Ranawat, C.J.—This is an appeal by Mohinder Singh from the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge of Ganganagar, dated the 19th of June, 1961 convicting the accused appellant Mohinder Singh under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to imprisonment for life. 2. ... ... ... 3. Mr. Chand Mal, for the accused Mohinder Singh, has urged that after the trial court had disbelieved the testimony regarding the extra-judicial concessions of Mohinder Singh, it could not be concluded merely from the presence of human-blood on the shirt of Mohinder Singh and the recovery of the blood-stained axe that he was the author of the crime. It was also argued that when the learned Magistrate assumed that the stains of blood on the shirt of Mohinder Singh were not of the same group as that of the deceased, he had no reason to connect this circumstance with the murder of Gurbax Singh. The learned counsel has also referred to the explanation offered by Mohinder Singh regarding the presence of blood on his shirt and has contended that the explanation being a reasonable one should have been accepted by the trial court and the stains of blood on the shirt of Mohinder Singh could not, therefore, lead to an inference against him about his complicity in Gurbax Singhs murder. As regards the delay in offering this explanation, the learned counsel has mentioned that the only opportunity which the accused got of giving the explanation was at the time of his statement at the trial and that as no question was put to him in the committing court, he had no opportunity to explain the circumstance of there being blood on his shirt at that time. He has referred to the decisions in State of U. P. Vs. Satyavir(l), S. Chimpiraiah Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh(2), and The State Vs. Anadi Betankar(3) and has urged that no such question could have been put to the accused in his statement at the committal stage for the reason that no evidence had been recorded by the committing Magistrate regarding the recovery of the blood-stained shirt and the opinion expressed by the Chemical Examiner and the Serologist about the articles being positive for human-blood. The learned counsel has also read out the statements of the witnesses on the point of extra-judicial confession and he has argued that the evidence of those witnesses is not reliable for the reason that there are material discrepancies in them and also because there is no corroborative evidence on the record in support of the said confession. 4. Mr. Rajnarain for the State has replied that the appreciation of the evidence regarding the extra-judicial confession, by the lower court, is not proper, and that this Court should appreciate the evidence on the point in a proper manner. He has urged that the evidence of the presence of human-blood on the shirt of Mohinder Singh and the recovery of the blood stained axe at his instance afford sufficient corroboration of the extra-judicial confession made by him and that the evidence on the whole is sufficient to warrant the conviction. 5. The Report of the Serologist shows that blood grouping could not be made on account of unstained control being not available and the material not being sufficient to enable the test for the purpose. The learned Additional Sessions Judge assumed, without any evidence on record, that the blood grouping of the shirt of Mohinder Singh was not of the group of the blood of the deceased Gurbax Singh. Probably the learned Judge meant by saying so that the evidence about blood-grouping wast not available on the side of the prosecution in its support. However, he used rather loose language, which virtually meant that the learned Judge assumed that the blood grouping of the shirt was different from the group of the blood of the deceased. If that assumption be correct, it would not involve the accused Mohindersingh in the murder. We think the assumption of the learned Judge is not well founded. As a matter of fact, no blood grouping was possible for the reasons mentioned by the Serologist and it cannot be said whether or not the blood-grouping of the stains of blood on the shirt of Mohinder Singh were of the same group as that of the deceased Gurbax Singh. The learned Judge was wrong in making an assumption on the point without there being evidence or, at any rate, in putting down the circumstance in loose language. 6. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...... 7. The learned Judge was wrong in making an assumption on the point without there being evidence or, at any rate, in putting down the circumstance in loose language. 6. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...... 