JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.— This petition, under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, has been preferred for quashing criminal complaint No 63/2 of 1987, pending trial in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class (3), Simla. 2. Briefly, the case is that the complainant married accused Kuldeep Singh on 29-4-1979 at village Baddowal, District Ludhiana The grievance of the complainant is that various articles, detailed in Annexure-A to the complaint, were given to the accused by the parents of the complainant towards dowry before, at and after the marriage, in addition to Rs 6,000 for purchase of T. V. Set and Dining Table set However, the accused continued persisting for mote dowry and treated her with cruelty. Finally, it was on 26-10-1980 that she was forcibly ousted and turned out of the house without any reason It has also been stated that the complainant has now married and despite demand to return the dowry articles, nothing has been done. 3. The present complaint based principally on the facts stated above, has been initiated under section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereafter in short ‘the Act). 4. In order to substantiate the allegations in the complaint, in addition to herself, the complainant produced other witnesses also. The trial , Court, after coming to the conclusion that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused under Section 6 of the Act, issued process summoning the accused by order of 20-8-1987 and then by order of 28-12-1989, charge has been framed against the accused. Feeling aggrieved by these orders, the accused have preferred the present petition in this Court. 5. Shri H. V. Rai, learned Counsel for the accused, submitted that the present complaint is liable to be quashed for want of prior sanction from the District Magistrate or any other competent authority as required by second proviso to section 8-A inserted by the State of Himachal Pradesh to section 8 of the Act. 5. Shri H. V. Rai, learned Counsel for the accused, submitted that the present complaint is liable to be quashed for want of prior sanction from the District Magistrate or any other competent authority as required by second proviso to section 8-A inserted by the State of Himachal Pradesh to section 8 of the Act. It was also contended that under section 7 (b) read with section 7(2) (H, P. State Amendment), cognizance of the offence cannot be taken beyond the period of limitation prescribed by these provisions, 6 In order to support these submissions, strong reliance was placed on decisions like 1988 (2) CLR 138, Likhi Ram and others v. Bane Singh and another, 1989 (1) CLR 55, Deepak Kumar and another v. The State of Punjab and another and 1990 Recent Criminal Reports 268, Gursharan Singh v. Smt Gursharan Kaur. 7. Shri Ashok Sood, learned counsel for the complainant asserted that both these pleas of the learned Counsel for the accused are no longer permissible after the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1984 to the principal Act, 1961. By this amendment, there is no requirement of prior sanction nor of any limitation bar. 8. in view of the conflict between the Central and the State Legislations, it is the former which has to prevail. Reliance in this regard was placed on AIR 1979 SC o98, M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India and AIR 1983 SC 150, T. Barai v Henry Ah Hoe and another. There is no dispute to far as the principle laid down in these cases are concerned. But, they do not apply to the case in hand for the reason that the amended Act of 1984 is subsequent to the commission of offence which in this case was committed on 2^-4-1979 and the marriage between the parties had taken place on 29-4-J 979. It is not a continuing offence in the present case. It is complete as soon as it is committed and section 6 of the Act prescribes a particular period within which the articles have to be restored to the woman or tbe heirs, as the case may be. The new amendment is not intended to be retrospective in operation, since sub-section (2) of section I specifically provides that It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint. The new amendment is not intended to be retrospective in operation, since sub-section (2) of section I specifically provides that It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint. I, therefore, hold that the present complaint has been filed beyond time and is liable to be rejected. Even otherwise, it is grossly delayed. 9. Coming to the other point, by virtue of Himachal Pradesh Act No. 25 of 1970, section 8-A was inserted in the Central Act which lays down that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act, except with the previous sanction of the District Magistrate, having jurisdiction in the area. Prior sanction of District Magistrate is thus a condition precedent for the institution of complaint under this Act Consequently, any complaint moved without the prior sanction of the District Magistrate has to be rejected, since the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the same. 10. The learned Counsel for the accused also submitted that even on facts, no case is made out against the accused and that looking to the facts and circumstances of this case, the proper forum to seek remedy is before a Civil Court and not by resorting to criminal proceeding, since there is serious dispute between the parties not only as to the articles in question, but also the nature of their transfer—whether by way of gifts or by way of dowry. 11. In view of the conclusions relating to the key questions as to the maintainability of the complaint, it is unnecessary to go into these submissions. 12. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that there is merit in this petition and the complaint (Case No 63/2 of 1987, 5m/. Manjeet Kaur v. Kuldeep Singh and others, cannot be allowed to proceed. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and the complaint as well as the proceedings taken in the case referred to above, are hereby quashed. Petition allowed.