JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, J. 1. The second appeal is by the 17th defendant in O. S. No. 888 of 1935, on the file of the court of the District Munsiff of Kasaragod, against the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge of the same place, reversing the decision of the Trial Court. The appellant is the Executive Officer of the Veerabhadra Devaswom of Cheruvathur and the only question involved in the second appeal is a question of limitation. The Trial Court held that the suit was barred by limitation and dismissed the suit; but the lower appellate court reversed the decision and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff-lst respondent for a portion of the plaint claim. The second appeal seeks to set aside the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge. 2. The Veerabhadra Devaswom had three trustees, the trusteeship having been vested in the karnavans of three tarwads. Two of the trustee-ship having been vested in the karnavans of three tarwads. Two of the trustees appointed the plaintiff-1st respondent, who is a junior member of one of" the said two families, as Samudayi of the Devaswom under a power of attorney dated 29th August, 1931. Though there was dispute in the lower courts regarding the validity of this appointment, because of the non junction of the third trustee, that point has not been seriously pressed before me. The plaintiff continued in management of the Devaswom, when two of the trustees issued a notice on 17th September, 1932 terminating or cancelling the power of attorney granted to him. Thereafter, according to the plaintiff, though he received the notice, he continued in management till 27th January, 1933. The suit, out of which the second appeal has arisen, was filed on 23rd September, 1935 for the recovery of amounts alleged to have been spent by the plaintiff in the course of his management of the affairs of the Devaswom after adjusting payments received by him from tenants and other debtors of the Devaswom. The only contention of the defendants, with which 1 am concerned in the second appeal, is one of limitation. According to them the agency or power of attorney was terminated on 17th September, 1932 and the suit which was filed on 23rd September, 1935, that is more than three years from the said termination, is barred by limitation. The only contention of the defendants, with which 1 am concerned in the second appeal, is one of limitation. According to them the agency or power of attorney was terminated on 17th September, 1932 and the suit which was filed on 23rd September, 1935, that is more than three years from the said termination, is barred by limitation. On the other hand, the plaintiff's case is that he continued in management till 27th January, 1933 and the suit filed on 23rd September, 1935 is well within time. 3. One of the grounds on which the lower appellate court held that the suit was not barred by limitation is that the suit was for the balance due on a mutual, open and current account, under which there had been reciprocal demands between the parties. Being so, according to the lower appellate court, the Article applicable to the case is Art. 85 of the Indian Limitation Act, the period of limitation being three years from the close of the year in which the last item admitted or proved is entered in the account, such year to be computed as in the account. If this view is correct, the suit is within time; for, the last item in the account, even according to the defendants, being on 17th September, 1932, the period of limitation is three years from the close of that accounting year in which 17th September, 1932 falls and that would undisputedly go beyond 23rd September, 1935, on which the suit was instituted. Therefore, the question in the second appeal resolves itself to this; namely, whether the account on which the suit is brought is a mutual, open and current account, under which there have been reciprocal demands between the parties. It is clear that an open account is one which is continuous or current, uninterrupted or unclosed by settlement or otherwise, consisting of several transactions. It is equally clear that an account current is an open or running account between two or more parties or, an account which contains items between the parties from which the balance due to one of them is, or can be, ascertained. (Vide Ram Pershad v. Harbans Singh (VI Cal. LJ 158)) As a matter of fact it is not seriously disputed that the account in this case is open and current, the only dispute being whether the account contains mutual dealings with reciprocal demands. (Vide Ram Pershad v. Harbans Singh (VI Cal. LJ 158)) As a matter of fact it is not seriously disputed that the account in this case is open and current, the only dispute being whether the account contains mutual dealings with reciprocal demands. 4. A very early authority on this question is a Division Bench ruling of Holloway Ag. C. J. and Innes J. in Hirada Basappa v. Gadigi Muddappa (VI MHCR 142) wherein Holloway Ag. C. J. observed: "To be mutual there must be transactions on each side creating independent obligations on the other, and not merely transactions which create obligations on the one side, those on the other being merely complete or partial discharges of such obligations." Another early authority on the point is the judgment of Mookerjee J. in Ram Pershad v. Harbans Singh (VI C. L. J. 158) which has already been referred to, wherein the learned Judge approved the aforesaid statement of the law by Holloway Ag. C. J. and observed: "that a shifting balance, sometimes in favour of one side, sometimes in favour of the other, is a test of mutuality, but its absence is not conclusive proof against mutuality." In another part of the same judgment Mookerjee J. observed : "In order to prove a mutual and open account current, it is sufficient to prove mutual dealings between the parties consisting of sales made, or services performed, by each party, to, or for the other, creating mutual debts or reciprocal demands" These decisions have been considered in a later Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Kunhi Kuttiali v. Kunhammad (AIR 1923 Mad. 278) and Schwabe C. J. speaking for the Court explained the first passage quoted above from the judgment of Mookerjee J. thus : "The meaning of that, as I understand it, is that, it you may get a balance in favour of either party, it follows that there must be mutual liabilities of both parties to each other; if the balance is always in favour of one party in the very nature or the transactions, there you have got a case where you have not separate mutual dealings." The second passage from the judgment of Mookerjee J. extracted above Schwabe C. J. explained in the following terms: "I think that is a fair statement of the principle to be applied and one has to look at each particular case and see if it is really a case of a debtor and creditor only or a case of mutual obligations which will in the ordinary way result in enforceable liabilities on either side." In The Tea Financing Syndicate Ltd. v. Chandra Kamal Bez Barns (ILR 58 Cal. 649 : AIR 1931 Cal. 359) all the authorities were reviewed by Rankin C. J. and the learned Judge held that the presence of a shifting balance alone was not the test, but the reciprocity of dealing and the right to mutual demand formed the essential ingredients of a mutual, open and current account. 5. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Forest Company v. Lal Chand ( AIR 1959 SC 1349 ) A. K. Sarkar J. who delivered the judgment of the Court, after referring to the judgment of Rankin C. J. with approval in the last mentioned case, held that the account in the case before the Supreme Court was not mutual. In that case the parties entered into an agreement in writing for the supply, by the sellers to the buyer, of 5,000 maunds of certain goods at the rates and times specified. On the date of agreement the buyer paid to the sellers Rs. 3,000/- and had agreed to pay a further sum of Rs. 10,000/- within ten or twelve days as advance and the balance due for the price of goods delivered after the expiry of every month. The said sum of Rs. On the date of agreement the buyer paid to the sellers Rs. 3,000/- and had agreed to pay a further sum of Rs. 10,000/- within ten or twelve days as advance and the balance due for the price of goods delivered after the expiry of every month. The said sum of Rs. 10,000/- was also paid and thereafter various quantities of goods were delivered by the sellers to the buyer, though not strictly at the times specified in the contract and those deliveries were accepted by the buyer. The buyer in turn made various payments towards the price of the goods, not month by month ; but the price was not paid in full. The suit was brought for the balance of the price of goods more than three years after the last delivery of goods. The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir held that the suit was not barred by limitation, but on appeal the Supreme Court, holding that the account was not mutual, dismissed the suit. The learned Judge made it clear in the judgment that what in fact had happened was that the sellers had undertaken to make delivery of goods and the buyer had agreed to pay for them and had in part made the payment in advance and that in so far as the payments had been made after the goods had been delivered, they had been made towards the price due, such payments being only in discharge of the obligations created in the buyer by the deliveries of goods made by the sellers to pay the price of the goods delivered and not creating any obligation on the sellers in favour of the buyer. Regarding the payment of advance of Rs. Regarding the payment of advance of Rs. 13,000/- the learned Judge observed that that amount was paid in discharge of obligations to arise under the contract, the amount having been paid under the terms of the contract, which was to buy goods and pay for them ; that the payment did not itself create any obligation on the sellers in favour of the buyer, it having not been intended to amount to an independent transaction detached from the rest of the contract; that the sellers were under an obligation to deliver the goods, but that obligation arose from the contract and not from