Judgment :- 1. These writ petitioners impugn the constitutionality of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' and the legality of their assessments to wealth-tax. The petitioner in O.P. 674 of 1958 is the karnavan of a Mappila marumakkathayam tarwad who was assessed to wealth-tax for the assessment year 1957-58, on the net wealth of his tarwad considered as an individual, and to whom a notice of demand, Ext. A-2, dated July 16,1958, was issued for payment; the petition is to quash Ext. A2. The petitioner in O.P. 538 of 1959 is the manager of a Hindu undivided family who was assessed to wealth-tax for the assessment year 1957-58, on the net wealth of his family as on March 31, 1957, the valuation date as defined in the Act, and had paid it, but against whom, proceedings were commenced by Ext. P-1 notice dated March 24, 1959, under S.17 of the Act, to reassess him, on the net wealth of the family and in particular, on an amount of 17,000 paras of paddy which was said to have escaped assessment; the petition is to quash Ext P-1 and to restrain the Wealth-tax Officer from proceeding with the reassessment. The petitioner in O. P. 684 of 1959 was the karnavan of a Nambudiri illom which was partitioned by deed said to have been executed on March 30, 1958, but registered on July 25, 1958, and was assessed to wealth-tax for the assessment; year 1958-1959 by order Ext. G dated April 30, 1959, on the net wealth as on September 16,1957, the valuation date, of his family treated as undivided; the petition is to quash Ext. G. The petitioner in O. P. 824 of 1959 was the karnavan of another Nambudiri illom, which was said to have been partitioned by deed executed on August 17,1958, and was assessed to wealth-tax for the assessment year 1958-1959 by an order Ext. A, dated June 18, 1959, on the net wealth, as on August 16, 1957 the valuation date, of his family treated as undivided; the petition is to quash Ext. A and the notice of demand pursuant to it O.P. 1155 of 1960, is also by the petitioner in O.P. 824 of 1959, to prohibit the Wealth-tax Officer from continuing, proceedings to assess his family to wealth-tax for the assessment year 1959-60. A and the notice of demand pursuant to it O.P. 1155 of 1960, is also by the petitioner in O.P. 824 of 1959, to prohibit the Wealth-tax Officer from continuing, proceedings to assess his family to wealth-tax for the assessment year 1959-60. When these petitions came on for hearing on January 30, 1961, we directed notice to go to the Attorney General of India, and accordingly notice has been served. 2. In the light of the arguments advanced before us, without going into details, at this stage it does not seem necessary more than to notice the broad grounds which have been raised in these petitions and have been refuted on behalf of the respondent, the concerned Wealth-tax Officer in each case. The most important ground was, that Parliament was not competent under Entry 86 in the Union List the seventh schedule in the Constitution of India to impose a tax, called the wealth-tax, on the capital value of the assets of Hindu undivided families and of Mappila marumakkathayam tarwads, and also on the capital value of the assets of any person, to the extent that they are or may be deemed to be made up of agricultural income. The assessments to wealth-tax made on the petitioners and the demands pursuant thereto were impugned on several grounds and in particular, the assessment of the petitioner in O.P. 674 of 1958, as on a Mappila marumakkathayam tarwad, was contended to be not warranted by the provisions of the Act, and those of the petitioners in O.P.684 of 1959 & O.P. 824 of 1959 were impeached as violative of S.20 of the Act, which prescribes the procedure for the assessment of a Hindu undivided family upon partition. At the hearing, it was urged for the petitioner in O.P.684 of 1959, that under Entry 86 in the Union List, Parliament could impose a wealth-tax only on individual human beings & on companies, and that too, only on the capital value of their assets to the exclusion of lands, buildings & of what may be deemed to be agricultural income, such a tax on lands and buildings being, according to the argument, covered by Entry 49 and a tax on agricultural income being covered by Entry 46 in the State List. 3. These entries may be set out here with advantage. 3. These entries may be set out here with advantage. Entry 86 in the Union List reads: "Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of individuals and companies; taxes on the capital of companies." Entry 46 in the State List reads: "Taxes on agricultural income." and Entry 49 in the State List reads: "Taxes on lands and buildings." It was argued, that the term'individuals' in Entry 86 of the Union List cannot, on any reasonable view, comprehend joint families or tarwads of Hindus or of Mohammedans and that construing the entries as they must be, in their widest amplitude, but so as to reconcile them in the event of conflict, if necessary, even by restricting the scope of any of them and applying the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, Entry 49 in the State List, which must be deemed to include a tax on the capital value of lands and buildings, and Entry 46 which provides specifically for a tax on agricultural income, are special or particular provisions and they derogate pro tanto, from what is but a general provision in Entry 86 in the Union List which authorises a tax on the capital value of assets generally. The rules for interpreting entries in a constitutional enactment conferring legislative power on the basis of which the above argument was advanced, appear to be too well-settled to need a restatement by us at this time of the day, and all that is necessary is to see how far the argument based on them can be sustained. 4. In examining its soundness, the first attempt must be to ascertain, what is the pith and substance or the true nature and character of the tax imposed by the Act. S.3 is the charging section and it imposes the wealth-tax as follows: "Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, there shall be charged for every financial year commencing on and from the first day of April, 1957, a tax (hereinafter referred to as wealth-tax) in respect of the net wealth on the corresponding valuation date of every individual, Hindu undivided family and company at the rate or rates specified in the schedule." 5. Under this section, the assessees are either individuals, as that term is employed in the Act or Hindu undivided families or companies, though, it may be mentioned, that companies have been exempted from the imposition subsequently. The 'net wealth' of an assessee, as defined by S.2 (m) of the Act means the amount by which the aggregate value of the assets, as computed, is in excess of the aggregate value of the debts, excluding those of specified categories, owed by the assessee. The term'assets' includes property of every description, movable or immovable subject to specified exceptions. S.4 to 6 provide, what shall or shall not be taken into account in computing the net wealth of an assessee. Under S.7(I) of the Act, assets have to be valued according to the market price prevailing on the 'valuation date' which, in relation to an assessment year, is the last date of the previous year as defined in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Generally speaking, the rest of the Act may be said to make provision for the machinery and the procedure for the levy, assessment and collection of the tax The rates of the tax, as specified in Parts I and II of the schedule of the Act, are different for individuals, for Hindu undivided families, and for companies and are graded according to the net wealth. These leave no room for doubt in our minds, that the pith and substance or the true nature and character of the tax is that it is a levy on the capital value of assets, subject to specified inclusions and exclusions in the content of the term 'assets', agricultural lands being one of the exclusions. To this extent, the wealth-tax is specifically and in substance covered by Entry 86 in the Union List, 6. There is no difficulty in accepting the argument, that "lands and buildings" can form part of assets and that "taxes on lands and buildings" within the meaning of Entry 49 in the State List may include a tax thereon on the basis of their capital value. There is authority for the view, that land tax can be related to the annual or capital or sales value of the land. (See Science of Public Finance by Findlay Shirras, page 208 and Encyclopaedia Britannica,1955 Edition, Volume XIII, page 675). There is authority for the view, that land tax can be related to the annual or capital or sales value of the land. (See Science of Public Finance by Findlay Shirras, page 208 and Encyclopaedia Britannica,1955 Edition, Volume XIII, page 675). A tax on the capital value of lands as such, was not dealt with in the passages in these books which were relied on. Where, as in the present case, the content of two competing entries, Entry 86 in the Union List and Entry 49 in the State List, conferring legislative powers is under consideration, the distinction, real and vital as it is between tax on lands and buildings on the basis of their capital value, and tax on such capital value itself treating lands and buildings as an item of asset, cannot be overlooked. This distinction was elucidated by the Bombay High Court in Municipal Commissioner v. Gordhandas (AIR. 1954 Bom.188) where Gajendragadkar, J, expressed himself thus: "I am disposed to hold that a distinction must be made between a rate or tax which is levied on land on the basis of its capital value and a tax which is levied on the capital value of the land treating it as an asset itself. It seems to me, that it is perfectly legitimate to the taxing authority to attempt to correlate its tax to the real value of the property . It is possible to consider this question in another way. Under Entry, 55 in List I (in the seventh schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935, which corresponds to Entry 86 in the Union List in the Constitution) if the Central Legislature were to levy a tax on the capital value of the assets, the levy would be made only after determining the capital value of the assets, properly so-called. If the asset in question happens to be a land, its real capital value in the context would be determined after taking into account the encumbrances to which the