JUDGMENT Newashar, J. This is an appeal preferred on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant u/s 40(a) of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act) against the order purporting to be one under Order 9, rule 8, CPC dismissing the suit filed by him u/s 10 of the Act for default. The circumstances material for the consideration of the points raised in this appeal are as follows. The appellant, who is a minor and who prosecuted these proceedings through his next friend Mr. K.M. Satwani, Civil Judge, Amreli (erstwhile Bombay State), filed a petition u/s 10 of the Act in the Court of the District Judge, Ratlam since at the time of the institution of the petition on 16-12-1952 the District Judge of every District was constituted a Tribunal under the Act. Before that Tribunal the proceedings went on for some time. Written statement was filed, issues were framed and thereafter an application was submitted on behalf of the respondents to try certain issues as preliminary. At this stage a notification was issued by the Madhya Bharat Government in the Madbya Bharat Gazette dated 4-11-1951, in supersession of the earlier notification under which the District Judge of every District had been appointed the Tribunal u/s 4 of the Act, appointing Civil Judge, First Class, of every Revenue District to act as Tribunal instead. This notification became operative from 1-12-1954. Thereupon the District Judge, Ratlam who was dealing with this case directed its transfer to Civil Judge, First Class, Neemuch. On receipt of the record before the Civil Judge, First Class, Neemuch he passed an order on the 10th of January 1955 requiring the patties to appear before him on 20-1-1955. Before the service of this notice, it appears, the appellant's next friend Mr. Satwani submitted a letter of request dated 23-12-1954 to the effect that unless there was any objection the intimation of the date which the Tribunal would be pleased to fix might be given to him at his place at Palanpur (North Gujarat) whore he had been posted and. that he might be given 15 days time in order to adjust his work. Pursuant to this letter of request the Tribunal sent a letter dated 31-12-1954 informing him that the date of hearing was 20-1-1955. that he might be given 15 days time in order to adjust his work. Pursuant to this letter of request the Tribunal sent a letter dated 31-12-1954 informing him that the date of hearing was 20-1-1955. On 12-1-1955 the next friend sent another letter requesting postponement of the date to another date on the ground that his uncle had died on 11-1-1955 and that he would be required to perform his Shradha ceremony. A self-addressed envelope was sent along with this letter and a request was made that he might be given intimation of the adjourned date. In the letter the next friend expressed his willingness to affix stamp on this letter of request if required as for an application on his appearance on the adjourned date. The learned Civil Judge, Neemuch directed this letter to be pub up before him on the date of hearing. On 20-1-1955 when the matter was placed for consideration the learned Judge treated the application as involving admission of the next friend that he had received intimation of the date fixed and without alluding to circumstances on the basis of which the next friend was required to request for adjournment and without even sending any reply to the same refusing adjournment dismissed the petition for default under Order 9, rule 8, Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Satwani who probably might have been under an impression that the case had been adjourned sent another post-card on 28-1-1965 requesting for information as to the adjourned date. A letter dated 8-2-1955 was again sent by him requesting for information as to what happened on 20-1-1955. It seems intimation of the dismissal of the suit was given to the next friend by means of a letter dated 17-2-1955. When exactly that was posted and reached the next friend is not clear. But he submitted an application for restoration and at the same time filed the present petition an a revision petition which later was directed to be converted into an appeal u/s 40(a) of the Act by my brother Dixit J. (as he then was). The occasion for such conversion arose when the question as to competency of the revision was considered by the learned Judge. The occasion for such conversion arose when the question as to competency of the revision was considered by the learned Judge. Section 40 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951, that came in for consideration in that connection is as follows:- Save as otherwise provided in section 41, an appeal shall lie from- (a) any final decree or order of the Tribunal, or (b) any order made in the course of execution of any decree or order of the Tribunal, which if passed in the course of execution of a decree or order of a civil Court would be appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1008, to the High Court within the limits of whose jurisdiction the Tribunal is situate. It is clear from the terms of this section that an appeal is contemplated against:- (1) a decree (final decree), or (2) final order, or (3) an order in the course of execution of any decree or order. Now a final order may mean any order which has the effect of terminating the proceeding in question so far as the Tribunal is concerned