7. The argument of the counsel of the appellant is that the accused got an opportunity to give the explanation for the first time in the course of the trial and it should, therefore, be assumed that the explanation was not offered with any amount of delay. Had the position been as suggested by the learned counsel, we would have expected the accused to offer this explanation to the investigating officer at the time his shirt was taken possession of on account of stains of blood having been noticed thereon. No question was put to the investigating officer or the Motbirs suggesting the explanation which has been offered for the presence of blood later, at the trial. The committing magistrate did not put any question to the accused regarding the circumstance of the presence of stains of blood on his shirt and in his statement the accused, therefore, it is urged, failed to come out with the explanation which he offered at the time of his examination in course of the trial. It is also argued by the learned counsel that the only questions which a committing magistrate is competent to put to the accused at that stage of enquiry are those limited to the evidence recorded under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 207-A of the Criminal Procedure Code and that there was thus no occasion for the accused to give any information in his statement. The learned trial Judge, while discussing this point, has referred to the omnibus question put by the Magistrate to the accused and has mentioned that the accused should, while replying to that question, have tried to explain the circumstance of the presence of blood on his shirt. A question has thus arisen as to what questions can be put to an accused person in the course of his examination by the committing Magistrate; whether such examination should be limited only to the statements of the witnesses recorded under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 207-A of the Criminal Procedure Code or it should also relate to the material contained in the documents including the statements of the witnesses recorded by the police. (4) of sec. 207-A of the Criminal Procedure Code or it should also relate to the material contained in the documents including the statements of the witnesses recorded by the police. We have been referred to three Single Bench decisions of Allahabad, Andhra and Orissa High Courts in this connection. In State of U.P. Vs. Satyavir(l) the question was whether the commitment was illegal on account of failure to examine the accused in the committing court, and in that context it was observed as follows: — "These two sub-secs.(6) and (7) of sec. 207-A make a clear distinction between the evidence to be recorded under sub-sec. (4) and the documents to be considered; the documents that are to be considered are not treated as evidence. The accused has to be examined only for the purpose of enabling him to explain adverse circumstances appearing in the evidence against him; he is not required to be examined for the purpose of enabling him to explain adverse circumstances appearing in the documents that have to be considered. If no evidence has been recorded under sub-sec. (4), the accused is not required to be examined at all because there is nothing that he can explain. As no evidence has been recorded there are no adverse circumstances appearing against him. If there are adverse circumstances appearing in the documents, the accused is not required to be examined to explain them; all that he is entitled to in every case is that he should be heard before the Magistrate frames a charge against him". In S. Chimpiraiash Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh(2) the learned Judge has observed:– "In my view, sub-sec. (6) does not enjoin upon the Magistrate the duty of examining the accused in regard to documents considered by him but only in regard to evidence referred to in sub-sec. (4)". In the State Vs. Anadi Betankar(3) the commitment was quashed for the reason that the Magistrate, without examining any witnesses during the commitment inquiry, examined the accused persons under sec. 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and in the opinion of the learned Judge the accused were prejudiced by such examination inasmuch as those statements were to be used in the court of Sessions as evidence against them. 8. We have carefully studied the three decisions mentioned above. 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and in the opinion of the learned Judge the accused were prejudiced by such examination inasmuch as those statements were to be used in the court of Sessions as evidence against them. 8. We have carefully studied the three decisions mentioned above. The reasoning which weighed with the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court is that for purposes of sec. 207-A(6), evidence means the statements recorded by the magistrate under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 207-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, and it does not include the documents including the statements recorded by the police which have also to be considered by the magistrate in ordering commitment or discharge of the accused. We find ourselves in respectful disagreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge in this behalf. Sub-sec. (6) of sec. 207-A provides :— "(6) When the evidence referred to in sub-sec. (4) has been taken and the Magistrate has considered all the documents referred to in sec. 173 and has, if necessary, examined the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him and given the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, such Magistrate shall, if he is of opinion that such evidence and documents disclose no grounds for committing the accused person for trial, record his reasons and discharge him.................." Sub-sec. (7) provides :-— "When, upon such evidence being taken, such documents being considered, such examination (if any), being made and the prosecution and the accused being given an opportunity of being heard, the I Magistrate is of opinion that the accused should be committed for trial, he shall frame a charge under his hand, declaring with what offence the accused is charged." It would be noticed that the word "evidence" has appeared in sub-sec. (6) three times and in sub-sec. (7) once. In the beginning of sub-sec.