land may be subject and the other liabilities which may be enforceable against it. The position of the Municipal Corporation when it levies a rate on the same property, treating it as land, is not the same or similar. The position of the Municipal Corporation when it levies a rate on the same property, treating it as land, is not the same or similar. It would be open to the Municipal Corporation to take into account the value of the land as such, without reference to the encumbrances to which it is subject, and to levy the rate on the value of the land so determined. In other words, the municipal rate or tax would not be concerned to determine the real economic capital value of the asset in question, but to find out the market value of the land apart from its real capital value in the economic sense and levy its tax on it. In this way, the capital value of the open land determined by the Municipal Corporation under R.350A (which was impugned) would not always or necessarily be the same as the capital value of the same land, if it was determined by the Central Legislature for the purpose of levying a tax under Item 55 in List I." His Lordship then noticed, that in some cases the capital value may work out to be the same, whether it falls under Entry 55 of List I or under Entry 42 of List II of the Government of India Act, 1935, the former corresponding to Entry 86 in the Union list, and, the latter to Entry 49 in the State list in the Constitution, and pointed out that: "The object with which the capital value is determined and the ultimate use which is proposed to be made of this capital value in levying a tax on lands under Entry 42 of List II, should not be confused with the object with which the capital value may be determined and the use which may be made of such capital value by legislation passed under Entry 55 of List I. The two rates or taxes would, despite the apparent similarity in some features, be distinct and separate." In the case of a tax whose base or object is lands and buildings, their annual or capital value is but a measure or standard adopted to ensure the justness and reasonableness of the levy, but in the case of a tax on capital value, such value is itself the base or the object of the levy. In the former, the imposition falls on one qua-owner or qua-occupier, but in the latter, an in the case of wealth-tax, it falls on him who is considered to possess more than ordinary wealth. In final analysis, both may fall on the same person and may thus appear to overlap, but "in law there is no overlapping", being distinct and separate imposts. To allocate the legislative power to impose a tax on the capital value of lands' and buildings, treating them as assets, entirely to the field covered by Entry 86 in the Union list is not, as contended, to rob entry 49 in the State List of its content, for even excluding taxes under Entries 45 to 48 in the State List which have some relation to lands or buildings or both, the field is still open under Entry 49 for legislation for other taxes on lands and buildings. Instances of such legislation are not wanting, by which local or municipal bodies in several States have been authorised to levy taxes on lands and buildings on the basis, of their annual letting value or of their capital value or sometimes of the plinth area in the case of buildings. There is therefore really no conflict and no overlapping of jurisdictions in the case of the two entries in question. 7. It may be, that in one sense a tax on the capital value of non-agricultural lands and buildings as assets, under Entry 86 in the Union list, by reason of its association, can be said to be a tax on lands and buildings under Entry 49 in the State list. Even so, Entry 49 must be held to be a general provision for taxes on lands and buildings and to yield to Entry 86 which must be held to be a special provision for a particular tax, viz., a tax on the capital value of assets. As noticed, the incidence and the objects of the two imposts are different. The term 'assets' in Entry 86 in the Union list may mean either the totality of the assets of an assessee, as Kania, J., and as Broomfield, J. seemed to think, in Sir Byramjee v. Province of Bombay AIR. 1910 Born. 65 (FB.), or may take in a part of such assets, as Chagla, C.J., observed in J.N. Duggan v. I.T. Commissioner, Bombay City, AIR. 1952 Bom. 261. 1910 Born. 65 (FB.), or may take in a part of such assets, as Chagla, C.J., observed in J.N. Duggan v. I.T. Commissioner, Bombay City, AIR. 1952 Bom. 261. Apart from the novelty of a tax on capital value in the history of taxation in this country, what is intended, is to tap wealth which is perhaps concentrated in the hands of a few, in order to secure a socialistic pattern of society. The exclusion of agricultural lands from assets in Entry 86 in the Union list seems to us to be almost conclusive, that the Entry was intended to include all others, even non-agricultural lands. In our judgment, the emphasis in Entry 86 is on "capital value" and not on "assets". We feel no hesitation in corning to the conclusion, that Entry 86 in the Union list confers a special legislative power which over-rides the general power under Entry 49 in the State list. 8. Very strong reliance was placed on the decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Oudh Sugar Mills v. State, AIR. 1960 All. 136 in which the U. P. Large Land Holdings Tax Act, 1957, enacted by the U.P. Legislature was under challenge, in so far as it imposed a tax for each agricultural year on the annual value of each holding at a rate specified in the schedule. The contention, that such legislation was outside the purview of Entry 49 in the State list was negatived upon the finding that the tax was on the holding itself, its annual or capitalised value being only the basis and not the object of taxation. Jagdish Sahai, J., who wrote the leading judgment, also examined the scope of Entry 86 in the Union List, though, as observed by him, it did not arise; became to the conclusion, that it is a general provision which has to be restricted by excluding non-agricultural lands also from its ambit in order to give full scope to Entry 49 in the State list. Speaking with respect, we are unable to agree that the scope of Entry 86 can be so curtailed. The distinction between a tax on the capital value of lands and buildings as an asset and a tax on lands and buildings on the basis of their capital value, which was expounded by the Bombay High Court in Municipal Commissioner v. Gordhandas AIR 1954 Bom. The distinction between a tax on the capital value of lands and buildings as an asset and a tax on lands and buildings on the basis of their capital value, which was expounded by the Bombay High Court in Municipal Commissioner v. Gordhandas AIR 1954 Bom. 188 was noticed by the learned judge. That distinction appears to us to go against the further reasoning by him, that on the wide definition of the term 'taxation' in Art.366 (28) of the Constitution, Entry 49 in the State list must be deemed to include a capital levy on lands and buildings, and that'assets' in Entry 86 being a general term, its import must be restricted. As observed, in our view, the exclusion of agricultural lands in Entry 86 is itself a strong indication, that non-agricultural lands were not meant to be excluded to be brought under the purview of Entry 49 in the State list for imposing a capital levy. The learned judge also agreed with Kania, J., in thinking, that 'assets' in Entry 86 meant the totality of assets. On the distinction pointed out above, the proper view seems to us to be, that subject to the exclusion of agricultural lands as specifically provided, a tax on the capital value of all assets would fall within Entry 86 in the Union list and not within Entry 49 in the State list. 9. As stated above, the vires of the Act was impugned, also on the ground that a tax on the net wealth of an assessee, to the extent that it is or may be said to bo made up of his agricultural income, pertains to the legislative field marked by Entry 46 in the State List. The charging section in the Act as quoted above does not purport to tax any 'income' whatever, but only the net wealth of an assessee as defined in terms of his assets, as on the concerned valuation date. In law as well as in common parlance, income and wealth are distinct concepts, though they stand in some relation to each other; while income contributes to the growth of a man's wealth, the latter is very often one of the sources which produces income. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace & Co. AIR. In law as well as in common parlance, income and wealth are distinct concepts, though they stand in some relation to each other; while income contributes to the growth of a man's wealth, the latter is very often one of the sources which produces income. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace & Co. AIR. 1932 P. C. 138 at p. 140 the Privy Council described income as connoting: "a periodical monetary return'coming in' with some sort of regularity or expected regularity from definite sources Thus income has been likened pictorially to the fruit of a tree or the crop of a field". In our view, a tax on the income of a person may be deemed to be a levy on his receipts, either actual or constructive, during a specified period, very often after making due allowance for expenses incurred by him in earning such receipts or it may be deemed to be a levy on his right to receive the same. In another view, it may be considered to be a levy on the person himself in relation to his income. The agricultural income of a person, to put briefly, is that which is received by him by way of rent or revenue in respect of land used for agricultural purposes or that which is derived by him from such land as a result of agricultural operations or both and may be in cash or in kind. A tax on agricultural income as its base or object would fall within Entry 46 in the State List, while a tax on other categories of income as its base or object would fall within Entry 82 in the Union List. Upon income being earned, excluding expenses incurred in the process, the balance may form part of his assets or of his wealth at that point of time. He may afterwards spend or save, the whole or part of it, or convert the same into some other form having a saleable or marketable value. To the extent of such saving or conversion, there is an addition to his wealth & to his assets, the amount of which