Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff revision petitioner filed a suit against the defendant-respondent. The suit was decreed exparte on 30-11-53. On 23-7-54 an application under 0.9, R.13 CPC. to have the exparte decree set aside was filed on the ground that the summons was not duly served on him and that he came to know about the decree only on 19-7-1954. The plaintiff contended that the summons was affixed as the defendant refused to accept summons. Both sides adduced evidence and the learned Munsiff found that the case set up by the defendant is not true and that the summons was actually offered and refused by the defendant. He, therefore, held that the petition was barred by limitation under S.164 of the Limitation Act and dismissed the petition. 2. The matter was taken up in appeal to the learned Subordinate Judge of Meenachil who agreed with the Munsiff that summons was served on 29-10-53. In the summons the first hearing was fixed for 12-11-53 and as sufficient number of days had not expired the court adjourned the case for appearance of the defendant to 21-11-53. On 21-11-53 as there was no sitting the case was adjourned to 30-11-53. Admittedly no notice of the adjourned date was given to the defendant, as provided in R.6 (i)(c) of 0.9 CPC. He, therefore found that there was no proper service and since there was no proper service of summons the defendant could rely on the knowledge of the decree for filing the application and since the petition was filed within 30 days of the date of knowledge, the petition was within time and on that ground be reversed the order of the Munsiff and set aside the exparte decree. The revision is filed against the aforesaid order. 3. Under 0.9, R.13 if the defendant satisfied the court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, .the court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him. It is clear that the provisions of 0.9 R.6 (1)(c) and the provision for sufficient time to be provided for the appearance of the defendant are mandatory. If that be so, the service will not be proper and that by itself would be a sufficient cause for non-appearance. 4. It is clear that the provisions of 0.9 R.6 (1)(c) and the provision for sufficient time to be provided for the appearance of the defendant are mandatory. If that be so, the service will not be proper and that by itself would be a sufficient cause for non-appearance. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision in Varkey Thomas v. Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. (1954 KLT. 609) where Koshi, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Full Bench held: - "An exparte decree passed in contravention of Art.482 is not an absolute nullity. It is only an irregular exercise of jurisdiction to have passed the decree in violation of the provisions of the article, but all the same the court has inherent jurisdiction to pass a decree in a suit. A decree passed by a competent court irregularly is only voidable, liable to be made void when a person who has a right to proceed in the matter takes the proper steps to have its invalidity declared. A voidable decree carries with it the means of its own overthrow but unless and until it is duly annulled it would have all the force of a valid decree". 5. Even the Full Bench decision referred to above is to the effect that Art.482 is peremptory, and that it gives no discretion to the court. If the provision is mandatory then it follows that the court has absolutely no jurisdiction to adopt a course contrary to such provisions and proceed to pass a decree. A service to be proper must be a proper service in all respects giving the party not only sufficient opportunity, but also necessary time which is enjoined upon by the rules. In the absence of compliance of the mandatory provision it cannot be said that there has been a proper service of summons and if there is no proper service the defendant can certainly rely upon the knowledge of the decree for filing the application. 6. This was the view taken by Vaidialingam, J., in V. Damodaran v. State (1959 KLT. 1157) The head-note reads as follows: - "The Court has absolutely no jurisdiction to adopt a course contrary to the mandatory provision of R.67 of the T-C. Civil Rules of Practice. 6. This was the view taken by Vaidialingam, J., in V. Damodaran v. State (1959 KLT. 1157) The head-note reads as follows: - "The Court has absolutely no jurisdiction to adopt a course contrary to the mandatory provision of R.67 of the T-C. Civil Rules of Practice. In the absence of compliance of the mandatory provision contained in R.67, Civil Rules of Practice, it cannot be said that there has been a proper service of summons in this case in accordance with R.67. The State was perfectly right in relying upon knowledge of the decree for filing the application" 7. If the summons had been properly served the petition which is filed after 30 days from the date of the decree would be barred by limitation. But in a case where there is no proper service the defendant can rely upon knowledge of the decree for filing the application. The defendant has stated that he knew the decree only on 19-7-1954. The learned Munsiff has discussed the evidence and was not prepared to believe this. In a case where the service of summons has been improper very slight evidence on the part of the applicant that he had no knowledge of the decree must be held to be sufficient. The Subordinate Judge was, therefore, perfectly justified in finding that the defendant could be taken to have known about the decree only on 18-7-54 and that the petition was within time. There is no reason to interfere with the well considered order of the learned Subordinate Judge. The revision petition is dismissed. Dismissed.