(6), the word "evidence" has been qualified with reference to the statements recorded by the Magistrate under sub sec. (4) and there is no ambiguity as to the meaning of the word at that point. The second time the word has been used without any reference to sub-sec. (6) three times and in sub-sec. (7) once. In the beginning of sub-sec.(6), the word "evidence" has been qualified with reference to the statements recorded by the Magistrate under sub sec. (4) and there is no ambiguity as to the meaning of the word at that point. The second time the word has been used without any reference to sub-sec. (4) and it is difficult to accept the view that the legislature intended to use the word "evidence" |at this point in the same context in which the word has been used for the first time in the sub-section. We think that if the legislature had intended to use the word in a limited sense., it could not have used it without qualifying it by the word "such" as has been done while using this word at subsequent places in the same sub-section and also in sub-sec. (7). The fact that the word "evidence" has been qualified by the term "such" at all subsequent places, goes to show that when the word was used a second time in sub-sec. (6), it was not intended |to be used in a limited sense, but was used in its ordinary dictionary meaning. It also stands to reason that when the Magistrate is to take into account the evidence recorded by him under sub-sec.(4) together with the other documents on the record of the case, the legislature, having regard to the rules of natural justice, could not have the intention to deprive the accused of an opportunity to explain not only the evidence under sub-sec. (4), but also the other materials that are required to be considered against him by the magistrate in, committing him or in discharging him. We do not think the accused can be deemed to be prejudiced by allowing him an opportunity of explaining the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence recorded by the magistrate, or in the documents on the record of the case, merely because this stage may, if occasion arises, be used against him in course of the trial. We do not think the accused can be deemed to be prejudiced by allowing him an opportunity of explaining the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence recorded by the magistrate, or in the documents on the record of the case, merely because this stage may, if occasion arises, be used against him in course of the trial. On the other hand, we think it would prejudice the accused if he is not allowed a fair opportunity to meet the case against him at the preliminary stage of the enquiry, for, if deprived of that opportunity, he may suffer commitment even though he may have a good explanation to offer which may avoid the further proceedings against him. In our opinion, the explanation of the accused, if used as evidence at the trial, cannot be considered to be prejudicial to him in any manner, even though it may form part of the evidence at the trial. We are in respectful disagreement on this point with the opinion expressed by the learned Chief Justice of Orissa. We think it would be proper for a Magistrate, in the course of commitment inquiry, after recording statements if any, under sub-sec. (4), to examine the accused and to afford him an opportunity to explain not only the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence recorded by the Magistrate, but also in the documents that are required to be considered under sub-secs. (6) and (7). In this view of the position of law, we think it was necessary for the committing Magistrate in the instant case, to put questions to the accused regarding the report of the Chemical Examiner and that of the Serologist for the presence of human-blood on the shirt and the axe of the accused Mohinder Singh. The accused was deprived of an opportunity of explaining these circumstances in his statement in the committing court for the simple reason that the Magistrate did not care to put questions to him on the point. 9. However, as observed earlier, we should have expected the accused to come out with an explanation even at the time when his shirt was taken possession of by the Station House Officer for the presence of stains of blood thereon. 9. However, as observed earlier, we should have expected the accused to come out with an explanation even at the time when his shirt was taken possession of by the Station House Officer for the presence of stains of blood thereon. Though Gyanaram and Biru have both stated that the accused had an injury on his middle finger at the time the shirt was taken possession of by the police, the Station Officer, Pusaram, has denied this circumstance. Pusaram has further stated that if he had seen the injury, he would certainly have got the accused medically examined. It has also to be remembered that in addition to the presence of blood on the shirt of the accused, there is the further evidence against him of the recovery of a blood-stained axe from the enclosure of his house in pursuance of information given by him to the investigating officer. The recovery of the