may vary from time to time. A tax on income is on that which is received; a tax on net wealth is on that which accumulates. To the extent of such saving or conversion, there is an addition to his wealth & to his assets, the amount of which may vary from time to time. A tax on income is on that which is received; a tax on net wealth is on that which accumulates. At a given point of time, a tax on net wealth may fall in part on what was originally received and bad accumulated and it may fall on the same person as the tax on income does; but the two are different. The prohibition in Art.246 of the Constitution is not against the imposition of more than one tax on or in relation to the same person or subject-matter, but is against a trespass by one legislature on a field reserved for another. The issue of trespass has to be adjudged on the doctrine of pith and substance of the impugned tax. Applying it, we feel no doubt that Parliament had committed no trespass whatever on the State field of legislation in imposing a tax on net wealth, part of which may have sprung from agricultural income. This applies not only to agricultural produce like paddy stored by some of the petitioners in their granary, but also to arrears of rent which had accrued due from their tenants. In the case of such arrears which stand in the position of debts due to the assessee, the mode of computation of their capital value must of course have regard to various factors, such as, the solvency of the debtors, the difficulty including those which have arisen in consequence of certain legislative enactments and expenses incidental to their realisation. 10. It has next to be considered, whether the legislative power of Parliament under Entry 86 in the Union List can reach Hindu undivided families. In this State, there are joint families of Hindus, including tarwads of Ezhavas and Nairs who follow the marumakkathayam law, and illoms of Nambudiris, and joint families of Nadar converts to Christianity in the south who follow the Hindu law with modifications; in addition, there are Mappilas or Mohammedans, in North Malabar who are presumed to be followers of marumakkathayam law, and in other parts of Malabar area and in Varkalai, Odetti and other parts of the former Travancore State, who follow the marumakkathayam law in relation to their tarwad properties. The argument was, that a tax under Entry 86, could be imposed only on the assets of an individual human being and of a company, but not on those of a joint family, whether of a Hindu or of a non-Hindu, which is a juristic entity or a legal person and can in no sense be regarded as a mere group or collection, or body of individuals and never be comprehended in the term'individuals' in Entry 86. It was not disputed, that the term'individuals' is wide enough to include a group, or a collection or a body of individuals, and perhaps also a partnership, which not being a juridical person, is in the words of the Supreme Court in Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay AIR. 1955 S.C. 74, "an association of persons for carrying on the business of partnership and in law the firm name is a compendious method of describing the partners." Corporations are undoubtedly legal persons and as observed by Salmond on jurisprudence, 11th Edition at page 358, so too are registered trade unions and friendly societies, which are made "legal entities distinct from their members" and are enabled to sue or be sued in their registered names by special statutory provisions concerning them. These, according to the learned author, are the only legal persons now recognised by the English Law, but that is no reason why, if a case is made out, the Indian Law should not add to their number. As observed in Charanjit Lal v. Union of India AIR. 1951 SC. 41 a corporation has a distinct personality of its own with rights and capacities, duties and obligations, separate from those of its individual members. For example, a company incorporated under the Companies Act is an entity distinct from the shareholders; the latter do not acquire any interest in the property of the company, though they have a right to participate in its profits when they are divided, and in the assets which would be available after its winding up. "A registered trade union is not a corporation nor an individual nor a partnership; but it becomes by registration a legal entity, distinct from an unregistered trade union. Its registered name is to be used and applied in all legal proceedings, unless there is any provision inconsistent with such use (Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Volume 32, page 486, Para.776"). Its registered name is to be used and applied in all legal proceedings, unless there is any provision inconsistent with such use (Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Volume 32, page 486, Para.776"). It was held by Bhagwati, J., in Satyavart Sidhantalankar v. Arya Samaj, Bombay AIR 1946 Bom 516, that unless a society is registered under the Societies Registration Act, it would only have the character of a club or other association and cannot sue or be sued except in the names of all its members or in accordance with the enabling provisions of Order I, R.B. In the case of a partnership, the provisions of Order XXX, CPC. enable it to sue or to be sued in its name. 11. In popular language, a joint family may be spoken of as a unit, and it is also common experience to regard or visualise it as such. Many marumakkathayam tarwads are identified by their names, and a similar identification in the case of other joint families is by no means uncommon; but we venture to think, that all this, is only in a somewhat loose sense. Salmond says thus, at pages 357 and 358 of his book: "When strictness of speech is not called for, the device of personification is extensively used. We speak of the estate of a deceased person as if it were itself a person. We say that it owes debts, or has debts owing to it, or is insolvent. The law, however, recognises no legal personality in such a case. So also we personify as a single person, the group of individuals concerned, even though the law recognises nobody corporate. But legal personality is not reached until the law recognises, over and above the associated individuals, a single entity which in a manner represents them, but is not identical with them." The learned counsel suggested, that between an individual who is a natural person and a corporation which is a legal or artificial person, in the contemplation of law, there can exist other entities who may well be regarded as persons, say quasi - corporations or "near corporations," and he relied on National Union of General and Municipal Workers v. Gillian (1946) I K. B. 81 where Uthwatt, J., summarising the effect of Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants 1901 A C. 426, said, that: "a registered trade union is recognised by the law as a body distinct from the individuals who from time to time compose it. It is not a corporation; but it is very much like one. The association is not merely the aggregate of the persons who compose it, & the presence of the corporate fiction is not necessary to secure its individuality. In an age of neologism it might be called a'near corporation." Earlier in the same case, Scott, L J., had adverted to the effect of the Trade Union Act of 1871 as clothing a registered union with a "co-operative personality so as to give it the status of a persona juridica". 12. It seems to follow from what has been stated above, that the crucial test is whether it can be predicated that a joint family has an existence, apart from and independent of its members. If it has no such existence, notwithstanding the corporate nature of the enjoyment of its properties by its members, in law it can only be considered to be a group or body of individuals bound together by ties of kinship and having rights in relation to the common properties as regulated by law or by custom or by statutes. Mulla in his text book on Hindu Law has described a joint Hindu family, as comprising all males lineally descended from a common ancestor and as including their wives and unmarried daughters and a Hindu co-parcenary, as consisting of those who acquire by birth an interest in joint property. The rights of the co¬parceners are found enumerated by Mulla on Hindu Law, 12th edition at page 353, Para.235, and the rights of junior members of marumakkathayam tarwads are found collected by Sundara Iyer in his book on Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law at page 7 But what is most important to note for the present purpose is, that the text-books agree (see Mulla on Hindu Law, page 318, para 216 and Sundara Iyer on Malabar Law, pages 7 and 8), that the ownership of the joint family properties is in the whole body, of co¬parceners in the case of a coparcenary and of the members in the case of a tarwad or illom. A corporation or a company, as noticed by Salmond [page 372] may survive the last of its members, but a joint family cannot. A joint family has no right to sue or to be sued in its name unlike a legal or juridical entity, say a corporation or a registered society. A joint family does not hold or convey property as a legal entity. In these respects, the manager of a joint family or the karanavan of a tarwad or illom has, subject to certain statutory requirements which have been engrafted, special powers of disposition and may act for all the members. 