Research › Browse › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

1961 DIGILAW 253 (KER)

Sivasubramania Iyer v. State of Kerala

1961-08-04

M.S.MENON, P.G.MENON

body1961
JUDGMENT P. Govinda Menon, J. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order of the Government compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service. The petitioner was a Sub-Magistrate in the Judicial Department of the State. While he was working at Ambalapuzha, complaints of corruption and misconduct were received against him and on a preliminary enquiry being conducted, the Government were satisfied that there were sufficient grounds for making a formal and public enquiry into the truth of the imputations and in exercise of their powers under section 2 of the Travancore Public Servants (Inquiries) Act XI of 1122, the Government ordered a public enquiry to be conducted by Sri P. D. Nandana Menon, the Enquiry Commissioner. Charges were framed and served on the petitioner to which he pleaded not guilty. 2. After examining witnesses and making the enquiry in the manner provided by the rules, the Tribunal dealt with the various charges and found that all except charges 1 and 4 were not proved. Charge No. 1 related to the receipt of illegal gratification of Rs. 25 from one Abdul Azeez, examined as P.W. 5 for releasing a lorry of his, which had been seized by the police and produced in court. The Tribunal found that P.W.5s evidence has been corroborated by his advocate P.W. 1, but on the ground that P.W. 5 was the person who actually gave the bribe and P.W. 1 had advised him to offer the bribe, the evidence was not clinching enough, but there were strong grounds to think that the officer was corrupt. Charge No. 1 related to the habitual receipt of illegal gratification by the petitioner for entertaining criminal complaints. On the evidence the Tribunal found that even though no specific instances had been proved circumstances showed that the officer was corrupt. He concluded his report by saying that there was every reason to suspect the integrity of the officer and that he is not a fit person to be continued in the Judicial Service and that he may be allowed to retire from service. 3. On a scrutiny of this report, the Government came to the provisional conclusion that it is not desirable to retain the petitioner in service. So he was called upon to show cause against the action proposed to be taken, namely dismissal and to submit his explanation, if any. 3. On a scrutiny of this report, the Government came to the provisional conclusion that it is not desirable to retain the petitioner in service. So he was called upon to show cause against the action proposed to be taken, namely dismissal and to submit his explanation, if any. He was also informed about the finding of the Tribunal. Pursuant to the notice the petitioner filed a detailed explanation challenging the findings and the general observations made by the Tribunal and pointing out that on mere suspicion he cannot be punished. 4. After a careful examination of the explanation offered, the evidence adduced in the case and the findings recorded in the enquiry, the Government felt that even though no particular charge had been fully made out, there were strong ground to suspect the integrity of the officer and accepting the recommendations of the Tribunal that he should not be retained in service ordered that the petitioner be compulsorily retired from service with effect from 13th November 1959, the date on which he was, placed under suspension. Aggrieved with the order, the petitioner has filed this writ application to quash the order of the Government and to reinstate him in service. 5. It was argued by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the finding of the Tribunal was that none of the charges were proved and if the Government was not inclined to accept the finding and exonerate the petitioner, he ought to have been given another opportunity to convince the Government that the evidence was worthless and that no case had been made out against him meriting the punishment that was sought to be imposed on him. It was also contended that when once the enquiry is ordered, the Government was bound by the findings arrived at by the Tribunal regarding the sustainability of the charges and cannot go behind that finding. 6. Every member of the civil service holds his employment at the pleasure of the State. But the undoubted power of the State to dismiss him is controlled by the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. 6. Every member of the civil service holds his employment at the pleasure of the State. But the undoubted power of the State to dismiss him is controlled by the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Except in the cases governed by the proviso to sub-clause (2) of Article 311, such a servant cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and he could be removed only after he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken. The action proposed to be taken will be known only after the enquiry is held and after the authority concerned comes to a tentative conclusion on the merits, for, the punishment would necessarily depend upon the gravity of the offence committed by the civil servant. Therefore, whatever machinery is provided by the State for the enquiry, whether it be through one of its executive officers or through a Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings, the entire enquiry from the beginning till the punishment is imposed on the officer in process. It is an enquiry held by the authority empowered to remove the servant. Though the enquiry may have to be held in two stages, one up to the time the authority comes to a conclusion on the question of the offence committed by the civil servant and the other from the stage notice is given to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, the entire process of his enquiry will have to be scrutinised for ascertaining whether reasonable opportunity was given to the public servant