JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai, J. 1. This appeal was preferred by the first defendant, the karnavan of Kalliatt tarwad against a preliminary decree for partition of its assets. One of his contentions in the suit was, that some of the properties in B schedule of the plaint belonged to five private devaswoms which are owned by the tarwad and of which he, as the karnavan was the ooralan, and that they are not partible. This contention was repelled by the Subordinate Judge at Tellicherry by whom the suit was tried. In this appeal, the first defendant had reiterated this contention. On his death his widow and children were impleaded as additional appellants 2 to 12. Afterwards, the 122nd defendant who had been impleaded in this appeal as the 121st respondent and who was next in succession to the karnavan-ship and who claimed to be the next ooralan, applied to be transposed as an appellant to enable him to press the contention of the first defendant as to the partibility of the aforesaid properties. The transposition has been ordered by us on C. M. P. 4814 of 1959 and he has been impleaded as the additional 13th appellant. His learned counsel pressed this appeal only with regard to the partibility of these properties. 2. The devaswoms claimed by the 1st defendant to belong to the tarwad are, Kalliatt, Mamanikunnu, Perummanna, Varayilkavu and Kavinisseri. The learned counsel for the 13th appellant did not press his case with regard to the properties claimed to belong to the last two of these devaswoms, which may therefore be left out of account. Of the others, the most important is the Kalliatt devaswom; most of its properties were stated to have been obtained by it or on its behalf under various documents of acquisition. The first defendant had specified the items of properties as belonging to the devaswom in paragraphs 27 and 28 of his written statement. By I. A. 3520 of 1951, the first defendant applied for the amendment of paragraph 27 by the inclusion of other properties also as belonging to the devaswom and this was ordered. We called for the original of the above application and the order thereon and have perused the same. By I. A. 3520 of 1951, the first defendant applied for the amendment of paragraph 27 by the inclusion of other properties also as belonging to the devaswom and this was ordered. We called for the original of the above application and the order thereon and have perused the same. We are satisfied, that the effect of the amendment was to include the additional properties also, as those claimed by him to belong to the devaswom, though, as seen from the original written statement in Malayalam and the printed written statement in English, the amendment is incorporated in the wrong place in paragraph 27. It has to be taken, that the claim of the first defendant extends also to the additional properties so included. It was brought to our notice at the hearing, that the documents of acquisition relied on for the 13th appellant might take in more properties than had been claimed by the first defendant himself; on this, we hold that the 13th appellant standing in the shoes of the first defendant cannot be permitted to claim any property in addition to what had been claimed in paragraph 27 as amended and in paragraph 28 of the first defendant's written statement. It may be mentioned, that though the properties covered by the documents of acquisition have been specified by the first defendant in his evidence with reference to the plaint schedule and had been noted by the learned Judge in his judgment, in the view which the learned Judge took on the merits of this controversy, it did not become necessary for him to determine whether the items in the documents corresponded to the items mentioned in the plaint schedule. In considering these documents, we propose to refer to the items mentioned in them ; if at a later stage of the proceedings in the Court below, the parties are at variance as to the identity of the properties covered by these documents with the items specified in the schedule of the plaint, it shall be open to the Court at the time of passing the final decree to specify the items in the plaint schedule in terms of the finding which are being recorded in this judgment. With these observations we shall now proceed to consider the documents as far as possible in their chronological order. 3. Ext. With these observations we shall now proceed to consider the documents as far as possible in their chronological order. 3. Ext. B61 dated December 3, 1877, is an Otti in favour of Kalliatt Kammaran Nambiar described as the ooralan of Kalliatt devaswom for a sum of Rs. 1000/-. It stated specifically, that the Otti was being granted to the devaswom and that the mortgage amount belonged to it and the devaswom was directed to pay the dues periodically to the jenmi. Clearly this was an acquisition for and on behalf of the devaswom ; it is said to relate to five items of the suit properties. Ext. B62 dated May 13, 1885 is an assignment of jenmom right to Kammaran Nambiar described as ooralan of Kalliatt devaswom. It recited prior possession with Kammaran Nambiar on kanom and kuzhikanom for Rs. 40/-. A payment of Rs. 150/- was made to the vendor on the date of the document which was for a consolidated sum of Rs. 190/-. The document having been taken by Kammaran Nambiar as Ooralan and the prior right having become merged in the larger right acquired, we hold that this acquisition including the prior right enured to Kalliatt devaswom. 