13. At this stage, it seems pertinent to enquire, how marumakkathayam tarwads and Nambudiri illoms have been defined in certain enactments. The Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 has defined a tarwad as meaning "the group of persons forming a joint family with community of property governed by the marumakkathayam law of inheritance" and a tavazhi of a female as a "group of persons consisting of that female, her children and all her descendants in the female line". The Travancore Nair Acts of 1088 and of 1100, and the Cochin Nair Acts of 1075 and of 1113, have defined a Nair tarwad to mean and include all members of a joint family with community of property governed by the marumakkathayam law. The Travancore Ezhava Act of 1100, has similarly defined an Ezhava tarwad. The Travancore Malayala Brahmin Act of 1106, the Cochin Nambudiri Act of 1114, the Madras Nambudiri Act of 1932, and the Kerala Nambudiri Act of 1958, have defined an illom as meaning all the members of a Nambudiri joint family with community of property. The Mappila Marumakkathayam Act of 1939 has defined a tarwad as a joint family which includes all its members with community of property governed by marumakkathayam law. In none of these definitions, which may be considered to reflect the state of the law when they were enacted, is any indication to be found, that a tarwad or illom was considered to be an entity distinct from its members and having an independent existence. If, as argued, these definitions are only descriptive and not determinative, it is not easy to understand why, no definition of that character was attempted. If, as argued, these definitions are only descriptive and not determinative, it is not easy to understand why, no definition of that character was attempted. We do not think that the provisions in some of these enactments, enabling tarwads or illoms, which desire to stand out, to register themselves as impartible, or denying the right to the members to alienate their undivided shares, recognised also by judicial decisions, e, g., Antherman v. Kannan 1960 KLT.1313 (F. B.), having anything to do with the present question as to whether the tarwads or illoms can be regarded as juridical entities. The precise nature of the constitution of a marumakkathayam tarwad was considered by a Division Bench of the former Travancore High Court in Thankamma v. Kesava Pillai 30 TLJ. 483, where Ramakrishna Iyer, J., observed: "No doubt in some of the decided cases loose language has been used and a tarwad has been referred to as a corporation. But the constitution of a Malabar tarwad is such that it can only be considered to be a group of individuals having diverse rights over tarwad properties and having a manager who is called the karanavan." Lukose, J., the other learned judge, after adverting to the definition of a tarwad in the Travancore Nair Acts of 1088 and 1100, and in the Travancore Ezhava Act of 1100, stated thus: "it is only a compendious name for the totality of the members of a family at any particular time Thus, there is nothing immortal about the exercise or integrity of a tarwad. Nor is there anything discernible, throughout the Statutes referred to, from which one may gather, that any corporation aggregate or a juristic person (such as a tarwad) is created, preserved or dissolved. Nor is there a provision, made in the aforesaid Acts, by which this legal person is enabled to sue, or to be sued, or to hold properties, apart from the members constituting the tarwad. In these circumstances, I agree with my learned brother in his observation, that a tarwad is nothing more than a group of individuals, bound together by certain ties of kinship or of holding common property. A tarwad is probably similar to, and nothing more, than the group constituting an ordinary joint Hindu family." 13. In Sokkanadha Vannimundar v. Sokkanadha Vannimundar ILR. A tarwad is probably similar to, and nothing more, than the group constituting an ordinary joint Hindu family." 13. In Sokkanadha Vannimundar v. Sokkanadha Vannimundar ILR. 28 Mad 344, a Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Subramania Ayyar and Boddam, JJ. observed, that a joint Hindu family, at times referred to even in judgments as a corporation, is not to be taken as a legal person in the strict sense of the term. Observations can be found in text-books and decided cases where Hindu undivided families are spoken of as owning or enjoying properties, as if they are corporate bodies, but these, as explained by the Bombay High Court in a case to be referred to presently, are only by way of analogy. For example, in Chakkra Kannan v. Kunhi Pokker ILR. 39 Mad. 317, Srinivasa Ayyanger, J., observed that, "in India it is not uncommon for groups of persons, though not incorporated, to bold properties as if they were corporate entities. Castes and nub-castes hold property as such, so also village communities." It is not possible to generalise from observations such as those that the law has clothed joint families, whether of Hindus or non-Hindus, with legal personality. On the contrary, in Income-tax Commissioner v. Sarwankumar AIR. 1945 All. 286, Iqbal Ahmad, C. J. described a family, though in a different context, as an association of people, a natural as distinct from an artificial association. In Income-tax Commissioner v. Sodra Devi AIR. 1957 S. C 832 at 834, Bhagwati, J. observed that, "there is authority for the proposition, that the word "individual is wide enough to include a group of persons forming a unit." 14. Quite recently, in Mahavir Prasad Badridas v. M.S. Yagnik AIR. 1960 Bom.191, a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Shah and S.T. Desai, JJ., has decided this precise question, by holding that the term'individuals' in Entry 86 in the Union list would "include an association of individuals such as a Hindu undivided family". Quite recently, in Mahavir Prasad Badridas v. M.S. Yagnik AIR. 1960 Bom.191, a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Shah and S.T. Desai, JJ., has decided this precise question, by holding that the term'individuals' in Entry 86 in the Union list would "include an association of individuals such as a Hindu undivided family". The view that a Hindu undivided family is a corporation was rejected as unsound and the argument founded on the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, that according to legislative practice, the term 'individual' must exclude a Hindu undivided family from its connotation, was repelled as unsustainable, Shah, J., observing that, "there is not only no settled legislative practice as to the meaning of the expression 'individual' in taxing Statutes, but there is not even unanimity of judicial opinion as to the meaning of that expression in the Indian Income-tax Act". So far as we are aware, this was the first case, in which the test for determining the true nature and the constitution of a Hindu undivided family, that is whether "the property of such family can be shown to vest not in the individuals who are members or coparceners of the family, but in a jural entity which is in the eye of law distinct from its members or coparceners", was propounded; it was answered in the negative. The question was examined by S.T. Desai, J., also in relation to marumakkathayam tarwads and was answered similarly. A learned single judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court followed the above case in Subramanyam v. Additional Wealth-tax Officer AIR. 1961 A.P. 75. The argument as to the interpretation of the term 'individual' based on what was stated to be the legislative practice, was further examined and was ultimately rejected by the learned judge as lacking in foundation. 15. The vires of the Act in relation to Hindu undivided families, was examined quite recently, by a Full Bench of three judges of the Allahabad High Court in Jugal Kishore v. Wealth Tax Officer 1961 ALJ. 408, and was upheld by a majority. 15. The vires of the Act in relation to Hindu undivided families, was examined quite recently, by a Full Bench of three judges of the Allahabad High Court in Jugal Kishore v. Wealth Tax Officer 1961 ALJ. 408, and was upheld by a majority. Gurtu, J. was of the view, that the Act came within the residuary field of legislation marked for Parliament by Entry 97 in the Union list read with Art.248 in the Constitution, and Jagdish Sahai, J. decided, that it came within the field demarcated by Entry 86; but Upadhya, J. the third judge held that it came within neither. Having regard to its constitution, Jagdish Sahai, J. considered, that a Hindu undivided family is a group or body of persons or individuals comprehended in the term 'individuals' in the legislative entry, on the principle which was deduced from decided cases, that in a constitution "general words are intentionally used, so that a constitution may remain useful for all times and the progress of a nation be not halted" and that, if it were otherwise, "the subject-matter or the field of legislation might have been narrowed down within the restrictions imposed by the particular words". In his opinion, no legislative practice to the contrary, has been established by the use of the term 'individual' in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 Gurtu, J., did not agree, that a Hindu undivided family is a corporation or "a corporate juridical entity", though at the same time, he was not prepared to lay down that it is "a mere collection of individuals"; according to him, it is "a peculiarity of Hindu society and it cannot be put into the framework of any of the well-known juridical concepts, namely individual person or corporation". The learned judge also derived support from what was considered by him to be the previous legislative practice in "taxation legislation", according to which, a Hindu undivided family is a unit of assessment, as distinct from an individual. The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and the Business Profits Tax Act, 1917 were referred to in this connection; but the provisions in the latter are different. It was explained, how even, that "if the legislative enactments in that particular field are few that would not establish that there was no legislative practice". The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and the Business Profits Tax Act, 1917 were referred to in this connection; but the provisions in the latter are different. It was explained, how even, that "if the legislative enactments in that particular field are few that would not establish that there was no legislative practice". Upadhya, J. drew largely on legislative practice relying also on the Expenditure Tax Act 1957, though a post-Constitution enactment, and also on the meaning of the term 'individual' in the dictionary and then surveyed the course of judicial decisions which have examined the two concepts, individual and Hindu undivided family, in other contexts. The learned judge did not hold, that a Hindu undivided family is a juristic entity, but considered it to be a "collective body in which the individual members have a certain interest and right and to which they owe certain obligations and which collective existence is a concept different from each of these individuals". The conclusion of the Bombay High Court in Mahavirprasad's case, AIR. 1960 Bom.191 that Judgment :- 1. These writ petitioners impugn the constitutionality of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' and the legality of their assessments to wealth-tax. The petitioner