JUDGMENT Mithan Lal, J. - This Civil revision filed by the defendant arises out of the following circumstances. 2. In this case a reference was made to arbitration and an award were dismissed and a decree was passed on the basis of the award by means of a judgment pronounced on 4th June 1959. Civil Court vacations followed from 5th June to 5th July 1959 and the Court re-opened on 6th July. On that date the defendant, who was aggrieved by the order, made an application for a copy. A notice of the copy being ready was posted on 23rd July and then the appeal was filed on 25th July. A premilinary objection was taken in appeal by the counsel for the plaintiff-respondent and it was that the appeal was not maintainable having been filed beyond time. This contention of the plaintiff, however, was accepted and the 2nd Additional District Judge, Agra, dismissed the appeal as barred by time. It against this order that the present revision has been filed. Sri S.D. Agarwal, counsel for the applicant, who has very ably argued the case, has contended that the view taken by the lower appellate court was not in accordance with law inasmuch as under Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act in computing the period of limitation for the appeal the day on which the judgment complained of is pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the decree must be excluded. According to him the judgment having been pronounced on the last day of working before the vacation, that is 4th June 1959, that day was to be excluded and as no application for copy could be made from 5th June to 5th July 1959, and as the same was made on the re-opening of the Courts on 6th July the whole period from 4th June to 5th July should be taken to be the time requisite for obtaining a copy. In support of his view he has relied upon the authorities of Saminatha Ayyar v. Venkata Subba Ayyar, 27 Mad. 21, Subramanyam v. Narasimham, 43 Mad. 640, Debi Charan Lal v. Mehdi Husain, AIR 1916 Patna 317, Munshi Mahton v. Lachman Lal, AIR 1929 Patna 615; Abdul Ghaffar v. Mt. In support of his view he has relied upon the authorities of Saminatha Ayyar v. Venkata Subba Ayyar, 27 Mad. 21, Subramanyam v. Narasimham, 43 Mad. 640, Debi Charan Lal v. Mehdi Husain, AIR 1916 Patna 317, Munshi Mahton v. Lachman Lal, AIR 1929 Patna 615; Abdul Ghaffar v. Mt. Rasulunisa, A.I.R. 1922 Oudh 39 Rana Uma Shankar Singh v. Abdul Karim Khan, ILR 17 Luck 314 and Udai Raj Singh v. Jugal Kishore Mehra, 1956 AWR (HC) 737. Sri S.N. Verma, learned advocate for the opposite party, has vehemently opposed the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant and has submitted that the period of limitation started running from 4th June 1959 and as no application for copy had been made on that date the limitation for the appeal expired during the vacation and as the application for copy was made on the reopening day the period from 4th June to 5th July could not be taken to be "period requisite for obtaining a copy." He has supported the view taken by the lower appellate court. In support of his view he has relied upon the authorities of Bechi v. Ahsanullah, 12 All. 461, Puttu Lal v. Bhagwan Dass, AIR 1938 Allahabad 106 : 1937 ALJ 1279, Raja Pande v. Sheopujan Pande, AIR 1942 Allahabad (FB) 429 : 1942 ALJ 592, Mukat Behari Lal v. Additional District Magistrate, 1959 ALJ 456. 3. The point which requires consideration in this case is whether in a case where the judgment has been delivered on the last working day of the courts, before vacation and the application for copy of the judgment and decree has been made on the reopening day of the courts, after the vacation the intervening period during which the courts remained closed can be treated to be "time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment and decree" within the meaning of Sec. 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act. In determining the question we have to keep in mind the elementary principles of law that no person shall be required to perform the impossible and that the act of the court shall prejudice no man. In determining the question we have to keep in mind the elementary principles of law that no person shall be required to perform the impossible and that the act of the court shall prejudice no man. In cases in which the judgment is pronounced on the last working day of the courts before vacation, a litigant has no control over the closing of the courts and the act of the closing of the courts cannot prejudice the rights of the litigants. It is also not possible in such cases for the litigants to make an application for a copy during the vacations. In such cases, therefore, if an application for copy has been made on the reopening day of the courts it should be deemed to he an act which has been performed with all due diligence on the removing of the obstacle or when the impossibility of the performance of the act has been removed. In other words in such cases if an application for a copy is made on the reopening day of the courts it should be treated to be an act which was performed at the earliest moment when its performance became possible. In such cases in computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeal the day on which the judgment was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy must be deemed to include the whole period from the last working day till the reopening day of the courts, that is in this case from 4th June to 5th July. An application for copy made on fifth July, that is the first working day after the reopening of the courts should be deemed to be the time requisite for obtaining the copy. It is true that the actual application for the copy was made on the reopening of the courts, but by fiction of law it must be deemed that this application for copy was made as soon as the judgment was pronounced and so the whole period from 4th June to 5th July should be taken to be the period along with the actual period taken in the preparation of the copy as the period requisite for obtaining a copy. 4. This view finds full support from the cases of Saminatha Ayyar, 27 Mad. 21 and Subramanyam, 43 Mad. 640. 