JUDGMENT A.P. Srivastava, J. - This is a decree-holders' appeal. The circumstances in which it has arisen are these: Sahu Jagarnath had three sons - Sahu Ram Prasad, Sahu Chandi Prasad and Sahu Ram Swarup. Sahu Chandi Pd. died heirless. Smt. Basanti Devi is the widow of Sahu Ram Swarup. Ram Krishna is the son of Sahu Ram Pd. Sarvasri Niranjan Prakash, Ram Prakash, Hari Prakash, Prem Prakash and Jai Prakash are all sons of Sahu Ram Krishna. On an application being made by Ram Krishna and his minor sons under Section 10 of the Court of Wards Act, the Court of Wards took charge of their estate. The Court of Wards was also incharge of another estate belonging to Shri Sheo Shankar Lal, Shri Hari Shankar Lal, Shri Kundan Lal, Shri Anant Lal, Shri Suresh Chandra, Shri Naresh Chandra, Shri Ramesh Chandra and Shri Mahesh Chandra. This latter estate was in need of money. The Court of Wards acting on behalf of the former estate advanced money to the latter estate on the basis of a simple mortgage bond executed on the 8th of January, 1938. The amount advanced was Rs. 40,500. Subsequently Smt. Basanti Devi claimed the property which can be referred to as belonging to the estate of Sahu Ram Krishna and his sons on the ground that the property really belonged to her husband Sahu Ram Swarup and she had inherited it from him. A suit No. 7 of 1938 for possession over the properties of that estate was filed by Smt. Basanti Devi against Ram Krishna and his sons as well as the Court of Wards. That suit ended in a compromise. Smt. Rajeshwari Devi, daughter of Smt. Basanti Devi also joined that compromise. By that corn promise, a part of the estate which had been taken over by the Court of Wards as the estate of Ram Krishna and his sons was held to belong to Smt. Basanti Devi and her daughter and they got possession over some properties of that estate including the mortgage bond dated the 8th of January, 1938. On the basis of that mortgage bond, therefore, Smt. Basanti Devi and her daughter Smt. Rajeshwari Devi filed suit No. 4 of 1950 for recovery of Rs. 27,739-6-0 by the sale of the mortgage property. On the basis of that mortgage bond, therefore, Smt. Basanti Devi and her daughter Smt. Rajeshwari Devi filed suit No. 4 of 1950 for recovery of Rs. 27,739-6-0 by the sale of the mortgage property. The suit was filed against the Collector of Banda as manager, Court of Wards in charge of the estate of the mortgagors Sheo Shankar and others. The suit resulted in a decree. Subsequently the estate of the mortgagors was released by the Court of Wards. The property mortgaged which was sought to be sold in satisfaction of the mortgage debt was zamindari property. Zamindari having been abolished, the two decree-holders sought to proceed in the execution against the compensation amounts that became payable to the mortgagors as a result of the abolition of the zamindari. The mortgagors then put in an objection under Section 47 C.P.C. and claimed the benefit of the provisions of the U.P. Zamindar's Debt Reduction Act. Two objections were filed. One was on behalf of the two mortgagors Hari Shankar and Mukandi Lal and the other was on behalf of Sheo Shankar and others. The objection of Sheo Shankar and others raised other points also. But so far as the question of reduction of the debt under the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act was concerned, it had been raised in both the objections by the judgment-debtors. This point in the two objections was considered by the learned Civil and Sessions Judge in a single order dated the 30th of August, 1954. That order was to govern the objection of Sahu Sheo Shankar Lal and others also. No appeal appears to have been filed against the order in the objection of Sheo Shankar Lal and others. But the present appeal has been filed on behalf of the decree holders against the order in the objection of Hari Shankar Lal and Mukandi Lal. In the objection raised by the judgment-debtors, they claimed apportionment of their liability under Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindar's Debt Reduction Act and also claimed reduction of the amount of the debt. The latter request was opposed on behalf of the decree-holders on the ground that the debt in question was not a debt as defined in the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act and the provisions of that Act were, therefore, not applicable to it. 2. The latter request was opposed on behalf of the decree-holders on the ground that the debt in question was not a debt as defined in the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act and the provisions of that Act were, therefore, not applicable to it. 2. The learned Civil and Sessions Judge found that the necessary materials for apportionment had not been placed before him. He, therefore, postponed the question of apportionment for the time being. He, however, directed a reduction of the amount of the debt and rejected the petition of the decree-holders that the debt was not reduceable under the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act. Two contentions have been pressed on behalf of the decree-holders in support of the present appeal. The first is that the learned Civil and Sessions Judge was not justified in directing reduction without apportioning the liability. The second is that he was incorrect in his view that the debt in question was a `debt' within the definition of the term as given in the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act. On behalf of the respondents a preliminary objection was raised that as no appeal had been filed against the order allowing the objection of the other judgment-debtors Sheo Shankar Lal and others, the present appeal was incompetent. 3. The preliminary objection must, in our opinion, be overruled. The two objections were dealt with by the learned Civil and Sessions Judge by the same judgment and were disposed of by a single order. The fact that an appeal has not been filed in one of the two cases heard together cannot, therefore, affect the maintainability of the appeal in the other case. See Narhari v. Shankar, A.I.R. 1953 SC 419. 