in O.P. 674 of 1958 is the karnavan of a Mappila marumakkathayam tarwad who was assessed to wealth-tax for the assessment year 1957-58, on the net wealth of his tarwad considered as an individual, and to whom a notice of demand, Ext. A-2, dated July 16,1958, was issued for payment; the petition is to quash Ext. A2. The petitioner in O.P. 538 of 1959 is the manager of a Hindu undivided family who was assessed to wealth-tax for the assessment year 1957-58, on the net wealth of his family as on March 31, 1957, the valuation date as defined in the Act, and had paid it, but against whom, proceedings were commenced by Ext. P-1 notice dated March 24, 1959, under S.17 of the Act, to reassess him, on the net wealth of the family and in particular, on an amount of 17,000 paras of paddy which was said to have escaped assessment; the petition is to quash Ext P-1 and to restrain the Wealth-tax Officer from proceeding with the reassessment. P-1 notice dated March 24, 1959, under S.17 of the Act, to reassess him, on the net wealth of the family and in particular, on an amount of 17,000 paras of paddy which was said to have escaped assessment; the petition is to quash Ext P-1 and to restrain the Wealth-tax Officer from proceeding with the reassessment. The petitioner in O. P. 684 of 1959 was the karnavan of a Nambudiri illom which was partitioned by deed said to have been executed on March 30, 1958, but registered on July 25, 1958, and was assessed to wealth-tax for the assessment; year 1958-1959 by order Ext. G dated April 30, 1959, on the net wealth as on September 16,1957, the valuation date, of his family treated as undivided; the petition is to quash Ext. G. The petitioner in O. P. 824 of 1959 was the karnavan of another Nambudiri illom, which was said to have been partitioned by deed executed on August 17,1958, and was assessed to wealth-tax for the assessment year 1958-1959 by an order Ext. A, dated June 18, 1959, on the net wealth, as on August 16, 1957 the valuation date, of his family treated as undivided; the petition is to quash Ext. A and the notice of demand pursuant to it O.P. 1155 of 1960, is also by the petitioner in O.P. 824 of 1959, to prohibit the Wealth-tax Officer from continuing, proceedings to assess his family to wealth-tax for the assessment year 1959-60. When these petitions came on for hearing on January 30, 1961, we directed notice to go to the Attorney General of India, and accordingly notice has been served. 2. In the light of the arguments advanced before us, without going into details, at this stage it does not seem necessary more than to notice the broad grounds which have been raised in these petitions and have been refuted on behalf of the respondent, the concerned Wealth-tax Officer in each case. 2. In the light of the arguments advanced before us, without going into details, at this stage it does not seem necessary more than to notice the broad grounds which have been raised in these petitions and have been refuted on behalf of the respondent, the concerned Wealth-tax Officer in each case. The most important ground was, that Parliament was not competent under Entry 86 in the Union List the seventh schedule in the Constitution of India to impose a tax, called the wealth-tax, on the capital value of the assets of Hindu undivided families and of Mappila marumakkathayam tarwads, and also on the capital value of the assets of any person, to the extent that they are or may be deemed to be made up of agricultural income. The assessments to wealth-tax made on the petitioners and the demands pursuant thereto were impugned on several grounds and in particular, the assessment of the petitioner in O.P. 674 of 1958, as on a Mappila marumakkathayam tarwad, was contended to be not warranted by the provisions of the Act, and those of the petitioners in O.P.684 of 1959 & O.P. 824 of 1959 were impeached as violative of S.20 of the Act, which prescribes the procedure for the assessment of a Hindu undivided family upon partition. At the hearing, it was urged for the petitioner in O.P.684 of 1959, that under Entry 86 in the Union List, Parliament could impose a wealth-tax only on individual human beings & on companies, and that too, only on the capital value of their assets to the exclusion of lands, buildings & of what may be deemed to be agricultural income, such a tax on lands and buildings being, according to the argument, covered by Entry 49 and a tax on agricultural income being covered by Entry 46 in the State List. 3. These entries may be set out here with advantage. 3. These entries may be set out here with advantage. Entry 86 in the Union List reads: "Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of individuals and companies; taxes on the capital of companies." Entry 46 in the State List reads: "Taxes on agricultural income." and Entry 49 in the State List reads: "Taxes on lands and buildings." It was argued, that the term'individuals' in Entry 86 of the Union List cannot, on any reasonable view, comprehend joint families or tarwads of Hindus or of Mohammedans and that construing the entries as they must be, in their widest amplitude, but so as to reconcile them in the event of conflict, if necessary, even by restricting the scope of any of them and applying the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, Entry 49 in the State List, which must be deemed to include a tax on the capital value of lands and buildings, and Entry 46 which provides specifically for a tax on agricultural income, are special or particular provisions and they derogate pro tanto, from what is but a general provision in Entry 86 in the Union List which authorises a tax on the capital value of assets generally. The rules for interpreting entries in a constitutional enactment conferring legislative power on the basis of which the above argument was advanced, appear to be too well-settled to need a restatement by us at this time of the day, and all that is necessary is to see how far the argument based on them can be sustained. 4. In examining its soundness, the first attempt must be to ascertain, what is the pith and substance or the true nature and character of the tax imposed by the Act. S.3 is the charging section and it imposes the wealth-tax as follows: "Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, there shall be charged for every financial year commencing on and from the first day of April, 1957, a tax (hereinafter referred to as wealth-tax) in respect of the net wealth on the corresponding valuation date of every individual, Hindu undivided family and company at the rate or rates specified in the schedule." 5. Under this section, the assessees are either individuals, as that term is employed in the Act or Hindu undivided families or companies, though, it may be mentioned, that companies have been exempted from the imposition subsequently. The 'net wealth' of an assessee, as defined by S.2 (m) of the Act means the amount by which the aggregate value of the assets, as computed, is in excess of the aggregate value of the debts, excluding those of specified categories, owed by the assessee. The term'assets' includes property of every description, movable or immovable subject to specified exceptions. S.4 to 6 provide, what shall or shall not be taken into account in computing the net wealth of an assessee. Under S.7(I) of the Act, assets have to be valued according to the market price prevailing on the 'valuation date' which, in relation to an assessment year, is the last date of the previous year as defined in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Generally speaking, the rest of the Act may be said to make provision for the machinery and the procedure for the levy, assessment and collection of the tax The rates of the tax, as specified in Parts I and II of the schedule of the Act, are different for individuals, for Hindu undivided families, and for companies and are graded according to the net wealth. These leave no room for doubt in our minds, that the pith and substance or the true nature and character of the tax is that it is a levy on the capital value of assets, subject to specified inclusions and exclusions in the content of the term 'assets', agricultural lands being one of the exclusions. To this extent, the wealth-tax is specifically and in substance covered by Entry 86 in the Union List, 6. There is no difficulty in accepting the argument, that "lands and buildings" can form part of assets and that "taxes on lands and buildings" within the meaning of Entry 49 in the State List may include a tax thereon on the basis of their capital value. There is authority for the view, that land tax can be related to the annual or capital or sales value of the land. (See Science of Public Finance by Findlay Shirras, page 208 and Encyclopaedia Britannica,1955 Edition, Volume XIII, page 675). There is authority for the view, that land tax can be related to the annual or capital or sales value of the land. (See Science of Public Finance by Findlay Shirras, page 208 and Encyclopaedia Britannica,1955 Edition, Volume XIII, page 675). A tax on the capital value of lands as such, was not dealt with in the passages in these books which were relied on. Where, as in the present case, the content of two competing entries, Entry 86 in the Union List and Entry 49 in the State List, conferring legislative powers is under consideration, the distinction, real and vital as it is between tax on lands and buildings on the basis of their capital value, and tax on such capital value itself treating lands and buildings as an item of asset, cannot be overlooked. This distinction was elucidated by the Bombay High Court in Municipal Commissioner v. Gordhandas (AIR. 1954 Bom.188) where Gajendragadkar, J, expressed himself thus: "I am disposed to hold that a distinction must be made between a rate or tax which is levied on land on the basis of its capital value and a tax which is levied on the capital value of the land treating it as an asset itself. It seems to me, that it is perfectly legitimate to the taxing authority to attempt to correlate its tax to the real value of the property . It is possible to consider this question in another way. Under Entry, 55 in List I (in the seventh schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935, which corresponds to Entry 86 in the Union List in the Constitution) if the Central Legislature were to levy a tax on the capital value of the assets, the levy would be made only after determining the capital value of the