the payment of advance alone and that if the sellers had failed to deliver goods, they would have been liable to refund the monies advanced on account of the price and might also have been liable in damages, but such liability would then have arisen from the contract and not from the fact of the advances having been made. 6. The foregoing discussion of the authorities reveals that, to constitute mutuality, there must be transactions on either side, creating independent obligations on the other, and not merely transactions which create obligations on the one side, the transactions on the other being in discharge, partial or in full, of such obligations; that where there is a case of shifting balance, the balance sometimes being in favour of one party and sometimes in favour of the other, it is usually a test of mutuality (that by itself not being a conclusive test), but its absence does not necessarily go against mutuality, reciprocity of dealing and the right to mutual demand being the essential ingredients; that to prove a mutual and open account current, it is enough to prove mutual dealings between the parties consisting of sales made, or services rendered by one party to, or for the other thus creating mutual obligations or reciprocal demands; and that one has to look at each particular case and see if it is really a case of a debtor and creditor only or a case of mutual transactions, which in the ordinary way result in enforceable claims against either side. 7. In the case before me, the accounts reveal that the plaintiff has collected various amounts due to the Devaswom from its tenants and debtors on different dates. 7. In the case before me, the accounts reveal that the plaintiff has collected various amounts due to the Devaswom from its tenants and debtors on different dates. The accounts also show that the plaintiff has met several expenses in connection with the management of the Devaswom and has also paid some amounts to the trustees on different dates, mostly from his pocket, that is in excess of the amounts received by him. From these facts it is clear that, as and when the plaintiff collected any amount from a tenant or debtor of the Devaswom, he became liable to account for that amount, because of his collecting the same, independently of any other contract. Similarly, as and when he paid any amount from his pocket, in the course of the management of the affairs of the Devaswom in discharge of any liability against the Devaswom, or, as and when he paid any amount to the trustees, by virtue of such payment alone, he became entitled, independently of any other contract, to recover that amount from the Devaswom. It is thus clear that the several transactions between the parties, evidenced by the entries in the accounts in this case, are transactions creating independent obligations on the parties, thereby creating mutual obligations or corresponding right to reciprocal demands. In other words, this is not a case of a debtor and creditor only; but is a case of mutual transactions creating mutual obligations and reciprocal claims against either side. The accounts are clearly mutual, open and current. 8. But Mr. Achuthan Nambiar, the appellant's learned advocate contends that, if the accounts in this case reveal that the obligation is always one-sided, that is, if throughout the accounts one party is always found to be owing and at no stage in the accounts the other party is found to be liable in any amount, then the account is not mutual. In other words, Mr. Achuthan Nambiar contends that in this case the accounts would reveal that the Devaswom was always liable, at all stages, to the plaintiff, the shifting balance having been throughout in favour of the plaintiff and the receipts by the plaintiff from the tenants and other debtors of the Devaswom being merely partial discharges of such obligation to the plaintiff, and therefore the accounts are not mutual. For one thing, the test of mutuality as laid down in the decisions cited above is usually, and not conclusively, a shifting balance, sometimes in favour of one side and sometimes in favour of the other, but the absence of such shifting balance is not always a test against mutuality. Therefore, even if there is no shifting balance in favour of one of the parties at some time or other, it cannot be said that the account is not mutual, if really the transactions create mutual obligations, though not a balance in favour of one of the parties. Secondly, in this case, the accounts do not reveal, as a matter of fact, that the balance has always been in favour of the plaintiff, I mean, the Devaswom having been always liable and the plaintiff always entitled to recover. There are moments, during the period for which accounts have been kept, when the plaintiff was found to be in possession of Devaswom funds in excess of the amounts due to him at those moments. Thus, in any view of the matter, the accounts are mutual, open and current. The consequence is that Art. 85 of the Limitation Act applies with the result that the suit is within time. The second appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs of the contesting respondent.