BHARGAVA, J.—This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for recovery of Rs. 803/ /-9 on the the basis of two khatas (Ex. 1 for Rs. 521/- and Ex. 2 for Rs. 297/-) executed on 20th December, 1942 by the respondent. Both the courts have dismissed the suit. 2. Plaintiffs case was that Manji defendant and his younger brother Lakhmiji after the death of their father Doongarji lived jointly. That on 20th December, 1942, defendant Manji acknowledged Rs. 521/- as due from him and executed a khata on page 12 of the Bahi for the same. On the same day he also acknowledged Rs. 297/- due from him and executed a Khata at page 13 of his account book. Defendant further agreed to pay interest on the amounts acknowledged by him. It was alleged that the defendant and his younger brother made the following payments in Exs.1 and 2. In Ex. 1 Rs. 5/- on 18.12.45 Rs. 5/- on 15.12.48 Rs. 5/- on 10.12.51 In Ex. 2 Rs. 2/- on 18.12.45 Rs. 2/- on 15.12.48 Rs. 5/- on 10.12.51 The total amount with interest of Rs. 519/11/- in Ex. 1 came to Rs.1040.11/-. Similarly in Ex. 2 the total amount with interest of Rs. 294/2/- came to Rs.591.2/-. Thus the total amount due from the defendant and his brother came to Rs. 1631/13/6 out of which Lakhmi Ji took upon himself the responsibility to pay Rs. 801/13/- and therefore, the plaintiff filed the present suit for the remaining amount i. e., Rs. 803/9/- against the defendant. The suit was contested by the defendant and he denied execution of both Ex.1 and 2 as well as the alleged payments. It was pleaded that Khatas Ex.1 and 2 were mere acknowledgements and a suit could not be founded on them. 4. The trial court found execution of Exs. 1 and 2 proved against the defendant. It further found the fact of payments proved against the defendant. But it held that Exs. 1 and 2 were mere acknowledgments and as the previous accounts were not produced, they could not be made the basis of the Suit and in that view of the matter dismissed the suit. The first appellate court on this point disagreed with the trial court and held that because Exs. But it held that Exs. 1 and 2 were mere acknowledgments and as the previous accounts were not produced, they could not be made the basis of the Suit and in that view of the matter dismissed the suit. The first appellate court on this point disagreed with the trial court and held that because Exs. 1 and 2 contained a stipulation for payment of interest they were not acknowledgments but were agreements and a suit could be based on them. As regards the alleged payments it held that the entry regarding payment of Rs. 5/- and Rs. 2/- on 18.12.45 was not proved to bear the thumb impression of the defendant and as such could not extend the period of limitation, and therefore, holding that the suit had become barred by limitation, dismissed it. 5. Exs. 1 and 2 are in the following terms: — Ex. 5/- and Rs. 2/- on 18.12.45 was not proved to bear the thumb impression of the defendant and as such could not extend the period of limitation, and therefore, holding that the suit had become barred by limitation, dismissed it. 5. Exs. 1 and 2 are in the following terms: — Ex. 1 ikuk 12 iVsy Mksxjth Lr ekuth xzke yhyoklk uk la- 1999 uk exlj onh 1 521½ ukek ckdh ys.kk ik% obMs chtkus vds :ih;k ikap lkS us ,dohl uk.ks dynkj rsuwa C;kt jke 12 ys[ks lMs rs xh.k ysowa yh% dksBkjh Fkwjth Fkkoj pan &½ fVdV ukS tes :- 521½ lk- iaM;k txUukFk mEesnjke yh\ ekuth o% Fkkojpan 519½ os;kt ds mnM+s mD[ks la- 2010 uk exlj lqnh 1 1040AAA½ rFkkukeqa 511½ [kkrk ikus 2 oghMs Jh ts iVsy Mwaxjth y{khuk fgLlk uk rsus [kkrs tqnk eaMkorh vrjs tek djks tqns [kkrs y{kh us ekaM;k rk- 10.2.54 bZ- dks &&& 526½ 5½ la- 2002 uk exlj lqnh 14 5½ jksdM+k vkO;k vds :ih;k ikl vekjs v:c: vk;k NS g% ekuth yh- dksBkjh /kujkt dl:ykyuk fu- ekuth c- dl:yky 5½ jksdM+k C;kt vds ikap vkO;k la- 2005 uk exlj lqnh 14 yh- dksBkjh ?kqyth FkkojpUn fu- y[klh c% FkkojpUnth ekuth FkkojpUn l- 2008 uk exlj lqnh 12 rk- 10.12.51 5½ jksdM+k vkO;k vds :ih;k ikap iqjk vekjs v:c: vkO;k g- ekuth oks y[kth yh- ukanfy;k BkdjpUn th eksrh pUn iqatiqj fu- ekuth fu- y[kth c- eksrhpUn Ex.2 ikuk 13 iVsy Mksxjth Lr ekuth xzke yhykor uk la- 1999 uk exlj onh 1 297½ ukeka ckdh ik% oghMs chtkus vds :ih;k clksu lrk.k uk.ks dynkj rsuqa C;kt jke 12 vds ckj ysds lMs rs x.kh ySowa yh- dksBkjh /kqjth FkkojpUn ½ ukS tesa :- 267½ lk- iM;k txUukFk mesn jke fu- ekuth c- dksBkjh FkkojpUn 277AA&½ C;kt ds jD[ks l- 2010 exlj lqnh 1 &&&& 574Aa 26AA½ C;kt ds iz- AAA½ ghlkc ls T;knk gksrs gS lks ukes fy[ks gS dqy :- 294½ lqn ds jD[ksA exlj lqnh 10 &&&& 591½ rFkk ukeq 290AAA½ [kkrk ik% 341 oghMs chts iVsy Mwaxjth y{khuk fgLlk uk rsus [kkrs tqnk eaMkok Fkh vrjs tdk djh tqns [kkrs y{kh us ekaM;k rk- 10.2.54 bZLohA &&&& 