JUDGMENT 1. This Rule originally came up before our learned brother Banerjee, J. sitting singly, on June 21, 1961, when, by his following order of that date, it was referred to the Division Bench: "the point raised in this Rule is that an order, made under Rule 47 of Chapter XXI, Part III, volume 1, of the Manual of the Court of Small Causes. Calcutta, is not revisable by way of a new trial under section 38 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. The point, in my opinion, is of sufficient importance to be decided by a Division Bench of this Court. I, accordingly, refer this case to the Division Bench. " In the view, however, which we are taking, it will not be necessary to go into the broad and difficult question, formulated above, as the Rule, in our opinion, may well succeed on a shorter and simpler ground. 2. The instant proceeding started on an application under Rule 47 of Chapter XXI, Part III, Volume 1, of the Manual of Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, providing for investigation of claims and objections to attachment of property. It was registered as a suit under the relevant rule [vide Rule 8 (2), Chapter VIII, Part IV, Volume II of the aforesaid Manual] and according to the prevailing practice of the Presidency Small Cause Court, Calcutta. The suit was eventually dismissed by the learned trial Judge, but, thereafter, the unsuccessful plaintiff applied before the Full Bench of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, under section 38 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, for a new trial and the learned Judges, constituting the said Full Bench, having taken the view that the learned trial Judge had erred grievously on a material question of fact, reversed his decision and decreed the plaintiff's suit. It is the propriety of this Full Bench decision, which is challenged in this Rule. The facts, leading to the present proceeding are as follows: The present petitioner obtained a decree against one Ramu Singh in S. C. C. suit No, 1743 of 1958 of the Presidency Small Cause Court, Calcutta. It is the propriety of this Full Bench decision, which is challenged in this Rule. The facts, leading to the present proceeding are as follows: The present petitioner obtained a decree against one Ramu Singh in S. C. C. suit No, 1743 of 1958 of the Presidency Small Cause Court, Calcutta. In execution of that decree he attached an iron-safe on April 6, 1960, which was claimed by the present opposite party Ambika Prasad Singh (nephew of the judgment-debtor Ramu Singh) as his own and which was located in a room, where according to this opposite party, he was carrying on business under the name and style of Messrs. Ambika Prosad Chotelal. According to the petitioner, that business was the business of his judgment-debtor Ramu Singh, to whom the attached iron-safe belonged. The learned trial Judge, upon the evidence before him, came to the conclusion that the iron safe in question belonged to Ramu Singh and that it was in his possession at the time of the above attachment. Upon that view, he dismissed the opposite party's suit. The learned Judges of the Full Bench, on the other hand, were of the opinion that, on the evidence before the court, the iron-safe in question must be held to be the property of the opposite party and that it was in his possession on the date of the above attachment, namely, April 6, 1960, and, upon that view, they decreed the opposite party's suit. 3. It is plain, therefore, that the two courts below have taken two different views on the question of title and possession of the attached iron-safe on the date of attachment, namely, April 6, 1960, which question, in the instant case, depends entirely on facts. The point thus arises as to whether the Full Bench had jurisdiction to reverse the learned trial Judge on a pure question of fact, namely, as to the ownership and possession of the attached iron-safe on the date of attachment. The decisions on this point are somewhat conflicting but the preponderance of view seems to be in favour of the petitioner to the effect that, on a question of fact, the Full Bench, under section 38, has no jurisdiction to differ from the learned trial Judge. The decisions on this point are somewhat conflicting but the preponderance of view seems to be in favour of the petitioner to the effect that, on a question of fact, the Full Bench, under section 38, has no jurisdiction to differ from the learned trial Judge. Prima facie, then, this Rule should succeed, the decree of the Full Bench should be set aside and the learned trial Judge's decision should be restored but, before we do so a few observations are necessary. 4. The instant proceeding is one under Rule 47. The scope of such a proceeding, or, rather, of the enquiry, to be made in it is somewhat limited. It is to determine the factum and character of possession of the attached property on the date of attachment whether, on that date, the said property was in the claimant's possession and, if so, whether that possession was on his own account or as of his own property or on account of or in trust for the judgment-debtor. The latter part of this determination, however, may often involve consideration of a question of title or benami and if, as in instant case, this consideration does not require any detailed investigation into facts or into any complicated question of title, it is hardly proper to exclude it from the scope and purview of a claim proceeding. The primary emphasis should, of course, be on 'possession' but its true character may often depend on the question of title or benami and, without determination of this latter question, a proper finding as to whether the claimant's possession is on his own behalf or on behalf of the judgment debtor may not be possible. In a claim proceeding, such finding would necessarily be incidental, that is, for and by way of assisting a proper appreciation of the true character of the claimant's possession,-and this is particularly so, when it is expressly made subject to the result of a suit (vide rule 52 of the above Chapter XXI corresponding to Order 21, rule 63 of the Code)-and this limited enquiry into the question of title or benami should not be ruled out except where it requires a detailed investigation into facts or raises any complicated question of title. Authorities on this point are not apparently uniform and, in some of them, the statement of the law is too wide but the apparent inconsistencies will largely disappear if they are examined from the proper perspective and due emphasis is laid on possession, to wit, its factum and character, and the role of title is kept within proper limits. Indeed, in these proceedings, it is as much wrong to relegate the question of possession in the background and decide the case on an abstract question of title as it is to ignore altogether the impact of title on the character of the particular possession and decide the matter merely on the factum of possession That, indeed, would be ignoring the statute itself and its express words and cannot merit acceptance. 5. In the present case, the question of benami raises a simple issue. It depends entirely on facts, which lie within a short compass. The learned trial Judge was, therefore, right in going into this question of benami and the opposite party's argument to the contrary cannot be supported. Indeed, the Full Bench also discussed the question of benami and it is on this point that the learned trial Judge's decision was reversed by it. 6. The question of benami, however, is, in the instant case, a pure question of fact and, in that context, the basic question of the factum and character of the claimant's possession would also be a pure question of fact If, now, on this basic question of fact, the learned trial Judge has taken a particular view of the evidence before him,-and there is no error of law in the matter,-it is not open to the Full Bench under section 38 of the Act to go against that finding and reverse the learned trial Judge's decision, and. particularly, when, as, in the instant case, on the evidence on record, either view appears to be plausible on that question of fact, the learned Judges, constituting the Full Bench, should not have interfered with the decision of the learned trial Judge on the point. We would, accordingly, make this Rule absolute, set aside the decision of the learned court below, namely, of the Full Bench of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, and restore that of the trial Court. There will be no order as to costs in this Rule. We would, accordingly, make this Rule absolute, set aside the decision of the learned court below, namely, of the Full Bench of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, and restore that of the trial Court. There will be no order as to costs in this Rule. In the view, we have taken, it is not necessary to decide the more fundamental question whether a proceeding under the above Rule 47 is, in law, a suit, so as to attract, at all the provisions of Sec. 38 of the Act. That point, on the statute and the Rules, as they stand now, is not altogether free from difficulty and we prefer to defer its consideration to a more suitable occasion, when such consideration will be necessary for deciding the matter at issue.