Judgment AYYANGAR, J. : (For himself and Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo, JJ.) The two Civil Appeals are by special leave of this Court and the two Writ Petitions have been filed by the respective appellants seeking the same relief as in the appeals, the relief sought being the setting aside of orders passed by the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry as the State Transport appellate authority (under the Motor Vehicles Act). All these four have been heard together because of a common point raised regarding the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the appeals and the petitions. 2. It is manifest that the preliminary point about the jurisdiction of this Court should have first to be considered before dealing with the merits of the contentions raised in the appeals and petitions. It might be convenient to state a few facts to appreciate the context in which the questions debated before us arise and the point concerned in the order now passed. 3. Sivarama Reddiar the appellant in Civil Appeal 43 of 1961 and the petitioner in Writ Petition 298 of 1960, is a citizen of India and is engaged in the business of motor transport. By a notification dated December 27, 1958 in the official gazette of Pondicherry the State Transport Commission of Pondicherry invited applications for the grant of stage carriage permits to be submitted before February 27, 1959, including the route from Pondicherry to Karaikal, the latter being another former French possession. In response to this notification, Sivarama Reddiar as well as one Gopal Pillai who is the second respondent to the appeal and the second respondent in the Writ Petition were two of the 19 persons who made applications for the grant of this permit to them. Before the State Transport Commission dealt with these applications, the Government of India in the exercise of its powers under S. 4 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. 1947 published a notification in the Official Gazette of Pondicherry extending the provisions of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as in force in Delhi to Pondicherry with effect from June 19, 1959. Before the State Transport Commission dealt with these applications, the Government of India in the exercise of its powers under S. 4 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. 1947 published a notification in the Official Gazette of Pondicherry extending the provisions of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as in force in Delhi to Pondicherry with effect from June 19, 1959. Rules 3(4) and 4 of this order promulgated under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act provided: "3 (4) Any Court, tribunal or authority required or empowered to enforce the said Act in Pondicherry may for the purpose of facilitating its application in relation to Pondicherry construe the said Act with such alteration not affecting the substance as may be necessary or proper with respect to the matter before the Court, tribunal or authority, as the case may be." 4. Rule 4 effected a repeal of existing Laws in these terms: "Repeal of existing laws: All laws in force in Pondicherry immediately before the commencement of the Order which correspond to the Act and the rules, notifications and Orders applied to Pondicherry by this order shall, except in so far as such laws relate to the levy of any fee, cease to have effect, save as respects things done or omitted to be done before such commencement On July 21, 1959, the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by S. 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 constituted a State Transport Authority for Pondicherry. The State Transport Authority, Pondicherry thus created issued a notification on August 1,1959 by which it required persons who had applied for State Carriage permits in response to the notification dated December 2 7, 1958 to furnish particulars with regard to a number of matters which were relevant for being considered for the grant of a Stage Carriage permit under the Motor Vehicles Act. Both the appellant-petitioner Sivarama Reddiar as well as inter alia the respondent Gopal Pillai furnished the required particulars. The particulars supplied by the parties were checked and verified by designated authorities and thereafter the State Transport Authority by an order on April 30, 1960 directed the grant of the permit to the appellant-petitioner Sivarama Reddiar rejecting the claims of all others including the respondent Gopala Pillai. The particulars supplied by the parties were checked and verified by designated authorities and thereafter the State Transport Authority by an order on April 30, 1960 directed the grant of the permit to the appellant-petitioner Sivarama Reddiar rejecting the claims of all others including the respondent Gopala Pillai. Though the Motor Vehicles Act which had been extended to Pondicherry included S. 64, whereby persons aggrieved by an order of a State Transport Authority could file appeals against such order, no appellate authority had been constituted by the Chief Commissioner. This situation was remedied by a notification by the Chief Commissioner dated Mat 4, 1960 whereby he constituted himself under S. 68 of the Act as the appellate authority for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under S. 64 thereof, Several of the aggrieved operators including Gopala Pillai preferred appeals to the Chief Commissioner. By an order dated September 5, 1960 the Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry allowed the appeal of the respondent Gopala Pillai, set aside the order of the State Transport authority granting the permit to the appellant Sivarama Reddiar and directed that the permit for the route Pondicherry to Karaikal be issued in favour of the respondent Gopala Pillai. Writ Petition No. 293 of 1960 has been filed to secure the setting aside of this order of the Chief Commissioner on the ground that the order violates the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioner by Part III of the Constitution and Civil Appeal No. 43 of 1961 is directed to obtain the same relief. It is not necessary at this state to set out the facts of the other appeal and petition by Masthan Sahib, because except that the route is different and so are the grounds on which the order of the Chief Commissioner is sought to be impugned, the other material facts relevant for the consideration of the preliminary point to which we adverted are exactly the same. 4a. The preliminary objection that is raised to the entertainment of the appeal is shortly as follows: Art. 136 (1) of the Constitution under which the appellant has obtained special leave reads: "136(1). 4a. The preliminary objection that is raised to the entertainment of the appeal is shortly as follows: Art. 136 (1) of the Constitution under which the appellant has obtained special leave reads: "136(1). Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the SC may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India." In order, therefore, that this Court might have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal it is a pre-requisite that the Court or Tribunal from whose judgment or order the appeal is preferred should be one in the territory of India. It is urged on behalf of the respondent that Pondicherry is not part of the territory of India, with the consequence that the Chief Commissioner whose order is impugned in the appeal is not "a Court or tribunal in the territory of India". The question thus raised is of great political and constitutional significance and it is not disputed that if this area were not part of the territory of India, this Court would have no jurisdiction in the absence of any legislation by Parliament under Art. 138 (1) and the Civil Appeal would have to be dismissed as incompetent. 5. It was common ground that this was the position in regard to the maintainability of the appeal but in regard to the writ Petition Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, learned Counsel for the petitioner, sought to sustain its main/inability on slightly different grounds. He invited our attention to the terms of Art. 12 of the Constitution which reads: "In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, "the State" includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India." 6. Learned Counsel pointed out that for the purpose of the exercise of this Court s powers under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of the fundamental rights its jurisdiction was not limited to the authorities functioning within the territory of India but that it extended also to the giving of directions and the issuing of orders to authorities functioning even outside the territory of India, provided that such authorities were subject to the control of the Government of India. This submission appears to us well founded and that the powers of this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution are not circumscribed by any territorial limitation. It extends not merely over every authority within the territory of India but also those functioning outside, provided that such authorities are under the control of the Government of India. 7. The power conferred on this Court by Part III of the Constitution has, however, to be read in conjunction with Art. 142 of the Constitution which reads: "142(1) The SC in the exercise of the jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, & any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the SC shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself." 8. It would be seen that Art. 142 brings in a limitation as regards the territory in which the orders or directions of this Court could be enforced. It is manifest that there is an anomaly or a discordance between the powers of this Court under Art. 32 read with Art. 12 and the executability or enforceability of the orders under Art. 142. It is manifest that there is an anomaly or a discordance between the powers of this Court under Art. 32 read with Art. 12 and the executability or enforceability of the orders under Art. 142. It is possible that this has apparently arisen because the last words of Art. 12 extending the jurisdiction of this Court to authorities "under the control of the Government of India" were added at late state of the Constitution-making, while Arts. 142 and 144, the latter reading: "All authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the SC". were taken, in whole or in part, from S. 210 of the Government of India Act. 1935 and that no necessary changes were made in Art. 142 to bring it into line with Art. 12 as it finally emerged and the powers of this Court under Art. 32. But this however offers us no solution to the question which is whether, in view of the limitation imposed by Art. 142 on the area within which alone the directions or orders of this Court could be directly enforced, the issue a writ in the nature of certiorari or other appropriate writ or direction to quash a quasi-judicial