JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai , J. - This writ petition is directed against the judgment and decree of the Board of Revenue dated 30th of September, 1955. The petitioner who was landlord filed a suit for the ejectment of the respondent no. 2 Kalyan Singh from certain, spots of land (hereinafter referred to as the land in dispute) under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act (hereinafter called the Tenancy Act). The suit was decreed by the trial court and the appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Agra, filed by the respondent no. 2 also failed. The petitioner then put his decree into execution and obtained actual possession over the land in dispute on 5th of August, 1951. By an order dated 5th of August 1951, the Assistant Collector directed the entry of the petitioner's name in the Khasra of 1359 Fasli against the land in dispute. Soon thereafter the petitioner was declared a bhumidhar of the land in dispute. On 30th of December, 1953, the respondent no. 2 filed a suit (being suit no. 5 of 1954) in the court of the Assistant Collector, 1st class, for reinstatement under Sec. 232/20 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and land Reforms Act, (hereinafter called the Act) on the allegation that he was a sub-tenant and entered as such in the khasra of 1356 Fasli against the plots in dispute and had thus become an adhivasi under Section 20 of the Act with a right to obtain possession over the land in dispute by virtue of the provisions of Section 232 of the Act. The petitioner contested the suit, inter alia on the ground that the respondent No. 2 was. not an occupant within the meaning of Section 20 of the Act, that he had not become an adhivasi and as such was not entitled to the benefit of Section 232 of the Act, that the suit was time-barred and that he was not entitled to regain possession as against the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner was a bhumidhar of the land in dispute and could not be ejected. The suit was decreed by the trial court, and the appeal which was taken to the Commissioner was lost. Thereafter the petitioner filed a second appeal before the Board of Revenue. That appeal was also dismissed on 30th of September 1955, as already mentioned above. The suit was decreed by the trial court, and the appeal which was taken to the Commissioner was lost. Thereafter the petitioner filed a second appeal before the Board of Revenue. That appeal was also dismissed on 30th of September 1955, as already mentioned above. The prayer in the petition is that the order of the Assistant Collector dated 11-8-1954, that of the Additional Commissioner dated 9-5-1955 and that of the Board of Revenue dated 30-9-1955 be quashed. 2. We have heard Mr. Gopi Nath in support of the petition. No one has appeared on behalf of the respondent. Mr. Gopi Nath has made two submissions before us. His first submission is that the provisions of Cls. (a) and land (b) of Section 20 of the Act are mutually exclusive and that if a person acquires adhivasi rights under Cl. (a) he cannot qualify to acquire the same rights under Cl. (b) and the benefits of Cl. (b) shall not be extended to him. Sec. 20 of the Act reads as follows :- "Every person who - (a) on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting was or has been deemed to be in accordance with the provisions of this Act - (i) except as provided in sub-CI. (i) of Cl. (b), a tenant of sir other than a tenant referred to in Cl. (ix) of Section 19 or in whose favour hereditary rights accrue in accordance with the provisions of Section 10, or, (ii) except as provided in sub-Cl. (b), a sub-tenant other than a sub-tenant referred to in proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Section 27 of the Untitled Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947 or in Sub-Sec. (4) of Section 47 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act. 1939 of any land other than grove land, (b) was recorded as occupant- (i) of any land other than grove land or land to which Section 16 applies or land referred to in the proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Section 27 of the U.P. Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947 in the khasra or khatauni of 1356 F. prepared under Secs. 28 and 33 respectively of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 or who was on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting entitled to regain possession thereof under Cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 27 of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947. 28 and 33 respectively of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 or who was on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting entitled to regain possession thereof under Cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 27 of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947. (ii) of any land to which Section 16 applies, in the khasra or khatauni of 1356 Fasli prepared under Secs. 28 and 33 respectively of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901, but who was not in possession in the year 1359F. shall unless he has become a bhumidar of the land under sub-sec. (2) of Section 18 or an asami under Cl. (h) of Section 21, be called adhivasi of the land and shall subject to the provisions of this Act, be entitled to take or retain possession thereof. Explanation I - Where a person referred to in Cl. (b) was evicted from the land after June 30, 1948, he shall notwithstanding anything in any order or decree, be deemed to be a person entitled to regain possession of the land. Explanation II - Where any entry in the records referred to in Cl. (b) has been corrected before the date of vesting under or in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, the entry so corrected shall for the purpose of the said clause prevail. Explanation III - For the purposes of Explanation II an entry shall be deemed to have been corrected before the date of vesting if an order or decree of a competent court requiring any correction in records had been made before the said date and had become final even though the correction may not have been incorporated in the records. Explanation IV - For purposes of this section "occupant" as respects any land does not include a person who was entitled as an intermediary to the land or any share therein in the year 1356F. 3. Cl. (a) of Section 20 provides that every person who on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting was or has been deemed to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act a tenant of sir not being of one of the categories mentioned in sub-Cl. (i) of Cl. (b) or who was a sub-tenant other than sub-tenants mentioned in sub-Cl. (ii) of Cl. (i) of Cl. (b) or who was a sub-tenant other than sub-tenants mentioned in sub-Cl. (ii) of Cl. (a) shall unless he has become a bhumidhar or an asami be called an adhivasi and shall subject to the provisions of the Act be deemed to take or retain possession thereof. Cl. (h) provides that whoever was recorded as occupant of any land other than those specifically provided for under that clause shall, unless he has become a bhumidhar or an asami, be called an adhivasi. It would be noticed that the opening words of Section 20 and the closing words of that section before the explanations start are common to both the Cls. (a) and (b). In other words, though Cl. (a) and (b) provide for different classes of persons the consequences that follow and the rights that accrue to them are the same. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel that if a person is a sub-tenant (as the respondent No. 2 in the present case was) he cannot get the advantage of also being recorded as an occupant. There is nothing in Section 20 which can reasonably lead us to conclude that Cls. (a) and (b) are mutually exclusive. It is well known that the same legal status may be acquired by a person by virtue of two or more different rights. A person can be an elector in a municipal board by virtue of his educational qualifications as also by virtue of the rent that he pays, and it cannot be said that inasmuch as he could not qualify himself to be an elector unless he had the required educational qualifications he could not acquire the same status by virtue of his having other qualifications i.e., of owning a house or of paying rent. A person who has attained a certain legal status by virtue of two different provisions can fall back on any of the provisions in order to sustain his right. In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the first submission of the learned counsel. 4. Mr. Gopi Nath has contended, placing reliance upon the provisions of Section 199 of the Act, that even though the respondent No. 2 may have become an adhivasi he could not disposses, the petitioner and obtain possession over the land in dispute at his cost. 4. Mr. Gopi Nath has contended, placing reliance upon the provisions of Section 199 of the Act, that even though the respondent No. 2 may have become an adhivasi he could not disposses, the petitioner and obtain possession over the land in dispute at his cost. Sec. 199 of the Act reads as follows: - "No bhumidhar shall be liable to ejectment." Mr. Gopi Nath's contention is that the word "ejectment" is a synonym for the word "dispossession" and that what Section 199 really provides is that a bhumidhar shall not be dispossessed. The word "ejectment" has not been defined in the Act. In Murray's "The New English Dictionary" Vol. 3, the following has been mentioned with regard to eject :- "Thrown out, the term was coined by Prof. Clifford on analogy of subject, objection to throw, to throw from within to turn out, evict (a person) from property or possessions, esp. in law ....." The dictionary meaning would, therefore, show that the word ejectment or eject is comprehensive enough not only to include ejectment from possession but also ejectment from property. In other words, it comprehends not only physical dispossession but also extinguishment of legal rights. It appears to us that the word ejectment in Section 199 has been used not in the sense of physical dispossession but in the sense of extinguishment of legal rights. Mr. Gopi Nath has invited our attention to several provisions of the Act wherein the word ejectment has been used with regard to sirdars, asamis and adhivusis and it is contended that it is a well known principle of interpretation of statutes that ordinarily the same meaning should be given to a particular word occurring in different parts of the same Act. We are unable to agree with this contention. The view that normally the same meaning should be given to the same word occurring at different places in the same Act is subordinate to another rule and that is that the meanings to be attributed to a word must be found from the context in which it is used. So far as sirdars, asamis and adhivasis are concerned they are only tenants and do not enjoy either proprietary or semi-proprietary rights. The only rights that they enjoy are to retain possession and cultivate the land so long as that right continues with them. So far as sirdars, asamis and adhivasis are concerned they are only tenants and do not enjoy either proprietary or semi-proprietary rights. The only rights that they enjoy are to retain possession and cultivate the land so long as that right continues with them. Therefore, the only right that they have got is the right to possession and no higher right. If, therefore, the Legislature used the word "ejectment" with regard to their rights that word can only have relation to possession and it must be held that by the use of that word it was intended that they shall stand