JUDGMENT T.C. Shrivastava, J. The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed by the respondent Nathoo Prasad against the three appellants for possession of Khaera No. 136, area 14.28 acres, in village Bhilkheda, Tehsil Barwani, District Khar cone. The trial Court had dismissed the suit, but in appeal the Additional District Judge, Nimar, reversed the judgment and decreed the claim. Accordingly, the defendants (appellants) have now come up in second appeal. The land in suit was originally held as a charitable Inam by one Sarasbai, who died without issues, and Chunnilal, who was the pujari of the temple and ancestor of the respondent, took possession of the land. The Barwani Darbar started proceedings against Chunnilal and on 10-8-19(9 the land was ordered to be taken over by the State. Chunnilal died in 1925 but apparently he had preferred an appeal to the Darbar. The matter was finally decided on 11-12-1934 by the order Ex. D/l, according to which the resumption of the Inam was maintained; but the respondent was permitted to continue to hold the land as raiyat, and the appellants were declared sub-tenants of the land entitled to continue on the land on certain terms detailed therein. Although Chunnilal was dead, no application for mutation was made till 1950, when on the application of the respondent his name was mutated in place of Chunnilal. In those proceedings, the appellants had objected to the mutation; but the objection was rejected. Thereafter, the respondent applied to the Tehsildar for restoring the possession of the land under the provisions of the 'Madhya Bbarat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. That application was rejected and so was an appeal preferred against the order on that application. These fact are no longer in dispute, although when the initial arguments were addressed on the appeal, much was said about them. After the arguments were concluded and the case was reserved for judgment Shri Malgawa for the appellants made an application that on account of the enactment of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, the status of the appellants has now been raised to that of an occupancy tenant and they are entitled to continue as such on the land. In other words, whatever may have been the position at the date of the institution of the suit, the subsequent events disentitle the respondent from claiming possession of the land. In other words, whatever may have been the position at the date of the institution of the suit, the subsequent events disentitle the respondent from claiming possession of the land. Shri Sanghi for the respondent replies to these arguments by stating (i) that the appellants were never inducted as sub-tenants by the respondent; and (ii) that section 185(1)(ii)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code does not apply to the case of the appellants. Both the parties are now agreed that for the purpose of the decision of this appeal it should be accepted that they were originally sub-tenants. The first point raised by Shri Sanghi for the respondent that the appellants were not inducted as sub-tenants on the land is without any force. They were undoubtedly holding the land as sub-tenants from Chunnilal originally and the respondent is Chunnilal's heir. After Chunnilal's death when the Inam was resumed, the respondent was granted raiyat rights on the land and on the commencement of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act he became a "pakka tenant" as defined in section 54 (vii). This position is not disputed by the respondent. As per order of the Darbar contained in Ex. D/l the appellants were granted the status of sub-tenants in 1934. That being the position, the appellants were holding the suit land as subtenants from the respondent, who was a pakka tenant. The fact that the land was originally given to the appellants by Chunnilal, who was the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent, or that Chunnilal was not then a pakka tenant does not affect the position. I hold that in the year 1950 the relationship between the parties was that of a pakka tenant and sub-tenant. It has next to be Been whether u/s 185(1)(ii)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code the status of the appellants was raised to that of an occupancy tenant. I hold that in the year 1950 the relationship between the parties was that of a pakka tenant and sub-tenant. It has next to be Been whether u/s 185(1)(ii)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code the status of the appellants was raised to that of an occupancy tenant. The relevant provision reads as follows: Occupancy tenants:-(1) Every person who at the coming into force of this Code holds:- (i) * * * * (a) * * * * (b) * * * * (c) * * * * (ii) in the Madhya Bharat Region;- (a) * * * * (b) any land as Ryotwari sub-lessee as defined in the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub Lessee Protection Act, 1955 (29 of 1955); shall be called an occupancy tenant and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon an occupancy tenant by or under the Code. The definition of a ''Ryotwari Sub-lessee" given in section 3 (b) of the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-Lessee Protection Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Protection Act) is as follows: Ryotwari Sub-lessee means a person to whom a Pakka Tenant of any Ryotwari land has sub-let on sub-lease any part of his Ryotwari land. We may here refer to Borne of the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, as the arguments addressed by Shri Sanghi for the respondent rest on these provisions. The policy of the Tenancy Act was to prevent a pakka tenant from sub-letting his land on any conditions whatsoever and u/s 73 it is provided that no pakka tenant shall sub-let for any period whatsoever any land comprised in his holdings except in the oases provided for in section 74. Section 74 deals with the cases of certain persons under disability who have been granted a concession in the matter of sub-letting them. We need not refer to them for the purpose of the present case. Section 