ORDER P.K. Tare, J. This appeal is by the plaintiff against the decree, dated 29-6-1959, passed by Shri D. K. Munshi, Second Additional District Judge, Bhopal, in Civil Regular Appeal No. 144-A of 1968, affirming the decree, dated 31-3-1958, passed by Shri S. R. Agarwal, First Additional Munsiff, Bhopal, in Regular Civil Suit No. 60 of 1957. The appellant is the President of the Board of Trustees of a Trust, known as 'Gulab Bai Digamber Jain Kanya Vidyalaya', which, on the appellant's own showing, is a Public Trust. A sale deed, dated 1-9-1939 (Exh. P-3) was executed in favour of the Trust regarding house property. Full description of the property sold is not given in the deed; but a map (Exh. P-3-A) is attached to the flame, which indicates the property sold. The sale deed in favour of the respondent was executed on 28-6-1949 as per Exh. D-3. That sale deed also does not give a full description of the property sold, but a map (Exh. 3 D-A) is attached showing the extent of the property sold. The appellant filed a suit against the respondent for demolition of a chabutara constructed in front of his house over an area of 2 feet in width and 60 feet in length, alleging that the land covered by it belonged to the plaintiff, and as such the defendant had encroached on the same. Therefore, a permanent injunction was sought against the defendant. The defendant-respondent did not claim any title in himself, but alleged that the land covered by the chabutara was municipal land; and even if it be found that there was an encroachment, the Municipal Committee alone had the right to get the encroachment removed. The plaintiff, in no case, could maintain the present suit. The learned Judges of the Courts below held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the land covered by the chabutara belonged to the plaintiff, or was the subject-matter of the Bale deed, dated 1-9-1939 in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, in no case, could maintain the present suit. The learned Judges of the Courts below held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the land covered by the chabutara belonged to the plaintiff, or was the subject-matter of the Bale deed, dated 1-9-1939 in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the land was held to be municipal land; and in that view of the case the plaintiff-appellant's suit was dismissed, The learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the present suit was not tenable by virtue of section 32 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, as the trust, which was admittedly a public trust, had not been registered under the provisions of the said Act. In reply to this, the learned counsel for the appellant urged that the suit having been filed on 10-5-1956, the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 could not be applied retrospectively. It was pointed out that the said Act was not applicable to the Bhopal region; and that for the first time it was applied by virtue of section 6 of the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958, which brought into force the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 in the Bhopal region with effect from 1-1-1959, as per the notification issued in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette Extraordinary of the name date. Unless there be a specific provision explicitly or by a necessary implication or intendment, every Act is prospective and it will not affect cases instituted prior to the coming into force of the Act. However, we have to see if section 32 of the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951 applies to pending cases. I am of opinion that the Act cannot be said to be retrospective in the sense of applying from a time anterior to the passing of the Act, or to affect vested rights. Section 32 of the Act is as follows :- (1) No suit to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust which has not been registered under this Act shall be heard or decided in any Court. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply to a claim or set offer other proceeding to enforce a right on behalf of such public trust. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply to a claim or set offer other proceeding to enforce a right on behalf of such public trust. Therefore, it has to be seen in each case whether the provisions of an Act are retrospective so as to apply to pending cases. The wording of section 32 of the Act, no doubt, indicates that the provisions will be applicable to pending cases, which might have been instituted before the Act came into force. The bar provided by sub-section (I) is against the hearing or deciding of a case by any Court. Of course, it does not mean that the suit should be dismissed. But what is necessary is that the suit cannot proceed unless the public trust is got duly registered. The learned counsel for the appellant invited attention to the discussion of the topic of retrospective operation in the commentary, on 'The Interpretation of Statutes' by Maxwell, 10th Edition, at page 221; with particular reference to the English Medical Act, 1858, which required the registration of all medical