order passed by an authority outside the territory of India though such authority is under the control of the Government of India. If the order of the authority under the control of the Government of India but functioning outside the territory of India was of an executive or administrative nature, relief could be afforded to a petitioner under Art. 32 by passing suitable orders against the Government of India directing them to give effect to the decision of this Court by the exercise of their powers of control over the authority outside the territory of India. Such an order could be enforceable by virtue of Art. 144, as also Art. 142. But in a case where the order of the outside authority is of a quasi-judicial nature, as in the case before us, we consider that resort to such a procedure is not possible and that if the orders or directions of this Court could not be directly enforced against the authority in Pondicherry, the order would be ineffective and that the Court will not stultify itself by passing such an order. 8a. 8a. In these circumstances it becomes imperative that we should ascertain the constitutional and political status of Pondicherry in relation to the Union of India. Certain documents have been placed before us and in particular an agreement dated October 21,1954 entered into between the Government of India and of France by which the administration of Pondicherry was ceded to the Government of India. Mr. Vishwanatha Sastri, learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner, contended that on the terms and covenant contained in this agreement Pondicherry was a part of the territory of India. On the other hand, Mr. Chari learned Counsel for the respondents urged that the reservations contained in the agreement were such as to preclude the court from reaching the conclusion that there had been a transfer of complete sovereignty, which according to him was necessary in order to constitute the area as a part of the territory of India. The learned Solicitor-General who appeared in response to the notice to the Union of India, submitted that the Union Government was agreeable to the respective contentions urged by the parties being decided by the Court. 9. We have considered the matter urged before us with great care and desire to make the following observations: So far as the Constitution of India is concerned, we have an express definition of what the phrase "territory of India" means. Article 1(3) enacts: "1 (3) The territory of India shall comprise (a) the territories of the States: (b) the union territories specified in the First Schedule; and (c) such other territories as may be acquired ". 10. There might be little difficulty about locating the territories which are set out in cls. (a) and (b) but when one comes to (c) the question arises as to when a territory is "acquired" and what constitutes "acquisition." Having regard to the subject dealt with, the expression "acquired" should be taken to be a reference to "acquisition" as understood in Public International Law. If there were any public notification, assertion or declaration by which the Government of this country had declared or territory as part and parcel of the territory of India, the Courts would be bound to recognize an "acquisition" as having taken place, with the consequence that that territory would be part of the territory of the Union within Art. 1(3)(c). If there were any public notification, assertion or declaration by which the Government of this country had declared or territory as part and parcel of the territory of India, the Courts would be bound to recognize an "acquisition" as having taken place, with the consequence that that territory would be part of the territory of the Union within Art. 1(3)(c). In the present case, we have this feature that the administration of the territory is being conducted under the powers vested in the Government under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. 11. The preamble to that Act recites that it was: "An Act to provide for the exercise of certain foreign jurisdiction of the Central Government." and accordingly the expression "foreign jurisdiction" is defined in its S.2(a) to mean "the jurisdiction which the Central Government has for the time being in or in relation to any territory outside India". Thus this would prima facie show that Pondicherry has not been "acquired" but still continues to be outside the territory of India. In our opinion, however though this might be very strong evidence that the territory has not been "acquired" and so not part of the "territory of India", it is still not conclusive. In this state of circumstances two courses would be open to us: (1) to decide for ourselves on the material that has been placed before us in the shape of the agreement between the two government etc. whether Pondicherry has been "acquired" so as to become part of the territory of India, or (2) to invoke the assistance of the Government of India by inviting them to state whether the territory has been acquired within Art. 1(3) of the Constitution and whether Pondicherry is thus now part of the "territory of India". We originally proposed to avail ourselves only of the procedure indicated in S.6 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1947 which enacts: "6 (1) If in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in a Court established in India, or by the authority of the Central Government outside India, any question arises as to the existence or extent of any Foreign jurisdiction of the Central Government, the Secretary to the Government of India in the appropriate department shall, on the application of the Court, send to the Court the decision of the Central Government on the question, and that decision shall for the purposes of the proceeding be final. (2) The Court shall sent to the said Secretary, in a document under the seal of the Court or signed by a Judge of the Court questions framed so as properly to raise the question, and sufficient answers to those questions shall be returned to the Court by the Secretary and those answers shall or production thereof be conclusive evidence of the matters there in contained". 