SARJOO PROSAD, C. J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment of Modi J. dated 1st December, 1958. 2. It arises out of a suit for recovery of a sum of money instituted by the plaintiff res-pondent in this appeal. The parties belong to the Porwal caste and they happen to be relations inasmuch as the plaintiffs daughter is married to the brother of the defendant Hazarimal. It is the common case of both the parties that Hazarimal had been out-casted by his caste-men, which is known as the Porwal Sangh, some six years ago. Hazarimal was, therefore, anxious to be restored to his caste and to have the ban removed. He accordingly collected the Pan-chas who came from 48 different villages and consisted of nearly 150 persons, at Umaidpur for the purpose of having a meeting of the Panchayat in order to remove the ban which had been imposed upon him. This was in the month Migsar Vadi 14, Svt. 2008, which corresponds to 17th November, 1952 (and not 11th November, 1952, as noted in the judgment of Modi J.). The case of the plaintiff is that after a discussion for about three days, the members of the Panchayat agreed to remove the ban and to restore the defendant to the Porwal caste, on condition that the defendant paid a sum of Rs. 10,225/- to the Panchayat. This money, according to the plaintiff, was to be spent on certain charitable objects connected with temples and other institution of the community. The plaintiffs case further is that the Panchas had earlier asked Hazarimal before giving their decision to agree in writing to abide by the decision of the Panchayat, which the defendant had willingly done and then a small committee of 23 persons selected out of the Panchas was appointed to consider the matter and it gave the decision which was adopted by the general body of the Panchayat and the ban was ordered by the Panchayat to be removed, subject to the payment of the money aforesaid. As Hazarimal had not the money in hand he asked the plaintiff to pay the above amount to the Panchayat and thereupon the plaintiff executed that very day a Hundi for a sum of Rs. 10,225/- bearing the post date of Migsar Sudi 15, Svt. 2009, corresponding to 1st December 1952 (and not 26th November, 1952). As Hazarimal had not the money in hand he asked the plaintiff to pay the above amount to the Panchayat and thereupon the plaintiff executed that very day a Hundi for a sum of Rs. 10,225/- bearing the post date of Migsar Sudi 15, Svt. 2009, corresponding to 1st December 1952 (and not 26th November, 1952). The Hundi was drawn on the firm of Lakhaji Daulaji of Bombay and was handed over to the President of the Panchayat, Poonam Chand, immediately. This Hundi was endorsed by Poonamchand, the President in favour of one Sardartmal who encashed the same on 2nd December, 1952. The defendant had agreed to reimburse the plaintiff in respect of the plaintiff in respect of the amount of the Hundi issued by him and to pay back the amount as soon as he reached Madras. It may be added here that both the plaintiff and the defendant carry on business at Madras, though they are residents of Rajasthan, the plaintiff being a resident of Umaidpur and the defendant of Dayalpur at a distance of about 5 miles from each other. The defendant in payment of the amount, according to the case of the plaintiff, sent a Bank draft to Lakhaji Daulaji for a sum of Rs. 5,000/- on Poh Vadi 1st, Svt. 2009, which corresponds to 2nd December, 1952, and wrote a letter to the firm asking the money to be credited in the account of the plaintiff. The money was credited accordingly on the 3rd of December, 1952. Thereafter the plaintiff says, the defendant did not pay the balance of the amount inspite of repeated demands and, therefore, the present suit had to be instituted on 13th of May, 1953. He claimed to recover in the suit a sum of Rs. 5,2,25/- by way of principal and further a sum of Rs.235/2/- by way of interest, from 11th November, 1952, upto the date of the suit as also Rs. 119/14/-, as incidental expenses, which were said to have been incurred by the plaintiff in demanding the recovery of his dues. 3. The defendant admitted that he had been out-casted by the Panchayat and also that he had requested the Panchas at Talehotgarh, which is the headquarters of the Porwal Sabha, to collect the Panchayat for removal of the disqualification imposed upon him. It was also admitted by the defendant that as a result of convening the. 3. The defendant admitted that he had been out-casted by the Panchayat and also that he had requested the Panchas at Talehotgarh, which is the headquarters of the Porwal Sabha, to collect the Panchayat for removal of the disqualification imposed upon him. It was also admitted by the defendant that as a result of convening the. meeting of the Panchayat, the disqualification had been removed. He, however, denied that the removal of the disqualification or the ban imposed on him was made conditional on his paying the sum of Rs. 10,225/- as alleged by the plaintiff; or that he had ever agreed to pay the same; or that he had asked the plaintiff to pay the amount on his behalf. His case is that the Panchas had merely asked him to deposit