302AAA½ 3½ C;kt esa deh Fkk os rjr ehrh 2½ l- 2002 uk exlj lqnh 14 2½ jksdM+k vkO;k vds :ih;k os uk.ks dynkj vekjs v:c: vk;k NS g- ekuth yh- dksBkjh /kujkt dpyyky uk uh- ekuth c- dl:yky 2½ jksdM+k vds csl- 2005 uk exlj lqnh 14 oh- dksBkjh /kqyth FkkojpUn uh- ekuth uh- y[kth c% FkkojpUn c%FkkojpUn 5½ jksdM+k vds vkO;k g- ekuth o y[kth yh uh- BkdjpUnth eksrhpUn iqatiqj uh- y[kth uh- ekuth c% eksrhpUn 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the first appellate court did not take care to read the statements of the plaintiff and his other witness Motichand and Thanwar Chand from whose evidence all the three payments in Ex. 1 and 2 were fully proved and it was also proved that the fact of each payment was made in writing and that each writing bore the thumb impression of the defendant. In that connection he has placed the statements of the plaintiff and of other witnesses before me. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent however, argues that the finding of the first appellate court that Exs. 1 and 2 contained a promise to pay and could be the basis of the suit was not correct. He has urged that both these documents are mere acknowledgments and a suit cannot be based on them. He has referred to Kanraj Vs. Vijai Singh,(1), Hasti Mal and another Vs. Shanker Dan and others(3), Ganesh Prasad Vs. Rombati Bai(4), Ratanchand Damru Mal Vs. Keth Singh,(5) and Mt. Janaka Vs. Sheo Charan and others,(6). He has also urged that even if it be held that Exs. 1 and 2 contained a promise to pay the case would not be covered by Sec. 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act because the other conditions namely that the debt had become barred by limitation and the defendant was the person charged therewith have not been satisfied. The plaintiff although was called upon to produce his previous accounts but failed to do so. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has met this argument in this way; that in Ex. 1 and 2 there is a clear stipulation for payment of interest. It is not mere acknowledgment but is coupled with a promise to pay interest and that being so it is a fresh agreement on which a suit can be founded. He contends that from the statement of the plaintiff and the language of the Exs. 1 and 2 it would be clear that the parties intended to substitute new contract for the old one and Exs. 1 and 2 amount to novation of contract. 9. The first question which calls for determination is whether Exs. 1 and 2 which are in similar terms are mere acknowledgments or agreements. In this connection reliance has been placed on Manak Shaw Vs. 1 and 2 amount to novation of contract. 9. The first question which calls for determination is whether Exs. 1 and 2 which are in similar terms are mere acknowledgments or agreements. In this connection reliance has been placed on Manak Shaw Vs. Tara Chand(7), Prahlad Prasad and another Vs. Bhagwan Das and another(8), Shanti Prasad and another Vs. Harnam Das and others(9), Gopi Vs. Singh Ram(10), Debi Prasad Vs. Bhagwati Prasad and another(11) and Tulsi Ram Shrikishan Marwadi Vs. Zaboo Bhima Shankar(12), 10. In Manak Shaws cases (7) it was held that: — "When in a document, interest is mentioned as an integral part of an acknowledgment of debt the debtor has no other purpose to mention it there except to make a promise to pay the interest at the rate mentioned therein. Therefore, wherever rate of interest is mentioned in an acknowledgment, it will be deemed to be one containing stipulation to pay interest even though there is no express promise to pay it. Such a document is covered by proviso to Art.1, Sch.I, of the Stamp Act and will not be chargeable to duty under that art. The document will come within the ambit of the term agreement and the proper stamp chargeable would be under Art.5 of the Stamp Act. Various cases on the subject were reviewed in this case and the cases reported in AIR. 1927 Allahabad, 676, A.I.R. 1933 All, 179, and A.I.R. 1938 Lahore 234 were cited with approval. 11. In Prahlad Prasads case(8), the plaintiff had sent to the defendant a statement of account and the defendant endorsed an acknowledgment that the amounts stated in the statement remained due from him and added the words interest at annas 12 per cent per mensem. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the document satisfied the conditions of Sec. 25(3) of the Contract Act. On behalf of the defendant it was, urged that there was no express promise to pay in writing as is required under the terms of that sub-section. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the document satisfied the conditions of Sec. 25(3) of the Contract Act. On behalf of the defendant it was, urged that there was no express promise to pay in writing as is required under the terms of that sub-section. The defendants contention was repelled and it was held that:-— "In our view it is impossible to hold that the stipulation as to interest can be interpreted otherwise than as a promise to pay interest in the future at the named rate whether the promise was in express words such as I promise to pay or a matter of necessary implication, is immaterial. In Shanti Prakashs case (9), it was held that: — "Whereever there is a balance struck and interest has been fixed or agreed to be paid, the words have always been construed to mean a promise to pay within the meaning of S. 25(3)." With regard to the language used it was further observed that: — "Where the words used amount to the words is payable or to be paid or to be taken or to be given baqi dena baqi lena etc, almost invariably that such words amounts to a promise to pay within the meaning of Sec. 25(3), Contract Act. In Gopis case (10) the document was in these terms: — "Lekha Gopy Bania bera Ganesh ka gam (gaon) Kakrpiwala jis ka biaj dar bara ana Sainkra dear le lena lekha kar ke mahina gail miti Poh Sudi Tij Sambat 1882, 700 rupaye baqi rehe dena miti Poh Sudi Tij Sambat 1982, Dastkhat Gopy Banida ticket 1 anna. It was held that: "It was a good contract under sec. It was held that: "It was a good contract under sec. 25 (3 contract Act, even if it consisted of time bared items." In Debi Prasads case (ii) it was held that: "If a person takes a sum from another person on a condition that it shall carry interest at a particular rate then in legal language he takes a loan and incurs a debt, and in all debts and loans the law implies an obligation on the part of the debtor or borrower to pay back the loan and a promise to pay is implict." In Tulsirams case, (12) it was held that: "Where in a letter the defendant says that he had taken a certain sum that day and affixes a stamp and also promises interest at the rate of Re. 1 per cent per mensem on this sum, the letter fulfils the requirements of S. 25(3), Cont ract Act and a suit can be based on it, even if the amount represents a time-barred debt." In none of the cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondent the documents contained a promise to pay interest. In those cases the document was a mere acknowledgment and therefore, it was decided that even though in an acknowledgment there is an implied promise to pay the debt still it does not amount to an express promise to pay which is necessary under Sec. 25(3) of the Contract Act and mere acknowledgment cannot be the basis of the suit. Therefore, the cases on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent are clearly distinguishable on this ground alone that in none of them there was stipulation to pay interest. There is no doubt that there is a distinction between an acknowledgment under Sec. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act and a fresh promise under Sec. 25(3) of the Contract Act. An unconditional acknowledgment because it implies a promise to pay, can be sufficient for the purpose of extending the limitation under Sec. 19 of the Limitation Act. But such an acknowledgment cannot be implied to contain an express promise to pay in writing so as to fall within the ambit of Sec. 25(3) Contract Act. If that were so Sec. 19 of the Limitation Act would be rendered nugatory. But such an acknowledgment cannot be implied to contain an express promise to pay in writing so as to fall within the ambit of Sec. 25(3) Contract Act. If that were so Sec. 19 of the Limitation Act would be rendered nugatory. In order that a document may be made the basis of a suit, it should contain an express promise to pay in writing and not only an implied promise to pay which an acknowledgment signifies. 12. It is settled law that if there is an acknowledgment along with astipulation to pay interest which is its integral part then there is a promise to pay in writing which satisfied the requirements of Sec. 25(3) of the Contract Act. 13. The next contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that even if that be so and it is held that the document contains an express promise to pay still the plaintiff is not entitled to succeed because the other conditions of Sec. 25(3) as noted above have not been satisfied. 