apart from any consideration as to remedy available against such order. In that sense an order dismissing the application for default is a final order since it brings to an end the proceeding before the Tribunal. The fact that such dismissal is liable to be set aside by means of an application under Order 9, rule 9, is concerned cannot detract from such order its finality. An appeal is, therefore, no doubt competent. This is also the view taken by the learned Judge who refused to entertain a revision application and directed its conversion into an appeal. Mr. U. M. Trivedi for the respondents contended that since an application to the very Court is competent the order of dismissal is not a final order. In my opinion the contention of the respondents is not correct. The order can nevertheless be a final order even if a remedy may lie to the very Court for setting it aside. The finality does not depend upon the consideration whether the order is liable to be set aside by the very Court or not. It depends, upon the nature of the order and its effect upon the proceeding or any part of the proceeding as also upon the question whether the rights of the parties are determined thereby. The finality does not depend upon the consideration whether the order is liable to be set aside by the very Court or not. It depends, upon the nature of the order and its effect upon the proceeding or any part of the proceeding as also upon the question whether the rights of the parties are determined thereby. If we are to accept the proposition that an order is not final in case there is a remedy available at law to the very Court which passed (he order then in all cases where it is competent to apply for review the order will not be final. The term final order appears in section 109, CPC which provides for appeals to Supreme Court. It was held in AIR 1933 58 (Privy Council) :- The finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. If, after the order, the suit is still a live suit in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined no appeal lies against it u/s 109(a) of the Code. In Mohmood Hasan v. Government of V.P. AIR 1950 All. 457 the High Court of Allahabad considered the question whether the order refusing to restore an appeal dismissed for default is a final order. It was held to be final following the tests laid down in Bozson v, Altrincham Urban District Council (1903) 1 K B 547, as also the decisions reported in its earlier case reported in Krishna Kant v. Lal Amarnath AIR 1937 All. 560 and M.A. Janaki Vs. M.A. Srirangammal, . The ratio of all these oases is that the order dismissing a suit for default is a final order because it is not interlocutory in the sense that it leaves nothing further to be done in the proceedings in suit and it determines the rights of the parties in the suit by its own force though such determination may not be on merits. Under the CPC such order of dismissal is not appealable but that is not a relevant consideration. Now as regards merits two points are raised:- (1) The Civil Judge First Class, Neemuch has no jurisdiction to try the case as he is not the Civil Judge First Class of the Revenue District. (2) The order of dismissal for default under the circumstances is erroneous in law and also unjust. Now as regards merits two points are raised:- (1) The Civil Judge First Class, Neemuch has no jurisdiction to try the case as he is not the Civil Judge First Class of the Revenue District. (2) The order of dismissal for default under the circumstances is erroneous in law and also unjust. As regards the first contention I do not think it has any force. No. doubt by a notification issued by the Madhya Bharat Government dated 4tb November 1954, the jurisdiction, which had been conferred upon every District Judge in Madhya Bharat to act as a Tribunal u/s 4 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951, had been taken away and had been conferred upon Civil Judges of the Revenue Districts, yet that did not mean that such jurisdiction had been conferred merely upon those Civil Judges who are posted at the headquarters of a Revenue District. There is no justification far giving this limited meaning to the words 'Civil Judge First Class of every Revenue District'. The phrase does not mean anything else than that every Civil Judge First Class within the limits of his own territory and which is not beyond the limits of his Revenue District is to be the Tribunal u/s 4 of the Act. First contention raised by Mr. Chitale is, therefore, untenable. The next question is whether the order dismissing the suit for default is correct on merits. It is no doubt true that on 20-1-1955 when the case was called on for hearing Mr. Satwani was not present. But it cannot be said that, that was a date fixed for hearing. The case was originally before the District Judge, Ratlam. When the notification issued by the Madhya Bharat Government dated 4-11-1954 became operative from li~12-195? the learned District Judge who had lost jurisdiction over the case sent it to the Civil Judge, First Class, Neemuch who had been conferred jurisdiction to try the same. That Court on receipt of the record of the case passed an order on 10-1-1955 in the absence of the parties requiring their appearance on 20-1-1955. This order it seems was a routine order and was meant to give intimation to the parties that the ease had before received by the Civil