JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal against a decision of the District Judge, Kumaun, rejecting his appeal as time-barred. The facts of this case are peculiar. In 1953 the Munsif of Pauri in the district of Garhwal had the jurisdiction to sit and hear cases at Chamoli about 70 miles away. The case which has resulted in this appeal was tried and heard by the learned Munsif at Chamoli. The following facts are revealed by entries in the order-sheet of the Court. On 7-9-1953, the hearing of the case concluded and the court informed the parties that judgment would be delivered at Pauri on the 11th September. On that day judgment was pronounced at Pauri and the plaintiff's suit dismissed. No party was present and the Court directed that information of the decision was to be sent to counsel which appears to have been done on 15th September. After the expiry of 30 days, the appeal became time-barred on 12th October. On that date an application was made on behalf of the plaintiff for a certified copy of the judgment and decree which were delivered on 2nd November. The appeal was filed on the 9th November. It was accompanied by an application praying that the appeal be treated as within time as counsel received information of the delivery of judgment on 10th October and limitation should be computed from that date. The appellant contended that limitation did not begin to run before the receipt of the court's Parwana that judgment had been delivered in the case. The learned Judge, however, observed that in view of the fact that the date of the judgment had been previously announced, it was the duty of the plaintiff and his counsel to find out on that date what the court's decision was and if they did not care to do so, they were themselves to blame. The learned Judge did not attach any legal significance to the fact that the trial court had intimated to the parties on the 7th September that they would be informed of the judgment, and observed that this was only by way of extra precaution but did not affect the law of limitation. He, therefore, held that the appeal was not filed within time and rejected it. Aggrieved by this order the plaintiff has come to this Court in second appeal. 2. Mr. He, therefore, held that the appeal was not filed within time and rejected it. Aggrieved by this order the plaintiff has come to this Court in second appeal. 2. Mr. R.C. Ghatak, learned counsel for the appellant urged two points in favour of this appeal. First, he contended that the limitation in this case began to run on 10th October only when counsel received the Parwana from the Munsif's court that judgment had been delivered. Learned counsel stated that in view of the peculiar conditions prevailing in the Kumaun hills, information is always sent by the Court to counsel whenever judgment is delivered. He pointed out that the courts are moving from place to place and means of communication are not easy. Therefore, this long standing practice prevails and is invariably followed. Even assuming that this is true, I do not think that this practice can affect the legal position as regards limitation. The period of limitation is prescribed by statute and the law of limitation cannot be modified by any local practice, however, just and convenient it may be in the interests of the bar and the litigant public. The limitation prescribed for an appeal before the District Judge is 30 days from the date of the decree. The law provides for the exclusion of the period which the litigant spends in obtaining certified copies and for other reasons. Sec. 5 makes no provision for any alleged local practice in the hills or elsewhere. The argument that the law of limitation should be modified in the district of Kumaun because of any local practice adopted by the courts for the convenience of counsel or the litigant public must be rejected. I, therefore, hold that the limitation in this case commenced from the date when the judgment was delivered and not when information was received by the plaintiff's counsel. 3. But the Court has the power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the prescribed time. Learned counsel argued in the alternative that the learned Judge should have condoned the delay under Section 5 on the ground that there was sufficient cause for it, and that his approach to the local Practice prevailing in the District of Kumaun was erroneous. 4. I have heard parties at considerable length. Learned counsel argued in the alternative that the learned Judge should have condoned the delay under Section 5 on the ground that there was sufficient cause for it, and that his approach to the local Practice prevailing in the District of Kumaun was erroneous. 