to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. If every opportunity was given to the civil servant to defend himself by examining witnesses and by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses, it would be unreasonable to compel the authority to repeat the entire enquiry after the second stage is reached. It is true that reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken includes an opportunity to canvass the correctness of the reasons for taking the proposed action. So the authority should necessarily in its order requiring the civil servant to show cause, mention not only the punishment proposed to be inflicted on him but also the reasons for coming to that conclusion. So the authority should necessarily in its order requiring the civil servant to show cause, mention not only the punishment proposed to be inflicted on him but also the reasons for coming to that conclusion. A civil servant can show cause that the Tribunal's report is either vitiated by gross irregularities committed by it or by violating the principles of natural justice. If the finding of the Tribunal is the basis for the proposed punishment, he can also attack the correctness of the finding by showing that the finding is not supported by any evidence. But it would be unreasonable to compel the authority to have trials as it were, one up to the stage of the notice contemplated by Article 311 and the repetition of it again after notice. 7. If this be the law, then in the instant case, it cannot be said that no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner or that he has been prejudiced in any way. The notice gave not only the proposed punishment; but also the reasons for the same. The appellant understood the notice in that sense and submitted his written explanation challenging the validity of the Tribunal's findings and also the quantum of punishment proposed to be inflicted by the Government. We are, therefore, of opinion that there was no need for any further opportunity being given to the petitioner. 8. It is incorrect to say that the report of the Tribunal is final and is binding on the Government. The Enquiry Officer is not a court, but is only an agency created as part of the machinery to provide a reasonable opportunity to the civil servant to show cause against the punishment proposed to be inflicted on him. His mission is essentially a fact finding one, of the collection of materials and his report is only an opinion and in no way binding on the Government who is the punishing authority. 9. We also do not think that in this case the Government has differed from the findings or the recommendations made by the Tribunal. We have carefully gone through the report and we are not prepared to accept the contention of the petitioners learned counsel that the Enquiry Officer did not find the charges established against the petitioner. What he has stated is that even though on the evidence of P.Ws. We have carefully gone through the report and we are not prepared to accept the contention of the petitioners learned counsel that the Enquiry Officer did not find the charges established against the petitioner. What he has stated is that even though on the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 5 he is not in a position to hold that there is clinching evidence regarding payment of the bribe in question, considered as a whole, there were strong grounds to think that the accused officer was corrupt. Thus for all practical purposes, the Tribunal has found that the charge, that the officer is corrupt, has been proved. 10. It is contended that in a case where the charge is one of corruption the court must be satisfied that there was evidence on which a criminal court would convict the accused. We do not agree. A similar argument was raised and repelled in the case in Dr. M. Krishnamoorthy v. The State of Madras A.I.R. 1951 Madras 382, where Rajamannar, C. J., observed as follows : "We see nothing of this sort laid down in Article 311 or in any other Article of the Constitution. It is nowhere stated on what ground a civil servant might be dismissed or removed. One can conceive of a dismissal or removal being justified on grounds of inefficiency, insubordination, of general reputation of corrupt conduct. The Constitution itself does not give any clue. Learned counsel wanted to argue from proviso (d) to clause (2) of Article 311 that the ground on which a dismissal could be justified must be akin to a criminal charge. On the other hand all that proviso enacts is that even the reasonable opportunity of showing cause need not be given to a person who has been actually convicted on a criminal charge." 11. On a scrutiny of the evidence, we are satisfied that the Government had enough material in the case to come to the conclusion that the charge of misconduct had been made out and that the petitioner was not a fit person to continue in the Judiciary. In such service matters to which Article 311 of the Constitution is attracted, the High Court can only see whether the requirements of that Article are satisfied before the punishment was inflicted. In such service matters to which Article 311 of the Constitution is attracted, the High Court can only see whether the requirements of that Article are satisfied before the punishment was inflicted. It is not the function of the High Court to sit in judgment on the decision of the competent authority inflicting the punishment and to say whether the decision about the punishment was or was not based on adequate material. This is not a case where there is a total absence of evidence in which case perhaps it might be open to the petitioner to challenge the finding. All that was necessary was that the civil servant must be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, and it is then for the punishing authority to decide whether the materials are sufficient to impose the punishment. For the foregoing reasons, we come to the conclusion that there in no merit in this petition. The application is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Advocates Fee Rs. 50.