JUDGMENT Madhavan Nair, J. 1. This Second Appeal is by the legal representative of the 2nd defendant. The suit property belonged to the plaintiffs tarwad, and at the partition in 1091 was allotted to the plaintiffs tavazhi. At that time the property was in the possession of a third person under a "Michavara-Pattom"� of 1069 to redeem which the plaintiff instituted O.S. No. 1789 of 1103 on the file of the Munsiffs Court, Alleppey, and secured the judgment, Ext. B. In execution thereof the plaintiff obtained delivery of the property on l8thMeenam 1118. The 1st defendant in the present suit, not being to nomine a party to Ext.B, applied for redelivery of the property, which was allowed by the executing court W Ext. H order dated 4th Dhanu 1121. Though the matter was taken in second appeal before the erstwhile Travancore High Court the order was only affirmed by Ext. C dated 9th Makaraml 123 and the 1st defendant obtained redelivery of the property. This suit was therefore instituted under Order XXI, Rule 101 of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure (corresponding to Rule 103 of the Indian Code). The contention was that the plaintiff-decree-holder, after he had obtained Ext. B decree, lost his rights because of court-sale in O.S. No. 1256 of 1094, evidenced by Ext. F in this case, and was not therefore entitled to execute Ext. B decree nor to claim possession thereunder. It was also contended that the suit was barred by limitation. The learned Munsiff found that the court-sale Under Ext. F. covered the rights of the plaintiff under the decree in Ext. B, that thereafter the plaintiff had no right to execute the decree, and that the order for redelivery was therefore right, and dismissed the suit. The learned Subordinate Judge on appeal held that the suit was not affected by limitation, that the possession which the 1st defendant obtained was only under a sub-demise made by the defendant in that suit after the institution of that suit which was therefore affected by lis pendens, that the present 1 st defendant could not have resisted execution in that case, and that Ext. F sale was not binding on the plaintiff and on all the above grounds decreed the suit with mesne profits which was fixed at Rs. 35 per annum and costs throughout. Hence this second appeal. 2. F sale was not binding on the plaintiff and on all the above grounds decreed the suit with mesne profits which was fixed at Rs. 35 per annum and costs throughout. Hence this second appeal. 2. It is admitted that the tarwad of the plaintiff became divided in 1091 long before the institution of O.S. No. 1256 of 1094. Neither the plaint nor the decree in the case is now available. All that is proved in regard to the same is Ext. D a copy of the file-book in that case, and it shows that the suit was for reimbursement of certain amount which the plaintiff was compelled to remit on behalf of the defendants to that suit and that the present plaintiffs mother was the 9th defendant therein. All the major members of the tarwad which became divided in 1091 had been made parties thereto and a decree was claimed against their properties. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the amount claimed therein was a debt of the tarwad, that all the members of the tarwad had been made parties thereto and that the claim was for a decree against the properties of the members so impleaded and that therefore the decree must be taken to be one against the tarwad itself. It is not shown that the claim related to a pre-partition debt. In view of the admission that the tarwad became divided in 1091, a suit against a non-existent tarwad cannot be conceived. The contention has therefore to be overruled. 3. It was next contended that the suit may be construed as one against the different tavazhis into which the tarwad became divided in the partition of 1091, the necessary parties for such a composite suit having been made defendants therein. There is nothing on record to show that a claim was made against the divided tavazhies. Ext. D only shows that one lump sum was claimed against all the defendants therein who constituted the several divided tavazhies. There was therefore no claim against and divided tavazhi as such. It follows therefore that in Ext. F case there was no decree against the plaintiffs tavazhi. It is pertinent to note in this connection that from the plaintiffs tavazhi only the plaintiffs mother was made a party to that case. There was therefore no claim against and divided tavazhi as such. It follows therefore that in Ext. F case there was no decree against the plaintiffs tavazhi. It is pertinent to note in this connection that from the plaintiffs tavazhi only the plaintiffs mother was made a party to that case. It is admitted that the plaintiff attained majority in 1097 and the court-sale in that case was only on 3rd Meenam 1108 without impleading the plaintiff who had ere then become karnavan of the tavazhi. It follows therefore that even if the decree be construed as one against the plaintiffs tavazhi, the execution sale against the properties of the plaintiffs tavazhi was without proper representation of the tavazhi, and was therefore void. The contention therefore that the decree-holder in Ext.B lost his rights to execute the decree by virtue of the court-sale as per Ext. F has no force. 4. By the above, I should not be understood to have held that it is competent for an execution court to question the competency of the person who appears on record as decree-holder in the case to execute the decree. The execution court is bound to execute the decree as it stands and cannot afford to go behind the decree. See the observations of the Supreme Court in Rcimaswamy Aiyengar v. Kailasa Thcvarai A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 5. The finding of the court below is that the present 1st defendant obtained possession of the property by virtue of an assignment of a sub-demise created by the defendant in Ext. B case subsequent to the institution of that suit; and it is not challenged before me. If the present 1st defendant got possession of the property only by a pendente lite transaction he would not be able to resist the delivery of possession in the execution of the decree in that case. The redelivery that was ordered as per the orders Exts. H and C cannot therefore be sustained. The plaintiffs title to possession of the property as per the delivery had on 18th Meenam 1118 is therefore declared. 