JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai, J. 1. The only question for decision is, whether the suit is barred under Article 85 of The Indian Limitation Act. The two courts have held that it is not barred. Hence this second Appeal by the first defendant. 2. The course of dealings between the parties has been found thus and has not been disupted before me. The plaintiff who represents a firm, had advanced various sums of money from time to time to the first defendant who represents another firm and the latter had supplied goods such as jiggery, tapioca, chillies, mustard, etc., to the former for sale on commission. The plaintiff sold them and debited the proceeds against the advances made claiming the commission for himself. The amount sued for was the balance due from the defendant to the plaintiff. The learned counsel for the first defendant relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Forest Company v Lal Chand (A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 1349) in support of the contention, that the account sued on, is not a mutual account within the meaning of Article 85. In that case, the respondents in the Supreme Court had agreed to supply goods in specified quantities at specified times to the appellant, and the latter had made an immediate payment of Rs. 3000 and agreed to pay a further sum of Rs. 10,000/- within ten or twelve days as advance and the balance due for the price of the goods delivered after the expiry of every month. The Court accepted the test laid down by Rankin C. J. in Tea Financing Syndicate Ltd. v Chandrakamal (I. L. R. 58 Calcutta 649) and held that in the case before it, what took place was that the sellers had undertaken to make delivery of goods and the buyer had agreed to pay for them and had in part made the payment in advance. There can be no question that in to far as the payments had been made after the goods had been delivered, they had been made so wards the price due. Such payments were in discharge of the obligation created in the buyer by the deliveries made to it to pay the price of the goods delivered and did not create any obligation on the sellers in favour of the buyer. The account was held to be not a mutual account. 3. Such payments were in discharge of the obligation created in the buyer by the deliveries made to it to pay the price of the goods delivered and did not create any obligation on the sellers in favour of the buyer. The account was held to be not a mutual account. 3. It seems to me, that the present case comes directly within the scope of the case decided by Rankin C. J. There, the plaintiff agreed to make advances to the defendant to the extent of Rs. 80, 000 to enable him to carry on his tea estate and the defendant secured to the plaintiff the crop of the estate for a specified season and agreed to dispatch the tea grown in his estate to the plaintiff, in order that it may be sold by the plaintiff by public auction. Rankin C. J. laid down the test, which was accepted by the supreme Court, to ascertain mutuality, in the following terms: We have, therefore, to see whether under the deed the tea, sent by the defendant to the plaintiff for sale was sent merely by way of discharge of the defendant's debt or whether it was sent in the course of dealings designed to create a credit to the defendant as the owner of the tea sold, which credit when brought into the account would operate by way of set-off to reduce the defendant's liability. Applying this test to the facts of the case before him, the learned Chief Justice concluded: In my opinion, plaintiffs liability to account to the defendant for the proceeds of the tea sold by them was an independent obligation and the circumstance, that they were expected and intended to apply such sums, as would be necessary, in liquidation of their advances, does not mean that this was an account, in which the obligation were all on one side as distinct from an account, in which there are cross-claims or reciprocal demands. In the present case, the goods were not sold to the plaintiff in discharge of the defendant's liability, but were delivered for the purpose of sale by the plaintiff, to enable him to earn his commission debting the balance of the sale proceeds against the amount payable by the defendant. In the present case, the goods were not sold to the plaintiff in discharge of the defendant's liability, but were delivered for the purpose of sale by the plaintiff, to enable him to earn his commission debting the balance of the sale proceeds against the amount payable by the defendant. The plaintiff's counsel also relied on M/s. Ganesh Prasad Bhurelal v M/s. Dulichand Girdharilal (A. I. R. 1961 Madhya Pradesh 99) for contending, that the accrual of the commission due to the plaintiff envisaged an independent account against the defendant; but I am of the view, that this case is fully covered by the decision of Rankin C. J. Here also, as in the other case, the plaintiff's liability to account to the defendant for the proceeds of the goods sold, must be held to be an independent obligation, and applying the above test it follows, that the account sued on is a mutual account within the meaning of Article 85 of the Indian Limitation Act. The case, Union Bank Ltd. v N Raghavan Nair (A. I. R. 1959 Kerala 204-1958 K. L. J. 865) is distinguishable as the payments made by the defendant in that case, were in discharge of the borrowings made by him from time to time. The decision appealed from is right and is hereby affirmed. No other point was urged. The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs.