Judgment :- 1. The accused who is a driver of a stage carriage vehicle was found guilty of the offence under S.279 and 304A, IPC., by the District Magistrate of Ernakulam and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months under S.279 IPC and to simple imprisonment for six months under S.304A, IPC., the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal the conviction was confirmed but the learned Additional Sessions Judge reduced the sentence to one of a fine of Rs. 150/-. This court issued notice to the accused to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced. Counsel for the accused has challenged the conviction as he is entitled to do under Clause.6 to S.449, Crl. P.C. 2. The facts of the case briefly stated are as follows:-On 29-1-60 at about 2.45 P.M. the accused was driving a bus KLK.1130 towards the Ernakulam bus stand. The vehicle came along the Shanmughom road, turned east to join the main Broadway road. At the junction of this road there is a traffic post. Vehicles should normally go round the traffic post before entering into the Broadway road. The evidence of Pws.1, 5 and 6 is that instead of rounding the traffic post, the bus was driven along the western side of the post at a high speed and without sounding the horn and that the accused lost control and rat) over the deceased who was sitting by the side of the road about 2 feet to the south of the main gate of the Chief justice's Bunglow causing his instantaneous death. The bus further dashed against a cyclist, Pw. 5 with the result that he was thrown into the gutter and the bus got on to the gutter and struck against the compound wall. 3. Pw.1 is a person who was sitting on the same side of the road 50 feet from where the deceased was sitting. Pw. 6 the other eye witness is a soda vendor hawking soda on the same side of the road about 100 feet to the south. The learned District Magistrate has discussed the evidence of these witnesses and has chosen to believe them. On a re-appraisal of the evidence the learned Additional Sessions Judge also concurred in the finding of the trial Magistrate. The learned District Magistrate has discussed the evidence of these witnesses and has chosen to believe them. On a re-appraisal of the evidence the learned Additional Sessions Judge also concurred in the finding of the trial Magistrate. The learned counsel has taken me through the relevant evidence and on a close scrutiny of the evidence in the light of the criticisms made, I do not find any ground to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the courts below. Pws.1, 5 and 6 are thoroughly disinterested witnesses whose evidence could with safety be accepted. Within fifteen minutes of the occurrence Pw.1 filed the complaint Ext. P1 and it is fully in conformity with the evidence adduced in the case. 4. The case of the accused was that after proceeding from the Shanmugham road he was sounding his horn, that he went round the traffic post by the eastern end of the road and while he was proceeding towards the south the cyclist Pw. 5 came from the opposite direction through the centre of the road and to avoid the cyclist dashing against the vehicle he turned the bus towards the west, that unfortunately the cyclist also turned to the west and dashed against the bus and on account of this sudden swerving of the vehicle to save the cyclist, the bus ran over the hawker and caused his death. 5. The accused examined on his side two witnesses. Dw.1 is the Assistant Educational Officer who was a passenger in the bus. He deposed that the accused had rounded the traffic post, that the cyclist came from the opposite direction and therefore the accused swerved to the west and that the cyclist fell into the gutter and the bus went off the road. His evidence was rightly rejected by the courts below. He is a neighbour of the accused and was only trying to help him. I am not at all impressed with his evidence. He says he saw the cyclist coming and does not attempt to give any explanation as to why the accused went to the wrong side and did not swerve to his left. Equally unacceptable is the evidence of Dw. 2 the conductor who is highly interested in the accused. I am not at all impressed with his evidence. He says he saw the cyclist coming and does not attempt to give any explanation as to why the accused went to the wrong side and did not swerve to his left. Equally unacceptable is the evidence of Dw. 2 the conductor who is highly interested in the accused. If their evidence is true that the accused had rounded the traffic post one would normally expect the bus to proceed on the eastern side of the road and there would have been no need to go to the extreme western end of the road. 6. A person who is driving a motor vehicle should always keep it in a state of control sufficient to enable him to avoid dashing against any other vehicle or running into any passenger who may fail to step off the road and he is prima facie guilty of negligence if the vehicle leaves the road and dashes head long and knocks against other users of the road. In the case of Reg v. Idu Beg (ILR. 3 All. 776) Straight, J., observed as follows: "Criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause injury but without the intention to cause injury, or knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted". With this view of the law, I am in entire agreement. By the criminal negligence in driving his bus on the wrong side at a speed which the circumstances existing at the time of the collision did not warrant by not keeping a proper look out to avoid collision and by failing to apply the efficient brakes which he had in time and which breaking would have averted the collision, the accused is plainly guilty of the offences under S.304-A and 279 I.P.C. The conviction is therefore correct. 7. 7. The next question that arises for determination is as to what is the proper sentence to be awarded. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has relied on the decision in Emperor v. Khanmahomed Shermahomed (AIR. 1937 Born. 96) for finding that the sentence of imprisonment is not called for and for reducing the sentence to one of a fine of Rs.150/-. In that case Beaumont, C.J. , stated that one has to consider whether the rash and negligent act of the accused showed callousness on the part of the accused as regards the risk to which he was exposing other persons and the severity of the sentence must depend to a great extent on the degree of callousness which is present in the conduct of the accused. On the particular facts of that case the court found that there was no callous conduct on the part of the accused and that it was only an error of judgment The decision must be limited to its special circumstances and in this connection the warning given by Lord Halsbury, L. C., in Quinn v. Leatham (1901 A.C. 495) may be usefully borne in mind: "Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found". Here the facts found by the learned judge himself show utter callousness on the part of the driver in having gone on the wrong side of the road losing control of the vehicle and running over a person who was sitting on the extreme end of the road and dashing against the cyclist who was coming on his proper side. 8. Counsel for the accused referred me to the observations of Mukerji.J. in H.W. Smith v. Emperor (AIR. 1926 Cal. 300 at p. 303) where the learned judge had stated: "The difficulty in dealing with a Case of this nature is to keep out of one's mind the prejudice that inevitably creeps in by reason of the fact, that lives have been lost and the responsibility for the same ultimately rests with none else but the accused. 1926 Cal. 300 at p. 303) where the learned judge had stated: "The difficulty in dealing with a Case of this nature is to keep out of one's mind the prejudice that inevitably creeps in by reason of the fact, that lives have been lost and the responsibility for the same ultimately rests with none else but the accused. This prejudice is bound more or less to reflect on the question of the culpability of the accused and give rise to false issues which tend to cloud judicial vision". The task no doubt of keeping out prejudice might be a difficult one but it has got to be performed. The trial Magistrate without any demonstrable prejudice has found the accused guilty on proper grounds and awarded a punishment proportionate to the gravity of the offences and "to ensure that road-hogs of the description of the accused are taught a deterrent lesson". The question of sentence is a matter of discretion of the trial judge and where that discretion has been properly exercised along accepted judicial lines an appellate court should not interfere with the sentence except for strong reasons. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has reduced the sentence for reasons which do not appear to me to be quite satisfactory. The sentence awarded by the learned Judge, I have no doubt, errs on the side of liberality. There is no justification for reduction at all. 9. It is true that the power of enhancing sentence should be exercised by the High Court very rarelly, but when it appears to the Court that the sentence imposed on the accused is grossly inadequate having regard to the gravity of the offence resulting in miscarriage of justice, it should not hesitate to impose an adequate sentence on the accused even though the effect of the order will be to send the accused back to jail. On a careful and anxious consideration of the case, I have no hesitation in holding that the sentence awarded by the District Magistrate was the proper sentence. I, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and enhance the sentence passed on the accused to one of simple imprisonment for three months under S.279 IPC., and simple imprisonment for six months under S.304A, IPC., the sentence to run concurrently. The rule issued by this court is accepted.