assets, properly so-called. If the asset in question happens to be a land, its real capital value in the context would be determined after taking into account the encumbrances to which the land may be subject and the other liabilities which may be enforceable against it. The position of the Municipal Corporation when it levies a rate on the same property, treating it as land, is not the same or similar. The position of the Municipal Corporation when it levies a rate on the same property, treating it as land, is not the same or similar. It would be open to the Municipal Corporation to take into account the value of the land as such, without reference to the encumbrances to which it is subject, and to levy the rate on the value of the land so determined. In other words, the municipal rate or tax would not be concerned to determine the real economic capital value of the asset in question, but to find out the market value of the land apart from its real capital value in the economic sense and levy its tax on it. In this way, the capital value of the open land determined by the Municipal Corporation under R.350A (which was impugned) would not always or necessarily be the same as the capital value of the same land, if it was determined by the Central Legislature for the purpose of levying a tax under Item 55 in List I." His Lordship then noticed, that in some cases the capital value may work out to be the same, whether it falls under Entry 55 of List I or under Entry 42 of List II of the Government of India Act, 1935, the former corresponding to Entry 86 in the Union list, and, the latter to Entry 49 in the State list in the Constitution, and pointed out that: "The object with which the capital value is determined and the ultimate use which is proposed to be made of this capital value in levying a tax on lands under Entry 42 of List II, should not be confused with the object with which the capital value may be determined and the use which may be made of such capital value by legislation passed under Entry 55 of List I. The two rates or taxes would, despite the apparent similarity in some features, be distinct and separate." In the case of a tax whose base or object is lands and buildings, their annual or capital value is but a measure or standard adopted to ensure the justness and reasonableness of the levy, but in the case of a tax on capital value, such value is itself the base or the object of the levy. In the former, the imposition falls on one qua-owner or qua-occupier, but in the latter, an in the case of wealth-tax, it falls on him who is considered to possess more than ordinary wealth. In final analysis, both may fall on the same person and may thus appear to overlap, but "in law there is no overlapping", being distinct and separate imposts. To allocate the legislative power to impose a tax on the capital value of lands' and buildings, treating them as assets, entirely to the field covered by Entry 86 in the Union list is not, as contended, to rob entry 49 in the State List of its content, for even excluding taxes under Entries 45 to 48 in the State List which have some relation to lands or buildings or both, the field is still open under Entry 49 for legislation for other taxes on lands and buildings. Instances of such legislation are not wanting, by which local or municipal bodies in several States have been authorised to levy taxes on lands and buildings on the basis, of their annual letting value or of their capital value or sometimes of the plinth area in the case of buildings. There is therefore really no conflict and no overlapping of jurisdictions in the case of the two entries in question. 7. It may be, that in one sense a tax on the capital value of non-agricultural lands and buildings as assets, under Entry 86 in the Union list, by reason of its association, can be said to be a tax on lands and buildings under Entry 49 in the State list. Even so, Entry 49 must be held to be a general provision for taxes on lands and buildings and to yield to Entry 86 which must be held to be a special provision for a particular tax, viz., a tax on the capital value of assets. As noticed, the incidence and the objects of the two imposts are different. The term 'assets' in Entry 86 in the Union list may mean either the totality of the assets of an assessee, as Kania, J., and as Broomfield, J. seemed to think, in Sir Byramjee v. Province of Bombay AIR. 1910 Born. 65 (FB.), or may take in a part of such assets, as Chagla, C.J., observed in J.N. Duggan v. I.T. Commissioner, Bombay City, AIR. 1952 Bom. 261. 1910 Born. 65 (FB.), or may take in a part of such assets, as Chagla, C.J., observed in J.N. Duggan v. I.T. Commissioner, Bombay City, AIR. 1952 Bom. 261. Apart from the novelty of a tax on capital value in the history of taxation in this country, what is intended, is to tap wealth which is perhaps concentrated in the hands of a few, in order to secure a socialistic pattern of society. The exclusion of agricultural lands from assets in Entry 86 in the Union list seems to us to be almost conclusive, that the Entry was intended to include all others, even non-agricultural lands. In our judgment, the emphasis in Entry 86 is on "capital value" and not on "assets". We feel no hesitation in corning to the conclusion, that Entry 86 in the Union list confers a special legislative power which over-rides the general power under Entry 49 in the State list. 8. Very strong reliance was placed on the decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Oudh Sugar Mills v. State, AIR. 1960 All. 136 in which the U. P. Large Land Holdings Tax Act, 1957, enacted by the U.P. Legislature was under challenge, in so far as it imposed a tax for each agricultural year on the annual value of each holding at a rate specified in the schedule. The contention, that such legislation was outside the purview of Entry 49 in the State list was negatived upon the finding that the tax was on the holding itself, its annual or capitalised value being only the basis and not the object of taxation. Jagdish Sahai, J., who wrote the leading judgment, also examined the scope of Entry 86 in the Union List, though, as observed by him, it did not arise; became to the conclusion, that it is a general provision which has to be restricted by excluding non-agricultural lands also from its ambit in order to give full scope to Entry 49 in the State list. Speaking with respect, we are unable to agree that the scope of Entry 86 can be so curtailed. The distinction between a tax on the capital value of lands and buildings as an asset and a tax on lands and buildings on the basis of their capital value, which was expounded by the Bombay High Court in Municipal Commissioner v. Gordhandas AIR 1954 Bom. The distinction between a tax on the capital value of lands and buildings as an asset and a tax on lands and buildings on the basis of their capital value, which was expounded by the Bombay High Court in Municipal Commissioner v. Gordhandas AIR 1954 Bom. 188 was noticed by the learned judge. That distinction appears to us to go against the further reasoning by him, that on the wide definition of the term 'taxation' in Art.366 (28) of the Constitution, Entry 49 in the State list must be deemed to include a capital levy on lands and buildings, and that'assets' in Entry 86 being a general term, its import must be restricted. As observed, in our view, the exclusion of agricultural lands in Entry 86 is itself a strong indication, that non-agricultural lands were not meant to be excluded to be brought under the purview of Entry 49 in the State list for imposing a capital levy. The learned judge also agreed with Kania, J., in thinking, that 'assets' in Entry 86 meant the totality of assets. On the distinction pointed out above, the proper view seems to us to be, that subject to the exclusion of agricultural lands as specifically provided, a tax on the capital value of all assets would fall within Entry 86 in the Union list and not within Entry 49 in the State list. 9. As stated above, the vires of the Act was impugned, also on the ground that a tax on the net wealth of an assessee, to the extent that it is or may be said to bo made up of his agricultural income, pertains to the legislative field marked by Entry 46 in the State List. The charging section in the Act as quoted above does not purport to tax any 'income' whatever, but only the net wealth of an assessee as defined in terms of his assets, as on the concerned valuation date. In law as well as in common parlance, income and wealth are distinct concepts, though they stand in some relation to each other; while income contributes to the growth of a man's wealth, the latter is very often one of the sources which produces income. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace & Co. AIR. In law as well as in common parlance, income and wealth are distinct concepts, though they stand in some relation to each other; while income contributes to the growth of a man's wealth, the latter is very often one of the sources which produces income. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace & Co. AIR. 1932 P. C. 138 at p. 140 the Privy Council described income as connoting: "a periodical monetary return'coming in' with some sort of regularity or expected regularity from definite sources Thus income has been likened pictorially to the fruit of a tree or the crop of a field". In our view, a tax on the income of a person may be deemed to be a levy on his receipts, either actual or constructive, during a specified period, very often after making due allowance for expenses incurred by him in earning such receipts or it may be deemed to be a levy on his right to receive the same. In another view, it may be considered to be a levy on the person himself in relation to his income. The agricultural income of a person, to put briefly, is that which is received by him by way of rent or revenue in respect of land used for agricultural purposes or that which is derived by him from such land as a result of agricultural operations or both and may be in cash or in kind. A tax on agricultural income as its base or object would fall within Entry 46 in the State List, while a tax on other categories of income as its base or object would fall within Entry 82 in the Union List. Upon income being earned, excluding expenses incurred in the process, the balance may form part of his assets or of his wealth at that point of time. He may afterwards spend or save, the whole or part of it, or convert the same into some other form having a saleable or marketable value. To the extent of such saving or conversion, there is an addition to his wealth & to his assets, the amount of which may vary from time to time. A tax on income is on that which is received; a tax on net wealth is on that which accumulates. To the extent of such saving or conversion, there is an addition to his wealth & to his assets, the amount of which may vary from time to time. A tax on income is on that which is received; a tax on net wealth is on that which accumulates. At a given point of time, a tax on net wealth may fall in part on what was originally received and bad accumulated and it may fall on the same person as the tax on income does; but the two are different. The prohibition in Art.246 of the Constitution is not against the imposition of more than one tax on or in relation to the same person or subject-matter, but is against a trespass by one legislature on a field reserved for another. The issue of trespass has to be adjudged on the doctrine of pith and substance of the impugned tax. Applying it, we feel no doubt that Parliament had committed no trespass whatever on the State field of legislation in imposing a tax on net wealth, part of which may have sprung from agricultural income. This applies not only to agricultural produce like paddy stored by some of the petitioners in their granary, but also to arrears of rent which had accrued due from their tenants. In the case of such arrears which stand in the position of debts due to the assessee, the mode of computation of their capital value must of course have regard to various factors, such as, the solvency of the debtors, the difficulty including those which have arisen in consequence of certain legislative enactments and expenses incidental to their realisation. 10. It has next to be considered, whether the legislative power of Parliament under Entry 86 in the Union List can reach Hindu undivided families. In this State, there are joint families of Hindus, including tarwads of Ezhavas and Nairs who follow the marumakkathayam law, and illoms of Nambudiris, and joint families of Nadar converts to Christianity in the south who follow the Hindu law with modifications; in addition, there are Mappilas or Mohammedans, in North Malabar who are presumed to be followers of marumakkathayam law, and in other parts of Malabar area and in Varkalai, Odetti and other parts of the former Travancore State, who follow the marumakkathayam law in relation to their tarwad properties. The argument was, that a tax under Entry 86, could be imposed only on the assets of an individual human being and of a company, but not on those of a joint family, whether of a Hindu or of a non-Hindu, which is a juristic entity or a legal person and can in no sense be regarded as a mere group or collection, or body of individuals and never be comprehended in the term'individuals' in Entry 86. It was not disputed, that the term'individuals' is wide enough to include a group, or a collection or a body of individuals, and perhaps also a partnership, which not being a juridical person, is in the words of the Supreme Court in Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay AIR. 1955 S.C. 74, "an association of persons for carrying on the business of partnership and in law the firm name is a compendious method of describing the partners." Corporations are undoubtedly legal persons and as observed by Salmond on jurisprudence, 11th Edition at page 358, so too are registered trade unions and friendly societies, which are made "legal entities distinct from their members" and are enabled to sue or be sued in their registered names by special statutory provisions concerning them. These, according to the learned author, are the only legal persons now recognised by the English Law, but that is no reason why, if a case is made out, the Indian Law should not add to their number. As observed in Charanjit Lal v. Union of India AIR. 1951 SC. 41 a corporation has a distinct personality of its own with rights and capacities, duties and obligations, separate from those of its individual members. For example, a company incorporated under the Companies Act is an entity distinct from the shareholders; the latter do not acquire any interest in the property of the company, though they have a right to participate in its profits when they are divided, and in the assets which would be available after its winding up. "A registered trade union is not a corporation nor an individual nor a partnership; but it becomes by registration a legal entity, distinct from an unregistered trade union. Its registered name is to be used and applied in all legal proceedings, unless there is any provision inconsistent with such use (Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Volume 32, page 486, Para.776"). Its registered name is to be used and applied in all legal proceedings, unless there is any provision inconsistent with such use (Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Volume 32, page 486, Para.776"). It was held by Bhagwati, J., in Satyavart Sidhantalankar v. Arya Samaj, Bombay AIR 1946 Bom 516, that unless a society is registered under the Societies Registration Act, it would only have the character of a club or other association and cannot sue or be sued except in the names of all its members or in accordance with the enabling provisions of Order I, R.B. In the case of a partnership, the provisions of Order XXX, CPC. enable it to sue or to be sued in its name. 11. In popular language, a joint family may be spoken of as a unit, and it is also common experience to regard or visualise it as such. Many marumakkathayam tarwads are identified by their names, and a similar identification in the case of other joint families is by no means uncommon; but we venture to think, that all this, is only in a somewhat loose sense. Salmond says thus, at pages 357 and 358 of his book: "When strictness of speech is not called for, the device of personification is extensively used. We speak of the estate of a deceased person as if it were itself a person. We say that it owes debts, or has debts owing to it, or is insolvent. The law, however, recognises no legal personality in such a case. So also we personify as a single person, the group of individuals concerned, even though the law recognises nobody corporate. But legal personality is not reached until the law recognises, over and above the associated individuals, a single entity which in a manner represents them, but is not identical with them." The learned counsel suggested, that between an individual who is a natural person and a corporation which is a legal or artificial person, in the contemplation of law, there can exist other entities who may well be regarded as persons, say quasi - corporations or "near corporations," and he relied on National Union of General and Municipal Workers v. Gillian (1946) I K. B. 81 where Uthwatt, J., summarising the effect of Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants 1901 A C. 426, said, that: "a registered trade union is recognised by the law as a body distinct from the individuals who from time to time compose it. It is not a corporation; but it is very much like one. The association is not merely the aggregate of the persons who compose it, & the presence of the corporate fiction is not necessary to secure its individuality. In an age of neologism it might be called a'near corporation." Earlier in the same case, Scott, L J., had adverted to the effect of the Trade Union Act of 1871 as clothing a registered union with a "co-operative personality so as to give it the status of a persona juridica". 12. It seems to follow from what has been stated above, that the crucial test is whether it can be predicated that a joint family has an existence, apart from and independent of its members. If it has no such existence, notwithstanding the corporate nature of the enjoyment of its properties by its members, in law it can only be considered to be a group or body of individuals bound together by ties of kinship and having rights in relation to the common properties as regulated by law or by custom or by statutes. Mulla in his text book on Hindu Law has described a joint Hindu family, as comprising all males lineally descended from a common ancestor and as including their wives and unmarried daughters and a Hindu co-parcenary, as consisting of those who acquire by birth an interest in joint property. The rights of the co¬parceners are found enumerated by Mulla on Hindu Law, 12th edition at page 353, Para.235, and the rights of junior members of marumakkathayam tarwads are found collected by Sundara Iyer in his book on Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law at page 7 But what is most important to note for the present purpose is, that the text-books agree (see Mulla on Hindu Law, page 318, para 216 and Sundara Iyer on Malabar Law, pages 7 and 8), that the ownership of the joint family properties is in the whole body, of co¬parceners in the case of a coparcenary and of the members in the case of a tarwad or illom. A corporation or a company, as noticed by Salmond [page 372] may survive the last of its members, but a joint family cannot. A joint family has no right to sue or to be sued in its name unlike a legal or juridical entity, say a corporation or a registered society. A joint family does not hold or convey property as a legal entity. In these respects, the manager of a joint family or the karanavan of a tarwad or illom has, subject to certain statutory requirements which have been engrafted, special powers of disposition and may act for all the members. 