4. I have heard parties at considerable length. Similar cases may arise in the future and it is desirable, irrespective of the result of this appeal, to indicate the correct approach to applications for condonation of the delay in filing of appeals from decisions of the courts in Kumaun which keep moving on circuit. It was not seriously disputed by Mr. D. S. Rawat, learned counsel for the respondent, that there is a practice among the courts in Kumaun to send information to counsel after the delivery of judgment. In view of the peculiar circumstances prevailing in this district, particularly the fact that the Kumaun courts do not hear cases in one place but move from one jurisdiction to another, I have difficulty in accepting the view that it is the duty of the party, whenever judgment is delivered in a place other than the one where the case was tried and heard, to arrange for information of the delivery of judgment to be conveyed to it promptly. In my view, this will place an unfair burden on the litigant public. The State may have good reasons of economy to vest one judicial Officer with several local jurisdictions, but the courts must function in a manner which does not result in material prejudice to any party nor add to the burdens of the litigants who already have to pay a heavy court fee to get justice from the State. 5. Under Order 20, R. 3, C.P.C. judgment in every suit must be delivered in open court on a date previously announced. `In open court' ordinarily means where the court sits. If this is done, the parties or their counsel are under a duty to keep themselves informed, so that any appeal against the decision may be filed within the prescribed time. But if the case is heard in one place and the judgment delivered at another place 70 miles away, it is no duty of the plaintiff or his counsel to go chasing after the court over such a long distance to ascertain the nature of the judgment and obtain copies. But if the case is heard in one place and the judgment delivered at another place 70 miles away, it is no duty of the plaintiff or his counsel to go chasing after the court over such a long distance to ascertain the nature of the judgment and obtain copies. This would place an intolerable burden on the litigants. Ordinarily it may be the duty of the litigating Mohamets to go to the judicial Mountain for information after delivery of judgment, but this rule must be relaxed where the Mountain goes to the litigating Mohamet's place to decide his case and keeps moving from place to place. To lessen the burden of the litigants the Kumaun courts which go on circuit have adopted, very properly, the practice of informing counsel after judgment is delivered. I do not think it was the duty of the plaintiff in this case to go all the way to Pauri on the 11th September to get information about the judgment, particularly in view of the fact that the learned Munsif had assured counsel for the parties that information would be sent to them as soon as it was delivered. 6. This does not mean, as stated above, that the law of limitation can be differently interpreted in the Kumaun district simply because the courts move from one jurisdiction to another. But I think the proper approach, whenever an appeal is filed beyond time, should be to make allowance for any delay in the filing of the appeal caused by the fact that information of the decision did not reach the party or its counsel in time as the judgment was delivered at a place away from the place of the hearing of the suit. It would be a fit and proper exercise of the court's discretion under Section 5 to condone the delay in filing the appeal if it was filed within one month of the receipt of information from the court of the delivery of judgment. This aspect was not considered by the learned Judge, presumably because the plaintiff did not pray for condonation of delay but contended that this appeal was within time - an obviously unsound contention. 7. The question before me is whether appeal should be allowed and the case remanded. Mr. This aspect was not considered by the learned Judge, presumably because the plaintiff did not pray for condonation of delay but contended that this appeal was within time - an obviously unsound contention. 7. The question before me is whether appeal should be allowed and the case remanded. Mr. Ghatak strongly urged that the plaintiff should be given an opportunity of showing that the delay was in fact caused only by the belated receipt of information of the delivery of judgment. He pointed out that cowlsel who argued the case at Chamoli had sworn an affidavit that he received the Parwana of the court on 10th October and immediately applied for certified copies of judgment. Mr. Ghatak however had to concede that even according to this affidavit a few days delay still remained unaccounted for, but he prayed for a further opportunity of filing a supplementary affidavit to explain this short delay. I have given this request some consideration, but I think no useful purpose will be served by granting it. Mr. Rawat opposes it and points out that the order-sheet of the Court reveals that information of the judgment was posted to counsel on 15th September. He hinted, though he did not say so in so many words, that it was difficult to believe the statement in counsel's affidavit that a communication posted at Pauri on the 15th September took 25 days to reach Chamoli when there was a motor road connecting the two places. I do not think that this controversy, in which learned counsel who swore the affidavit would almost certainly be involved, should be re-opened. The appellant did not account for the entire delay at the proper time and any supplementary affidavit filed after eight years explaining the delay of a few days is not likely to be of much value. Mr. Ghatak could not state, on a question from the Court, the cause of the unexplained delay. 8. This appeal must, therefore, be missed, but in the circumstances of the case I direct the parties to WI' their own costs of the appeal.