14. On behalf of the appellant it is urged that Exs. 1 and 2 are fresh agreements in place of the old ones and a suit can be filed on their basis. It is obvious that Exs. 1 and 2 were in the nature of account stated and balance was struck from old accounts because there is a reference of the other accounts books in Exs. I and 2. It is also clear from the statement of the plaintiff that Exs. 1 and 2 were executed in lieu of the old accounts to which a reference has been made in that statement and that position does not seem to have been controverted by the defendant either in the cross-examination of the plaintiff or at any other stage. It may be noted that the defendant himself did not enter the witness box. I am therefore of the opinion that the parties substituted new contracts in place of the old ones and there is a novation of contract and Exs. 1 and 2 can form the basis of the suit. Apart from novation such promise is enforceable by virtue of sec. 25(3) if the debt had become barred on that date. 15. The next question that has to be considered is whether the payments as alleged by the plaintiff have been proved. 1 and 2 can form the basis of the suit. Apart from novation such promise is enforceable by virtue of sec. 25(3) if the debt had become barred on that date. 15. The next question that has to be considered is whether the payments as alleged by the plaintiff have been proved. The plaintiff in his own statement says that in Ex. 1 defendant had paid Rs. 5/- on 18th December, 1945 and the payment was recorded by Kachroo Lal (P. W. 3) and the defendant affixed his own thumb impression. Similarly, he proves the payment of Rs. 5/- on 15th December, 1948 and says that it was recorded by Thanwarchand (P. W. 2) and below that entry the defendant and his brother Lakhmiji had affixed their thumb impressions. For the last payment of Rs. 5/- made on 10th December, 1951, he says that the amount was paid and it was recorded by Motichand(P. W. 4) but he omits to state that the defendant had put his thumb impression below this entry. But Motichand (P. W. 4) has staled that the amount was paid in his presence. He had recorded the payment and the defendant had put his thump impression below the entry. Thanwarchand has also supported the statement of the plaintiff and has proved the payment of Rs. 5/-on 15th December, 1948. Kachroolal of course omits to say in clear language that the defendant had put his thumb impression under the entry regarding the payment of Rs. 5/- on 18th December, 1945. But even if his statement is left out of consideration the unrebutted statement of the plaintiff is quite sufficient to prove these payments within the meaning of S. 20 of the Limitation Act. Similarly in Ex.2 payment of Rs. 2/- on 18th December, 1958 again of Rs. 2/- on 18th December, 1948 and of Rs. 5/- on 10th December, 1951, is proved by the statements of the plaintiff and his witnesses Motichand and Thanwarchand. The learned District Judge did not consider the statement of the plaintiff and his other two witnesses namely Thanwarchand and Motichand at all. He did not think it necessary to consider even the statements of Motichand and Thanwarchand probably because the first payment of Rs. The learned District Judge did not consider the statement of the plaintiff and his other two witnesses namely Thanwarchand and Motichand at all. He did not think it necessary to consider even the statements of Motichand and Thanwarchand probably because the first payment of Rs. 5/- on 18th December, 1945 was not proved by the evidence of Kachroolal but there is no reason why he should not have considered the plaintiffs statement on that point. As noted above the defendant did not enter the witness box and the plaintiffs statement remained unrebutted. 16. Apparently therefore, there was no reason to disbelieve the plaintiff on that point. From this evidence it is established that the payments were made within the prescribed period and fact of payment was recorded in writing which bore the thumb impression of the defendant. The suit was filed within three years of the last payment i.e. on 10th December, 1951 and was therefore, within limitation. According to the plaintiffs statement the total amount due including interest came to Rs. 1631/13/6 out of which Lakhmiji took upon himself the liability to pay Rs. 801/13/-. He therefore, did not file any suit for that amount against the defendant and only sought to recover Rs, 803/9/- the remaining balance. 17. In view of these findings the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for the suit amount. He has however, not produced the old khatas and it is not clear as to how much interest he had already realised on the principal money advanced by him. Looking to the circumstances of the case the plaintiff is not allowed any interest pendente lite or future. 18. This appeal is therefore, allowed, judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside and the plaintiffs suit for a sum of Rs. 803/9/- is decreed with costs of all the courts against the defendant. He will not be entitled to any pendente lite or future interest.