Order Accused in C.C. No. 61 of 1959 on the file of the First Class; Magistrate's Court Trichur, who has been convicted for an offence under section 6(3) of the Indian Explosives Act (Act IV of 1884) and whose appeal before the Sessions Judge of Trichur was dismissed has filed this Revision Petition. The accused is the proprietor of Jupiter Trading Concern in Trichur, a firm licensed to possess fireworks and Chinese Crackers On 15th September, 1958, P.W. 4 the Assistant Inspector of Explosives checked the consignment of fireworks which P.W. 7 the manage of the accused had taken to the Trichur Railway Station. On checking the stock it was found some of the fireworks contained potassium chlorate. Possession of an explosive mixture containing sulphur in admixture with potassium chlorate is prohibited under the Government of India Notification No. M. 1217, dated 9th February, 1939. At the request of the accused the samples were sent to the Chemical Examiner, Trivandrum, who also certified that the samples contained potassium chlorate. The evidence of P.W. 1 the goods clerk, P.W. 2 the forwarding agent of the accused, P.W. 7 the manager and P.W. 4 the Assistant Inspector of Explosive have proved that the explosives were produced for testing preliminary to the transit by rail for and on behalf of the accused. This fact is not disputed by the accused. Possession of the explosives must be taken to be that of the accused even though it was P.W. 7 the manager who actually produced it before the Explosives Inspector. Possession of the prohibited article through his servant or agent really constitutes possession by the accused as the so-called possession of the representative is detention and not possession in a legal or juridical sense. The learned counsel appearing for the accused contends that the accused had no mens rea or the knowledge that the fireworks contained prohibited material and in the absence of such guilty knowledge he cannot be found guilty of the offence charged. It is true that actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea is a cardinal doctrine of criminal law, but the legislature can create offences which consist solely in doing an act or being in possession without any intention whatsoever. Whether mens rea is a constituent part of a crime or not must in every case depend upon the wording of the particular enactment. Whether mens rea is a constituent part of a crime or not must in every case depend upon the wording of the particular enactment. Goddard, J., in Evans v. Dell (1937) 53 T.L.R. 310 at 313 stated: “With the complexity of modern legislation one knows that there” are times when the Court is constrained to find that, by reason of the clear terms of an Act of Parliament, mens rea or the absence of mens rea becomes immaterial and that if a certain act is done, an offence is committed whether the person charged knew or did not know of the act.” In Brend v. Wood (1946) 62 T.L.R. 462 at 463 Lord Goddard, C.J., again reiterated the same principle: “It is of the utmost importance for the liberty of the subject that a Court should always bear in mind that unless a statute either clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea as a consti-tutent part of a crime, the Court should not find a man guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has a guilty mind.” In Sherras v. De Rutsen L.R. (1895) 1 Q.B. 918 at 931 Mr. Justice Wright pointed out: “There is a presumption that mens rea…………….Intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is an essential ingredient in every offence, but that ‘presumption is liable to be displaced either by the words of the statute creating the offence or by the subject-matter with which it deals, and both must be considered.” In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 9, at page 11 the learned author says: “In a limited class of offences, mens rea is not an essential element. This class consists, for the most part, of statutory offences of minor and only quasi-criminal character and, in order to determine whether mens rea is an essential element of an offence, it is necessary to look at the object and terms of the statute which creates it.” In Ravula Hariprasad Rao v. The State (1951) S.C.J. 296 His Lordship Fazl Ali, J., has observed: “Unless a statute either clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, an accused cannot be found guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has got a guilty mind.” In State v. Gaulfield Holland, Ltd. A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 70 it was held that it was open to the legislature to provide for offences where mens rea might not be an essential element and that if the legislature expressed its intention in that behalf in unambiguous and clear language, the principle that mens rea must ordinarily be established in a criminal case would have no application. This decision has been followed in a later decision of the Bombay High Court in. State v. Ismail Shakur Morani A.I.R. 1958 Bom. 103 where the entire case-law has been discussed. The charge was under section 5(3) of the Act which penalises manufacture, possession, etc., of explosives in contravention of rules made under the Act and section 6(3) penalises manufacture, possession, etc., in contravention of notifications issued under the Act. It was held: “When the Legislature enacted section 5(3) of the Act, it intended that the state of the mind of a person or his knowledge or his intention should be immaterial for the purpose of constituting an offence under that sub-section.” Thus there is a judicial agreement that in order to find whether mens rea is or is not a constituent element of an offence created by a statute we must turn to the words of the statute. The Legislature can either clearly or by necessary implication rule out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime. If the essence of the offence is solely in the doing of an act or in mere possession and nothing more was required the question of mens rea would not arise. On the other hand if the Legislature intended that the state of the mind of the doer should be a constituent part of the offence the prosecution would fail without proof of mens rea. If we look into the various sections of the Explosives Act, no such word as “knowingly” or “intentionally” occur before the word ‘imports’ or ‘possesses’. It is clear that the intention of the Legislature in enacting these provisions was that the state of the mind of the person was immaterial and irrelevant when an offence is committed. In order to gather the intention of the Legislature when the Indian Explosive Act was enacted, we may with advantage turn to the provisions of sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. In order to gather the intention of the Legislature when the Indian Explosive Act was enacted, we may with advantage turn to the provisions of sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. Section 3 says: “Any person who unlawfully and maliciously causes by any explosive substance………” Section 4 provides: “Any person who unlawfully and maliciously……..( a) does any act with intent to cause by an explosive substance……..( b) makes or has in his possession or under his control any explosive substance…… Section 5 provides: “Any person who makes or knowingly has in his possession or under his control any explosive substance……” It is, therefore, clear that when the Legislature intended that the state of the mind of a person should be a vital, constituent element of an offence, words indicative of that intention would be expressly used. But in the Indian Explosives Act , such or similar words are conspicuous by their absence, which must show beyond doubt that when the Legislature enacted sections 5 and 6 of the Act, it intended that the state of the mind of a person or his knowledge or his intention should be immaterial for the purpose of constituting an offence. The Legislature has enacted the Act and has provided that explosives should not be manufactured or that explosives should not be stocked except under conditions which would not be detrimental to the public safety, health and convenience. So stocking of prohibited explosives is made punishable without any proof of mens rea. There are other enactments, for instance, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act which penalises sale of adulterated food without proof of mens rea. For these reasons the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the accused cannot be convicted of the offence unless the requisite mens rea is proved cannot be accepted. The result is the conviction has to be confirmed and the Revision Petition has to be dismissed. Regarding the sentence it is not claimed that these fire-works containing potassium cholorate were manufactured by the petitioner himself. In Emperor v. Mahadevappa A.I.R. 1927 Bom. 209. Mr. Justice Crump in the course of his judgment said that the accused's ignorance though, is not a defence was often taken as a mitigating circumstance. Following this view, I consider, a fine of Rs.150 would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. In Emperor v. Mahadevappa A.I.R. 1927 Bom. 209. Mr. Justice Crump in the course of his judgment said that the accused's ignorance though, is not a defence was often taken as a mitigating circumstance. Following this view, I consider, a fine of Rs.150 would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. In the result, while confirming the conviction, the sentence is reduced to a fine of Rs.150. Excess fine, if paid, would be refunded. With this modification the Revision Petition is dismissed. M.C.M.-----Sentence reduced.