Judgment :- 1. The agriculturist-judgment-debtor, who filed a petition in the lower court under S. 22 (1) (b) of Kerala Act XXXI of 1958, is the Civil Revision Petitioner. His immovable properties were sold in execution of a Small Cause decree against him obtained by the 1st respondent in this Civil Revision Petition and the same were purchased by the 2nd respondent. The petitioner applied for setting aside the sale making the necessary deposit contemplated by S.22 of Act XXXI of 1958. The respondents contended that the 1st respondent-decree-holder was a widow and the debt due to her at the commencement of the Act was excluded from the definition of debt under S.2 (c), since the value of the property owned by her at such commencement including the principal amount of the debt did not exceed Rs. 6,000/-. The lower court accepted this contention and dismissed the petition and the judgment-debtor has come up in revision. 2. By S.16 of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief (Amendment) Act, 1960 (Act II of 1961) S.23-A has been inserted in the principal Act and this section provides for an appeal, inter alia, against any order under S.22, to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the court passing the order. The amending Act has been made retrospective from the date of commencement of the principal Act. Therefore, under this section the order sought to be revised, is appealable to the Subordinate Judge's Court. But since the learned advocate of the petitioner did not indicate that he would take advantage of this provision and since the Civil Revision Petition itself was filed prior to the passing of the amending Act, I propose to dispose of the Civil Revision Petition on merits. This course is in order, for, the revisional powers of the High Court under S.115 are excluded only in cases where appeals are provided to the High Court and not to one of the subordinate courts (vide Raman Vasu v. Raman Namboodiripad Narayanan Namboodiripad, CRP. No. 390 of 1961 and Martha Nicholas v. Yesamma,1961 KLT. 927). 3. Mr. This course is in order, for, the revisional powers of the High Court under S.115 are excluded only in cases where appeals are provided to the High Court and not to one of the subordinate courts (vide Raman Vasu v. Raman Namboodiripad Narayanan Namboodiripad, CRP. No. 390 of 1961 and Martha Nicholas v. Yesamma,1961 KLT. 927). 3. Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, the petitioner's learned advocate, has raised two contentions before me: (1) that the earned Munsiff wrongly cast the burden on the petitioner to prove that the debt came within S.2 (c) (viii) and (2) that the term'Debt' in S.22 had its ordinary and natural meaning and it meant any debt of an indebted agriculturist and was not confined to a debt as would come within S.2 (c) of the Act. The contention of the learned advocate on the first point is that since Clause (viii) of Sub-section (c) of S.2 speaks of an exclusion, the claim for such exclusion has to be established by the one who, claims it and therefore, the learned Munsiff was wrong in casting the onus of proving it on the judgment-debtor. I am not sure that this contention is right. "Debt" is defined as any liability in cash or kind due from or incurred by an agriculturist etc. but does not include, inter alia, any debt or debts due to a widow etc. The onus is on the petitioner to prove that the debt in question comes within the definition of that term in S.2 (c), which means that he has not only to establish that it is a liability due from or incurred by an agriculturist, but also to prove that it is not included in any of the clauses under Sub-section (c). At any rate, in this case even if the burden of proving the exclusion is on the decree-holder, even then I do not think that the conclusion of the learned Munsiff is wrong, in view of the evidence available in the case. I have perused the evidence of Pw.1 and Rw. 2 and I am not satisfied that the appreciation of the evidence by the lower court is wrong. 4. I have perused the evidence of Pw.1 and Rw. 2 and I am not satisfied that the appreciation of the evidence by the lower court is wrong. 4. The next point urged by the learned advocate is that in S.22 the term "debt" is used in its natural meaning to include every debt of an indebted agriculturist and not to restrict it to such a debt alone as would come within the definition in S.2 (c) The definition in the section commences with the words "unless the context otherwise requires" and therefore, if the context of S.22 requires otherwise, this contention may be acceptable. The learned Advocate refers to a previous decision of mine in Umbichi Ahamadu v. Kalyaniyamma (1960 KLT. 865), wherein I held that the term "debts" occurring in S.15 had its ordinary and natural meaning and meant all the debts of an indebted agriculturist and not merely such of his debts as would come within the definition of that term in S.2 (c). But S.22 does not indicate any such intent otherwise. S.22 [1] as amended deals with the setting aside of a sale or foreclosure of immovable property, in which an agriculturist had an interest, in execution of a decree for the recovery of a debt or arrears of rent or michavarom and with the setting aside of a sale held under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act or for recovery of a debt due to a Banking Company in liquidation, of any such immovable property in which an agriculturist had an interest. It may be noted that some of these liabilities like arrears of rent and michavarom and a debt due to a banking company are debts not included in the definition of "debt" under S.2 (c). It is argued, on the basis of the inclusion of these liabilities within the scope of S.22, that because these categories of liabilities are also included in S.22 (1), the term "debt" used therein must be presumed to have been used in its ordinary and natural meaning, that is, in its wider meaning to include every category of debt of an agriculturist. I fail to see the force of this contention. If the inclusion of arrears of rent and michavarom and debts due to a baking company means anything, it means that the term "debt" is used in the restricted sense as under S.2 (c). I fail to see the force of this contention. If the inclusion of arrears of rent and michavarom and debts due to a baking company means anything, it means that the term "debt" is used in the restricted sense as under S.2 (c). The legislature wanted to include within the scope of S.22 certain other categories of liabilities like arrears of rent and michavarom and debts due to banking companies, which are not strictly "debts" under the definition and those liabilities had been specifically enumerated in the section. If "debt" in S.22 (1) included all the liabilities of an agriculturist like arrears of rent and michavarom and debts due to banking companies, then those liabilities need not have been again mentioned specifically in the section. Therefore, the indication is clear that the term "debt" in S.22 is used in the sense in which the term appears in the definition. The Civil Revision Petition therefore fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs. Dismissed.