13. At this stage, it seems pertinent to enquire, how marumakkathayam tarwads and Nambudiri illoms have been defined in certain enactments. The Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 has defined a tarwad as meaning "the group of persons forming a joint family with community of property governed by the marumakkathayam law of inheritance" and a tavazhi of a female as a "group of persons consisting of that female, her children and all her descendants in the female line". The Travancore Nair Acts of 1088 and of 1100, and the Cochin Nair Acts of 1075 and of 1113, have defined a Nair tarwad to mean and include all members of a joint family with community of property governed by the marumakkathayam law. The Travancore Ezhava Act of 1100, has similarly defined an Ezhava tarwad. The Travancore Malayala Brahmin Act of 1106, the Cochin Nambudiri Act of 1114, the Madras Nambudiri Act of 1932, and the Kerala Nambudiri Act of 1958, have defined an illom as meaning all the members of a Nambudiri joint family with community of property. The Mappila Marumakkathayam Act of 1939 has defined a tarwad as a joint family which includes all its members with community of property governed by marumakkathayam law. In none of these definitions, which may be considered to reflect the state of the law when they were enacted, is any indication to be found, that a tarwad or illom was considered to be an entity distinct from its members and having an independent existence. If, as argued, these definitions are only descriptive and not determinative, it is not easy to understand why, no definition of that character was attempted. If, as argued, these definitions are only descriptive and not determinative, it is not easy to understand why, no definition of that character was attempted. We do not think that the provisions in some of these enactments, enabling tarwads or illoms, which desire to stand out, to register themselves as impartible, or denying the right to the members to alienate their undivided shares, recognised also by judicial decisions, e, g., Antherman v. Kannan 1960 KLT.1313 (F. B.), having anything to do with the present question as to whether the tarwads or illoms can be regarded as juridical entities. The precise nature of the constitution of a marumakkathayam tarwad was considered by a Division Bench of the former Travancore High Court in Thankamma v. Kesava Pillai 30 TLJ. 483, where Ramakrishna Iyer, J., observed: "No doubt in some of the decided cases loose language has been used and a tarwad has been referred to as a corporation. But the constitution of a Malabar tarwad is such that it can only be considered to be a group of individuals having diverse rights over tarwad properties and having a manager who is called the karanavan." Lukose, J., the other learned judge, after adverting to the definition of a tarwad in the Travancore Nair Acts of 1088 and 1100, and in the Travancore Ezhava Act of 1100, stated thus: "it is only a compendious name for the totality of the members of a family at any particular time Thus, there is nothing immortal about the exercise or integrity of a tarwad. Nor is there anything discernible, throughout the Statutes referred to, from which one may gather, that any corporation aggregate or a juristic person (such as a tarwad) is created, preserved or dissolved. Nor is there a provision, made in the aforesaid Acts, by which this legal person is enabled to sue, or to be sued, or to hold properties, apart from the members constituting the tarwad. In these circumstances, I agree with my learned brother in his observation, that a tarwad is nothing more than a group of individuals, bound together by certain ties of kinship or of holding common property. A tarwad is probably similar to, and nothing more, than the group constituting an ordinary joint Hindu family." 13. In Sokkanadha Vannimundar v. Sokkanadha Vannimundar ILR. A tarwad is probably similar to, and nothing more, than the group constituting an ordinary joint Hindu family." 13. In Sokkanadha Vannimundar v. Sokkanadha Vannimundar ILR. 28 Mad 344, a Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Subramania Ayyar and Boddam, JJ. observed, that a joint Hindu family, at times referred to even in judgments as a corporation, is not to be taken as a legal person in the strict sense of the term. Observations can be found in text-books and decided cases where Hindu undivided families are spoken of as owning or enjoying properties, as if they are corporate bodies, but these, as explained by the Bombay High Court in a case to be referred to presently, are only by way of analogy. For example, in Chakkra Kannan v. Kunhi Pokker ILR. 39 Mad. 317, Srinivasa Ayyanger, J., observed that, "in India it is not uncommon for groups of persons, though not incorporated, to bold properties as if they were corporate entities. Castes and nub-castes hold property as such, so also village communities." It is not possible to generalise from observations such as those that the law has clothed joint families, whether of Hindus or non-Hindus, with legal personality. On the contrary, in Income-tax Commissioner v. Sarwankumar AIR. 1945 All. 286, Iqbal Ahmad, C. J. described a family, though in a different context, as an association of people, a natural as distinct from an artificial association. In Income-tax Commissioner v. Sodra Devi AIR. 1957 S. C 832 at 834, Bhagwati, J. observed that, "there is authority for the proposition, that the word "individual is wide enough to include a group of persons forming a unit." 14. Quite recently, in Mahavir Prasad Badridas v. M.S. Yagnik AIR. 1960 Bom.191, a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Shah and S.T. Desai, JJ., has decided this precise question, by holding that the term'individuals' in Entry 86 in the Union list would "include an association of individuals such as a Hindu undivided family". Quite recently, in Mahavir Prasad Badridas v. M.S. Yagnik AIR. 1960 Bom.191, a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Shah and S.T. Desai, JJ., has decided this precise question, by holding that the term'individuals' in Entry 86 in the Union list would "include an association of individuals such as a Hindu undivided family". The view that a Hindu undivided family is a corporation was rejected as unsound and the argument founded on the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, that according to legislative practice, the term 'individual' must exclude a Hindu undivided family from its connotation, was repelled as unsustainable, Shah, J., observing that, "there is not only no settled legislative practice as to the meaning of the expression 'individual' in taxing Statutes, but there is not even unanimity of judicial opinion as to the meaning of that expression in the Indian Income-tax Act". So far as we are aware, this was the first case, in which the test for determining the true nature and the constitution of a Hindu undivided family, that is whether "the property of such family can be shown to vest not in the individuals who are members or coparceners of the family, but in a jural entity which is in the eye of law distinct from its members or coparceners", was propounded; it was answered in the negative. The question was examined by S.T. Desai, J., also in relation to marumakkathayam tarwads and was answered similarly. A learned single judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court followed the above case in Subramanyam v. Additional Wealth-tax Officer AIR. 1961 A.P. 75. The argument as to the interpretation of the term 'individual' based on what was stated to be the legislative practice, was further examined and was ultimately rejected by the learned judge as lacking in foundation. 15. The vires of the Act in relation to Hindu undivided families, was examined quite recently, by a Full Bench of three judges of the Allahabad High Court in Jugal Kishore v. Wealth Tax Officer 1961 ALJ. 408, and was upheld by a majority. 15. The vires of the Act in relation to Hindu undivided families, was examined quite recently, by a Full Bench of three judges of the Allahabad High Court in Jugal Kishore v. Wealth Tax Officer 1961 ALJ. 408, and was upheld by a majority. Gurtu, J. was of the view, that the Act came within the residuary field of legislation marked for Parliament by Entry 97 in the Union list read with Art.248 in the Constitution, and Jagdish Sahai, J. decided, that it came within the field demarcated by Entry 86; but Upadhya, J. the third judge held that it came within neither. Having regard to its constitution, Jagdish Sahai, J. considered, that a Hindu undivided family is a group or body of persons or individuals comprehended in the term 'individuals' in the legislative entry, on the principle which was deduced from decided cases, that in a constitution "general words are intentionally used, so that a constitution may remain useful for all times and the progress of a nation be not halted" and that, if it were otherwise, "the subject-matter or the field of legislation might have been narrowed down within the restrictions imposed by the particular words". In his opinion, no legislative practice to the contrary, has been established by the use of the term 'individual' in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 Gurtu, J., did not agree, that a Hindu undivided family is a corporation or "a corporate juridical entity", though at the same time, he was not prepared to lay down that it is "a mere collection of individuals"; according to him, it is "a peculiarity of Hindu society and it cannot be put into the framework of any of the well-known juridical concepts, namely individual person or corporation". The learned judge also derived support from what was considered by him to be the previous legislative practice in "taxation legislation", according to which, a Hindu undivided family is a unit of assessment, as distinct from an individual. The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and the Business Profits Tax Act, 1917 were referred to in this connection; but the provisions in the latter are different. It was explained, how even, that "if the legislative enactments in that particular field are few that would not establish that there was no legislative practice". The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and the Business Profits Tax Act, 1917 were referred to in this connection; but the provisions in the latter are different. It was explained, how even, that "if the legislative enactments in that particular field are few that would not establish that there was no legislative practice". Upadhya, J. drew largely on legislative practice relying also on the Expenditure Tax Act 1957, though a post-Constitution enactment, and also on the meaning of the term 'individual' in the dictionary and then surveyed the course of judicial decisions which have examined the two concepts, individual and Hindu undivided family, in other contexts. The learned judge did not hold, that a Hindu undivided family is a juristic entity, but considered it to be a "collective body in which the individual members have a certain interest and right and to which they owe certain obligations and which collective existence is a concept different from each of these individuals". The conclusion of the Bombay High Court in Mahavirprasad's case, AIR. 1960 Bom.191 that