4. This view finds full support from the cases of Saminatha Ayyar, 27 Mad. 21 and Subramanyam, 43 Mad. 640. In both those cases an application for copy was made on the reopening day of the courts after the vacation and it was held by the Madras High Court that the period of holidays must be taken into consideration in calculating the time requisite for obtaining a copy under Sec. 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act and must thus be excluded. In the two Oudh cases of Abdul Ghaffar, A.I.R. 1922 Oudh 39 and Rana Uma Shanker Singh, I.L.R 17 Luck. 314 a similar view was taken and it was held that when an application for copy has been made on the reopening day of the courts and the judgment was pronounced on the last working day of the courts before the vacation, the whole period of vacations must be excluded deemed as the time requisite for obtaining a copy. 5. In the two Patna cases of Debi Charan Lal, AIR 1916 Patna 317 and Munshi Mahton, AIR 1929 Patna 615 at a much wider view was taken which has not been accepted by this Court. The learned Judges of that Court went a little further and held that in excluding the period for obtaining a copy as required by Sec. 12(2) of the Limitation Act the whole of the period should be excluded whether an application for copy has been made on the reopening day or on any subsequent day. It is not necessary to express any opinion about the correctness of the view relating to application filed after the reopening day, but in some cases of this court this wider view has not been accepted. However, the fact remains that Patna High Court also favours this view. 6. A learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Udai Raj Singh, 1956 AWR (HC) 737 following the aforesaid authorities expressed the view and with all due respects I entirely agree with his view that in a case of similar type when an application has been made on the reopening day of the courts after vacation, the whole of the period of vacation should be included in the time requisite for obtaining a copy and the entire period should be excluded while computing the period of limitation under Sec. 12(2) of the Limitation Act. 7. 7. Certain observations made by the Division Bench in the case of Putti Lal AIR 1938 Allahabad 106 : 1937 A.L.J. 1279 may also be quoted with profit in support of the above view. That was a case in which an application for copy of the judgment and decree was not made on the reopening day after the vacation but later on. The Division Bench observed that: "There are certain cases in which an application for a copy has been made on the opening day after vacation and it has been held that under those circumstances under Sec. 12(2) the period of limitation may be extended by the period requisite for obtaining a copy, i.e. the period between the date of the application and the period of granting the copy." 8. The Division Bench did not agree with the Patna High Court in applying the same principle to cases where an application for copy was made after the reopening day after vacation. This case, therefore, though relied upon by Sri Verma does not give any support to the arguments submitted by him. In the Full Bench case of Raja Pande, AIR 1942 Allahabad (FB) 429 : 1942 ALJ 592 to the point under consideration was different. That was a case under the Provincial Insolvency Act and a question of application of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act and Section 4 of the Limitation Act arose. That case did not involve the consideration of Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. But all the same there are certain observations at page 437 which go to support the view taken by me because as observed by the Full Bench the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform. The case of Mukat Behari Lal, 1959 ALJ 456 is also based on the same footing and so that too does not lend any support to the views of the learned counsel for the opposite party. 9. In the case of Bechi, 12 All. 461 , however, Mahmood, J., has made certain observations at pages 472 and 473 which have been relied upon by the counsel. 9. In the case of Bechi, 12 All. 461 , however, Mahmood, J., has made certain observations at pages 472 and 473 which have been relied upon by the counsel. Firstly these observations have been made in connection with a hypothetical proposition which did not arise in that case and secondly, as rightly explained by the learned single Judge who decided the case of Udai Raj Singh, 1956 AWR (HC) 737 the facts of that case were different. In that case no application for copy had been made on the reopening day of the courts after vacation. The Court was not required to consider the effect of making an application on the reopening day after vacation when the judgment was pronounced on the last working day before the vacation. Any observation by Mahmood, J. cannot be taken to be laying down a law in this behalf. They are more obiter dicta. If the learned Judge intended to lay down a different law then with great respect I do not agree with the views expressed in that case. 10. Thus having regard to the views expressed by the Oudh Chief Court, Madras High Court, Patna High Court as also by this Court in cases where the judgment has been pronounced on the last working day before the vacation and the application for copy has been made on the reopening day after the vacation, the whole period of vacations as well as the day on which the judgment was pronounced must be reckoned to be the time requisite for obtaining a copy and must be excluded from the period of limitation under Sec. 12(2) of the Limitation Act. In this view of the matter the revision must succeed and the order passed by the learned Judge must be set aside. Before parting with the case I must acknowledge with gratitude the assistance received from Sarvshi S. D. Agarwal and S.N. Verma, counsel for the parties, who placed all the law before the Court. 11. The revision is allowed with costs. The order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Agra, is set aside. The appeal is remanded to the District Judge, Agra, with the direction to readmit it and then dispose it of according to law. Let the record of the case be sent back to the Court below forthwith.