12. But the learned Solicitor-General very properly pointed out that an answer to the question which could be referred under this provision would relate merely to "the existence or extent of jurisdiction" and that information on these points might not be sufficient to solve the problem posed by the preliminary question raised in the appeals and petitions as to whether Pondicherry is a part of the "territory of India or not. We agree with the learned Solicitor-General that information relating to the "existence or extent" of the jurisdiction exercisable by the Union Government in the territory might not completely solve the question for our decision as to whether Pondicherry is part of the territory of India or not, but still if the extent of the jurisdiction vested in the Union Government by the arrangements entered into between the two Governments virtually amounts to a transfer of sovereignty for every practical purpose, it would be possible to contend that such a transfer or cession was so incompatible with the existence of any practical sovereignty in the French Government as to detract from the surrender or transfer being other than complete. It is for this reason that we consider it proper to exercise the powers vested in the Court under S.6 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. 13. It would be observed from what has been stated above that it would be more satisfactory & more useful for the disposal of the proceedings before us if we ascertain from the Union Government an answer to the question whether they do or do not consider that Pondicherry is part of the territory of India. We have only to add that on the decisions in England, the Court has jurisdiction to invite the government to assist it by information as to whether according to Government any territory was part of Her Majesty s Dominion or not (vide the Fagerness, 1927 p. 311). Besides, the learned Solicitor-General agreed that the Government would assist us by answering our reference. Besides, the learned Solicitor-General agreed that the Government would assist us by answering our reference. In view of the matters set out above we direct that the following questions shall be forwarded to the Union of India under the seal of this Court for the submission of their answers: (1) whether Pondicherry which was a former French Settlement is or is not at present comprised within the territory of India as specified in Art. 1(3) of the Constitution by virtue of the Articles of the Merger Agreement dated October 21, 1954 between the Governments of India and France and other relevant agreements, arrangements, acts and conduct of the two Governments. (2) If the answer to Question 1 is that Pondicherry is not within the territory of India, what is the extent of the jurisdiction exercised by the Union Government over the said territory and whether it extends to making all and every arrangement for its civil administration, its defence and in regard to its foreign affairs. The Government of India might also state the extent of jurisdiction which France possesses over the area and which operates as as a diminution of the jurisdiction ceded to or enjoyed by the Government of India. 14. On the receipt of the answers to these questions the appeals will be posted for further hearing. SARKAR, J.: ( For himself and K. C. Das Gupta, J.) 15. Four matters came up for hearing together. Two of these are appeals brought with leave granted by this Court and two are petitions under Art.32 of the Constitution. One appeal and one petition are by one party and the other appeal and petition are by another. The appeal and the petition by each party challenge an order made by the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Each of the two orders challenged was made on applications for the grant of bus permits. By one of the orders a permit for a certain route had been given to a person other than one of the parties who has moved us in preference to him. By the other order similarly, the claim of the other party moving us, to a permit for a different route was rejected. All the matters raise substantially the same question concerning the validity of the Chief Commissioner s orders. 16. By the other order similarly, the claim of the other party moving us, to a permit for a different route was rejected. All the matters raise substantially the same question concerning the validity of the Chief Commissioner s orders. 16. Now, Pondicherry was earlier a French possession administered by the Government of France. By an agreement between the Governments of India and France, the administration of Pondicherry was transferred to the Government of India as from November 1, 1954. The Government of India had been exercising, power in Pondicherry since, under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947. The Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry is an officer of the Government of India appointed under the powers derived as a result of the agreement. 