JUDGMENT Mukerji, J. - These are three connected appeals, inasmuch as the controversy in all the three appeals is the same. The appeals were disposed of in the trial court by one judgment, and the learned single Judge also disposed of the second appeals by a common judgment, and we also propose to dispose of the three Special Appeals by this judgment. 2. The suits out of which these appeals have arisen were for the recovery of profits under Section 231 of the U.P. Tenancy Act - there were three suits because the property in respect of which profits were claimed were situated in three separate Mohals. Chhotey Lal was a co-sharer in the three Mohals and the defendant appellant was a Lumberdar. 3. On the 4th June 1934 Chhotey Lal applied to be declared an insolvent and he was declared an insolvent by the Insolvency Judge on the 13th July 1934. On the 26th July 1935 Chhotey Lal was discharged. 4. One Bhikam Singh had a simple money decree against Chhotey Lal and he had, in execution of that decree, put Chhotey Lal's share in the three Mohals to sale, and he had himself purchased the share when there was an auction sale on the 20th June, 1936. It may be noted here that when Bhikam Singh purchased the share of Chhotey Lal in the three Mohals, his share had vested in the Official Receiver by virtue of Sec. 28(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, inasmuch as Chhotey Lal, as we have pointed out earlier, had been declared an insolvent on the 13th July 1934. 5. It appears that sometime in 1945, Bhikam Singh found that his title to the properties, by virtue of his purchase at the auction sale, was probably in jeopardy because of the properties having vested in the Official Receiver and Chhotey Lal not having had any right, title or interest in the properties at the time when they were sold. Bhikam Singh, therefore, approached the Official Receiver and wanted, so to speak, to have the sale regularised. As a result of certain applications which Bhikam Singh made to the Official Receiver, the Official Receiver reported to the Insolvency Court on the 23rd March 1945 to accept the sale which had been made in favour of Bhikam Singh on the 20th June 1936. As a result of certain applications which Bhikam Singh made to the Official Receiver, the Official Receiver reported to the Insolvency Court on the 23rd March 1945 to accept the sale which had been made in favour of Bhikam Singh on the 20th June 1936. On the 1st September 1945 the Insolvency Court made an order to the effect that if Bhikam Singh deposited a sum of Rs. 1,000-2-8 for payment to the creditors of Chhotey Lal then the sale was to be confirmed. What apparently the court meant by the sale being confirmed was that the Insolvency Court was prepared to accept the sale, or that the Official Receiver was to treat that sale of the 20th June 1936 as having been made by him in insolvency proceedings. It appears that Bhikam Singh deposited the sum of Rs. 1,000-2-8 on the 3rd September 1945. There was, it may be pointed out, no specific order thereafter by the Court either refusing the payment or accepting the payment, but it does appear from the record that payment was taken by the Official Receiver and utilised for purposes for which it was meant-viz., for payment to the creditors of Chhotey Lal. 6. The contention which was put forward on behalf of the defendant appellant was that the auction purchase by Bhikam Singh of the 20th June 1936 being of no consequence, inasmuch as, Chhotey Lal was an insolvent at that time and his property had vested in the Official Receiver, the auction purchaser could claim no interest in respect of the property, and that profits could not possibly be recovered on the strength of the title acquired under the auction purchase. It may here be mentioned that there was no controversy as to the period for which profits were claimable and for which the respective suits had been filed on any ground save the in validity of the auction purchase by Bhikam Singh who stepped into the shoes of Chhotey Lal. The courts below decreed the suits. 7. On second appeal a learned single Judge of this Court held that the sale of the 20th June 1936 having been ratified, in a sense, by the Official Receiver and the Insolvency Court the appellant could not escape his liability on the ground of the invalidity of the auction sale of the 20th June 1936. 8. 7. On second appeal a learned single Judge of this Court held that the sale of the 20th June 1936 having been ratified, in a sense, by the Official Receiver and the Insolvency Court the appellant could not escape his liability on the ground of the invalidity of the auction sale of the 20th June 1936. 8. Under Section 28 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act on the making of an order of adjudication the whole of the property of the insolvent vested in the Court or in a Receiver if appointed and that the property became divisible among the creditors. That sub-section further said that no creditor to whom the insolvent was indebted in respect of any debt provable under the Act could, during the pendency of the insolvency proceedings, have no remedy against the property of the insolvent in respect of the debt except with the leave of the Court and on such terms as the Court thought fit to impose. The auction sale of the 20th June 1936 could be ignored by the Official Receiver by virtue of the aforementioned sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 28. The protection which that sub-section gave was a protection meant for the benefit of the creditors. The sub-section did not, in our opinion, create any inherent bar in respect of any rights which a creditor had at common law. The sub-section only placed a restriction on that right. It has to be noted that tinder the sub-section itself the Insolvency Court could give leave to a creditor to proceed against a debtor or his property in respect of a debt. In the instant case the auction sale was not conducted after obtaining the leave of the Insolvency court and therefore the auction sale could have been ignored by the Receiver. Rut we find, as we have already pointed out that the Receiver recognised the sale and the insolvency court, in a sense, by making the order, that it did on the 1st September 1945 ratified the sale as though it was a sale under its own orders, for, indeed, the condition that the Insolvency Court imposed was a condition that ensured to the benefit of the creditors. The result was that the Official Receiver accepted this sale of the 20th June 1936. The result was that the Official Receiver accepted this sale of the 20th June 1936. The Insolvency Court approved of that sale and the creditors got the benefit out of that sale inasmuch as they got a total sum of Rs. 1,000-2-8 for being divided, per capita, to them in proportion to their debts. The question that calls for our determination is whether under the aforementioned circumstances it could be legitimately contended that the defendant who had an obligation to pay the profits in respect of the property which passed into the hands of Bhikam Singh by the sale of the 20th June 1936 could defeat Bhikam Singh's right simply because at the time when the sale was made Chhotey Lal had no saleable interest in the property, for that interest had vested in the Official Receiver. We have found that the Official Receiver subsequently accepted the sale therefore the Official Receiver by his act did what could, in substance, amount to `feeding the estoppel,' a principle which has been recognised in Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. 9. In Midnapur Zamindary Co. v. Abdul Zalil, 1933 A.I.R. Cal. 627 a Bench of the Calcutta High Court held relying on the view of Mr. Freeman in his Law of Void Judicial Sales (Sec. 50, p. 170) that there could be a ratification of a sale which was irregular or voidable of the type in the instant case. The learned single Judge was of the opinion as we have said, that the auction sale of the 20th June 1936 though it was bad in law at the date when it took place, yet the sale was validated by a subsequent order of the Insolvency Court. In our view it was open to. the Insolvency Court to validate the sale and that the Insolvency Court did by its order dated the 1st September 1945 validate the sale and therefore the contention of the defendant-appellant could have no force on the score of the invalidity of the auction sale. 10. For the reasons given above we have seen no force in the three appeals which we dismiss with costs.