practitioners before they could maintain an action in a Court of law. In Leman v. Houseley (1875) LR 10 QB 66, as also in the earlier oases, it was held that the provisions of section 32 of the Medical Act, 1858, were not retrospective in the sense of being applicable to pending oases. So far as the Indian Courts are concerned every statute is to be construed to be prospective, unless, by a specific provision or by necessary intendment or implication, it is found that the Act is applicable to pending cases, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Keshavan Madhava Menon Vs. The State of Bombay, where the question relating to the retrospective nature of Article 13(1) of the Constitution of India was considered by their Lordships. In Syed Fakir aw others v. Chandrabai and Others 1940 NLJ 655 : ILR 1940 G. 648 : AIR 1940 Nag. 307, Grille J. held that section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act had no retrospective operation so as to bar a suit in reaped of an unregistered firm filed prior to the Act came into force. In Syed Fakir aw others v. Chandrabai and Others 1940 NLJ 655 : ILR 1940 G. 648 : AIR 1940 Nag. 307, Grille J. held that section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act had no retrospective operation so as to bar a suit in reaped of an unregistered firm filed prior to the Act came into force. Further on, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the special Bench case of the Madras High Court in G. Naratnaswami Naidu and Another v. Inspector-General of Police, Mayavaram and Another AIR 1948 Mad. 807 wherein the question was whether section 16-A of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act No. 1 of 1947 had a retrospective operation so as to apply to pending proceedings u/s 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Judges constituting the special Bench held that it did not apply to pending proceedings and that the habeas corpus petition could not be dismissed that reason alone. Further on, reliance was placed the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme General Films' Exchange Ltd. AIR 1960 SC 880, wherein their Lordship said down that an amendment affecting vested rights cannot be construed to be mere procedural matter and therefore, such amendment cannot have respective operation. In that ease the question was whether the Bombay Courts Amendment Act (12 of 1954) was retrospective. Thus, there can be no doubt that where a statute or an amendment affects any vested right, or any to rights, including a right of appeal the same cannot be construed to affect pending cases. But, where the statute or the amendment is merely procedural, it will no doubt, have retrospective operation merely to the extent of affecting the pending cases. Of course, this principle is applicable only when the statute ore amendment is merely procedural. From the wording of second 32 of the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951 it is clear that the said provision appeals to be merely a procedural matter not affecting vested rights of the particular. Of course, this principle is applicable only when the statute ore amendment is merely procedural. From the wording of second 32 of the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951 it is clear that the said provision appeals to be merely a procedural matter not affecting vested rights of the particular. The bar is against the trial of the suit on merits, unless the public trust is referred Therefore, I am of opinion that the provision in the said section be merely procedural, is retrospective to the extent of being applicable to pending cases at whatever stage they might be because the appeal would be considered to be a continuation of the suit. As such, I am of opinion that although the said section may not have retrospective operation in general, it is retrospective to the extent of being applicable to pending cases. Therefore, it is clear that the present appeal cannot go on, unless the public trust, on whose behalf the suit has been filed by the appellant, is registered, as required by the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951. The learned counsel for the appellant invited attention to the observations of Bhutt J. in Kaliji Deity v. Ramnihora, wherein the learned Judge observed that in a suit by a trustee if the defendant wished to object to the hearing of the suit on the ground of non-registration of the trust alleged to the public trust by him, he must first obtain the finding of the Registrar under sections 5 and 6 of the M. P. Public Trusts Act and that he cannot seek a stay of the But without having obtained such finding. I am in agreement with the view of Bhutt J. that such question cannot be permitted to be raised by a defendant unless he first raises the same duly before the Registrar of Public Trusts; because a question nay arise in some types, of cases whether the trust is a public trust or a private trust. Therefore, the defendant must obtain the finding of the Registrar, it the trust is a public trust. If it be a private trust, the suit will not be barred by virtue of section 32 of the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951. Therefore, the