure Code should be understood as merely referring to one who stands in the shoes of another to use an expression familiar in legal parlance and as meaning more or less the same thing as the expression` claiming under' used in other sections of the Code, e.g. Sections 11 and 146." 6. These observations were, if we may say so, of a general character and were not meant to apply to a person holding the status of a Custodian under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. 7. In Bankey Behari Lal v. Mst. Brij Rani, A.I.R. 1944 Oudh 314 a Division Bench of that Court was dealing with a case under the En-cumbered Estates Act. The following observations were made by the Bench: "In considering whether an application is under Section 47 or not, the Court must examine the substance of the application to find out its true nature and should not be guided solely by the heading given to it by the applicant. Even if the objections are headed under Order 21, Rule 58 yet having regard to the nature of the objections and the character which the objectors occupied in relation to the proceedings the objections can be held to have been made under Section 47." The word "representative" in Section 47 has a much wider meaning than the words "legal representative" used in Section 50 inasmuch as it includes not only a legal representative but any representative-in-interest, i.e., any transferee of the interest of a party whether by assignment, succession or otherwise who so far as such interest is concerned, is bound by the decree." These observations again have no direct bearing on the status of a Custodian acting under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. 8. In Mst. 8. In Mst. Sant Kuer v. Teja Singh, AIR 1946 Lahore 142 (F.B.) a Full Bench of that Court was dealing with the status of a transferee of a vendee and in that connection it made the following observations: "The word "representative" as used in Section 47 has a much wider meaning than the words "legal representative" and includes not only a legal representative but any representative-in-interest, i.e., any transferee of the interest of a party, whether by assignment, succession or otherwise, who so far as such interest is concerned is bound by the decree - A transferee from a defendant pendente lite being the representative-in-interest of such defendant and being bound by the decree eventually passed in the suit, by reason of the operation of the rule of lis pendens, is a representative of the defendant within Section 47 and the decree-holder can execute the decree against him in the same manner and to the same extent as he could execute it against the original defendant." 9. These observations, we may again point out, do not apply to the position of a Custodian which, as already said, is unique. 10. In Balram Karmakar v. Subodh Chandra Bose, A.I.R. 1956 Assam 9 a Division Bench of that Court also made a general observation regarding the scope of the expression "representative" to be found in Section 47, Civil Procedure Code. The remarks made in this connection ran as follows: "The word `representative' in Section 47 is not limited merely to the legal representatives but includes persons on whom interest has devolved by assignment, transfer or otherwise. 11. None of the rulings, cited by the learned counsel for the respondent, however, make out that a Custodian preferring an objection under Section 17 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act can be said to be acting as the representative of the original evacuee judgment-debtor. It is obvious that such an objection could not be taken by the original judgment-debtor himself. 12. We have accordingly come to the conclusion that the question which has been referred to us, should be answered in the negative. The case will, accordingly go back to the learned single Judge, with our answer.