4. In order of date is Ext. B 106 dated August 4, 1904, which was a sale deed executed by one Manian Namboodiri and others to Narayanan Nambiar described as Ooralan and udama of Kalliatt devaswom for a consideration of Rs. 10,500/-. It recited that Kammaran Nambiar, the predecessor of Narayanan Nambiar had obtained a kanom in the year 1887 with a stipulation to redeem a kanom of the year 1876 in favour of one Moosan and others and a sum of Rs. 7,500 was set apart for that purpose. The sale consideration of Rs. 10,500/- was exclusive of this and was made up of an adjustment of Rs 3,450/- and a cash payment of Rs. 7,050/-. It is quite clear, that the prior right of Rs. 7,500/- was set apart and the only right which the devaswom acquired under Ext. B106 was the jenmom right for Rs. 10,500/-; the operative part of the document stated that the sale was in favour of Kalliatt devaswom. After this, Chathukutty Nambiar, who was the karnavan of Kalliatt tarwad and the manager of Kalliatt devaswom describing himself as such, sued to redeem Moosan's kanom. B106 was the jenmom right for Rs. 10,500/-; the operative part of the document stated that the sale was in favour of Kalliatt devaswom. After this, Chathukutty Nambiar, who was the karnavan of Kalliatt tarwad and the manager of Kalliatt devaswom describing himself as such, sued to redeem Moosan's kanom. Moosan and others in their turn, instituted a suit for exercising their right of pre emption against Chathukutty Nambiar. These suits were compromised between the parties by the execution of a deed of surrender, Ext. B192, dated June 13, 1917, by Moosan and others in favour of Chathukutty Nambiar, by which he surrendered some of the properties covered by the kanom, except a few which were allowed to him, expressly and in favour of Kalliat tarwad. There is a statement in Ext. B 192, that the right under Ext. B106 belonged to the tarwad; this cannot go against the specific provision in Ext. B106. Ext. B192 also confirms the priorright of the tarwad. Ext. B103 is the compromise petition dated July 19, 1917, for recording the adjustment and for the suit instituted by Chathukutty Nambiar being dismissed, and it was ordered accordingly by Ext B 104 of the same date. The averment in Ext. B105, the plaint in that suit, that the jenmom right belonged to the devaswom can only relate to the right acquired under Ext. B106. If the properties given over to Moosan and others under Ext. B192 relate to the suit properties they have to be excluded from the scope of the partition. 5. Ext. B 65 dated February 10, 1908, is the next document of acquisition, being a sale deed by one Chaladath tarwad to Narayanan Nambiar of Kalliatt tarwad, who was described both as karnavan of the tarwad and Ooralan of Kallialt Devaswom. It was for items 1 to 6 and one-half of items 7 to 15 in that document, for a total consideration of Rs. 26,540/- There had been an earlier mortgage under Ext. B60 of the year 1872 in favour of one Kammaran Nambiar for a sum of Rs. 6,980/-; It recited earlier documents taken by a prior karnavan of the tarwad and by Kammaran Nambiar and consolidating all these, including Ext. B60, the sale deed, Ext. B65 recited the prior Otti and puramkadaom rights in favour of Kalliatt tarwad at Rs. B60 of the year 1872 in favour of one Kammaran Nambiar for a sum of Rs. 6,980/-; It recited earlier documents taken by a prior karnavan of the tarwad and by Kammaran Nambiar and consolidating all these, including Ext. B60, the sale deed, Ext. B65 recited the prior Otti and puramkadaom rights in favour of Kalliatt tarwad at Rs. 11,876/- It may be mentioned here, that items 1 to 9 of Ext. B60 corresponded to items 7 to 15 in Ext. B65. Whatever construction is possible on the terms and provisions of Ext. B60 and whatever ambiguity may arise therefrom, must be deemed to have been superseded and cleared by Ext. B65, by which the prior Otti and puramkadam right of the tarwad was settled at Rs. 11,876/-. The operative part of Ext. B65, that Kalliatt devaswom may enjoy the properties conveyed on jenmom must be understood subject to the above right and to relate only to items 1 to 4 on full right and to the equity of redemption over items 5 and 6 and one-half of items 7 to 15 in that document. 6. Ext. B108 dated March 31, 1914, is a sale deed by Manian Namboodiri and others, for 51 items of properties for Rs. 1,550/-in favour of Chathukutty Nambiar described as tarwad manager and Ooralan of Kalliatt devaswom. It recited that some of the items were in the vendor's possession, but that others were outstanding on kanom with tenants. Chathukutty Nambiar was directed to collect purapad from the tenants for Kalliatt devaswom and the properties were to be enjoyed by him for Kalliatt devaswom. The recital in a subsequent deed of surrender Ext. B195, taken by Chathukutty Nambiar describing himself as karnavan, cannot negative the right of the devaswom under Ext. B108. 