an advance sum of Rs.1,500/- to meet the expenses of the Panchas, so that a meeting of the Panchayat could be called and the amount spent over incidental costs of calling the meeting; and after the ban had been removed, a sum of Rs, 620/7/- was in fact returned to the defendant, after meeting the costs of the Panchas who had assembled on the occasion. In the alternative , the plea of the defendant was that if the court accepted the case of the plaintiff that in fact a sum of Rs. 10,225/- had been paid by the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant, inasmuch as the said payment was for an unlawful purpose and contrary to public policy, the defendant could not in law be held liable for reimbursing the plaintiff in respect of the amount paid. The defendant also contended that he had no need to ask the plaintiff to execute any Hundi on his behalf and, therefore, the case of the plaintiff that any such Hundi had been given by him on account of the defendant was clearly false. The defendant further pleaded that some time in 1952, the plaintiff had been in a difficult financial situation and thers was also a marriage in his family at about the same time, in connection with which the plaintiff required money and, therefore, the defendant arranged to advance a loan to the plaintiff; and the draft for Rs. The defendant further pleaded that some time in 1952, the plaintiff had been in a difficult financial situation and thers was also a marriage in his family at about the same time, in connection with which the plaintiff required money and, therefore, the defendant arranged to advance a loan to the plaintiff; and the draft for Rs. 5,000/- in question which had been sent by the defendant to Lakha Daulaji for being paid to the plaintiff was merely by way of a loan and not for the payment of any dues of the plaintiff. The defendant also averred that he had instituted a suit for recovery of the loan advanced in the civil court at Madras and that suit was pending decision. 4. One of the main questions, therefore, which arose for determination in the case was whether the plaintiff had paid the sum of Rs. 10,225/- to the Porwal Sangh Sabha for the defendant and at the instance of the defendant ; and whether the sum of Rs. 5,225/- was recoverable by the plaintiff on account of that payment as alleged. The trial court dismissed the suit. It held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the Hundi was written by the plaintiff at the request of the defendant Hazarimal in favour of the Sabha. The court also disbelieved the plaintiffs case that Rs, 5,000/- had been paid to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the payment made on behalf of the defendant to the Sabha. Modi J. in this Court on appeal has reversed that decision and after a comprehensive examination of the evidence and the circumstances of the case has come to a definite finding in favour of the plaintiff on the material points involved. In the appeal before us, the learned counsel has challenged this decision on various grounds. 5. The decision of the trial court depending as it did mainly on appreciation of the evidence on record would hot ordinarily call for interference by this Court; but the judgement of Modi J. shows that the trial Judge was in error in his appreciation of that evidence. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that, according to the case of the plaintiff himself, there was a decision given in writing by the Panchayat and that the defendant also had agreed in writing to abide by that decision. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that, according to the case of the plaintiff himself, there was a decision given in writing by the Panchayat and that the defendant also had agreed in writing to abide by that decision. It appears that none of these documents were produced in support of the case of the plaintiff. It is, therefore, urged that the learned Judge of this Court was in error in relying upon the evidence of Poonam Chand alone, the President of the Panchayat, in support of the plea that the Panchayat or the Sabha had removed the ban imposed upon the defendant on payment of Rs. 10,225/- as alleged by the plaintiff. It is also urged that there is no satisfactory evidence to show that the plaintiff had actually executed the Hundi in question at the instance of the defendant and, therefore, there could be no liability on the part of the defendant to pay the amount to the plaintiff. It has also not been explained, according to the learned counsel, why a post-dated Hundi was executed by the plaintiff in favour of the Sabha; and, in any case, it was urged that the plaintiff was in the position of a surety and on the authority of S. 145 of the Contract Act, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover any amount wrongfully paid by the plaintiff to the Sabha in question. In our opinion, these arguments have no substance. It is true that the plaintiff alleged that the decision of the Sabha was in writing and that the defendant had also agreed in writing to abide by the decision of the Sabha. Presumably a Sabha of such magnitude, which demanded such a large sum of money