6. It was next contended that the order allowing re- delivery (Ext. The redelivery that was ordered as per the orders Exts. H and C cannot therefore be sustained. The plaintiffs title to possession of the property as per the delivery had on 18th Meenam 1118 is therefore declared. 6. It was next contended that the order allowing re- delivery (Ext. H) was passed on 4th Dhanu 1121, and this suit was instituted only on 7th Makaram 1124 and therefore was barred under Article 8 of the Travancore Limitation Act (corresponding to Article 11 -A of the Indian Limitation Act.) The plaintiffs answer thereto is that the abovesaid order Ext. H was taken in appeal and second appeal and therefore the final order on the proceeding was made only by the High Court as per Ext. C dated 9th Makaram 1123 and the suit having been instituted within one year of that date, is not affected by limitation; and further that, in any event, the High Court having directed the plaintiff to institute this suit by its order Ext. C, and this suit, having been instituted within one year thereof, cannot be questioned by the present defendant who was a party to that order of the High Court. 7. A question almost identical on facts came before a Full Bench of this High Court in Chacko v. Govinda Pillai 1957.K.L.T. 742 There an order on obstruction to delivery was passed on 29th Medam 1112. But the suit was instituted only on 21st Midhunam 1118, counting the period of limitation only from 22nd Midhunam 1117 the date of the order on the Civil Revision Petition filed against the order of the executing court. The Full Bench observed: "There Would however appear to be divergence of judicial opinion as to whether when the order on a revision application is one rejecting it, the date of the original order should not be taken to furnish the terminus a quo for the suit under rule 103. The Madras High Court and the erstwhile Travancore High Court favour the view that the period of limitation should be calculated from the date of the High Court's Order-See Venfyotaswtimi v. Sara Bai ( A.I.R. 1943 Madras 633) and Narayanan Pisharody v. Pathoo (1947 T.L.R. 484). The Calcutta High Court would however seem to take the opposite view-See Meghmala Debi v. Saday Parhya (A.I.R. 1933 Calcutta 557). The Calcutta High Court would however seem to take the opposite view-See Meghmala Debi v. Saday Parhya (A.I.R. 1933 Calcutta 557). In Gavinda Menon v. Krishna Pillai (A.I.R. 1955 T.C. 51) a similar though not identical, matter came up for consideration and the decision rendered accords with the Calcutta view. We do not here think it necessary to resolve the conflict, and that for two reasons. In the first place the High Court's order in the revision virtually directed the present plaintiff to have his rights agitated in an original suit and whatever the rule as to the starting point of limitation for such a suit be, defendant 5 who was a respondent to that revision application cannot be heard to question the correctness of the direction. The suit cannot therefore be taken to offend the one years rule under Article 11-A of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908."� The above observation is clearly to the effect that if, on a revision petition against the order on an obstruction to delivery, the High Court gave a direction to the parties to move their disputes in a fresh suit, limitation should be counted only from the date of such order, and a suit instituted within a year thereof would be within time. Though the learned counsel for the appellant vehemently pressed that this observation deserved reconsideration and should be referred to Full Bench, in the circumstances of this case I do not think it necessary to do so. Applying the dictum of the Full Bench, I hold that this suit is not barred by limitation. 8. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the 1st defendant having taken redelivery of the property and himself being a pendente lite transferee and therefore a representative of the defendant in that case, delivery of the property from the judgment-debtor in Ext. B case has to be taken has not been effected so far and that therefore he is entitled to a fixity of tenure as per the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act and could not be evicted hereafter. It is seen that in Ext. B judgment, as also in the judgment of the court below in this case, the expressions lease and mortgage have been used as synonyms. It is seen that in Ext. B judgment, as also in the judgment of the court below in this case, the expressions lease and mortgage have been used as synonyms. One is at a loss to understand from them how the courts construed the document which was the basis of Ext. B judgment, whether as a lease or as a mortgage. That document also is not before Court. Therefore I am unable to decide whether the Michavara-pattam, which was the basis of the decree in Ext. B, was really a mortgage or a lease. The suit has therefore to be remitted to the court of first instance for a consideration of this issue and also of the effect of the delivery had on 18th Meenam 1118, on the defendant claim for fixity of tenure, and for a fresh disposal of the suit in the light of its decisions thereon. Both parties will be entitled to adduce their respective evidence on the above matter. Costs hitherto incurred will be costs in the cause. It is decreed accordingly. The appellant will have the usual refund.