7. Ext. B107 dated June 21, 1914 is a jenmom assignment by Manian Namboodiri and others to Chathukutty Nambiar for a consideration of Rs. 3,850/-, Chathukutty Nambiar being described, both as karnavan of the tarwad and Ooralan of the devaswom. There was no prior right in favour of the tarwad and certain amounts were reserved with the vendee to redeem earlier kanoms, the balance being paid in cash to the vendor. It expressly provided, that the transfer was to Chathukutty Nambiar; the prior marupat for one item was in favour of the tarwad. There was no prior right in favour of the tarwad and certain amounts were reserved with the vendee to redeem earlier kanoms, the balance being paid in cash to the vendor. It expressly provided, that the transfer was to Chathukutty Nambiar; the prior marupat for one item was in favour of the tarwad. The description of Chathukutty Nambiar as Ooralan is not conclusive, for he was also described as karnavan. We hold that Ext. B 108 was in favour of the tarwad. 8. Certain 'A' form registers were relied on for the 13th appellant and they can be used only to the extent, that they support the above conclusions; standing by themselves they are not sufficient. So far as the Mamanikunnu and Perummanna Devaswoms are concerned, the learned counsel has relied only on 'A' form registers. The fact that some properties may stand in these registers in the names of the devaswoms, is not conclusive, that they were acquired for the devaswoms or that they were so dedicated. It cannot be stated under what circumstances these came to be entered in the names of the devaswoms in these registers. The 13th appellant has not satisfied us, that the finding of the lower Court that such items belonged to the tarwad and are partible, is erroneous. Even the entries in the 'A' registers have not been satisfactorily identified with reference to the specific items in the plaint schedule. On these grounds we hold, that the claims made on behalf of these devaswoms has not been established. As a result of the examination of the various documents so far, certain items of properties or rights in them, have to be adjudged to belong to the Kalliatt devaswom. 9. The learned Judge has however held, that there is no proof of dedication in favour of the devaswom, as the funds for the acquisition must be deemed to have proceeded from the tarwad and as the tarwad had certain prior rights, and that subsequently there had been intermingling of tarwad and devaswom funds. That a hindu idol is a juridical person capable of holding property is a proposition that is well settled. Of course.it is only in an ideal sense that a property can be said to belong to an idol and the possession and management of it must naturally be left to a human agency. That a hindu idol is a juridical person capable of holding property is a proposition that is well settled. Of course.it is only in an ideal sense that a property can be said to belong to an idol and the possession and management of it must naturally be left to a human agency. The Judicial Committee summed up as follows the legal principles involved in Pramath Nath Mullick v Pradeyumna Kumar Mullick (52 Indian Appeals 245): "A Hindu idol is, according to long established authority, founded upon the religious customs of the Hindus, and the recognition thereof by Courts of law, a 'juristic entity'. It has a juridical status with the power of suing and being sued. Its interests are attended to by the person who has the deity in his charge and who is in law its manager with all the powers which would, in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to the manager of the estate of an infant heir. It is unnecessary to quote the authorities ; for this doctrine, thus simply stated is fairly established." If the devaswom or the idol holds property as a juristic entity it must follow in the absence of a benami theory, that an acquisition made for or on behalf of such juristic entity must belong to it. Even if the tarwad had contributed funds, the acquisition by itself is sufficient to spell dedication or to afford strongest evidence of dedication. The existence of prior rights in favour of the tarwad is in itself no bar to the acquisition or dedication of other rights; where the prior rights have not merged in the later rights acquired, the acquisition is to be confined to the later rights only. The subsequent intermingling of funds, if true, may perhaps spell in the region of breach of trust, though in the present case we have no materials to hold that the karnavans from time to time had been guilty of breach of trust, merely on account of, the maintenance of a common rent roll, or of a common account, or of the issuance of common receipts. These are not sufficient to efface the title of the devaswoms under the documents referred to above. 10. The result is, that the only properties which have to be excluded as belonging to Kalliatt devaswom are, those covered by Exts. B61, B62, B108, the properties under Ext. These are not sufficient to efface the title of the devaswoms under the documents referred to above. 10. The result is, that the only properties which have to be excluded as belonging to Kalliatt devaswom are, those covered by Exts. B61, B62, B108, the properties under Ext. B106, except those given up under Ext. B192 and subject 10 the prior rights of the tarwad as stated above and the properties being items 1 to 4 in Ext. B 65, the equity of redemption of items 5, 6 and one-half of items 7 to 15 in Ext. B65, subject to the mortgage right of the tarwad for Rs. 11,876/-inclusive of the right under Ext. B60. The rights of the tarwad under Ext. B192 and the mortgage right over items 5, 6 and one-half of items 7 to 15 in Ext. B65, as also the properties in Ext. B107, must be held to belong to the tarwad and to be partible. These are already included as such in the preliminary decree. The properties claimed for the other devaswoms are hereby negatived. 11. The next question is, whether the properties of Kalliatt devaswom can be divided in the suit. Under the English Law, the beneficiaries of a private trust, if they are sui juris and of one mind, may at their option modify or put an end to the trust. As pointed out by Mukherjea, one point which is still debatable in Hindu Law, is whether this principle can be applied to a private or family Debutter (Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust, page 192). In Konwar Doorganath Roy v Ram Chunder Sen (4 Indian Appeals 52) the Privy Council made the following observations : "if the deed of endowment from Rajah Mahanand were satisfactorily proved, and it were an endowment which dedicated this Mahal to the service and worship of a particular idol, then, though the idol were a family idol, the property would be impressed with a trust in favour of it. Where the temple is a public temple, the dedication may be such that the family itself could not put an end to it; but in the case of a family idol the consensus of the whole family might give the estate another direction. No question, however, of that kind arises in the present case." This obiter dictum came for strong criticism in this country. No question, however, of that kind arises in the present case." This obiter dictum came for strong criticism in this country. In Surendra Krishna Roy v Shree Shree Iswar Bhubaneshwari Thakurani (ILR 60 Calcutta 54) Sir George Rankin said : "I am not prepared to hold on the strength of the well known passages in Konwar Doorganath Roy's case that there is in Hindu law any warrant for the proposition that at any particular time by consent of all the parties then interested in the endowment a dedication can be set aside. The passage so much relied upon does not appear to me to be intended as a considered opinion to that effect, and before importing any such doctrine into Hindu law there is much to be considered." This case went up to the Privy Council. But the Board in its decision in Sri Sri Iswari Bhubaneshwari Thakurani v. Brojonath Dey (64 Indian Appeals 203) however left the question undecided. 12. We are in respectful agreement with all that has been said by Sir George Rankin in Surendra Krishna Roy's case and would hold, that if there was a valid dedication in favour of the devaswoms concerned, even an unanimous decision among the members of tarwad -- whether before or after a severance of status -- for the termination of the private trust will be of no avail. The observations of the Privy Council in Konwar Doorganatha Roy's case were essentially based on the concepts of English Law regarding the rights of beneficiaries in a private trust. It has to be noted, that under that law there can be no charitable trust for the benefit of particular individuals or members of a particular family, and that a trust for the establishment of a private chapel, for example, will not be a charity in the legal sense of the word, and will be hit by the rules against perpetuity and remoteness. 13. We therefore hold, that the properties or rights now adjudged to belong to the Kalliatt devaswom cannot be partitioned in this suit between the members of the tarwad. It only remains to observe, that the learned Judge has made a reservation in the judgment, that adequate provisions will be made for the maintenance of devaswoms belonging to the tarwad. This direction must stand so far as the devaswoms other than the Kalliat devaswom are concerned. It only remains to observe, that the learned Judge has made a reservation in the judgment, that adequate provisions will be made for the maintenance of devaswoms belonging to the tarwad. This direction must stand so far as the devaswoms other than the Kalliat devaswom are concerned. As for Kalliatt devaswom, we have held that certain properties or rights belong to it. Whether they are sufficient for the maintenance of that devaswom is more than we can say; if they are not, it will be open to the lower Court at the time of passing the final decree to make suitable provisions as in the case of the other devaswoms but to the extent necessary keeping in view the properties or rights now adjudged I to belong to it. The directions made above as regards the identification of the various items of properties comprised in the documents with those in the plaint schedule will be given effect to, at the time of passing the final decree. The appellants 2 to 12 will be entitled to the share of the first defendant. The costs of the contesting parties to this appeal will come out of the estate.