from the defendant must be maintaining accounts of its own; though the defendants own case was that the decision of the Panchayat was oral and no account was kept of the money paid by him. The plaintiff, however, did make an effort to have the relevant document produced. These documents were not in possession of the plaintiff himself; they were in the possession of the office-bearers of the Sabha, viz. either the President Poonamchand or the Secretary. The court was, therefore, not justified in refusing the prayer of the plaintiff to call for these documents. The plaintiff, however, did make an effort to have the relevant document produced. These documents were not in possession of the plaintiff himself; they were in the possession of the office-bearers of the Sabha, viz. either the President Poonamchand or the Secretary. The court was, therefore, not justified in refusing the prayer of the plaintiff to call for these documents. In any case Poonamchand has been examined, but was unable to explain where these documents were. There may be some ulterior reason why these accounts or writings have not been produced by Poonamchand; but that by itself would not destroy the case of the plaintiff which appears to us otherwise well-founded on the evidence and circumstances. 6. The most important circumstance which naturally impressed the learned Judge of this Court is that on the very date on which the Sabha in question was held —and there is no dispute that there was a Sabha held on that date at the instance of the defendant for the purpose of removing the ban which had been imposed upon him—a Hundi was executed by the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 10,225/-; and though this Hundi was post-dated, in fact it was handed over to the Panchayat that very day. It was evidently a big Sabha consisting of Panchas from as many as 40 villages and with the strength of about 150 Panchas; it lasted for about three days; a committee was specially appointed to go in to the matter and when the committee gave its decision, the same had to be approved by the general body. It is, therefore difficult to believe the case of the defendant that these Panchas outright exonerated him merely on payment of the expenses for convening the meeting and calling the Panchas. It is significant to remember that a ban under which the defendant had smarted for the last 6 years had come to be removed. It is no bodys case that there was any ban imposed on the plaintiff. He is a relation of the defendant; they both carry on business at Madras. He had personally no other business at the Sabha. It is no bodys case that there was any ban imposed on the plaintiff. He is a relation of the defendant; they both carry on business at Madras. He had personally no other business at the Sabha. In the circumstances it is legitimate to assume that the plaintiff issued this Hundi for the sake of the defendant and at the instance of the latter where as the ban was actually and admittedly lifted in favour of the defendant by the Panchayat and the defendant was restored to his caste. It is true that no explanation has been offered as to why this Hundi was post-dated; but if the point was of any consequence, it should have been put to the plaintiff when he was in the witness box. No. such question was ever put to the plaintiff who could have explained the position. There may be various reasons for issuing a post-dated Hundi to the Panchayat. The fact remains that it was drawn on the firm of Lakhaji Daulaji of Bombay and there is ample and satisfactory evidence that this Hundi was in fact encashed on the 2nd December, 1952, i.e., on the very next date on which it became payable. 7. The other important circumstance is that the defendant sent a bank draft for Rs. 5,000/- which is dated 2nd December, 1952, and this bank draft was also payable to the firm of Lakhaji Daulaji of Bombay and was to be credited in favour of the plaintiff. This is admitted by the defendant and supported by the letter which he sent. The case of the defendant is that this payment way by way of loan to the plaintiff. On the face of it this is an utterly false defence. It stands to reason that if the plaintiff had money to pay to the extent of Rs. 10,225/- on the 2nd December, 1952, it is impossible for us to believe that he was in any such need of having a loan on the 2nd, December 1952, from the defendant. There appears to be no doubt that this payment, as the proximity of dates also indicates, was in part satisfaction of the payment which had been made by the plaintiff on account of the defendant. There appears to be no doubt that this payment, as the proximity of dates also indicates, was in part satisfaction of the payment which had been made by the plaintiff on account of the defendant. These two circumstances very clearly go to support the case of the plaintiff and to corroborate the positive evidence which has been given by him and his witnesses in proving the fact that the plaintiff did execute this Hundi for Rs. 10,225 in favour of the Panchayat for payment on account of the defendant and the defendant had the advantage of the payment, in that the disqualification of out