17. With regard to the appeals, a question arose at the hearing before us as to whether they were competent. The appeals had been filed with leave granted under Art. 136 of the Constitution. It was said that the appeals were incompetent because Pondicherry was outside the Indian territories and under Art.136 no appeal from any court outside such territories lay to this Court. It was, however, contended on behalf of the appellants that since the Indo-French agreement or very soon thereafter, Pondicherry became part of the Indian territories as a territory acquired by India and therefore, the appeals were competent. As the most satisfactory way of deciding the question whether Pondicherry is within India or not is to seek information from the Government on the point, the majority of the members of the Bench are of opinion that the Government of India should be approached to enlighten us about it. The learned Solicitor General, appearing for the Government, has not objected to this procedure being adopted. 18. With regard to the Petitions under Art.32, it was contended that the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry was a State within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution as under that Article any authority under the control of the Government of India outside the territory of India was a State for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution. On this basis it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the petitions under Art.32 asking for certain writs to quash the orders of the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry were also competent. On this basis it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the petitions under Art.32 asking for certain writs to quash the orders of the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry were also competent. A further question then arises as to whether in view of Art. 142 of the Constitution the writs, if issued, could be enforced against an authority under the control of the Government of India at Pondicherry, if Pondicherry was outside India and if they could not, whether the Court should issue the writs as it would only be stultifying itself by doing so. 19. It seems to us that it is unnecessary to decide these questions at this stage, for we are going to ask the Government to inform us whether Pondicherry was at the relevant time part of Indian territories. If the Government inform us that Pondicherry was part of India, then no question would arise concerning the powers or jurisdiction of this Court in any of the matters now before us. If the information from the Government is that Pondicherry is not within the territories of India, that will in our opinion, be the proper time to consider whether the Court can still give the petitioners the relief which they ask. 20. These cases involve other question of difficulty and importance on which it would be proper, in our view, to make a pronouncement after the Government of India s answer to our request is received. As to none of these or indeed any question arising in these cases we express any opinion at this stage. We wish, however, to observe now that it seems to us exceedingly strange that if this Court finds that a party s fundamental right has been violated, from which it would follow that that party has a right to move this Court under Art. 32 and to obtain the necessary writ, this Court could refuse to issue it for the reason that it would thereby be stultifying itself. If a party is entitled to a writ under Art. 32, then we are not aware that there is any discretion in the Court to refuse the writ on the ground that the writ cannot be enforced. If a party is entitled to a writ under Art. 32, then we are not aware that there is any discretion in the Court to refuse the writ on the ground that the writ cannot be enforced. Even assuming that in view of Art. 142 of the Constitution a writ cannot be enforced outside India- as to which we pronounce no opinion now- might it not be said with justification that it is not necessary for us to be unduly pressed by considerations of the difficulties of the enforcement of the writ and that it would be reasonable for us to think that the Government of India has sufficient respect for this Court to do all that is in its power to give effect to this Court s order, whether or not there might be technical difficulties in the way of its enforcement by this Court ? In view of these doubts, we are unable, as at present advised to concur in the opinion expressed in the judgment of the majority of the learned Judges constituting the Bench that Art. 142 stands in the way of this Court issuing a writ under Art. 32 in this case. We would reserve our opinion till a later stage and till it becomes necessary to express any opinion at all. ORDER 21. BY the Court :- We direct that the two questions set out in the majority judgment be forwarded to the Union of India under the seal of this Court for submission of their answers. 22. On receipt of the answers to the questions the appeals will be posted for further hearing. Order accordingly. Editorial note: The judgment of the SC delivered after the receipt of the answers on the questions referred to the Government has already been published in AIR 1962 SC 797 as the copy of the judgment was received earlier than the copy of the judgment here being reported. For Citation : AIR 1963 SC 533