axe was made on the 21st of October, 1960, in the night, after the investigating officer had arrived there. Pusarams statement is that he received the axe and sent it to the Chemical Examiner. The report of the Chemical Examiner and that of the Serologist are positive for human-blood on the axe. Karnisingh, who met the accused persons coming from the scene of occurrence, has not mentioned if Mohindersingh carried the axe (Article 1) at that time. He has mentioned that he saw one sheet of cloth (Chadar) in the hand of the accused. The witness did not notice the axe in the hand of Mohindersingh at that time; but as the accused could not have brought the axe to his house later on, we think, he must have been in possession of it at the time when he met Karanisingh. Karanisingh saw the accused from a distance of about 20 paces and it may be that the accused may be carrying the axe under the sheet of cloth noticed by the witness as it has a very small handle. The fact, however, remains that the axe (Article 1) was recovered on information given by Mohindersingh to the investigating officer from inside the enclosure of his own house shortly after the investigating officer reached the village. The doctor, who performed the post-mortem examination, has stated that the wounds on the person of the dead body could have been caused by the axe (Article 1). 10. The doctor, who performed the post-mortem examination, has stated that the wounds on the person of the dead body could have been caused by the axe (Article 1). 10. The learned Judge in the Court below has noted in the judgment that no mention was made in the first information report about the extra-judicial confession and that the fact of such confession having been made is, therefore, doubtful. Gyanaram (P. W. 2) has stated that he got information about the names of the accused for the murder of Gurbaxsingh, firstly from Shersingh and then he got the same information in the Gawad from the accused persons and the names of the accused were mentioned in the first information report on that information. Nand Ram has also similarly supported the version contained in the first information report which is in his handwriting and bears the signatures of Gyanaram and others. Thus, although the fact of the extrajudicial confession has not been mentioned in the first information report, yet the mention of the names of the accused therein emanates from the extra-judicial confession and from no other source and the circumstance of there being no mention of the extra-judicial confession in the first information report is, therefore, not of much consequence and cannot be taken to be detrimental to the prosecution case. Moreover, this is a mere omission in the first information report, and it cannot, by necessary implication, lead to the inference that no extra-judicial confession had been made by that time by the accused. 11. The recovery of the blood-stained shirt from the person of the accused Mohindersingh and also of a blood-stained axe from the enclosure of his house at his instance are circumstances which go to support the extra-judicial confession made by him, even though no particular mention of these articles appeared in that confession. The confession was simple as regards the fact of murder of Gurbaxsingh by the accused and these circumstances are no doubt connected with the murder and they corroborate the fact of the murder, mentioned by the accused, in material particular. It is also significant that the accused Mohinder Singh and Dalbarasingh were seen returning from the scene of occurrence at 10 a.m. by Kami Singh, as mentioned by him. It is also significant that the accused Mohinder Singh and Dalbarasingh were seen returning from the scene of occurrence at 10 a.m. by Kami Singh, as mentioned by him. The dead body was also recovered in the field of Mohinder Singh at the instance of the accused Mohinder Singh and Dalbara Singh before the arrival of the police. There were cut injuries on the neck of the deceased and this circumstance further supports the extra judicial confession. It is also noteworthy that the villagers Gyanaram and other apprehended the accused persons Mohindersingh and Dalbarasingh before the arrival of the police and detained them at the house of Lunaram, where they were found by the Station House Officer when he reached the village. Besides, the learned Judge disbelieved the witnesses of the extra-judicial confession for flimsy reasons as discussed above. 12. The nature of the injuries on the person of the deceased leave no doubt that they were inflicted by a sharpedged weapon like the axe (Article 1) and the accused, in inflicting those injuries, must have intended to cause such injuries as were positively known by him to be likely to cause death. The conviction of accused Mohinder Singh under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code is, therefore, well founded, though not merely on the circumstance of the recovery of the blood-stained axe, but also on the basis of the extra-judicial confession and the circumstances discussed above. He has been sentenced to the lesser of the two sentences. The appeal fails and is dismissed. 13. Mr. Chandmal has prayed for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court; but we do not think this is fit case in the meaninsr of Article 134(l)(c) of the Constitution. The prayer for leave to appeal is therefore rejected.