JUDGMENT M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. The suit out of which this Second Appeal arose was one in partition. The suit property as is found concurrently by the courts below belonged to Biyyathumma, the grandmother of the plaintiff. Moideen and Ahmad were her sons and Kunhambi, Kunhamina, Kathiya and the 17th defendant her daughters. This Second Appeal is concerned only with Moideen's share in the property. Claiming the property to have belonged to his late father, Moideen assigned his share therein on February 25,1901, while Biyyathumma was alive, to a stranger Avulla under Ext. B4; and on May 6, 1905 Avulla transferred the same, under Ext. B5, to Aharaad. Subsequently after Biyyathumma's death Moideen, as her heir, transferred his share in the property to the 18th defendant, his son, as per Ext. B19. As the property really belonged to Biyyathumma, Exts. B4 and B5 were incapable of conveying any rights in the property unless puffed up with title under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not surprising, therefore, that Ahmad claimed the benefit of the said Section 43 to support his rights to the suit property. It is admitted, on both sides, that unless Section 43 is attracted to fill up title under Exts. B4 and B5, Ahmad, or his legal representatives the defendants 1 to 6, will have no title to Moideen's share, and that if Section 43 is attracted the title has necessarily to be found with them. So the only question that arises for consideration in this Second Appeal is the applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act to the transaction covered by Exts. B4 and B5. 2. Till recently, the view that had held the field was that if the transferee was in the know of the real facts, that is to say, of the defect in the title of the transferor he could not claim the benefit of section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. Mulla, in his Commentary on the Transfer of Property Act, summarises the position thus: "The section does not expressly provide that the transferee should have been misled by erroneous representation, but, as said in Mulraj v. Inder Singh, the word "represents" clearly shows that the person in whose favour the equity is allowed to operate, must have acted on the representation. This has been settled by numerous decisions" Needless to say this was a judicial interpolation in the expression of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. The only three conditions that are laid down in Section 43 for entitling the transferee to the exercise of the option mentioned in the Section are: (1) The transferor should have made a fraudulent or erroneous representation that he is authorised to transfer the immovable property involved in the transfer, (2) The transfer should be for (valuable) consideration, and (3) There should not be another transferee "in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the option". No fourth requirement for the attraction of Section 43 finds a place in the Section. I am happy to find that this has been the view held recently by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Parma Nand v. Champa Lal ( AIR 1956 All. 225 ) and followed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Veeraswami v. D. V. Subbarao (AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 288). It is not disputed that Ext. B4 was a transaction for valuable consideration, in which Moideen professed to have authority to transfer property as the heir of his father, that it was an erroneous representation on his part and that Moideen got a real title to a share in the property on the death of his mother Biyyathumma. The conditions of applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act are therefore, present in Ext. B4. The transaction under Ext. B4 not having been so far repudiated by the transferee the option under the section was available to him when he advanced it in this case before the court of first instance. He had thus exercised his option and thereby perfected his title to the property by the after-acquired title of his transferor. As the learned Subordinate Judge has found that Ext. B19, the conveyance from Moideen to the 18th defendant, was not supported by valuable consideration, which finding, being one of fact, cannot be challenged in this Second Appeal, the exception in the second paragraph of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act does not arise for consideration in this case. It follows therefore that the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge is correct. 3. The Second Appeal fails, and is dismissed. It follows therefore that the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge is correct. 3. The Second Appeal fails, and is dismissed. As both parties have advanced untenable contentions in the suit, and in view of their close kinship, they are directed to suffer their costs throughout.