4. The first point raised on behalf of the decree-holders appears to be well founded. Under Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act, if the Act applies at all, it is necessary foe the Court first to apportion the liability of the various judgment-debtors and then to reduce the amount. As we read the section, it is not permissible to order any reduction without apportioning the liability. It was urged that it was not necessary to apportion the liability in all cases. But the word used in the section is `shall' which shows that the Court had no option. As we read the section, it is not permissible to order any reduction without apportioning the liability. It was urged that it was not necessary to apportion the liability in all cases. But the word used in the section is `shall' which shows that the Court had no option. If a request for apportionment is made the liability must be apportioned and then the question of reduction should be taken up. The learned Civil and Sessions Judge was, therefore, not justified in postponing the question of apportionment and directing reduction of the amount. 5. The more important question, however, is whether the Act applied at all to the debt in question. It is not disputed that the mortgagors were zamindars, that the debt was a secured debt and that the property offered as security for the debt was zamindari property. It is also not disputed that the debt was in substance an advance in cash. What the decree-holders contend is that the present transaction could not be considered to be a debt as defined in Cl. (1) of Section 2 of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act because it fell within Exception (vi) of that definition. Leaving out the words of the definition which are not relevant for our purposes, the definition reads: "2 (f) "debt" means an advance in cash or in kind and includes any transaction which is in substance a debt but does not include an advance as aforesaid made on or after the first day of July, 1952 or a debt due to........ (vi) a person, where the debt was advanced on his behalf by the Court of Wards to a ward." In the present case it is urged that the debt was an advance by the Court of Wards to persons who were wards of the Court of Wards. The decree-holders can, therefore, get advantage of the fact and on account of that fact the debt cannot be considered to be a debt for the purpose of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act. 6. The reply of the respondents, however, is that before the Exception clause could apply to the debt, it should have been shown that the debt was an advance on behalf of the decree-holders. Only in that case they could get advantage of the Exception clause and get the debt excluded from the purview of the definition. 6. The reply of the respondents, however, is that before the Exception clause could apply to the debt, it should have been shown that the debt was an advance on behalf of the decree-holders. Only in that case they could get advantage of the Exception clause and get the debt excluded from the purview of the definition. In the present case it is pointed out that the debt was certainly advanced by the Court of Wards to some of its wards but it was not advanced on behalf of the decree-holders. It was really advanced on behalf of Sahu Ram Krishna and his sons. The decree-holders, it is urged, are not claiming through Sahu Ram Krishna and his sons. They are claiming in their own right and as the Court of Wards never purported to advance the debt on their behalf Exception (vi) of sub-Cl. (f) of Section 2 cannot apply at all. We have looked into the mortgage bond on the basis of which the decree in question was passed. The Court of Wards purported to advance the money not on behalf of the present decree-holders but on behalf of the estate of Ram Krishna and his sons. It cannot, therefore, be said that the debt was advanced for or on behalf of the present decree-holders. 7. It is, however, urged on behalf of the decree-holders that the entire estate to which the money belonged and which the Court of Wards had taken over at the request of Sahu Ram Krishna and his sons under Section 10 of the Court of Wards Act did not really belong to those persons. The present decree-holders had also an interest in the estate. The title of the present decree-holders to a part of the estate was subsequently recognised when suit no. 7 of 1938 was filed. That suit resulted in a decree and in that decree the mortgage bond was allotted to the decree holders. The Court of Wards must in the circumstances be deemed to have made the advance on behalf of the decree-holders. The flaw in the argument appears to be that it overlooks the fact that the decree-holders are not claiming through Ram Krishna and his sons and that the Court of Wards was never in charge of the estate of the present decree-holders. The flaw in the argument appears to be that it overlooks the fact that the decree-holders are not claiming through Ram Krishna and his sons and that the Court of Wards was never in charge of the estate of the present decree-holders. Rightly or wrongly the Court of Wards had taken over the estate of Ram Krishna and his sons on the ground that the estate belonged to him and his sons. It was acting on behalf of Ram Krishna and his sons and not on behalf of anyone else. It may be that the decree-holders were also claiming a part of the estate and succeeded in establishing their claim in the subsequent suit. But from that it cannot be inferred that the Court of Wards advanced the money for them or on their behalf; nor can it be said that the decree-holders are successors-in-title of Sahu Ram Krishna and his sons. They claimed the mortgagee rights on the basis of the decree in which the mortgage bond was allotted to them. They cannot, therefore, say that the money was advanced on behalf of their predecessors-in-interests or predecessors-in-title. It is, therefore, clear that the debt in dispute was not an advance by the Court of Wards on behalf of the present decree-holders. Exception (vi) of Cl. (f) of Section 2 could not, therefore, apply and the debt could not be taken out of the definition of "debt" as given in that clause. 8. The only ground on which the decree-holders contended that the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act did not apply, was therefore, not tenable, the learned Civil and Sessions Judge must therefore be held to be justified in his view that the provisions of the Act applied and that the respondents were entitled to get the debt reduced under its provision. The result is that the appeal must be allowed in part and the case sent back to the learned Civil and Sessions Judge for first apportioning the liability between the various judgment-debtors and then directing reduction of the debt under Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act. We direct accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.