defendant must obtain the finding of the Registrar, it the trust is a public trust. If it be a private trust, the suit will not be barred by virtue of section 32 of the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951. In the present case, even on the plaintiff's own showing, the trust is a public trust, and, therefore, it is not necessary for the defendant to approach the Registrar of Public True and to have a finding on that question. The nature of the trust is apparent even from the plaintiff's own allegation. Consequently, I am of opinion that the rule indicated by Bhutt J. will not be applicable to cases where the plaintiff himself alleges the trust to be a public trust and an objection about be tenability of the suit in the absence of registration of a public trust can a raised by a defendant in spite of the fact that he may not have obtained a finding of the Registrar of Public Trusts on the point. The learned counsel for the respondent urged that section 32 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951 being merely procedural, has retrospective effect to the extent of being applicable to pending proceedings. The bar provided by the section is against the hearing or deciding of suits, and not against institution. As laid down by Rao J. in Jiwan Bodh Deity v. Keeheorao (2), the proper procedure in such cases is not to dismiss the suit, but to stay it in order to enable the party to get the Public Trust registered. However, where the plaintiff does not admit the trust to be a public trust, the defendant cannot be permitted to raise the question without having taken up the matter with the Registrar of Public Trusts, as laid down by Bhutt C.J. in Kaliji Deity v. Ramnihora (1). But, where the plaintiff himself alleges the trust to be a Public Trust, the course suggested by Rao J. is to be adopted. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that section 32 of the Act cannot be construed to have retrospective effect so as to apply to pending cases. In this connections attention was invited to a Division Bench case of this Court in Mohd. Ishag v. Registrar of Public Trust (3) decided by Shrivastava and Pandey JJ. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that section 32 of the Act cannot be construed to have retrospective effect so as to apply to pending cases. In this connections attention was invited to a Division Bench case of this Court in Mohd. Ishag v. Registrar of Public Trust (3) decided by Shrivastava and Pandey JJ. wherein it was held that the provisions of section 14 of the M.P. Public Trust Act, 1951 hare no retrospective operation so as to affect a sale of trust property made before the Act came into force. Section 14 of the Act prescribes that subject to any direction in the instrument of trust or any direction given under this or any other law by any Court, no sale, mortgage, exchange or gift of any immovable property and no lease for a period exceeding 7 years in the case of agricultural land, or any period exceeding three years in the case of non-agricultural land or building belonging to a Public Trust is to be valid without previous sanction of the Registrar. The question in that case was whether the trustees were required to obtain the sanction of the Registrar in respect of a sale effected before the Act came into force. There can be no doubt that the provisions of the Act cannot be construed to have a retrospective operation, so as to affect vested rights already accrued prior to the Act. Therefore, a sale effected prior to the Act could not be held to be invalid for want of sanction of the Registrar. To that extent I am certainly in agreement with the view of the learned Judges of the Division Bench that section 14 of the Act has no retrospective operation. At this stage it is not necessary for me to examine the other provisions of the Act. But, so far as section 32 of the Act is concerned, it does not affect any vested right accrued prior to the date when the Act came into force. The bar is not against institution of a suit, or the filing of an appeal. The bar is only against the hearing of the suit or appeal and deciding the same. From this point of view, there can be no doubt that section 32 of the Act is applicable to pending appeals. The bar is not against institution of a suit, or the filing of an appeal. The bar is only against the hearing of the suit or appeal and deciding the same. From this point of view, there can be no doubt that section 32 of the Act is applicable to pending appeals. Therefore, I am of opinion that the decision of the appeal on merits will have to be stayed to enable the appellant to get the Trust registered as a Public Trust. To conclude, I am of opinion that the present appeal is to be adjourned in order to enable the appellant to get the Trust registered as a Public Trust tinder the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 till such time as the appellant files a certified copy of the order of registration. The present appeal be put up for further hearing after that. The question of costs regarding the preliminary objection raised by the respondent will be considered at the time of final hearing.