dispossessed. But, a bhumidhar has not only got a right of occupation or possession in that sense; he has also a higher right i.e. he can admit someone else to possession or tenancy and receive rent from him. See Surisetti Butchayya v. Raja Parthasarthly Appa Row, 48 IA 387 where at page 394 the Judicial Committee observed as follows: - "An owner may in one sense be in possession of his estate by the receipt of rent from the tenants of that estate, but not occupancy." The mere fact that a Bhumidhar who is an owner may not be in physical possession of the bhumidhari land owned by him would not destroy his right as a bhumidhar, and even though the land is in the occupation of an adhivasi for purposes of cultivation, the right of the bhumidhar to realise rent and to its possession as ultimate owner is not destroyed. When Section 200 of the Act speaks of a sirdar or asami not being liable to be ejected from his holding except as provided in the Act it was intended to provide that he shall not be dispossessed except in the manner provided by law. Similarly, when Section 201 provides that a sirdar shall be liable for ejectment from his holding it contemplates dispossession on any of the grounds mentioned in Secs. 165, 206 or 212 of the Act. There cannot be the least manner of doubt that the word "ejectment" as used in Section 199 has been used in respect of a totally different kind of rights than it is used in Section 200 or 201 of the Act. 165, 206 or 212 of the Act. There cannot be the least manner of doubt that the word "ejectment" as used in Section 199 has been used in respect of a totally different kind of rights than it is used in Section 200 or 201 of the Act. It is not possible to correctly define the scope of the word "ejectment" in Section 199 of the Act without keeping in mind the sweep of the rights of a bhumdihar. If the narrow meaning which Mr. Gopinath wants us to give to the word ejectment in Section 199 is given the result would he that adhivasis who would otherwise be entitled to obtain possession would stand disqualified to obtain it. It is a fundamental canon of interpretation of statutes that the various provisions in an Act should be read harmoniously in order to effectively administer them. The legislature should not be held to have given a right at one place and destroyed it in the very next place. The only method by which the various provisions in an Act, which superficially appear to conflict with each other, should be interpreted, is to give the words used in the various sections such comprehensive meanings as to make all the sections workable. We are consequently of the opinion that the word "ejectment" used in Section 199 of the Act means ejectment in the sense of extinguishment of legal rights and not mere physical dispossession. Even when an adhivasi enters possession of the land of a bhumidhar, the bhumidhar remains in constructive possession over it though the adhivasi may be in physical possession of the same. It is not possible to say that merely because an adhivasi has obtained possession of the land of a bhumidhar, all rights of the bhumidhar are extinguished and he ceases to have either the control or right over the land. Even Mr. Gopi Nath could not go to the extent of saying that the mere possession of an adhivasi over a plot of land would destroy all the rights of a bhumidhar over it. If in such a case, the bhumidhar retains some rights as admitted by Mr. Gopi Nath, then how can it be said that he has been ejected from that plot of land. If in such a case, the bhumidhar retains some rights as admitted by Mr. Gopi Nath, then how can it be said that he has been ejected from that plot of land. It was contended that even though logically it may not be possible to say that only because an adhivasi is admitted to possession by a bhumidhar, the latter loses all rights but inasmuch as the dictionary meaning of the word "ejectment" is dispossession, we must interpret that word as meaning dispossession only leaving it for the Legislature to make suitable amendments. We would only be repeating ourselves when we say that the dictionary meaning of the word "ejectment" is not so restricted. Apart from it, there is good authority for the proposition that a departure can be made even from the dictionary meanings if that leads to the proper interpretation of the will of the Legislature. see Shamrao v. District Magistrate, Thana, A.I.R. 1952 SC 324 where the Supreme Court observed as follows:- "Indeed, the law goes so far as to require the courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided." (See also Grey v. Pearson, 1857 (6) HLC 61 at p. 106 and Narayana Swami v. Emp., A.I.R. 1939 PC 47 as also Salmon v. Duncombe, 1886 (11) AC 627 at p. 634. One of us (Jagdish Sahai, J.) in Baleshwar Prasad v. Managing Committee, 1961 ALJ 722 relying upon the decisions mentioned above took the view that in order to give effect to the intention of the Legislature it as permissible to depart from the ordinary dictionary meaning of a word. We need not, however, invoke the aid of this doctrine because as we have already shown above the word "ejectment" is also used in the sense of the extinguishment of legal rights as different from mere dispossession from property. For the reasons mentioned above we are not satisfied that then is any substance in the submission of the learned counsel that by the mere delivery of possession of the land dispute to the respondent No. 2 in the capacity of an adhivasi the petitioner would stand ejected from his bhumidhari rights. We, therefore, overrule this submission of the learned counsel also. No other submission has been made before us. 5. We, therefore, overrule this submission of the learned counsel also. No other submission has been made before us. 5. The result is that we find no merits in this petition and dismiss it but there is no order as to costs.