75 provides that all sub-leases created prior to the commencement of the Act shall terminate after the expiry of four years after the commencement of the Act. We need not refer to them for the purpose of the present case. Section 75 provides that all sub-leases created prior to the commencement of the Act shall terminate after the expiry of four years after the commencement of the Act. It will thus be seen that on the fourth anniversary of the Act there will be no sub-tenant left in a Ryotwari village and thus the aim of the Act to abolish sub-tenancy completely and to make the tiller of the soil the direct holder from the State would be achieved. Shri Sanghi referred to the provisions in section 76, which provides that: If the sub lease does not hand over possession of the land sub-let to him after the sub-lease ceases to be in force under sections 74 and 75 to the lessor or his legal heir in case of his (lessor's) death, he shall be deemed to be a trespasser and shall be liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of this Act. On the strength of these provisions in this section, Shri Sanghi contends that as soon as four years expired the appellants became trespassers on the land and could not, therefore, be considered sub-lessees as defined in the Protection Act and consequently they were not entitled to any enlargement of their rights as occupancy tenants under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code. The question was considered in Raghunath Singh v. Gangabat 1961 MPLJ 398 : AIR 1961 MP 49 : 1960 JLJ 998 , in which Krishnan J. held that section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code gives benefit to all persons whose ejectment was stayed under the Protection Act. Shri Sanghi contends that in coming to the conclusion the learned Judge entered into the legislative history of the enactment which is not relevant, as the provisions of section 185 are not ambiguous. He also pointed out that the contentions which he is now raising on the basis of sections 73 to 76 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act were not raised at the time of the arguments in the appeal leading to that decision. In enacting section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code there can be little doubt that by item (b) under sub-clause (ii) the Legislature intended to give protection to some sub-lease in Ryotwari villages in the Madhya Bharat region. In enacting section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code there can be little doubt that by item (b) under sub-clause (ii) the Legislature intended to give protection to some sub-lease in Ryotwari villages in the Madhya Bharat region. The effect of section 75, as I have said above, is that no sub-lessee was left on the land of ryots after the expiry of four years after the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, If the word "sub-lessee" is strictly construed and it 1B insisted upon that the status of a sub-lessee should be existing in 1959 to attract section "185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, it will be observed that there will be absolutely no person on which the rights under that section could be conferred. The interpretation put upon it by Shri Sanghi would thus completely defeat the legislative intent. Under such a situation, a wider construction used on the words in the statute can be placed to give effect, to the legislative intent. I may refer to the following passage from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, on page 229 : Where the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical cone traction, leads to a manifest construction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship, or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their collection; or by rejecting them altogether, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the Legislature could not possibly have intended what its words Signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true reaming. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's un-skillfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's un-skillfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. 9-A. It is obvious that in 1955 when the Protection Act was enacted the Legislature was intending to enlarge the rights of sub-tenants as actual tillers of the soil; but as it involved a definite policy in the matter necessarily requiring some time, the Protection Act was enacted as an interim measure. The provisions in section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code have, therefore, to be liberally construed in favour of sub-lessees and that interpretation which furthers this policy should be accepted. I do not, of course, mean that if the language in section 185 is not at all capable of any beneficial construction in favour of the sub-lessees, the sub-lessees can be given occupancy tenancy tights in spite of it. All that I say is that an attempt has to be made to see whether the language can reasonably be interpreted to fulfill the intention of the Legislature. I have already quoted the relevant provisions from section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code above. Now if we substitute the definition of a sub-lessee for the words "as Ryotwari sub-lessee as defined in the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-Lessee Protection Act, 1955" the provisions read as follows: Every person who at the coming into force of this Code holds any land as a person to whom a pakka tenant of any Byotwari land has sub-let on sub-lease any part of bia Ryotwari land shall be called an occupancy tenant etc. It is pertinent to observe that the definition of a sub-lessee as given in the Protection Act emphasizes only the origin of the tenancy add has no reference to the continuing state of sub tenancy. By incorporating that definition in section 185, the Legislature only meant to point to the origin of the rights in the manner as given in the definition. If a person acquired land in that way, he must be construed to be a sub-lessee for the purpose of Beotion 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code. By incorporating that definition in section 185, the Legislature only meant to point to the origin of the rights in the manner as given in the definition. If a person acquired land in that way, he must be construed to be a sub-lessee for the purpose of Beotion 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code. The apprehension that this might lead to the absurdity that a person, who was a sub-lessee when he originally came on the land, would be protected irrespective of the fact that he had lost the rights several decades ago, was foreseen by the Legislature and a second condition was added to the acquisition of occupancy rights viz., the person claiming such rights must be holding the land at the commencement of the Code, that is, the person must be in possession of the land on that date. Possession may be actual or constructive and may include the possession of a person who had been dispossessed by a trespasser but was entitled in law to take back possession. I need not discuss this matter in detail. Suffice it to observe that the person must be holding $he land at the relevant date. In my opinion, the emphasis of the words "at the coming into force of this Code" used in section 185 must be placed on the condition of holding the laud rather than on the status of "sub-lessee" existing on that date, for the obvious reason that there was no person having that status on that date. This way of construing the enactment seems to me to be reasonable and I have no hesitation in Baying that this interpretation which furthers the intention of the Legislature must be accepted. I shall now consider the effect of sections 73 to 76 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. Before I do so, I may refer to section 58 of that Act which is the main section providing for the ejectment of trespassers. According to that section, any person who occupies land without lawful authority may be dispossessed by the Tehsildar by a summary process and may also be ordered to pay a fine. This section is intended to protect unoccupied land belonging to the Government in a Ryotwari village. It has no application to a land which is in possession of a pakka tenant. This section is intended to protect unoccupied land belonging to the Government in a Ryotwari village. It has no application to a land which is in possession of a pakka tenant. See Chunnilal v. Kalu 1962 MPLJ 139 : 1959 MPC 156 (Rev.). If section 53 stood alone, it is obvious that a pakka tenant who was dispossessed by a trespasser could not avail of the remedy provided under it. It is for this reason that in the several subsequent sections in the Act, where resort to a summary ejectment by a revenue Court is considered necessary, that the offending party has been deemed to be a trespasser by a fiction and it is then provided that action under Beotion 58 would be taken by the Tehsildar for his ejectment. Section 76, which is relied upon by Shri Sanghi, provides that if a sub-lessee does not band over possession of the land to the lessor after the expiry of four years after the commencement of the Act as provided in section 75, "he shall be deemed to be a trespasser and shall be liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of this Act". I do not agree that this section has the effect of declaring the Status of the sub-lessee as that of a trespasser for all purposes. The section creates a fiction and the fiction must be limited to the purpose for which it is created. The object of deeming the sub-lessee as a trespasser in this section is only to make section 58 applicable to the case and it is for that, purpose alone that the fiction has to be restricted. In any other context, the sub-lessee cannot be considered to be a trespasser on the strength of this section alone. Accordingly, I cannot accede to the contention that section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code has no application to the sub-lessees merely because they could be deemed to be trespassers u/s 76 for a limited purpose in the Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. In my opinion, the word "sub-lessee" occurring in section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code should be construed to include a sub-lessee whose sub-lease came to an end u/s 75 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act provided that he continued to hold the land on account of the provisions in the Protection Act. In my opinion, the word "sub-lessee" occurring in section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code should be construed to include a sub-lessee whose sub-lease came to an end u/s 75 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act provided that he continued to hold the land on account of the provisions in the Protection Act. A similar construction was placed on sections 4, 16 and 17 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act in Shyamlal Lachman Vs. Umacharan Ramdulare Tiwari, where the word "tenant" used in those sections was liberally interpreted to include an ex-tenant also, and it was laid down that a tenant whose tenancy bad been terminated prior to 1-1-1959 by a valid notice would be a tenant for the purposes of that Act. Accordingly, a decree for ejectment cannot be passed against him, nor can it be executed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 4. I have no doubt that the word "sub-lessee" occurring in section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code must also be similarly interpreted to include an "ex-sub-lessee". In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The decree of the lower appellate Court, so far as it relates to ejectment of the appellants, is set aside, while that in respect of mesne profits is maintained. The appellants have succeeded in this appeal on account of the change in law in 1959. The ground in that respect was not raised till the case was closed for judgment, and the whole case had therefore to be re-heard. Under the circumstances, I direct that the costs in the Courts below and in this Court shall be borne by the parties as incurred. Final Result : Allowed