caste imposed upon the defendant had been removed. There is also reliable evidence to indicate that the Hundi had been executed by the plaintiff at the instance of the defendant, who had no ready money at that time to pay to the Panchayat. The trial Court has criticised that part of the evidence on the ground that some of the witnesses do not say that there was any talk between the plaintiff and the defendant in their presence on the subject. This talk may have taken place earlier, but the point is whether at the time when this deliberation of the Panchayat was going on and the decision was arrived at, the document had not been evidently executed by the plaintiff on account of the defendant and at the instance of the latter. On that point certainly the witnesses were very well competent to depose and to conclude that it was so executed. The trial court was in error in losing sight of this important factor. We have had the advantage of the examining the decision of the learned Judge of this Court in the light of the evidence discussed before us and we entirely agree with him in the conclusion at which he has arrived and for the reasons which have been given by him. 8. The only other question which remains is about the applicability of sec. 145 of the Contract Act. The learned Judge has rightly held that it was not a case in which sec. 145 of the Contract Act applied, though at the same time he has been at pains to go into an elaborate discussion of the legal aspect of the matter. 145 of the Contract Act. The learned Judge has rightly held that it was not a case in which sec. 145 of the Contract Act applied, though at the same time he has been at pains to go into an elaborate discussion of the legal aspect of the matter. In our opinion, it is a simple case where the plaintiff has advanced money on account and at the instance of the defendant to certain persons and claims reimbursement of the amount from the defendant. It is not a case of surety at all. In fact the plaintiff acted as an agent of the defendant in paying the amount to the Sabha; and irrespective of any question whether the Sabha had or had not any valid right to take this money from the defendant, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the amount from the defendant which he has actually paid and of which the benefit has been taken by the defendant. If any authority is required, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kishanlal Vs. Bhanwarlal (1). 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred us two decisions on the point. One is a decision in Bhanamal Vs. Bhartumal (2). This was a case where a surety bond was forfeited on account of the surety being unable to surrender the accused for whom he stood surety. The surety then sought to recover the amount so forfeited from the person for whom he stood surety. He was held not entitled to recover on the facts of that case. The learned Judge observed that when a man stands surety for the appearance of another he should take every precaution to ensure the carrying out of his undertaking and he cannot be allowed to recover any sum forfeited under the bond either from the actual person for whom he stood surety or from any other person who induced him to stand as such for in case he is allowed to do so it would only tend to render the surety callous and indifferent to the discharge of the obligations which rest on him under the surety bond and the whole object of demanding such bond would be defeated. In the above case the surety himself was a party to the wrongful act. The next case is a decision in Thunki Vs. In the above case the surety himself was a party to the wrongful act. The next case is a decision in Thunki Vs. Baji Rao(3) where the plaintiff had paid a sum of money to the defendant, his cousins husband, to obtain divorce and sued on the farkat which was executed by the defendant on that account. It was held that he was not entitled to recover the amount from the cousin as it was money spent on an illegal or immoral purpose. All these cases in our opinion have no application to the case in hand; in the above cases the plaintiff himself was in pari delicto. Sec. 145 of the Contract Act is as follows:— "In every contract of guarante there is an implied promise by the principal debtor to indemnify the surety; and the surety is entitled to recover from the principal debtor whatever sum he has rightfully paid under the guarantee, but no sums which he has paid wrongfully." There is nothing to show that the plaintiff in this case had wrongfully paid any amount or was party to any wrong of which he intended to take advantage in recovering the amount from the defendant. The illustration to the sec. makes the principle underlying clear:— 10. Therefore, in the absence of any case being established by the defendant that the money paid was wrongfully paid by the plaintiff or that the latter was himself a party to any such wrong, the claim of the plaintiff could not be defeated even if it fell within sec. 145 of the Act. 11. In the result we must uphold the decision of the learned Judge of this Court decreeing the suit of the plaintiff and dismiss the appeal with costs.