Judge, First Class, Neemuch and for their appearance before him. On their appearance all that was intended to be done is to pass further orders. This order it seems was a routine order and was meant to give intimation to the parties that the ease had before received by the Civil Judge, First Class, Neemuch and for their appearance before him. On their appearance all that was intended to be done is to pass further orders. Although technically we may say that since the intimation is ordered to be given to the parties for appearance on 20-1-1955 this date can be called a date fixed for hearing yet we cannot lose sight of the fact that the subject of requiring appearance was not for hearing the easier on that date but was for passing further order as the issues had already been framed. In Sheikh Mohammad v. Liuhmina Kunwar AIR 1946 All. 606, it is held that; where a date had been fixed for ascertainment of the result of another case between the parties, the absence of the plaintiff on that date should not have resulted in the dismissal of the suit for default even though the Court had received intimation regarding the dismissal of that suit. This was held on the ground that the case should not be held to have been fixed for hearing. In Mg. Ahmin v. Mg. Saung AIR 1938 Rang. 360, the case was fixed for filling the list of witnesses. It was held that the fixture was not for hearing and powers under Order 9, rule 8, directing the dismissal of the suit was not proper. It was held that although the word 'hearing' as used in the order may not be confined to recording of evidence, it does not include such matters as are of routine nature and can be attended to by an officer of the Court. On the circumstances of the present case it may be doubtful whether the case can be called to have been fixed for 'hearing1 since all that was contemplated on appearance of the parties was to require them to file fresh lists of witnesses or pass orders on the application for additional preliminary issues of law sought for by the defendant in case the notice of the application was served upon the next friend of the plaintiff although the record does not show that it was so served. But even assuming that the case can technically be said to have been fixed for hearing on 20-1-1955 still under the circumstances of the case it was Dot a- proper exercise of discretionary power vested in the Court to dismiss the suit for default. The next friend of the minor plaintiff in this case was a Judicial Officer at Palanpur in North Gujarat and WAB required to accommodate the business of looking after the minor's interests in the case consistently with his duties in a Court particularly where he has to fix several cases for hearing. He had requested for an indulgence from the Court, on a point of convenience by a letter dated 23-12-1954 that he might be intimated the date which would be fixed before him a fortnight ahead so that it might be possible for him to adjust his work in the Court at Palanpur. Later there was an accidental circumstance namely the uncle of the next friend Shri Satwani died on 11-1-1955 and he was required to perform his Shradh ceremony. It was, therefore, not convenient for him to attend on 20-1-1955. He sent a letter of request in the form of an application offering to pay stamps, if required, on his appearance, asking for adjournment. The letter reached the office of the Court of the Civil Judge Neemuch on the 14th. The Court passed orders on it to be put up for consideration on the date fixed for hearing. When, therefore the case was taken up on 20th he should have judicially considered the application and having regard to the predicament in which the next friend was placed should have adjourned the case instead of dismissing it particularly when nothing further in the matter of hearing was to be done. He could even have taken up the application for framing additional preliminary issues, submitted by the defendants and could have passed orders ex parte thereon in case he was satisfied that notice of the application as directed by him was served upon the plaintiff. If it was not served be could at any rate have directed the parties to file their lists of evidence by a certain date. If it was not served be could at any rate have directed the parties to file their lists of evidence by a certain date. It is held by Hidayatullah J. of the Nagpur High Court (as he then was) in case reported: AIR 1948 55 (Nagpur) , that although no distinction is made between the case of a minor plaintiff and any other plaintiff so far as Order 9 is concerned yet where there is no indirect purpose in the failure of the next friend to be present at the hearing, in view of the fact that a minor is unable to protect his interests except through the agents, his case deserves to be treated more indulgently. In this case even an indulgence was not needed. All that was needed was sound exercise of discretionary power under Order 9, rule 8, Civil Procedure Code. The order of dismissal of the suit under the circumstances is unsustainable. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the plaintiff's suit is restored to file. It shall be proceeded with from the stage at which it was when the impugned order was passed. The appellant is entitled to costs of this appeal. Costs in the Court below will abide the final result. Krishnan, J. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed