JUDGMENT Mithan Lal, J. - This civil revision arises out of an roder passed by the Civil Judge, Allahabad, rejecting the application of the applicant under Section 10 while granting the prayer of the opposite party and issuing an injunction to the applicant not to proceed with the suit at Delhi. 2. The facts of the case briefly stated are that the opposite party. Messrs. A.H. Wheeler and Company Limited under an agreement with the Union Government keep book-stalls on railway stations. The present applicant entered into an agreement with the opposite party to act as an agent for book-stall no. 1 at Delhi Junction railway station with effect from 1st October, 1954. The conditions of contract were all embodied in a written agreement dated 23rd November, 1954. It is not necessary to state anything more about the actual terms of the agreement or the subsequent agreement which was entered into between the parties with respect to other stalls, Nos. 2 and 3, than to say that under the terms of the agreement it was agreed between the parties, (as entered in Cl. (19) of the agreement) "that all disputes and differences of every kind, arising out of or in connection with this agreement, or the agency of the agent shall be settled and decided at Allahabad and the court at Allahabad shall have jurisdiction to decide such cases arising in connection thereto." 3. The differences and disputes have arisen between the parties and two suits were instituted, one was instituted by the applicant at Delhi as suit No. 2 of 1959 while the other was 3 instituted by the opposite party as suit No. 10 of 1959 at Allahabad. The subject-matter of the two suits appears to be almost the same, but in the suit at Allahabad a specific sum of Rs. 7,865.10 nP. has been claimed while the other suit at Delhi appears to be a suit for damages or a suit for accounting or for both. 4. In the court of the Civil Judge, Allahabad, two applications were moved, one by the plaintiff-opposite party requesting the court to issue an injunction against the defendant-applicant in this case not to proceed with the suit at Delhi, while the present applicant moved an application under Section 10, C.P.C., praying for the stay of the suit at Allahabad. 4. In the court of the Civil Judge, Allahabad, two applications were moved, one by the plaintiff-opposite party requesting the court to issue an injunction against the defendant-applicant in this case not to proceed with the suit at Delhi, while the present applicant moved an application under Section 10, C.P.C., praying for the stay of the suit at Allahabad. The learned Civil Judge heard both the applications together and after finding that a part of the cause of action arose at Allahabad and that under the agreement between the parties the suit could only be instituted at Allahabad dismissed the applicant's application under Section 10 while the application of the opposite party for injunction was allowed. It is against this order that the present revision has been filed. 5. It has been contended by Dr. Gyan Prakash that the provisions of Section 10, C.P.C., are mandatory and so the suit at Allahabad should have been stayed and that no injunction in such a case should have been issued. His second contention is that no injunction could be issued to a person residing outside the jurisdiction of the court and the order of injunction is without jurisdiction and bad in law. None of these arguments can be accepted. 6. So far as the first argument goes, the provisions of Section 10, C.P.C. are no doubt mandatory, but in cases where there is a binding contract between the parties with respect to the institution of a suit at a particular place out of more than one place where the suit could be instituted, Sec. 10 will not come in the way of the court from enforcing the contractual obligations between the parties and in issuing an injunction under Section 151, C.P.C. Sec. 10 lays down: - "10. No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they of any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the (Central Government) and having like jurisdiction, or before (the Supreme Court)." 7. The above provision does not bar the institution of suits at two places but what is barred is the trial of one suit if the conditions given in the section are fulfilled. Obviously the purpose of the section is to prevent the trial of two similar suits at two different places simultaneously. This purpose can be achieved either by staying the latter suit if all the ingredients of Section 10 are fulfilled and there is also no binding contract between the parties to the contrary or by giving effect to the contract between the parties and staying any of the two suits in order to stop the abuse of the process of the Court. In case of existence of a contract between the parties a suit previously instituted in a court, which could not entertain the suit because of the agreement between the parties, it cannot be said that such a court had jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed. That court may have had jurisdiction either because a part of the cause of action arose there or for some other reason, yet the parties having entered into a contract the jurisdiction of that court so to say was taken away by the contract of parties for settling the dispute arising out of the agreement between the parties at a particular place. The High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Assam, Madras and Madhya Bharat have taken the view that Section 10 would not apply in such a case and the Court may, in the exercise of its inherent power, decline to stay a subsequently instituted suit on the ground that the first instituted suit constituted an abuse of the process of court. A reference in this behalf may be made to the authorities of Tilakram Chaudhri v. Kodumal Jethananand Wadha, AIR 1928 Bombay 175 followed in Ram Bahadur Thakur & Co. v. Devidayal Sales Ltd., AIR 1954 Bombay 176, Bhagat Singh Bugga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhney, AIR 1941 Calcutta 670, Prabir Ram Barooah v. Albert David Ltd., A.I.R. 1957 Assam 120, Manohar Lal v. Rao Raja Hiralal Ji, A.I.R. 1955 MB 145 and Gulab Chand Dhan Raj v. P. Anandan, AIR 1954 Madras 11. These are all authorities which have upheld the contract between the parties relating to the place of suing, when more than one Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These are all authorities which have upheld the contract between the parties relating to the place of suing, when more than one Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Obviously when the parties have entered into an agreement to get their disputes settled under the jurisdiction of a particular High Court and the contract is binding, no party can resile from that contract by forestalling the suit, subsequently filed, by the other party in another Court and claim the benefit of Section 10 by violation of the contract. The previously instituted suit at a place not agreed will not only amount to an abuse of the process of court but it is doubtful if it can be said that the court, in which that suit was instituted against the agreement between the parties, can be called a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief as is required by Sec. 10. Sec. 10 would not apply to such a case as the present and the court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction has power to restrain a party not to proceed with the previously instituted suit. 8. As regards the second contention, the argument of the learned counsel is that the court should not grant an injunction nor pass any order which may prove to be ineffectual. He has submitted that as the defendant was residing in Delhi outside the jurisdiction of the court at Allahabad, the Allahabad court is not in a position to punish him if the order of injunction is disobeyed. For this purpose he has relied upon the authority of Binjraj Maheswria v. Ramniwasdas Jalan, AIR 1943 Calcutta 89 and the authority of In the goods of Mrs. Lilian Singh, AIR 1943 Calcutta 93. In the first authority it was held by the learned Judge, following the three earlier authorities that the Calcutta High Court in its original jurisdiction had no power to issue an injunction restraining a party from proceeding with a suit in another court unless the party sought to be restrained resided within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. In the first authority it was held by the learned Judge, following the three earlier authorities that the Calcutta High Court in its original jurisdiction had no power to issue an injunction restraining a party from proceeding with a suit in another court unless the party sought to be restrained resided within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. In the latter case it was laid down that the court had no power to restrain by injunction a party residing outside its jurisdiction in exercise of its original jurisdiction, but it had such a power to issue such an injunction in exercise of its equity jurisdiction which the court inherited from the Supreme Court. The principle enunciated in these authorities has no application to the subordinate civil courts which have equity jurisdiction. The rule of law in Eng. land where equity jurisdiction is separate from other jurisdiction of courts is not applicable to India. 9. The learned counsel also relied upon the authority of Lalmohan Trivedi v. Ram Chandra, A.I.R. 1938 Oudh 87. In that case an injunction had been issued against a court outside the province. That was also a case under Or. 39, R. 7, C.P.C. The injunction had also been issued in execution proceedings and it was observed by the Division Bench, which decided that case, that a court is not justified in staying proceedings in a court not situated in its province or to issue an injunction against a party residing outside the jurisdiction of the court not to execute his decree in a court in a different province. The order in that case had been passed under the provisions of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act which was not a Central Act but to which provisions of the C.P.C. had been made applicable. It was observed by the learned Judges : "We do not think that an order staying sale of property in execution of a decree is an order for `preservation' of that property. Moreover, under Order 39, rule 7(a), the property sought to be preserved must be the subject-matter of a suit but the suit does not relate to any property but to a debt owing by the applicants to the opposite party." It was in the context of the aforesaid circumstances that the court held that it would not be justified in staying proceedings in a court not situated in this province. This authority cannot be taken to lay down the general proposition of law that a court of one State cannot restrain a party to a suit before it from proceeding with his suit in another State. 10. Reference was also made to the case of Ram Kirpal v. The Union of India, AIR 1955 Allahabad 468. That was a case under Article 226 of the Constitution, and the Division Bench who decided that writ rightly laid down that: "the Courts do not issue writs and injunctions which they have no power to enforce. If a writ or injunction is disobeyed, the only way to enforce it is to take proceedings against the guilty party for disobedience of the order. If the party is outside the jurisdiction of the Court, then the Court has no power to enforce obedience of the injunction on writ issued by the Court, and Courts, therefore, do not issue writs where they have no power to enforce their obedience. If a writ is issued to some officer at New Delhi and he ignores it, the Allahabad High Court cannot proceed in contempt against such officer, as he is outside the jurisdiction of the Court." This case, again, is no authority because the writ jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 is limited only to the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction. 11. The subordinate courts in India have been given a power to issue a warrant of arrest, to issue temporary injunctions, to appoint Receivers, to make attachment of properties, to ask the parties to furnish security and to make such interlocutory orders as may appear to the court to be just and convenient in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated, in Section 94 of the C.P.C. Sec. 94 uses the expression "if it is so prescribed" and obviously it means prescribed under the rules in the first Schedule. There are provisions in the first Schedule with respect to the issue of temporary injunctions and other matters enumerated in Sec. 94. In the present case, an injunction was issued in the exercise of the inherent power of the Court under Section 151, C.P.C. The mode of service of such injunction has been provided in the Code as also the procedure in case of disobedience of the injunction. In the present case, an injunction was issued in the exercise of the inherent power of the Court under Section 151, C.P.C. The mode of service of such injunction has been provided in the Code as also the procedure in case of disobedience of the injunction. Besides the equity jurisdiction possessed by the subordinate courts in India, the injunction having been issued under a Central law in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated, the order of injunction has to be served in another State and in case of disobedience if any process is issued by a competent authority in one State the authority in the other State has to serve the process. It is therefore not quite correct to say that in case of dis-obedience the court issuing the injunction will have no power to enforce it if the defendant resided outside its jurisdiction. The law framed by Parliament for the whole of the territory of India within its legislative competency under Part XI, Chap. I, of the Constitution of India can be enforced throughout the whole territory of India. Under Article 261(1) full faith and credit shall be given throughout the territory of India to public acts and judicial proceedings of the Union and of every State and under Cl. (3) of the same Article final judgments or orders delivered or passed by civil courts in any part of the territory of India shall be capable of execution any where within that territory according to law. There appeared to be no corresponding provisions in the Government of India Act, but even at that time a distinction was made between the original jurisdiction and equity jurisdiction. All laws passed by the Central Government were enforceable even at that time throughout the territory of India and now there is a specific provision under Article 261. I do not mean to say that the order passed in a suit in an interlocutory matter is a final order in the same sense as used in Article 133 because a final order should ordinarily mean that it does not leave the original proceedings in the court alive after the passing of such an order, as held in Messrs. Bhagwan Dass & Co. v. The Income-tax Officer, AIR 1958 Allahabad 800 and Savitri Devi v. Rajul Devi, AIR 1961 Allahabad 245 F.B. : 1960 ALJ 897. Bhagwan Dass & Co. v. The Income-tax Officer, AIR 1958 Allahabad 800 and Savitri Devi v. Rajul Devi, AIR 1961 Allahabad 245 F.B. : 1960 ALJ 897. But perhaps the words "final orders" used in Article 261 may have been used in a wider sense including final orders in interlocutory matters. However, even if the expression "final orders" used in Article 261(3) means final orders in the same sense as used in Article 133, yet the principle of reciprocity in the enforcement of law, particularly the Central law, having been recognised in the Constitution, it cannot be said that there is no remedy if an injunction issued by a competent court in one State is disobeyed by a person residing in another State. There is also the authority of Firm Bichocha Ram Babu Ram v. Firm Baldeo Sahai Suraj Mal, AIR 1940 Allahabad 241 : 1940 ALJ 188 in which a Division Bench of this Court upheld the order of issue of an injunction outside the State. It is true that the argument raised now was not raised in that case, but that authority does lay down that an interim injunction issued by a competent court in one State can be enforced and proceedings for disobedience can be taken if the person disobeying is residing outside that State. 12. In spite of the able argument of Dr. Gyan Prakash I am unable to agree with him. Both the points raised by him have no force. 13. The revision must fail and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.